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AMERICAN

JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY


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VOLUME LXIX

405
"002"

BALTIMORE: THE JOHNS HOPKINS PRESS

LONDON: ARTHUR F. BIRD

PARIS: ALBERT FONTENOING

LEIPZIG: F. A. BROCKHAUS

1948

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MASSILIAN DIPLOMACY BEFORE THE SECOND PUNIC WAR.

Roman and Greek historians devote slight attention to the rôle played by Massilia in the events or policies leading to the Second Punic War.¹ It has long been assumed, however, that Massilian influence on Roman policy was greater than would appear from the tradition,² and there are good grounds for supporting this view. To the evidence of friendly relations between Massilia and Rome dating at least from the fourth century B. C.³ may be added the assumption that these states would be mutually concerned about the eastward expansion of Carthaginian power in Spain. This concern grew increasingly more

¹ Massilia is not mentioned, except incidentally (*Polybius*, II, 32), until the end of the period between the First and Second Punic Wars, and then merely as the source of information sought by the Roman ambassadors returning from Carthage about the attitude of the Gauls in the impending struggle with Hannibal (*Livy*, XXI, 20). But Massilians may have been among the "other Greeks who dwelt in the neighborhood of Emporiae and in other parts of Spain" (*Appian, Iber.*, II, 7 [Loeb]) who sent ambassadors to Rome.

² Cf. B. L. Hallward, *C. A. H.*, VIII, p. 31: "Nor does the tradition sufficiently emphasize the effect of Massiliote diplomacy in urging Rome to challenge the eastward expansion of Carthage in Spain." The importance of Massilian diplomacy is noted also by T. Frank, *C. A. H.*, VII, pp. 309-10, *Roman Imperialism* (New York, 1914), pp. 121-2, H. Scullard, *A History of the Roman World from 753 to 146 B. C.* (London, 1935), p. 201, J. Nap, *Die Römische Republik* (Leiden, 1935), pp. 54-5, 226, and 338, G. De Sanctis, *Storia dei Romani* (Turin, 1916), III, 1, pp. 307 and 410-12, A. Schulten, *C. A. H.*, VII, pp. 787-8, and F. Oertel, *Rh. Mus.*, LXXXI (1932), p. 224.

³ Diodorus Siculus, XIV, 93, 4, Appian, *Ital.*, VIII, 1, Justin, XLIII, 5, 8 ff.

acute when the Romans were in conflict with the Gauls, and the possibility of a Gallic-Carthaginian coalition had become serious. To such a threat the rapprochement of Massilia and Rome would be the natural response: by 218 the Massilians had become allies of Rome.⁴ It may, then, be taken for granted that diplomatic negotiations were conducted by Massilia and Rome before the Second Punic War dealing with the impact of developments in Spain and northern Italy upon their national security.

That the effectiveness of Massilian propaganda may be gauged by the degree to which it appealed to Rome's self-interest is recognized by Frank in his comments on the dispatch of the embassy to Hasdrubal in 226. "If Rome cared little for the question of open ports in Spain, the Massilians had other ways of arousing her interest. They could urge that a Punic attack upon Emporiae would be a declaration of war against Massilia, which, in turn, must involve Rome because of their alliance; and she could din into the ears of Roman senators the reports that were current in Spain that the ultimate purpose of the Barcids was a war of revenge upon Rome. Her diplomacy was effective, at any rate."⁵

It is here assumed that Rome at this time was alarmed by the direct threat of the Carthaginian expansion to herself. But in the twenty-year period between the First Punic War and the Saguntine episode, when Carthage was extending her power and steadily threatening Massilian trade and security, there were only two occasions when Rome was moved to intervene in Spain (in 231 and 226), in both instances under stress of danger from the Gauls. To the Roman Senate of this period Rome's self-interest—the key to her policy—was concerned not so much with the threat of the Carthaginian advance in Spain to Massilian trade (though this was undoubtedly a contributory factor) nor to Rome directly, as with the impact of the advance upon the Gauls and the possibility of their receiving active assistance from the Carthaginians.⁶

For a clear understanding of the motivation of the Roman government during these years it is essential to appreciate the gravity of the Gallic crisis and the vagueness to the Roman mind

⁴ Livy, *loc. cit.*

⁵ *Roman Imperialism*, p. 122.

⁶ See p. 10, *infra*.

of the danger from Carthage; Rome's primary concern and certainly her major resources were directed toward the defeat of the terrible Celtic barbarian. Polybius leaves no doubt of the impression left by these wars upon the contemporary mind: "Thus were destroyed these Celts during whose invasion (225), the most serious that had ever occurred, all the Italians and especially the Romans had been exposed to great and terrible peril."⁷ And again: "Such was the war against the Celts, a war which, if we look to the desperation and daring of the combatants and the numbers who took part and perished in the battles, is second to no war in history."⁸

The effectiveness of Massilia's propaganda can best be gauged, then, by her success in convincing the Romans that their peril from the Gauls would be enormously increased by the Carthaginian conquest of Spain. Her propaganda would become more effective in proportion as these potential dangers were focused in concrete and immediate crises and as their implications were understood by the Roman magistrates at the helm of the state during crucial periods. How did these dangers come into focus? What was the character of the Roman administration called upon to face them? To what extent was the administration aware of the larger issues involved and willing to meet them aggressively? The answers to these questions, in view of the silence of Roman tradition regarding Massilia's influence, may provide the approach to an understanding of what Roman policy in the North and West owed to her diplomacy.

Attempts to discover a consistent long-range foreign or domestic policy⁹ have not met with wide acceptance; Rome is

⁷ II, 31, 7 (Loeb).

⁸ *Idem*, II, 35, 2. Nap (*op. cit.*, p. 6) well portrays the intensity of Rome's concern.

⁹ E. g., the view that Rome sought to find a settlement with Carthage in the geo-political sense (E. Täubler, *Vorgeschichte des zweiten punischen Kriegs* [Berlin, 1921]); that Roman policy must be interpreted against a background of opposition between an agrarian party under Flamininus whose outlook was confined to Italy and a capitalistic group interested in *Weltpolitik* (Meyer, *op. cit.*); that Rome consistently sought to preserve the Italian race-federation (M. Gelzer, *Hermes*, LXVIII [1933], p. 151); that in Spain the Ebro-River was intended to define Carthaginian and Roman "spheres of influence" (Frank, *Roman Imperialism*, p. 135, n. 28, lists several proponents of this point of view).

believed rather to have applied practical remedies to each situation as it arose.¹⁰ The history of this period, however, shows a marked consistency in the march of events themselves, with crises of similar character repeated at intervals (viz., in 231, 226 and, with the exception of the Gauls, 219). It would appear that certain noble Roman families, faced with recurring issues, were aligned in each instance into the same opposition groups, depending upon whether they favored intervention in Spain as an integral part of the program of national security or were convinced that defensible frontiers of the Italian peninsula were effective bulwarks against any danger that might arise. Continuity of senatorial policy as such cannot be found; it must be remembered, however, that, in this century, at least, we must not look for a governmental foreign policy comparable to that of modern states, a continuity of action generally undisturbed by changes of administration. The shaping of policy was, rather, in the hands of certain noble families who were constantly strengthening their ranks by the inclusion in their circles of lesser noble, and frequently plebeian, families, so that in general the course of foreign policy may be charted through the particular circles in control in critical periods, during which their reactions can be clearly discerned. This is neither to postulate a far-sighted policy nor to infer a lack of connection between the several phases of Rome's response to recurring perils. It is simply historical fact that, in precisely those years when Rome acted to forestall the possibility of a Gallic-Carthaginian coalition, members of the same or related circles (viz., the Aemilii and the democratic leaders) were in control of policy and were in each period opposed by the same group.

Scarcely three years after the First Punic War those developments began to be manifest which were characteristic of the next twenty-three years: the sporadic movements of the Gauls from the northwest, the efforts of the Roman government to keep the Carthaginians as far removed as possible from Italian shores, and the Carthaginian aggrandizement in Spain. Conflicts with the Ligurians throughout the years 238-236 are reported,¹¹ and

¹⁰ Scullard, *op. cit.*, p. 201, Frank, *op. cit.*, pp. 120-1 and *C. A. H.*, VII, p. 816. Täubler, *op. cit.*, pp. 79-80, believes that the attempt to formulate the opposition of parties drops the concrete aim from sight.

¹¹ Zonaras, VIII, 18; Livy, Epit., XX; Orosius, IV, 12.

in 236 the Gauls were on the march toward Ariminum; ¹² in 238 the Romans seized Sardinia (though its conquest and that of Corsica were not completed until 231); and the following year the Carthaginians, to rebuild their empire after the loss of Sicily and Sardinia, moved into Spain. By 235, however, the Romans closed the doors of the temple of Janus, believing that they had successfully quelled the disturbances in northern Italy and Sardinia.

In this initial phase, concluded by a symbolic act of peace by the consuls T. Manlius Torquatus and C. Atilius Bulbus II, there is slight indication of an aggressive foreign policy. Rome showed by the seizure of Sardinia, however, that she had come to appreciate the strategic value of the island to Carthage and was willing to take the necessary steps to make good her failure to include it in the peace terms of 241.¹³ With the campaigns against the Ligurians, perhaps prompted in part by Massilia's desire to rid her trade-routes of piracy,¹⁴ may be linked the invasion of Corsica in 236, for no settlement was permanent so long as the Corsicans and their kinsmen the Ligurians were able to assist one another against the Romans.¹⁵ The campaigns in

¹² Polybius, II, 21.

¹³ The seizure of Sardinia is variously interpreted: as part of a consistent policy of marking out a sphere of influence (Täubler, *op. cit.*, p. 77), as a move consequent upon Hamilcar's arrival in Spain (Meyer, *op. cit.*, p. 387), as the result of a reversal of policy occasioned by the annual change of magistrates (Frank, *Roman Imperialism*, p. 113), as the desire to keep the Carthaginians out of territory adjacent to Italy (Scullard, *op. cit.*, p. 180). It seems clear that the demands of national security were justification enough in the Roman mind for seizing the island.

¹⁴ Cf. Scullard, *op. cit.*, p. 184. Though not directly threatened by the periodic movements of the Gauls into Italy, Massilia was nevertheless on the periphery of the storm area: in the region above Massilia the Gauls, among them the Gaesati, were massing in 231 for their offensive against Rome six years later (cf. Polybius, II, 22-23). Moreover, Sardinia and Corsica, particularly in the hands of the Carthaginians, could become a powerful sea-blockade against Massilia (F. Altheim, *Weltherrschaft und Krise Epochen der römischen Geschichte* [Frankfurt am Main, 1935], II, p. 23).

¹⁵ G. Giannelli, *Istituto di Studi Romani, Storia di Romani*, II: *Roma nell' età delle Guerre Puniche* (Bologna, 1938), p. 109; Scullard, *loc. cit.*

Sardinia and northern Italy were already bringing to the attention of the Roman government the wider implications of extra-peninsular expansion.¹⁶

The developments initiated in 238 appear in sharp relief in the years 233-231. This period is marked by intense rivalry between the leading noble families and by the growth of democratic power under the leadership of Flaminius. In these years the Gauls were busy with preparations for war upon Italy, and Hamilcar was advancing with alarming rapidity in Spain. In 231 the Romans intervened in Spain for the first time. The simultaneity of these events is no mere coincidence: the Roman government was awakened, perhaps by Massilia,¹⁷ to the realization that the dual threat from the West and the North might soon become one, and the effect of this contingency upon Rome's foreign policy would be sure to sharpen whatever differences there were between the leading factions. For it was by no means clear at this time how far Rome must go to secure her boundaries without committing herself to involvement in the western Mediterranean.

It is impossible to determine how those circles which were in control of foreign policy aligned themselves from 238 to 233.¹⁸ But from 233 to 230 the maze of political alliances and the cross-currents of opposition are well marked. The ascendancy of the powerful Fabius Maximus Verrucosus comes in a period of pronounced Aemilian and democratic dominance.¹⁹ This singular fact is regarded by Münzer²⁰ as evidence of an alliance between

¹⁶ Cf. Frank, *Roman Imperialism*, p. 114: "The incident (the seizure of Sardinia) is highly important in showing that Rome was acquiring . . . a wider view of her possible interest in neighboring lands."

¹⁷ See p. 9, *infra*.

¹⁸ The consuls of 238, Ti. Sempronius Gracchus and P. Valerius Falto, belonged to the Claudian circle (W. Schur, *Das Erbe der Alten* [Leipzig, 1927], Neue Folge, XIII, pp. 115-16, and *Hermes*, LIX [1924], p. 471); no one family enjoyed control in 237 and 236. The influence of the Fabian circle begins in 235 in the consulship of T. Manlius and C. Atilius Bulbus II (F. Münzer, *Römische Adelsparteien und Adelsfamilien* [Stuttgart, 1920], p. 57, Schur, *Das Erbe der Alten*, p. 108).

¹⁹ Of the eight consuls of 233-230 Fabius is the sole outsider, all the others being members of the Aemilian circle (see pp. 12-13, *infra*).

²⁰ *Op. cit.*, p. 184. Schur (*Das Erbe der Alten*, p. 110) rightly believes that Fabius was "in scharfer Kampfstellung" to the Aemili.

Fabius and the Aemilii, but all developments in these and later years point to the contrary. The emergence of democratic influence, apparent not only in the plebeian consulships of the Pomponii, M. Junius Pera, and M. Publicius Malleolus,²¹ but particularly in the tribuneship of Flaminius, is significantly illustrated by the success of the tribune's agrarian bill (to allot to Roman citizens the *ager Gallicus*) against the opposition of the Senate. But, as it will be seen, the issues went deeper than the traditional conflict between patrician and plebeian and were more complex. Flaminius' measure had a bearing on foreign as well as on domestic policy, and there were noble families in sympathy with its wider implications.²² How were these internal political struggles inter-related? To what extent were they touched off by the mounting threat of war? What relation do they bear to the measures taken by the Roman government to forestall it?

The immediate concern of the government was the Sardinian question. In 235 the Sardinians and Corsicans revolted, purportedly at the instigation of the Carthaginians, and the Ligurians likewise renewed the conflict.²³ The persistence of Rome's efforts to reduce these peoples has surprised some modern writers,²⁴ and it is indeed difficult to explain unless the impu-

²¹ It is noteworthy that the consuls of 233-231 were all, with the exception of Fabius, previously obscure figures: the families of M. Aemilius Lepidus and C. Papirius Maso had long been in obscurity, and the plebeian Pomponii and Publicius were the only representatives of their families to reach the consulship (Münzer, *op. cit.*, pp. 160-1). Their elevation is attributed by Frank (*C. A. H.*, VII, p. 806) to the democratic ferment made possible by the reform of the centuries, but the date of this reform is uncertain and Nap may be right (*op. cit.*, p. 175) in referring it to the year 225, since, along with chronological considerations, the impending war might well call for comprehensive revision. Internal political developments, moreover, will hardly suffice to explain the concentration of these hitherto little known persons in positions of the highest responsibility within this three-year period. The explanation of their ascendancy must take into account the impact upon Roman politics of external events.

²² See pp. 10-11, *infra*.

²³ Zonaras, *loc. cit.*

²⁴ Cf. Frank, *C. A. H.*, VII, p. 805. Meyer (*op. cit.*, pp. 385, n. 1, 387, n. 2, 389) rejects the charges against Carthage (made first in the year 237 according to Livy, *Epit.*, XX; Orosius, IV, 11, 2; Eutropius,

tations of Carthaginian complicity are taken seriously. In the light of Polybius' statement that the resentment of Carthage over the loss of Sardinia was among the causes of the Hannibalic War,²⁵ it seems natural to suppose that Carthage would seek to embarrass the Romans by fomenting rebellion among the natives. But whether the charges were well founded or not, the fact that they had gained currency reveals that the Roman government was alive to what Carthaginian intervention might mean; the islands were, in fact, a laboratory demonstration of the seriousness of focalized infection.

Far more serious, however, was the danger to the north. In 233 Fabius had extended the Roman dominion beyond Genoa; the following year Flamininus' agrarian bill to apportion the *ager Gallicus* among the citizens served notice to the Gauls that Roman policy had gone beyond the stage of periodic skirmishing. The conviction was growing on both sides that a crisis was imminent:²⁶ the Boii and Insubres formed a league and enlisted the aid of the Gaesati near the Rhone; the Romans countered with feverish if confused preparations for defense. Polybius, following the Fabian interpretation, fixes the responsibility for inciting the Gauls on Flamininus, a reflection of the opinion of some conservative senators that the division of the *ager Gallicus* was the step which convinced the Gauls "that now the Romans no longer made war on them for the sake of supremacy and sovereignty, but with a view to their total expulsion and extermination."²⁷ In answer to this charge it is argued that the war

III, 2) as unhistorical; Giannelli (*loc. cit.*) considers them authentic. Polybius' silence on Carthaginian intervention is not surprising: the Fabian circle dominating Roman policy during these years, when the government was disinclined to renew the conflict with Carthage, would hardly circulate these inflammatory reports.

²⁵ III, 13, 1: *συνεπέτευε δὲ αὐτῷ [Τρυπαλῷ] τὴν δργήν . . . τὰ κατὰ Σαρδόνα.*

²⁶ *Idem*, II, 22, Cicero, *De Officiis*, I, 38. M. Gelzer (*Herrnes*, LXVIII [1933], p. 150) believes that "nicht das Plebisitz an und für sich, sondern seine Durchführung die Boier beunruhigte," apparently accepting 228 as the year in which the bill was passed. The évidénce for the date is contradictory, Polybius (II, 21, 7-8) assigning the bill to 232, Cicero (*De Sen.*, 11) to 228. Münzer (*R.-E.*, s.v. "Flamininus," col. 2497) is probably right in his conjecture that the distribution of land extended up to the latter year.

²⁷ II, 21, 9 (Loeb).

with the Gauls did not come until the eighth year after the division of Picenum,²⁸ that the subjugation of the Po region was a long-standing policy.²⁹ But Polybius is right to the extent that the Gauls recognized how different a policy of permanent settlement³⁰ was from the annual campaigns which the Romans had hitherto conducted whenever danger seemed to threaten. If the Gauls and certain conservative senators could foresee the consequences of this settlement, it is hardly less probable that the sponsor of the bill himself and those who supported it were aware of them.

But before the pattern of Roman policy toward the Gauls can be drawn more precisely, it will be necessary to consider its relation to developments in Spain. Hamilcar had been moving steadily northward and was not far from Saguntum, with which Massilia had trade relations. Alarmed by the growing threat to her trade along the east coast of Spain, Massilia must have apprised the Senate of the gravity of these developments in the hope that Rome would intervene to check the Carthaginian advance. The moment which Massilia chose to make her appeal was indeed unpropitious: events in distant Spain could scarcely have seemed urgent to a Senate absorbed in the danger from the Gauls. But the advantages derivable from these negotiations were by no means unilateral: Rome reaped the benefits of Massilia's position as a friendly observation post between her potential enemies.³¹ From her vantage point Massilia could see the storm forming in two directions; she could hardly have failed to point out the significance of these movements to Rome. And the controlling circle in the Roman government at this time showed itself capable of understanding the relationship of a

²⁸ Cf. Polybius, II, 23, 1: ἔτει μετὰ τὴν τῆς χώρας διάδοσιν ὀγδόῳ. De Sanctis, *op. cit.*, p. 305; Meyer, *op. cit.*, p. 397.

²⁹ Meyer, *op. cit.*, p. 395.

³⁰ If the alliance with the Veneti and Cenomani fell in this period (Meyer, *loc. cit.*) rather than in 225 (Polybius, II, 23, followed by Nap, *op. cit.*, pp. 11, 59), it would strengthen the Gauls' conviction (if they knew of the alliance) that Rome was in northern Italy to stay.

³¹ The movements of the Gauls' allies, the Gaesati, who lived near the Rhone, were doubtless relayed to Rome by Massilia. Strabo, IV, 1, 5, and 9, suggests Massilia's value to Rome as a guard against any hostile assault on the south coast of Gaul (cf. Chester Starr, *A.J.P.*, LXIV [1943], p. 58, n. 5).

stable frontier in northern Italy to the progress of Carthage in Spain. In 231 an embassy was dispatched to Hamilcar to secure information concerning his movements and intentions.³²

The adoption of an aggressive and far-reaching policy in northern Italy and the decision, in view of Massilian alarm over Hamilcar's advance and of the danger to Rome if the Carthaginians should proffer aid to the Gauls, to intervene for the first time in Spain fall in a period when the Aemilian party was in the ascendancy and when democratic influence was at its height.³³ From this fact two premises may be made: (1) that the Aemilian party was aware in these years,³⁴ as in 226-225, of the broader implications of national security and was accordingly receptive to Massilian propaganda, and (2) that Flaminius' measure, which must be considered in its wider context as a step to stabilize the northern frontier as well as a move in the arena of domestic politics to strengthen the plebeians, was an integral part—in fact if not in intention—of the foreign policy of the Aemilian consuls of this period.³⁵ The program of the Aemilius

³² Dio, frag. 48: πρέσβεις ποτὲ ἐπὶ κατασκοπῇ . . . ἀπέστελλαν.

³³ That this is not mere coincidence is clear from the recurrence of the situation in 226-225.

³⁴ In 230, according to Zonaras (VIII, 19), the Romans forbade the giving of gold or silver to the Gauls because they feared that the money might be used against themselves; the law is discussed by Nap, *op. cit.*, pp. 5-6, 354.

³⁵ Nap (*op. cit.*) devotes a chapter (VII) to the conflict between Flaminius and M. Aemilius Lepidus over the passing of the agrarian bill of 232, basing his argument chiefly on Valerius Maximus, V, 4, 5: . . . cum (C. Flaminius) tribunus plebis legem de Gallico agro viritim dividendo invito et repugnante senatu promulgasset, preciosus minisque eius aserrime resistens ac ne exercitu quidem adversum se conscripto, si in eadem sententia perseveraret, absterritus. . . . Of the opposition of the Senate to the bill there is, of course, no doubt (cf. Polybius II, 21, 8; Cicero, *De Inv.*, II, 52, *Acad. Pr.*, II, 13, *De Sen.*, 11). But except for Valerius Maximus, the tradition makes no mention of calling out the army, for Cicero says only that the bill was passed *invito senatu*, and Polybius concerns himself with its supposed demoralizing influence and its provocative effect upon the Gauls. Moreover it was Feibus, rather than Aemilius, who was presiding over the Senate when the bill was under discussion (cf. p. 13, n. 46, *infra*). The local political ramifications of the *lex Flaminia* may have been much greater than the tradition would lead us to suppose. It may, for example, have provided for the commission to allot the land and have sought to insure the success of

and the democratic consuls of the Aemilian party and that of Flamininus converged at the point at which aggressive action to establish a strong frontier against the Gauls was related to the policy of committing Rome to a possible intervention beyond the borders of Italy.

The concrete expression of these policies may be observed clearly in the reactions of the Roman government in Spain and in northern Italy, and in the conflicts and maneuvering in Rome between candidates for high office.

As we have said, it was to Rome's advantage to keep in touch with Massilia; doubtless at Massilia's suggestion³⁶ Rome sent an embassy to Hamilcar. The assumptions, drawn from Dio's account,³⁷ that the ambassadors were authorized to do no more than to investigate the reasons for the Carthaginian advance and that they returned apparently satisfied with Hamilcar's explanation that his conquests were necessary to furnish the means for paying the indemnity imposed by the peace terms of 241, would indeed afford no ground for concluding that Rome entertained serious intentions of intervening in Spain. Yet one may well ask why Rome should have signed a treaty with Saguntum in this year³⁸ if she did not intend to act upon a

the program by legal curbs upon the magistrates who might attempt to disrupt it (cf. Nap, *op. cit.*, pp. 111-120). With such provisions Aemilius probably was no more in sympathy than were the other senators, and he may even have shared the view that Roman settlers in the *ager Gallicus* would be exposed to the fury of the Gauls rather than form a bulwark against them (*ibid.*, pp. 2, 54). But whatever Aemilius' personal attitude toward the aggressive tribune or his view of the regulatory provisions of the *lex Flaminia* may have been, the program of his own circle of intervening in Spain in the face of the mounting threat of Gallic invasion was integrally related to the attempt of Flamininus to strengthen the northern frontier; however divergent the roots of their policies, the movement of events brought their aims into close alignment.

³⁶ Hallward, *op. cit.*, p. 27; cf. Schulten, *op. cit.*, p. 787.

³⁷ *Loc. cit.*

³⁸ Täubler's conjecture (*op. cit.*, p. 44) that the treaty was signed in 231 is generally accepted, e. g., by Frank (*C. A. H.*, VII, p. 809), P. Schnabel (*Klio*, XX [1926], p. 111), Oertel (*loc. cit.*); E. Groag (*Hannibal als Politiker* [Vienna, 1929], p. 55) argues for 221-220. Polybius (III, 30) says only that the treaty was arranged several years before the time of Hannibal: πλεοσιν ἔτεσιν ἡδη πρότερον τῶν καὶ Ἀννίβαν καιρῶν.

renewal of the Carthaginian threat. Since, as Dio says,³⁹ Rome had as yet no interests in Spain, the treaty is indicative of a claim to intervene when potential danger threatened—a policy very different from that of manning the bulwarks whenever the foe appeared. The administration in these years was prepared to establish a diplomatic foothold in the West as well as a military frontier in the North.⁴⁰

That this frontier was the concern of the extreme aristocrats, Fabius and Marcellus, there can be no doubt: the former in these years and the latter in 222 vigorously pursued the war against the Gauls.⁴¹ But they did so only when war was upon them. The Fabian party had had ample incentive to adopt measures for a permanently effective defense when the Gauls threatened Ariminum in 236⁴² and an excellent opportunity to do so through their control of policy in the years immediately following. Their inaction means simply that they saw the Gallic danger in a narrower context than did the Aemilian party and Flaminius, and that they were apparently content to meet the crises as they arose rather than to commit Rome to what they may have believed to be provocative moves to forestall hypothetical perils.

In the light of these differences over foreign policy, let us examine the internal political struggles of 233-230. Intimations of the intense conflict between rival factions in this period appear in the attempts of each group to bolster its forces. The Aemilian house was strengthened by the elevation to the consulship of the plebeian Pomponii, Publicius, and M. Junius Pera, lifelong foe of Fabius, and the patrician C. Papirius Maso. The significance of these political relationships can be judged from the close marriage bonds which linked the Pomponii and Papirius with the Aemiliis as well as from their association in

³⁹ Loc. cit.: κατέπερ μηδὲν μηδέπω τὸν Ἰβηρικὸν σφίσι προστηκέντων.

⁴⁰ Altheim (*op. cit.*, p. 52) would place Rome's interest in Saguntum after the Celtic War of 225, but Rome must at this time have seen the advantage Saguntum afforded (like Massilia) as an observation post in the area of enemy activity.

⁴¹ Scullard, *Scipio Africanus in the Second Punic War* (Cambridge, 1930), p. 35.

⁴² Nap (*op. cit.*, p. 2) believes that the conquest of the Po should have been risked in 238, after the Gauls had unsuccessfully attacked.

the pontifical college.⁴³ The conclusion is inescapable that the ascendancy to power of these previously little-known men may be attributed to the machinations of the Aemilii,⁴⁴ employing to their own advantage the wave of democratic influence.

In view of the enhanced position of the Aemilii and the influence of Flamininus, Fabius' strength at this time is remarkable. He had not, indeed, been idle: he had helped secure the consulship of 234 for L. Postumius, who in turn had assured the election of Fabius as his successor the following year.⁴⁵ As consul, Fabius led the opposition in the Senate to Flamininus' agrarian measure.⁴⁶ In a drastic move for power, Fabius, through his control of the college of augurs, removed from the censorship two former members of his own circle, Q. Fulvius Flaccus and T. Manlius Torquatus, in 231 despite their seniority, in order to clear the path for his own election as censor for the next year.⁴⁷ Almost by his own efforts, then, Fabius maintained his position in the face of a powerfully entrenched Aemilian circle and of an aroused popular group who looked to Flamininus for leadership.

The traditional cleavage between patrician and plebeian appears in this case to be complicated by a major division in the Senate itself, for the Fabian party was ranged not only against the Aemilii, but, one may infer, against the Cornelii, who had close connections with the Aemilii as early as the First Punic War, the alienated Fulvii and Manlii, and perhaps the Claudii, since by 225 they were ranged beside the Aemilii. The schism

⁴³ The brothers Pomponii were related to the Scipios through the marriage of their sister Pomponia to P. Cornelius Scipio, consul of 218. The close connections between the Scipios and the Aemilii dating from the First Punic War were cemented by the marriage of Aemilia, daughter of L. Aemilius Paullus, consul of 219, to P. Cornelius Scipio Africanus. The son of Paullus married Papiria, daughter of C. Papirius Maso, consul of 231. Between the families of M. Junius Pera and the Aemilii there had been affiliations long before this time. (For a complete discussion of family relationships and associations in the pontifical college, see Münzer, *op. cit.*, pp. 157, 160-164).

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 416.

⁴⁵ Fabius' consulship in 228 was likewise secured through the efforts of a Postumius (Albinus II), consul the previous year.

⁴⁶ For almost five months Fabius' consulship was cotemporaneous with the tribunate of Flamininus (cf. Meyer, *op. cit.*, p. 390).

⁴⁷ Fulvius thereupon moved his entire family into the camp of the Claudii (Schur, *Das Erbe der Alten*, pp. 111-112).

might very probably have weakened the opposition to Flaminius' measure. But the major inference to be drawn from the alignment of parties in 232-230 is that it reflects in the steps taken by Rome in northern Italy and Spain a rapprochement of the Aemilian consuls and the democratic group in a program integrated by the external pressure of Rome's potential foes, the Gauls and the Carthaginians. This policy, if not directly the result of Massilian diplomacy, was at least crystallized by Massilia's alarming reports, and the Massilians on their part found dominant factions in Rome ready to give serious consideration to these reports.⁴⁸

The steps taken in 232-230 apparently being regarded as sufficient, interest seems to have been diverted from affairs in Spain to more immediate issues such as the campaign against Teuta and to domestic problems. The Aemilii, who were identified with the policy of intervention in Spain, were unable to maintain their dominant position and were replaced by members of the Fabian party.

Within a few years, however, Rome's attention was directed to the advance of the Carthaginian power in Spain, and the Romans determined to concern themselves again with Spanish affairs.⁴⁹ The influence of Massilia is once more apparent; it was doubtless upon the assumption of command by Hasdrubal in 229 that she renewed to Rome her protestations of alarm. And in 226 she may have proved of signal value to Rome in reporting an impending invasion of the Gauls, whose preparations for war she could keep under scrutiny in the region above her.⁵⁰

⁴⁸ Nap (*op. cit.*, pp. 54-55, 269, and 338) believes that Rome was prompted to conclude a treaty with Massilia in 229/228 in order to forestall the coalition of the Gauls and the Carthaginians and that the treaty contained provisions for mutual aid. Although his conjecture rests upon the somewhat tenuous grounds of associating the treaty with the introduction of the Massilian Artemis to Rome, of identifying the Greeks (in the account of the burial alive of a Greek and a Gallic couple in 228) as Massilians, and of supposing that the treaty anticipated those with the *nomen Latinum*, there is a core of probability in the assumption that Rome stood to gain much from an alliance with Massilia in the years 231-225.

⁴⁹ Polybius, II, 13, 3.

⁵⁰ Cf. Frank, *C. A. H.*, VII, p. 810.

The Gallic unrest, although part of a long, periodic movement, was doubtless fanned by the progress during this period of the settlement of the *ager Gallicus* in accordance with Flaminius' measure; for the attempt to stabilize the northern frontier had the effect of provoking alarm among the Gallic tribes. Thus the Fabian regime began to feel the pressure of the forces which had precipitated the crisis of 231.

These forces, already astir in 238 and sufficiently developed by 231 to provoke Roman intervention in Spain, had in 226-225 converged with momentous import.⁵¹ The long period during which the Romans and the Gauls had met in occasional skirmishes was over: the Gauls were now mustering their forces for a decisive struggle; revolt flared in Sardinia, and the Carthaginians, whose resources had appeared to be exhausted at the conclusion of peace in 241, were steadily rebuilding their empire by the conquest of Spain, apparently unmoved by the threat of Roman interference implicit in the Saguntine treaty. The persistent warnings of Massilia⁵² could not be ignored or discounted: the combination of Gallic and Carthaginian power, a potential threat in 231, was now capable of imminent realization.⁵³ For whatever Hasdrubal's intentions may have been,⁵⁴ it is clear that

⁵¹ So important does Nap (*op. cit.*) regard the year 225 that he relates the political and religious activity of the Romans between the First and Second Punic Wars either directly or indirectly to that year. While most of the connections seen between political measures and religious moves are admittedly conjectural, Nap puts the historian of Rome in his debt by focusing attention upon the epochal significance of the year 225.

⁵² Cf. Appian, *Iber.*, II, 7: "The Saguntines . . . and all the other Greeks who dwelt in the neighbourhood of Emporiae and in other parts of Spain, having apprehensions for their safety, sent ambassadors to Rome" (Loeb). There can be no doubt but that Massilians were among the ambassadors. Frank asserts (*loc. cit.*) that Rome came to a complete understanding with Massilia at this time.

⁵³ Cf. De Sanctis, *op. cit.*, p. 412, Meyer, *op. cit.*, p. 395, Nap, *op. cit.*, p. 58, *passim*, M. Rostovtzeff, *A History of the Ancient World*, Vol. II: *Rome* (Oxford, 1927), pp. 63-64, Scullard, *A History of the Roman World from 753 to 146 B.C.*, p. 194.

⁵⁴ Frank (*C. A. H.*, VII, p. 809) believes that at this time Rome was needlessly afraid; that the real danger came later, in Hannibal's strategy. But the Romans in 226 could not have afforded to assume that the Carthaginians would not make common cause with the Gauls; in

a unique opportunity lay before him, a prospect which, had it come seven years later, might have altered materially the outcome of the Hannibalic War.

Once more the Romans turned to those men who they felt were competent to deal with the intricate character and far-reaching implications of the problems facing them. For Rome was no longer able to pursue an independent course without reference to the impact of peoples to the east, north, and west. The Illyrian campaign of 229, the first embassy to Greece the following year, and the increasing gravity of the danger from the Gauls and the Carthaginians committed the Romans to a wider outlook, a point of view which those conservative senators now in control found it difficult to grasp, or at least to implement, while the influence of Flaminius and the democratic element, mounting steadily in these years, provided an inner dynamic disturbing to the supremacy of the Fabii. As a result, while the Fabii were able to secure the election to the consulship of M. Valerius Messala and C. Atilius Regulus for 226 and 225 respectively, the plebeian strength revealed in the elevation to the consulship of L. Apustius Fullo in 226 and the comprehensive coalition of the Claudii and the Aemilii⁵⁵ the following year brought resistance to Fabius to a climactic phase and marked the beginning of the mastery of the Aemilian party.

A glance at the list of magistrates reveals the strength of the Aemilii. The Fabian representative in the consulship, Atilius, was matched by L. Aemilius Papus; the censors were M. Junius Pera, Aemilian consul of 230, and C. Claudius Centho, whose election was doubtless due to the aforementioned coalition of the Claudii and the Aemilii.⁵⁶

The issues confronting this administration were an inheritance, since the Fabian-dominated government after 230 had not acted upon them, from the Aemilian regime of 231—viz., the extent to which Rome should interfere in Spain to safeguard the interests of her ally, Massilia, and relieve the threat of Carthaginian

framing the Ebro Treaty they were reacting to what they rightly conceived to be a genuine threat. Altheim (*op. cit.*, pp. 50-51) and Nap (*loc. cit.*) are therefore correct in assuming that the Romans believed that the time was ripe for checking the Carthaginian advance.

⁵⁵ Cf. Schur, *Das Erbe der Alten*, p. 116.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

intervention in the impending Gallic conflict. "For the present they did not venture to impose orders on Carthage, or to go to war with her, because the threat of a Celtic invasion was hanging over them, the attack being indeed expected from day to day. They decided, then, to smooth down and conciliate Hasdrubal in the first place, and then to attack the Celts and decide the issue by arms. . . ." ⁵⁷ The outcome of this decision was the Ebro Treaty, stipulating that the Carthaginians should not cross the Ebro River under arms.

The attitude of the Romans in framing the treaty was in marked contrast to their former peremptory treatment of the Carthaginians, but Polybius' terms "smooth down" (*καταψήσαντες*) and "conciliate" (*προσάντες*) are misleading. In so far as Rome acted in her own interests to secure a temporary respite from the threat of Carthaginian interference in her war with the Gauls, she was, of course, on the defensive, and the advantages afforded by the treaty weighed more heavily in her favor. But from the point of view of her championing the cause of Massilia, with the concomitant commitment to long-range and decisive action involved in the limiting of Hasdrubal's advance, Rome showed that she was prepared to challenge the progress of Carthaginian expansion northward. And Hasdrubal, although the agreement did not prevent him from completing the conquest of Spain up to the Ebro and even freed him from the fear that the Romans might incite rebellion among the recently subdued Spanish tribes in the rear, nevertheless, by his willingness to sign the treaty, recognized Rome as a power able to arbitrate in Spain.⁵⁸ This achievement, similar to that of the administration of 231 in the understanding of the problem and in the plane of its solution, must be credited to the Aemilian consuls.

But how far does the treaty reveal the concern of the government in safeguarding the interests of its ally? So far as we know, there was no clause limiting the commercial encroachment of Carthage north of the Ebro River; the Massilian colonies to the south, Hemeroscopium, Aloris, and Alicante, were forfeited.

⁵⁷ Polybius, II, 13 (Loeb).

⁵⁸ Cf. Oertel, *op. cit.*, p. 222, who quotes W. Otto (*Hist. Zeitschr.*, CXLV [1932], p. 509): "die in Spanien neben den Karthagern entscheiden könne."

Yet Massilia had good reason to be satisfied: Rome's intervention was in itself a triumph of Massilian diplomacy, and Rome might have been content to draw the line of demarcation still farther north.⁵⁹ Massilia must have realized that under the circumstances Rome had gone as far as she could.

Thus Rome secured the northwestern flank, and the presence of the consul Atilius in Sardinia⁶⁰ forestalled a renewal of trouble from that quarter. The government, then, effectively checked at their sources long-menacing disturbances, the simultaneous eruption of which would have proved disastrous in this crisis.

The successful prosecution of the war by the Aemilian administration insured the support of the Senate; the Romans were encouraged "to hope that they would be able entirely to expel the Celts from the plain of the Po; and the consuls of the next year (224), Quintus Fulvius and Titus Manlius, were sent against them with a formidable expeditionary force."⁶¹ This was a logical move if the policies of the administration were to be brought to fulfillment, but it is noteworthy as indicative of a general sentiment which, if it was not imperialistic, at least revealed an interest in expansion. The leaven of war and of the rapid unfolding of a broader foreign policy was working upon popular opinion, while the influence of those who, like the Fabii, had been protagonists of the status quo declined. The eclipse of the Fabian party is apparent in the election of Fulvius and Manlius, representatives of the Claudian and Aemilian factions, as well as in the growing strength of Flamininus.

⁵⁹ Scullard (*op. cit.*, p. 194) suggests that the Romans might have fixed the limits at the Pyrenees; Oertel (*op. cit.*, p. 225) sees the treaty as a compromise, Rome having sought to confine Carthage to a line south of Saguntum. I cannot agree with Schulten's view (*op. cit.*, p. 788) that the limit set was "a very considerable concession by Rome": the Ebro River boundary accomplished her primary purpose of preventing Carthaginian aid to the Gauls.

⁶⁰ This, in view of the imminence of the Gallic invasion, has evoked surprise from Meyer (*op. cit.*, p. 396; cf. Gelzer, *op. cit.*, p. 150). But it is consistent with Rome's policy of taking seriously any trouble in the island she had wrested from Carthage. Nap (*op. cit.*, p. 56) is clearly right in attributing it to Roman anxiety over a coalition of the Gauls and Carthaginians.

⁶¹ Polybius, II, 51 (Loeb).

There is little question but that Flamininus was a powerful force in these years, perhaps, as Meyer suggests,⁶² the real leader. His strengthening of the frontier through the settlement of the *ager Gallicus* had proved to be a sound measure of defense; the administration of the government was in the hands of noble families whose own policies were advanced by his program, with the Senate, too, apparently favoring expansion northward; popular influence, partly as a result of his own efforts, was finding expression in a succession of plebeian consulships; and his powerful opponents, the Fabian faction, had been compelled to relinquish for the time their dominant position. The movement of outer events had given heightened significance to what might otherwise have been merely a popular revolt against senatorial land capitalists, and Flamininus' leadership of a vigorous plebeian element placed him in the forefront of Roman politics. In 223 he was elected consul.

That Flamininus was the acknowledged leader of those plebeians in the Aemilian circle who reached the consulship cannot be proved, nor would tradition support the inference that the Aemilii and their colleagues were in close alliance with Flamininus and the democratic group, but their contemporaneous emergence to power in 233-230, the integration of their programs in 225-224, and their continuing association⁶³ in the highest magistracies from this time until the opening years of the Hannibalic War are cogent grounds for believing that in their recognition (to which Massilia had set the spark) of the need for Rome's pursuing a broader and more aggressive policy, and in their mutual conflict with Fabius, the Aemilii and Flamininus were united.

Flamininus' consulship, in conjunction with that of P. Furius Philus,⁶⁴ now gave him the opportunity of carrying out the pro-

⁶² *Op. cit.*, p. 398. Meyer, however, regards Flamininus' influence as extending only to domestic politics. Schur (*op. cit.*, p. 17) believes that Flamininus and Fabius were in agreement over domestic, but opposed in outer, policies. But these views fail to account for the fact that the periods of his preëminence are either inaugurated by, or help to inaugurate, crises in foreign affairs.

⁶³ Together with the Scipios, who, after 222, shared the consulship.

⁶⁴ A member of the Aemilian circle closely connected with the Scipios (Münzer, *op. cit.*, p. 250, Schur, *op. cit.*, p. 121).

gram of expansion⁶⁵ for which his agrarian measure and the invasion of the Gauls had prepared the way. But although the Senate was at last ready to carry through to completion the subjugation of the Gauls, opposition to Flaminius as general resulted in his recall, on the ground that terrifying omens had been observed.⁶⁶ This is clearly the work of Fabius, who, as head of the college of augurs, did not scruple to employ his office to the embarrassment of his enemy. The Senate, moreover, would be reluctant to see Flaminius' reputation enhanced by a triumph and perhaps favored his recall before he could claim a victory. But the people voted him the triumph despite senatorial opposition, and although he and his colleague abdicated a month before the expiration of their term, Flaminius' stature was increased rather than diminished. The campaign was reopened in 222 by the consuls Cn. Cornelius Scipio Calvus and M. Claudio Marcellus, a plebeian of aristocratic sympathies whose military ambitions could now be satisfied.

As soon as the pacification of northern Italy was assured, the Romans intervened again in Spain. It is unlikely that the Aemilian administration, which had been at the helm of the state since 236, had lost sight of developments in Spain after the signing of the Ebro Treaty; the stabilization of the Po region was of immediate concern, and Spanish affairs did not press for settlement. But when Hannibal opened the vigorous campaigns of 221 and 220, the Massilian colonies and Saguntum once again grew apprehensive, the Saguntines appealing repeatedly to Rome,⁶⁷ so that the Carthaginian question became a live issue on the agenda of the consuls of 220.

The political factions which had been receptive to Massilian propaganda in 231 and 226 were grouped to a remarkable degree in the present administration. The Aemilian circle had reached the peak of its power;⁶⁸ and the strength of plebeian influence

⁶⁵ Flaminius attacked the Insubres through the territory of the Anares, not far from Massilia (Polybius, II, 32; cf. Plutarch, *Marcellus*, 4).

⁶⁶ Cf. Zonaras, VIII, 20.

⁶⁷ Polybius, III, 15, 1.

⁶⁸ The consuls of 221 were P. Cornelius Scipio Asina and M. Minucius Rufus, whose house had long been in the Aemilian circle and later was faithful to Scipio Africanus (Schur, *op. cit.*, p. 121); in this year L. Cornelius Caudinus replaced as pontifex maximus L. Caecilius Metellus.

is apparent in the consulships of M. Minucius Rufus and C. Lutatius Catulus, in the elevation of Flamininus to the censorship (together with L. Aemilius Papus, consul of 225), and in the democratic composition of the Senate of 220.⁶⁹ The mastery of the group most appreciative of the implications of Rome's newly-won position of international importance⁷⁰ thus coincided with a vigorous popular movement centered in the censorship of Flamininus⁷¹ which enabled plebeian representatives to participate in the formulation of major policies of the state.

It might be expected, then, that this administration would interpret widely the Carthaginian issue as presented by the Massilian and Saguntine envoys. It was not a question merely of assisting an ally, nor again of Rome's acting in her own defense, as in the Gallic crises of 231 and 226. Confident of her power, Rome was now in a position to exploit the advantages

In 220 one of the consuls was L. Veturius Philo, a close friend of the Scipios, Aemilii, and Livii; the colleague of Flamininus in the censorship was L. Aemilius Papus.

⁶⁹ Cf. E. Cavaignac's study, *Rev. Et. Lat.*, X (1932), particularly p. 466: "Sur 300 sénateurs, 190 avaient passé par le tribunat, dont quarrevingts n'avaient géré que cette charge."

⁷⁰ Frank (*Roman Imperialism*, p. 134, n. 15) says of the foreign policy of Scipio Africanus: "Scipio's whole career proves him an anti-imperialist." But the association of the Scipios with the Aemilii in the policies leading to Rome's participation in western Mediterranean affairs indicates that they were intimately concerned with wider issues. Cf. Schur (*op. cit.*, p. 17): "Des Geschlecht der Scipionen hat . . . soweit uns die Überlieferung das zu sehen gestattet, immer zu der weiter ausschauenden Partei gehalten." And again (p. 18): "So überkam unser Scipio von seiner Vorfahren eine grosse Tradition weitausschauender Politik . . . Der Horizont der Scipionen war nicht durch die Küsten Italiens begrenzt, sondern umfasste zum mindesten den ganzen Westen des Mittelmeergebiets." This is also the view of Seullard (*Scipio Africanus*, p. 36).

⁷¹ The significance of Flamininus' censorship is recognized by Meyer (*op. cit.*, pp. 398-399) and Münzer (*R.-E.*, s. v. "Flamininus," col. 2498): "Leider gibt die hier besonders lückenhafte Tradition kein klares Bild von der grosser Bedeutung dieser Censur." The scope of his program is suggested by the probability that he proposed a revision of the entire constitution of the centuries (Münzer, *loc. cit.*, following Mommsen, *Staatsrecht*, III, pp. 270-271, 281, 436). For 225 as the date of revision see Nap, *op. cit.*, p. 175.

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secured by the Gallic campaigns⁷² and the Ebro Treaty, and it was to her interest to intervene in Spain before the expansion and consolidation of Carthaginian strength necessitated war. The clash between the Saguntines and the Torboletae had afforded Rome the opportunity, on the strength of her alliance, of undermining Hannibal's position by supporting a faction within the city hostile to Carthage; and when it appeared that Hannibal was about to attack Saguntum the Romans sent envoys warning him to desist.⁷³ Since Hannibal had hitherto been careful to avoid any act of aggression against Saguntum,⁷⁴ Rome's interference showed that she did not intend to respect the Ebro Treaty now that the danger from the Gauls had passed, and that she was ready to assume the initiative in challenging the authority of Carthage in the West.⁷⁵

Accurately appraising the temper of the Roman administration and the consequences of its policy for Carthage, Hannibal launched the siege of Saguntum. The administration must have weighed the possibility that Hannibal could not be intimidated by threat or by the prestige of Rome; that if he attacked Saguntum, the Romans would be forced into the extremely awkward position of having to intercede without the justification afforded either by their previous treaties or by the urgency of present circumstances. It may be that they hoped by the warning to prevent Hannibal from exploiting their preoccupation with the Illyrian campaign.⁷⁶ But Hannibal ignored the threat and thereby precipitated a critical test of the policy of intervention

⁷² Northern Italy was brought within reach of the Roman armies by the building of the *via Flaminia* to Ariminum. Contracts for the road were let by the censor Flaminius, who doubtless appreciated the need for it as a result of his own campaigns in 223.

⁷³ Polybius, III, 15, 5.

⁷⁴ *Idem*, III, 14, 10.

⁷⁵ That Rome was the aggressor in instigating trouble in Spain is now generally agreed. Cf., e.g., Hallward (*op. cit.*, p. 31): "It is true that it was Hannibal's attack on Saguntum, undertaken in full knowledge of the almost inevitable consequences, that precipitated the war, but the historian must decide that, so far as attack and defence have a meaning in the clash between states, the balance of aggression must incline against Rome."

⁷⁶ Cf. Altheim, *op. cit.*, p. 54.

which this and previous Aemilian-democratic administrations had pursued.

The predicament of the administration was no less embarrassing in Rome. For the factions which had on each prior occasion been opposed to involvement in Spain⁷⁷ would now be disposed to point out how much sounder a program confined to expansion in northern Italy would have been.⁷⁸ Among the factors adduced to account for the Senate's hesitation to aid the Saguntines, the opposition of the Fabian circle, to which Hannibal's unexpected assault had given fresh virulence, must be accorded a salient position.

Unfortunately, the tradition regarding the discussions which must have been carried on in the Senate in the period between the attack on Saguntum and the decision to send an ultimatum to Carthage in March, 218, is contradictory. Polybius is at pains to prove (by the argument of probability) that no debate occurred; that, apparently, the Roman people were of one opinion regarding the Saguntine issue.⁷⁹ Dio-Zonaras, on the other hand, recounts the arguments presumably advanced by those favoring, and those opposed to, a declaration of war.⁸⁰ These and other intimations of underlying conflict in the Senate may throw some light on the dilatory course which the Romans pursued during this crucial ante-bellum year and on the reasons why the Senate eventually resolved upon war.

There were, to be sure, certain obvious reasons for avoiding war: both consuls were absent in Illyria, and Rome might at any time become entangled in hostilities with Macedonia.⁸¹

⁷⁷ It is possible that Hannibal was aware of a strong non-interventionist group in the Senate.

⁷⁸ Cf. Dio, frag. 57, 12 (probably spoken by Fabius in reply to Lentulus): "Now is it not absurd for us to be zealous for success in foreign and remote enterprises before we set the city itself upon a firm foundation?" (Loeb).

⁷⁹ III, 20. Roman tradition naturally contrasts the Carthaginian schism with Rome's unanimity.

⁸⁰ Dio, frag. 55, 1-9; Zonaras, VIII, 22. De Sanctis (*op. cit.*, III, 2, p. 197) has established the credibility of the tradition summarizing the debate.

⁸¹ Hallward, *op. cit.*, p. 32. It is unlikely, however, that the Illyrian campaign would have deterred the Romans once they had resolved upon war with Hannibal.

There had, moreover, been no breach of the Ebro Treaty, and it must have appeared to many that the plight of far-off Saguntum was a matter calling for the reopening of negotiations rather than for involvement in a major conflict. But most important was the issue of Rome's self-interest, which the spokesman for the opponents of war flung in the face of Lentulus.⁸² Once again, and at a time when the administration was in an inherently weak position, the question was raised as to whether it was to Rome's advantage to pursue a wider course.

The Massilians and Saguntines, whose envoys were probably in Rome to press their case, doubtless realized quite as well as the administration that this was the paramount issue. Possibly they sought to impress upon the Romans the fear that Hannibal was vowed to a war of revenge, and that his attack upon themselves would be but a prelude to the invasion of Italy. It is open to question, however, whether any Roman at this time seriously entertained the idea that Hannibal would cross the Alps. The problem lay elsewhere: if they were to succeed, the envoys would have to convince the Romans that their self-interest lay in the extension of their power, if not of their dominion, to the western Mediterranean—a task facilitated by Rome's intervention in Saguntum a couple of years earlier, and that now was the time to act.

It might be expected that the triumphant return of the consuls from Illyria would strengthen the cause of the interventionists:⁸³ the spirit of victory was in the air, and the settlement of affairs in the East would quiet the fears of those averse to fighting two wars simultaneously on opposite sides of Italy. But as a matter of fact even the fall of Saguntum, shortly before the arrival of the consuls in Rome,⁸⁴ had failed to evoke an immediate declaration of war. This is in itself good reason for believing that the Massilian propagandists and the administration were facing vigorous opposition to their policy of active intervention in Spain.

⁸² Dio, frag. 55, 5: "Do not arouse us, Lentulus, nor persuade us to go to war, until you show us that it will be really to our advantage" (Loeb).

⁸³ Cf. Täubler, *op. cit.*, p. 78.

⁸⁴ Polybius, III, 16, 6-7; 19, 12.

There is in the tradition no statement of policy by the consuls: they may already have been under suspicion for allegedly making an inequitable distribution of the Illyrian booty.⁸⁵ But if the consuls themselves were unable to exert maximum influence, the administration had a powerful spokesman in L. Cornelius Lentulus Caudinus, who as pontifex maximus and princeps senatus was the leading figure in Rome in this year. Explicit in the tradition followed by Dio-Zonaras is the fact that Lentulus epitomizes the wider outlook as Fabius embodies the narrower.

Before the new consuls assumed office in March, 218, the Senate had made up its mind: an embassy was named⁸⁶ to present the Carthaginian government with the alternative of surrendering Hannibal or of facing a declaration of war. This was ostensibly a compromise: the Fabian group had succeeded in its demand for negotiation; actually it was a victory for the Aemilian administration and the Massilian envoys, for the Senate must have realized that the Carthaginians would refuse to give up Hannibal and be forced to accept war. Despite the gravity of a war with Carthage and the indefensibility of Rome's juridical position,⁸⁷ and despite the power and prestige of Fabius, the wider viewpoint had prevailed. The Massilians might well congratulate themselves that, when the Romans could have modified their demands and effected a compromise avoiding war,⁸⁸ they interpreted to their own advantage Massilia's request for intervention.

⁸⁵ M. Livius Salinator is specifically indicted (cf. Frontinus, *Strat.*, IV, 1, 45: *quod praedam non aequaliter divisorat militibus*); his colleague, L. Aemilius Paullus, fares better (cf. Livy, XXII, 35, 3: *prope ambustus*, and 40, 2: *semustus*).

⁸⁶ According to Livy, XXI, 18, 1, the ambassadors were Quintus Fabius, M. Livius Salinator, L. Aemilius Paullus, and Q. Baebius Tamphilus. The chairman was more probably M. Fabius Buteo than Q. Fabius (cf. Dio, frag. 55, 10, Zonaras, VIII, 22). It is to be noted that the Aemilian consuls of 219 were named to the embassy.

⁸⁷ The case against Rome is summed up by Hallward (*op. cit.*, p. 31) and Scullard (*History of the Roman World*, pp. 197-198).

⁸⁸ There is no reason for supposing that the war was inevitable, that there was no point at which the Romans could not have turned back. Cf. Hallward (*ibid.*), who believes that a balance of power might have been effected, such as was achieved by Hellenistic statecraft.

Massilian propaganda, then, played a highly significant rôle in the shaping of policy which finally brought Rome into conflict with Carthage, and its effectiveness may be attributed to the following factors:

(1) The service which Massilia rendered to Rome in periodically informing her of the movements of the Gauls and Carthaginians, so that the Romans were made aware of impending crises and were accordingly more keenly alert to the scope of their own interests.

(2) The ascendancy in the Roman government during these crises of the Aemilian family and its adherents, together with a strong plebeian element closely connected with the Aemilii—an interstitial series of administrations whose consistency of action was due not to a long-range and continuous foreign policy but to the fact that the formulation of policy and its implementation in specific instances were in the hands of members of the same or related circles.

(3) The mutually supplementary character of the Aemilian and democratic programs as a result, first, of a common hostility to the Fabian party and, secondly, of the integral connection between the democratic interest in the expansion to, and consolidation of, northern Italy and the concern of the Aemilii in meeting the threat of a Gallic-Carthaginian coalition.

(4) The susceptibility of the Aemilian and plebeian administrations to Massilian propaganda aimed at convincing the Romans that in the critical years 231, 226, and 219 their self-interest was intimately associated with checking the Carthaginian aggrandizement in Spain.

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A BACCHIC GRAFFITO FROM THE DOLICHENEUM AT DURA.¹

In the course of the ninth season (1935-1936) of the Yale expedition to Dura a temple² was excavated in block X7 in the Roman military quarter. The inscriptions, sculptures, and cult objects found identify the temple as belonging to Jupiter Dolichenus and to a god addressed as Zeus Helios Mithras Tourmasgade. These two gods held equal rank. There is also a cult chamber dedicated to a goddess addressed as $\eta\ kυρία$,—presumably Juno Dolichena. In a room (number 24) next to the cult chamber of Tourmasgade was found the graffiti which I propose to present here, with such comment as seems necessary, leaving aside, however, the question of the relationship of the text to the religious life of the whole building and to the cult of Jupiter Dolichenus. Such matters must await the publication of the temple.

The Dolicheneum was built *ca.* 211 A. D. by units of the Roman army, and, in all probability, remained a purely military temple until the fall of Dura, *ca.* 256 A. D. Our text may, therefore, be roughly dated to the second quarter of the third century A. D.

Room number 24 in which the text was found measures approximately 3 by 6 metres and contained along its north end, the short wall furthest from the door, a bench 1.3 metres from front to back and extending the entire width of the room. The

¹ I would like to express my gratitude to Professor C. Bradford Welles who first suggested that I look at this text, made the first readings from the plaster, and who has helped the progress of this paper in many ways.

² Unpublished. The inscriptions were discussed in an as yet unpublished portion of his dissertation, *The Roman Garrison at Dura* (Yale, 1940) by J. F. Gilliam. I am indebted to Dr. Gilliam for information concerning the building, its use, and its date. For Dura in general see *The Excavations at Durā-Europos; Preliminary Reports I-IX* (Yale, 1929-1944) and *Final Report IV*, Part I, fascicle I (1945), and Part II (1943), and F. Cumont, *Fouilles de Doura-Europus* (Paris, 1926).

graffito was inscribed on the north wall and the pieces of plaster bearing the text, 17 in all, were found where they had fallen, on the bench. They are now at Yale. All the pieces show traces of red paint, indicating that the entire area occupied by the text, if not the whole wall, was painted red.

The text was inscribed in two parallel columns. Col. I, on the left, is .39 m. high and the length of the line varies from .23 m. to .30 m. Col. II is .14 m. high and about .24 m. wide. The letters are irregularly formed and vary from one to two centimetres in height. Where the plaster was soft and easy to write in, as in the lower lefthand corner of Column I, the letters are the rounded capitals typical for third century Dura. For most of the text, however, particularly in the case of Column II, the plaster was too hard for easy writing. The letters here are erratically formed and straight lines tend to be substituted for curves. Omega sometimes is written in the form W.

The text of Column II was cut in a tabella ansata .145 m. high. Below occurs a second tabella, with stray words ($\delta\epsilon\nu\rho$, $\mu\epsilon\tau\alpha$ $\mu[\cdot]$) written here and there in large letters (.02-.035 m.). At the left of Column I the right end of a third tabella is preserved, .145 m. high, without writing. The plaster at the right is a tangle of scratches and letters, including some small, neat writing in a semi-cursive, .005 m. high, only $\alpha\pi\sigma$ being legible.

Under Col. II is a rough sketch consisting of a single vertical line 26 centimetres long surmounted by a triangle, base 5 cent., height 3 cent. Immediately under the triangle a wavy line crosses the shaft. This sketch is not sufficiently detailed to enable us to decide what it represents. It may be a fillet-bound thyrsus with a disproportionately large head, or, possibly, the standard of the cult of Dolichenus, surmounted by the usual triangular plaque.³ To the right of this sketch is written in large letters (ca. 3 centimetres high) the month $\Delta\epsilon\iota\sigma$. Above the word $\Delta\epsilon\iota\sigma$, and crossing the shaft of the thyrsus (?), are written the words $\Delta\epsilon\nu\rho$ $\gamma\epsilon\lambda\omega\eta$.

³ That the famous triangular plaques of the cult of Dolichenus were mounted on wooden shafts has been established by the finds at Mauer-an-der-Url. See R. Noll, *Der Grosse Dolichenusfund von Mauer a. d. Url* (Vienna, Kunsthistorisches Museum, 1938) and review by A. S. Hoey, *J. R. S.*, XXXI (1941), pp. 196-197.

COL. I.

1. Ὀδάριν
2. Δεῦρο γελῶν
3. Δεῦρο γελῶν
4. Δεῦρος γελῶν
5. μετὰ Μ
[[μετν]] ειολίδων
6. ἀλόχεντε Βρόμιε /
7. καὶ σὺ [μ]άκαρ μετὰ Μ[ε]
8. νολίδων Χρησμωδέ [/]
9. καὶ μετὰ <Με>ν[ο]λίδωγ [κά]
10. λεσον θάσον Σ[ά]τυρε
11. {κα} καὶ σὺ μάκαρ μόλε παν
12. τομέδω<ν> κάλεσον Βρόμιε /
13. ΩΝΠΡΟΠΟΑΛΩΕΙΝΟΣΙ / δεῦ
14. ρο γελῶ[ν] μεθύων Σατύρε /
15. [μετ'] ἐφῆβων Υμενέων
16. μετ' Ἐρά{ω}των Αφροδ{ι}είτη /

COL. II.


Δεῦρο γελῶν
 μετὰ Μενόλ [δων]
 ἀλόχεντε Βρ[όμιε]
 καὶ σὺ μάκαρ [μετ]
 ἀ Με{νλ.ων}
 νολίδων Χρησ[μ]ωδέ

Line 1. Ὀδάριν for φδάριον, cf. C. B. Welles in *Dura Report IV*, p. 144. Lines 1 and 2 are in a different hand from the rest of Col. I. The letters are smaller and more widely spaced. As the plaster was softer when they were inscribed than it was when the scribe of the rest of the column wrote, they were probably written by some cult official to indicate where the φδάριον was to go and what φδάριον was to go there.

Line 3. This line is a title, probably copied unwittingly by the scribe from his example, not an integral part of the text. It was not repeated in Col. II. The two words occur three times by themselves at various positions on the plaster; once, followed by μετὰ Μεν-, in a tabella ansata. On first words used as titles see E. Nachmanson, "Der Griechische Buchtitel," *Göteborgs Högskolcs Arsskrift*, XLVII (1941), pp. 37 f.

Line 4. This line is indented 4 centimetres to mark the beginning of the song.

Line 5. Μενολίδων: αι becomes ε here as in νμενέων, line 15 below, but not in καὶ (cf. *Dura Report IV*, p. 143). In each case ε (= αι) is to be scanned as a long syllable. The corrected mistake, ΝΝ for ΑΜ,—a mistake of the eye, not of the ear,—indicates that lines 3-16 were copied from a text in a similar hand and not written down from memory.



Line 6. *Βρόμιε*—following this word is a stroke rising from left to right at approximately a thirty degree angle. Similar strokes follow *Βρόμιε* in line 12 and *Σάτυρε* in line 14 and precede *Δεῦρο* in line 13. Another presumably followed *Χρησμωδέ* in line 8 where the plaster fails us. Compare the dashes to mark a change of speaker in *P. Petrie*, V, the fragment of the *Phaedo*.

Line 9. The *r* of *μετά* is written above the line. The scribe omitted the first two letters of *Μενολίδων*.

Line 11. {κα} καὶ—this line, like line 4, is indented. After the *ώδαριον* had been inscribed, the wall to the left of the text received a new coat of plaster which obliterated the first five or six letters of lines 12 to 16. The obliterated letters were then reinscribed on the fresh plaster. Line 11 had escaped because of its indentation. Nevertheless the first two letters were rewritten on the new plaster, and so we read {κα} καὶ. In patching up line 16 the scribe found that he had too much space and therefore repeated the omega, the last of the letters which he was restoring.

Lines 11-12. *παντομέδων*—for the omitted final *nu* see now L. R. Palmer, *A Grammar of the Post-Ptolemaic Papyri*, I: *Accidence and Word Formation*, Part I: The Suffixes (Publications of the Philological Society, XIII [London, 1945]), p. 2.

Line 13. ΩΝΙΠΡΟΠΩΛΩΕΙΝΟΣΙ—the reading is certain except for the last three letters, of which the bottom half only is preserved. For conjectures see pp. 35-6 below.

Line 16. *ἐρώ* {ω} *των*—see note on line 11. 'Αφροδ{ι}είτη—a conflation of 'Αφροδείτη, representing contemporary orthography, and the older form 'Αφροδίτη.

Col. II has been of use in establishing the text of lines 4 to 8 of Col. I, which it repeats, but adds nothing new. Its writer knew little Greek and his work is full of insignificant error. The ΛΙ of line 8 of Col. I stand close together and resemble the letter N. They were so interpreted by the scribe of Col. II who then, characteristically, wrote it (in line 6, Col. II) upside down, proving that Col. I was the example for Col. II.

If we follow the punctuation rather than the line division of the original, the text may be reconstructed as follows:

Lines 4-6 Δεῦρο γελῶν μετὰ Μαινολίδων ἀλόχευτε Βρόμιε.
 " 7-8 καὶ σὺ, μάκαρ, μετὰ Μαινολίδων, χρησμωδέ.
 " 9-10 καὶ μετὰ Μαινολίδων (κάλεσον θάσον) Σάτυρε.
 " 11-12 καὶ σὺ, μάκαρ, μόλε παντομέδων (κάλεσον) Βρόμιε.
 " 13 ΩΝΙΠΡΟΠΩΛΩΕΙΝΟΣΙ
 " 13-14 δεῦρο γελῶν μεθύων Σάτυρε.
 " 15-16 μετ' ἐφήβων Υμεναίων, μετ' Ἐρότων, Ἀφροδίτη.

Hither laughing with the Maenads self-born Bromios;
 And thou, blessed one, with the Maenads, giver of oracles;
 And with the Maenads (call out, dance) Satyr.

And thou, blessed one, come, thou who rulest all, (call out)
Bromios;

-----;
Hither laughing drunken Satyr.

With the Hymenaioi who are young men, with the Erotes,
Aphrodite.

The main outlines of the φθάριον are clear. Its form, dictated by the religious beliefs of the man who composed it, provides an extremely simple answer to the demands of the occasion for which it was produced. It consists of a threefold invocation in lines 4 to 10, repeated in lines 11 to 14 with, however, the omission of the Maenads⁴ who served as companions in lines 4 to 10, followed by a simple invocation to the divine consort. The question as to whether the threefold invocation is addressed to three distinct divine beings who represent three functions of divinity or whether the terms Βρόμιος, χρησμωδός and Σάτυρος are all thought of as describing the three functions of one god, is not clear from the text. The words καὶ σύ in line 7, which introduce a new god in *H. Hom.*, XXIX, 7 and *Orph. H.*, I, 5, 12, suggest that χρησμωδός should be thought of as distinct from Βρόμιος,⁵ but in a text of such loose formulaic construction fine linguistic points must not be pressed too far. On the other hand the appearance of the word Σάτυρος in the singular rather than in the usual plural number suggests that it is used here, as in *Anth. Pal.*, IX, 524, as an epithet describing a function, not as the name of a distinct god. Whatever the answer may be,—and the problem possibly does not admit a simple one,—it is significant here that we have in this text evidence for the cult's belief in the threefold aspect of their male divinity and characterization, however, slight, of each aspect.

In lines 4 to 6, and again in lines 11 and 12, the god invoked is called Βρόμιος, in general an epithet, not a cult name,⁶ although

⁴ They are called Μαινόλιδες instead of the more usual *Malvades metri gratia*. The adjective μαινόλις, feminine form of μαινόλης, does not occur elsewhere in the genitive, according to Liddell-Scott-Jones, *A Greek-English Lexicon*.

⁵ But cf. the formulaic καὶ σὺ μὲν οὖτω χαῖρε of *H. Hom.*, I, 20; III, 545, etc., where καὶ σύ does not introduce a new god. Compare the καὶ σε of the hymn to Dionysus in the *Antigone* of Sophocles (line 1131) and, on this, E. Norden, *Agnostos Theos* (Leipzig, 1913), p. 158.

⁶ Preller-Robert, *Griechische Mythologie*, p. 665, n. 1, "Βρόμιος scheint nur poetisches Beiwort zu sein."

there is in Pergamum a dedication to a Βρομίψ Πακορτῶν.⁷ In addition to the traditional γελῶν⁸ and μάκαρ, words embedded in the introductory formulae, he is given the more particular epithets ἀλόχευτος and παντομέδων. This is the oldest of the known occurrences of the word ἀλόχευτος and it is perhaps significant that it first appears in a Syrian army temple of a superficially Hellenized Semitic cult.⁹ Its etymological meaning, from a privative and λοχεύω, is "unborn" or rather "not having gone through the process of birth" and it is used once in the simple sense of our "unborn" (Nonnus, *Dionysiaca*, VIII, 27) of the god Dionysus still in his mother's womb. It can also, by a simple extension of usage, mean "born in a manner other than the usual manner" and in this sense it is applied to Athena by Colluthus (*De Raptu Helenae*, 182). It is possible that this is its meaning here, in which case it should be associated with the other more specific epithets which have reference to the birth legend of Dionysus, διμήτωρ, πυριγενῆς, etc. Such an interpretation is not, however, in my opinion, satisfactory. The initiates in Dura did not have the interest in or knowledge of mythology and etymology possessed by Nonnus and Colluthus. Another passage in Nonnus gives us our lead for the true religious and mystic significance of the epithet. In *Dionysiaca*, XLI, 52 and 53 the goddess Φύσις is described as αὐτογένεθλος—ἀπάτωρ ἀλόχευτος

⁷ *I. Perg.*, II, 297 = W. Quandt, *De Ecclesio ab Alexandri aetate in Asia Minor culto* (Diss. Halle, 1912), p. 122.

⁸ The basic meaning of γελᾶν, according to W. B. Stanford (*Greek Metaphor* [Oxford, 1933], pp. 114-117) is "to be bright," and hence can mean "to smile" or "to gleam." Perhaps "radiant" would be a good translation of the participle here. For γελᾶν and its cognates applied to Dionysus see *Orph. H.*, XLIV, 3; XLV, 7; XLVII, 6; and L, 4. Compare also *P. L. G.*, III⁴, 675 (carm. pop. 46), lines 7 and 8 and *Anth. Pal.*, IX, 524, line 4. On the mystic significance of the divine laughter in Hellenistic thought see Philo, *De Praemiis et Poenis*, 31-35 and E. R. Goodenough, *By Light, Light* (New Haven, 1935), pp. 153 f.

⁹ Hitherto first in Symesius, *Hymn*, I, 54, who uses it to describe his neoplatonic god. I do not wish to imply that the word was coined by a soldier in Dura, which is unlikely, but simply to suggest that its first appearance in a Semitic cult is symbolic of the oriental background of Neoplatonism.

ἀμήτωρ. Parallel passages such as the oracle of Apollo at Colophon, quoted by Lactantius¹⁰ (*Div. Inst.*, I, 7, 1), given in answer to the question, “Quis aut quid esset omnino deus?”, beginning ἀντοφύης ἀδίδακτος ἀμήτωρ ἀστυφέλικτος and line 10 of the Orphic hymn to Φύσις (X), ἀντοπάτωρ, ἀπάτωρ, show that Nonnus here is imitating the language of hymns and oracles and suggest that ἀλόχευτος is one of a group of epithets,—ἀπάτωρ, ἀντοπάτωρ, ἀμήτωρ, ἀντοφύης, ἀντογένεθλος, ἀντολόχευτος, ἀντοδίδακτος, κ.τ.λ.—which make their appearance, or are first used in a religious sense, in the early Christian era¹¹ and serve to express the theological conception of god as Prime Mover, the ultimate source of reality. This is certainly the sense in Synesius, *Hymn*, I, 54:

ὅ μὲν ἀντόσσοντος ἀρχὴ,
ταμίας πατήρ τ' ἔοντων,
ἀλόχευτος — — —

I suspect that Nonnus, when he uses ἀλόχευτος of the unborn god, is playing a stylistic trick, a fondness for which he shares with our learned English epic poet, that of using a word in its etymological rather than in its idiomatic meaning.¹² Here a pleasing ambiguity is achieved, for the word is appropriate to the mature god in quite a different mystic sense.

Ἀντολόχευτος is similar in history and meaning to ἀλόχευτος. It, too, is applied to Dionysus (Nonnus, *Dionysiaca*, VIII, 87), and would have done equally well in Nonnus' description of Φύσις quoted above. This word occurs in a text preserved by Didymus (*De Trinitate*, III c, 2, 9), quoting οἱ ἔξω, which defines well the area of thought expressed by this group of epithets.

οὐ γὰρ ἀπ' ὁδίγος Θεὸς ἄμβροτος οὐδὲ ἀπὸ κόλπων
νηδόνος ἐκ λοχίης φάος ἔδρακεν, ἀλλὰ νόοιο
ἀρρήτῳ στροφάλιγγῳ κυκλούμενος, ἀντολόχευτος
γίνεται, ἐξ ἔθεν αὐτὸς ἐών, γενέτης τε καὶ νιός.

¹⁰ On this see Norden, *op. cit.* (see note 5), p. 231, n. 1.

¹¹ Ἀμήτωρ, ἀντογενῆς, ἀντοδίδακτος, and ἀντομαθῆς all occur in Philo (see J. Leisegang, *Indices ad Philonis Alex. Opera* = Vol. VII of Philo, *Opera*, ed. L. Cohn and P. Wendland [Berlin 1926-1930], *sub verba*). The religious concepts involved had, therefore, already been expressed in these epithets in Hellenistic times.

¹² Compare Nonnus' use of ἀγνωστος, *Diony.*, I, 371.

Frequently, as in this passage from Didymus, these epithets are found in texts which stress the identity of the creating (father) and the created (son) gods.¹³ We may compare Synesius, *Hymns*, III, 145 ff. πατέρων πάντων | πάτερ αὐτοπάτωρ | προπάτωρ ἀπάτωρ | νιὲ σεαυτοῦ, and for this type of thought applied to Dionysus, *Orph. H.*, LII, 6, where the god is called θεῶν πάτερ ἡδὲ καὶ νιέ.

If the god is first given an epithet which emphasizes his character as the source of all things, his second distinctive epithet, used in describing this first and most impressive aspect of the divine principle, παντομέδων, "lord of all things," stresses his continuing rule over the universe. This compound was unknown until it appeared in an inscription from Syria (*S. E. G.*, VII, 213, 23: II/III cent. A. D.) as the name of a horse. For the meaning we may compare the Dionysus παντοδυνάστης of *Orph. H.*, XLV, 2 and the Dionysus παντοκράτωρ of an inscription from Ephesus¹⁴ of the second century. Epithets compounded out of the same elements are to be seen in the formulaic "magic" invocation to Hecate from Pergamum: ἵω πασικράτεια, ἵω πασιμέδονσα, ἵω πάντα ἐφέπονσα,¹⁵ probably of the third cent. A. D., and in the παμμεδέων of Nonnus, *Paraphrasis S. Evangelii Ioannei*, V, 102; XII, 71, etc., and later, of *Anth. Pal.*, I, 31. Παν- (πασι-, παντο-) was a prolific compound-producing prefix in the second to fourth centuries A. D. and many single occurrences of words so produced are recorded from hymns and inscriptions.¹⁶ Their vogue reflects the prevailing monotheistic tendencies of this period.

For the god in his second aspect (or for the second god?) we have, unfortunately, only the evidence of lines 7 and 8, as the passage in which he is invoked again (line 13) is corrupt. The

¹³ Norden, *op. cit.* (see note 5), pp. 223 f.

¹⁴ Quandt, *op. cit.* (see note 7), p. 161 = *B. M. I.*, III, 2, 600.

¹⁵ R. Wünsch, "Antikes Zaufergerät aus Pergamon," *Jahrbuch, Ergänzungsheft VI*, p. 13, line 65, cf. also p. 25. With this compare K. Preisendanz, *Papyri Graecae Magicae*, IV, line 2775. O. Kern in "Die Herkunft des orphischen Hymnenbuches," *Genethliakon . . . Carl Robert* (Berlin, 1910), p. 94, discusses this formula in relation to the Orphic Hymns.

¹⁶ See e. g., L. Van Liempt, *De Voaculario Hymnorum Orphicorum atque Aetate* (Purmerend, 1930), pp. 58-60.

epithet *χρησμῳδός*, "singer of oracles," by which he is characterized in line 8 has, like *ἱμωὐδός*,¹⁷ a priestly ring to it. It is used six times in Plato, always of men, and four times paired with *μάντις* or *θεόμαντις*. In Roman times, however, it was used as a divine epithet in the Orphic hymn to **Ονειρος* (LXXXVI, 2) and in a dedicatory inscription to Apollo from Nubia.¹⁸ Here, apparently, it is used to express that aspect of divinity in which the god communicates with mortals, instructing them as to what they are to do and revealing to them their fate. Can we say what proper name would be appropriate for this *χρησμῳδός*? I think not. If we were concerned with the traditional thiasos, as we know it in Italy and Asia Minor, a strong candidate would be Silenus, "the hierophant of the Dionysiac mysteries."¹⁹ The mantic wisdom of Silenus and his position as "elder statesman" of the thiasos are attested by the literary tradition²⁰ and by cult documents, both archaeological²¹ and epigraphical.²² Here, however, where Aphrodite has replaced Ariadne and a single Satyr the usual band of satyrs, analogy must be used with caution. In Syrian cults the divine power which communicates with men, the messenger god, had many names.

For the first 15 letters of line 13, in which he who is called *χρησμῳδός* in line 8 is invoked again, I can suggest no satisfactory reading. These letters are among the clearest on the plaster and are all fairly certain except for the last three, of which the bottom half only is preserved. We must, I think, assume both omission and corruption. I have thought of <*καὶ μετὰ τ>* ὅν προπόλω<ν>²³

¹⁷ See Th. Reinach, s. v. "Hymnodus" in Daremburg et Saglio, *Dictionnaire*.

¹⁸ Kaibel, *Epi.gr. Gr.*, 1023, 2 = C. I. G., 5039.

¹⁹ M. I. Rostovtzeff, *Mystic Italy* (New York, 1927), p. 74.

²⁰ See Vergil's sixth eclogue and the story of Silenus' capture by Midas (*Preller-Robert, op. cit.* [see note 6], p. 731, n. 1).

²¹ For Silenus' participating in what is probably an act of divination see Rostovtzeff, *op. cit.* (see note 19), p. 51 and plate IV, 2. Cf. also K. Lehmann-Hartleben and E. C. Olsen, *Dionysiac Sarcophagi in Baltimore* (1942), pp. 39-40 and fig. 9.

²² See the *Σειληνίκοσμος* of the Bacchic inscription in the Metropolitan Museum published by Vogliano and Cumont in *A. J. A.*, XXXVII (1933), pp. 244-246. Cf. *Orph. H.*, LIV, 4, where Silenus is called *θύστον νομίον τέλετάρχα* and Athenaeus, 197e, *οἱ τὸν δῆλον ἀνείργοντες Σειληνοί*.

²³ For the omitted final *nu* see on *παντομέδων* above (page 30).

Eῖνος "and with thy priests, shaker," and *<θεῦρο γελ>*ων προπολῶ^ν *Eῖνος* "Hither laughing ministering shaker," or, if we assume the omission of a whole line *<καὶ στι, μάκαρ, μετὰ τ>*ων προπόλω^ν *Eῖνος* "And thou, blessed one, with the priests, shaker." *Eῖνος* (= "Eros, Hesychius, s. v.) means "shaking" or "disturbance," usually an earthquake, but not always.²⁴ Once, in a bacchic setting, the concept is personified, and the word means, "Spirit of Earthquake."²⁵ Here, presumably, if the reading be correct, the god is addressed as being or causing that psychic disturbance with its concomitant irrational physical behavior which is characteristic of the mantic and orgiastic ἔκστασις.²⁶ There are, however, no parallels known to me for such a meaning and the reading must remain a possibility only.

Just as the eternal and all-powerful aspect of divinity is first invoked, followed by the mantic, guiding aspect, so, third and last, the orgiastic, generative principle is summoned, as the name, Satyr, and epithet, drunken,²⁷ tell us. In these three invocations we have, it is fair to assume, a brief statement of the beliefs of the cult about its male god.

In the last two lines of the text the divine consort is summoned. Aphrodite was the Hellenized form of the great Syrian nature goddess Atargatis and it is not surprising that in Dura, in cult practice, she has supplanted Ariadne, herself originally a very similar nature goddess.²⁸ We have hints of a similar association of Dionysus and Aphrodite in an inscription from Athens of the second century A. D.,²⁹ in the Orphic hymns,³⁰ probably from

²⁴ The word is used, perhaps metaphorically, of the sacking of Troy in Euripides, *Trojan Women*, 1326, and of a disturbance of the air in Euripides, *Helen*, 1363.

²⁵ Euripides, *Bacch.*, 585, *<σείς> πέδον χθονὸς Εύνοι πότνια*. This is the probable reading, though there is some uncertainty about the text.

²⁶ For the Bacchic ἐνθουσιασμός extended to all nature in the form of earthquakes and whirlwinds, an easy step for the Greeks with their animistic attitude to nature, see *Orph. H.*, XLVII, 1-5, and Aeschylus, frag. 65.

²⁷ With μεθύων cf. Βάκχος μεθυδώτης, *Orph. H.*, XLVII, 1, and Βάκχος μεθύων, Bergh, *P. L. G.*, III⁴, p. 335, "Anacreontea" 57, 24.

²⁸ For the tomb of an Aphrodite-Ariadne in Crete, see Stoll in Roscher, *Lex. des Gr. und Rom. Mythologie*, I, col. 543, lines 62 ff.

²⁹ In the cult of the Iobacchoi an initiate plays the part of Aphrodite in cult performances (*S. I. G.*³, 1109, 122-126).

³⁰ In *Orph. H.*, LV, 7 Aphrodite is called σεμνὴ Βάκχοιο πάρεδρε. Compare also LVII, 3-4 and XLII, 7.

Asia Minor of the second to fourth centuries A. D.,³¹ and in the late mythological traditions as reported by Servius and others.³² The companions of the goddess, the "Ἐρωτες" and the "Ὑμέναιοι," establish beyond a doubt that the text was composed for the important ceremony of the *ἱερὸς γάμος*.

The god "Ὑμέναιος" is a regular attendant at divine weddings³³ but I know no other case of his fission into a band of "Ὑμέναιοι."³⁴ In Nonnus the word *ὑμέναος* in the plural means neither "wedding songs" nor "gods of marriage" but "wedding" or, simply, "sexual union,"³⁵ with no notion of ceremony involved. The *ἔφηβοι* "Ὑμέναιοι" of this song are presumably personifications derived from this use of the word in the plural, a process of personification facilitated by the analogy of the "Ἐρωτες."

For the form of the separate invocations, particularly for the first, an interesting parallel is provided by what has been called "gewiss eines der ältesten liturgischen Stücke, die wir in griechischer Sprache noch besitzen,"³⁶ the song of the women of Elis,³⁷

³¹ On the date and provenance of the Orphic hymns see Van Liempt, *op. cit.* (see note 16), *passim*, and, most recently, I. M. Linforth, *The Arts of Orpheus* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1941), pp. 179 f., where the current views are discussed and references given.

³² According to one tradition Hymenaios was the son of Dionysus and Aphrodite (Roscher, *op. cit.*, I, col. 2800, lines 38 ff.) as were Hermes (*Orph. H.*, LVII, 3-4) and Priapus (Preller-Robert, *op. cit.*, p. 736, n. 5) while the Graces were their daughters (Servius on *Aeneid*, I, 720).

³³ Dionysus and Althaea (Cornelius Baltus in Servius on *Aeneid*, IV, 127), Dionysus and Ariadne (Servius on *Ecl.*, VIII, 30). Compare also Lucian, *Herodotus*, 5.

³⁴ Unless we should capitalize *ὑμελαος* in the fourth Anacreontic, line 13 (Bergh, *P. L. G.*, III⁴, p. 300),—ἢ Κύπρος | ὑμελαος κποροῦσα—where the context is similar, as perhaps we should, if only by analogy with the *ἔφηβοι* "Ὑμέναιοι" of the graffito. Here, however, the meaning "wedding-songs" is appropriate.

³⁵ It means wedding in *Paraphrasis Ioannei*, B 62, Δ 253 (compare Vergil's "inceptos hymenaeos," *Aeneid*, IV, 316 and the comments of A. S. Pease on *Aeneid*, IV, 99 in his edition [Harvard, 1935]), but is used of seduction in *Dionysiaca*, XLVIII, 728, 869, etc.; *ἔρωτες* can have this same meaning, *ibid.*, XLVIII, 870, 875, where Koehler does not capitalize.

³⁶ A. Dieterich, *Eine Mithrasliturgie*² (Leipzig, 1923), p. 127.

³⁷ Plutarch, *Quaest. Graec.*, 36, 7 = Bergh, *P. L. G.*, III⁴, pp. 656-657.

in which they request Dionysus to appear as their divine bridegroom:²⁸

Ἐλθεῖν ἥρω Διόνυσο
Ἄλειων ἐς ναόν
ἀγνόν σὺν Χαρίτεσσιν
ἐς ναόν
τῷ βοέῳ ποδὶ θύων.

And then, says Plutarch who quotes it, they add twice as a refrain, "Ἄξει ταῦρε. In both our first invocation and the Elian song the basic formula seems to be (1) a request to the god to appear, (2) naming of companions, (3) acclamation in the vocative case. Furthermore, in giving us the Elian song Plutarch sets off the acclamation by the words εἴτα δἰς ἐπάδουσιν, indicating that, while part of the song, it is in some measure distinct from it, like a refrain. In our text the vocative acclamations are set off from the rest of the text by the fact that they do not always carry on the dactylic rhythm and by the insertion of the imperatives κάλεσον—which cannot be addressed to the god—and θόασον—which probably is not addressed to the god—immediately before them in lines 10 and 12. May we not conclude that we have in our text, clothed in the words of the third century A. D., an ancient type of liturgical invocation, a type which has survived the vicissitudes of syncretism and all changes in theological concepts, a universal simple formula which, because of its very simplicity, would be recorded only now and then, once by the antiquarian Plutarch; and once by a worshipper in Dura, who left it on a wall of his temple for us to examine?

The imperatives κάλεσον, "call," and θόασον,²⁹ "rush about," provide another link with the fragmentarily known tradition of Bacchic ritual. We may compare the scholiast on Aristophanes' *Frogs*, 479 (= Bergh, *P. L. G.*, III⁴, p. 656, fr. 5): Ἐν τοῖς Δημαικοῖς ἀγῶσι τοῦ Διονύσου ὁ δαδοῦχος κατέχων λαμπάδα λέγει· καλεῖτε θεόν, καὶ οἱ ἐπακούοντες βοῶσι. Σεμελήνη Ἱακχε πλουτοδότα. ἦ

²⁸ So A. Klinz, *Ιερὸς Γάμος* (diss. Halle, 1933), p. 73.

²⁹ The verb θόάξω is used in the *Bacchae* of Euripides (lines 65 and 219) to describe the inspired motions of the female followers of the god and may have been imbedded in the Bacchic vocabulary from early days. It is not, however, a familiar word in ancient ritual and it is tempting to emend to βόασον. For βοάξω used to introduce acclamations see E. Peterson, *Els Θεός* (Göttingen, 1926), 191.

*πρὸς τὸ ἐν ταῖς θυσίαις ἐπιλεγόμενον· ἐπειδὰν γὰρ σπουδοποιήσωνται,
ἐπιλέγονται· Ἐκκέχυται· κάλει θεόν.* Here, however, they pose a problem. In hymns in which the god is described in the third person, *καλέω* and similar words commonly appear in the imperative addressed to the audience, but in a text in which the god is addressed in the second person, as here, these verbs are in the first person. The answer must be that this is not a hymn, but a series of loosely composed liturgical invocations, and that the imperatives, except, of course, *μόλε*, are, as it were, parenthetical stage directions which have found a position after the introductory formulae and the epithets and before the final vocative acclamations.

These imperatives, then, serve to stress the ritualistic nature of the text. The fact that they are in the singular is interesting. Are they addressed to a single individual who is, perhaps, going through the process of initiation? Or are they addressed to an initiate who is taking the part of the god in a sacred drama? We cannot say, for we do not know how to interpret in detail the symbolism of the *ιερὸς γάμος*, and we know nothing of the liturgy of the Syrian cults.

In matters of language and style the graffito has many links with the hymns of its own age. In lines 4 to 14 the units of composition are sacred formulae and epithets, both probably designed originally for hexameter hymns. *Δεῦρο* is the first word in *Orph. H.* LXII and in a magic hexameter hymn to Hecate (Abel, *Orphica*, p. 289).⁴⁰ In hexameters in hymns of all periods *μάκαρ* frequently occupies the position it holds here, the second half of an introductory choriambic metrical colon.⁴¹ *Αλόχεντος*, *χρησμῷδός*, and *παντομέδων* are all typical hexameter compounds. While it is true that *Μαινολίδων* and *παντομέδων* in this text bridge over the normal caesura of the third foot, in the cult hymns there was never the strict avoidance, which we find in

⁴⁰ Compare the hymn to Poseidon in Aristophanes, *Equites*, 559 and 586, the Paean to Dionysus of Philodamus Scarpheus (*Collectanea Alexandrina*, p. 165), line 1, and the hymn to the Mother of the Gods from the temple of Aesculapius at Epidaurus (*I. G.*, IV [Ed. Minor, 1929], no. 131), line 2.

⁴¹ E.g. *Orph. H.*, XXX, 8, *κλῆθε*, *μάκαρ*, *ibid.*, XXXIV, 1, *Ἐλθέ*, *μάκαρ*. For the possible original meaning of this word see A. H. Krappe, "Mákar," *Rev. Phil.*, 3. Série, XIV (1940), p. 245.

Callimachus and Nonnus, of such words,⁴² and so it is quite possible for *μετὰ Μαινολίδων* and *παντομέδων* to have stood in the same position in relation to the beginning of the line in a hexameter hymn which they occupy in this text. For the cadence of lines 11 and 12 we may compare the formulaic *ἀλλά, πάτερ,* *μόλε μωσηπόλοις* (*Orph. H.*, XXV, 10; cf. LXVIII, 11 and LXXIX, 11).

Despite this use of hexameter formulae it would be a mistake to regard the text of lines 4 to 14 as consisting of defective hexameters. The composer clearly made no effort to shape his material to the hexameter structure. The invocations vary in length and the dactylic rhythm is carried only as far as, but not including, the final vocative acclamation.

In the invocation to Aphrodite (lines 15 and 16) we have a change in both meter and style. There is no introductory formula, not even *καὶ*, and no epithet. The two lines have the appearance of having been quoted whole, not assembled. While this meter, ionic *a minore* dimeter, was traditional in Dionysiac cult hymns of the Classical and Hellenistic eras,⁴³ I prefer to explain its appearance in Dura in the third century by reference to the Christian hymns of the following century. If Gregory of Nazianzus in Cappadocia could use this meter for a hymn to Christ in the second half of the fourth century⁴⁴ and if, a little later, Synesius, who did not know Gregory's hymns, could use the same meter in Cyrene for the neoplatonic hymns of his pre-conversion period,⁴⁵ the use of this meter for cult hymns must have been widespread, though the only hymns that we possess now in this form and of this period are the light-hearted literary *Anacreontics*.⁴⁶

⁴² In the Orphic hymns I have counted 24 cases in 1107 lines, almost twice the Homeric ratio.

⁴³ It occurs in Euripides, *Bacchae*, 65 ff., in the Iacchos-hymn of Aristophanes, *Frogs*, 324 ff., and in the refrain of the *Paeon to Dionysus* of Philodamus Scarpheus. See E. R. Dodd's remarks in his commentary on the *Bacchae* (Oxford, 1944), p. 69.

⁴⁴ Hymn I in Christ and Paranikos, *Anthol. Gr. Carm. Christianorum* (Leipzig, 1871), p. 23.

⁴⁵ Hymns I and II in Christ and Paranikis, *op. cit.*, pp. 3 and 5.

⁴⁶ Though differing totally in spirit, the graffito has, besides the meter of lines 15 and 16, certain links in language and style with the Anacreontics. They, like our text, are called *ῳδάρια* (see Bergh, *P. L. G.*,

Despite the difficulties and uncertainties of its interpretation, and despite its literary crudity, the graffito, supplementing the rich iconographic and epigraphic evidence,⁴⁷ casts a flood of light on the important mystery cult of Dionysus, here seemingly assimilated to the Semitic religion of Jupiter Dolichenus. We see the old Hellenic gods surviving by assimilation, not only in name, but, to some extent at least, in attributes and in liturgic tradition. The cult's conception of the nature of its god, as revealed in the epithets with which he is hailed, is in the Hellenistic tradition as expressed by Philo and further developed by the neoplatonic writers of the end of the third century. However, when we try to trace in this text the underlying Semitic character of the cult,⁴⁸ lack of evidence reduces all to conjecture. Possibly the appearance of Aphrodite as bride to the god is the product of local syncretism. Probably, in my opinion, the three-fold division of the male god, for which I know no parallels in the cult of Dionysus, reflects the beliefs of the worshippers of the baal of Doliche. Further study, when the temple as a whole is published, may clarify this point.

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III⁴, pp. 308, 312, 316). For the verbal framework of line 16 we may compare Anacreontic 50, 8: *μετὰ χρυσῆς Ἀφροδίτης* (*ibid.*, p. 327). For Dionysus, Aphrodite, the Erotes, and νυμέναιοι together in a scene engraved on a cup, see Anacreontic 4, 10-14 (*ibid.*, p. 300), but cf. note 34 above.

⁴⁷The evidence has been recently assembled by A. H. Kan in his *Jupiter Dolichenus* (Leiden, 1943).

⁴⁸O. Kern, *Die Religion der Griechen* (Berlin, 1938), III, p. 255. "Der Einfluss des Griechentums auf diesen kommagenischen Baal scheint sehr gering gewesen zu sein"—a statement in need of modification. The evidence of this graffito suggests that the beliefs of the worshippers in the Dolicheneum at Dara had much in common with the theological concepts currently prevailing throughout the Greek-speaking world, however idiosyncratic were the iconographical manifestations of those beliefs.

THE "MORAL SENSE" ASPECT OF ARISTOTLE'S ETHICAL THEORY.

It is the object of this paper to bring into relation the use of the term *μεσότης* (i) in Aristotle's theory of perception as stated in the *De Anima* and (ii) in his account of the differentia of virtue in the definition in the *Nicomachean Ethics*.¹ An attempt will be made to show that the use of the *De Anima* serves as a clue to the use in the *Ethics* in the sense of being systematically prior to it.² At the same time, it will be necessary to consider the passages in the *Nicomachean Ethics* where direct reference is made to *αἰσθησις* as an element in the ethical situation.

The term *μεσότης* occurs first in the *De Anima* in an account of the physiological side of sense perception:

τὸ δὲ αἰσθητήριον αὐτῶν τὸ ἀπτικόν, καὶ ἐν ᾧ ἡ καλουμένη ἄφὴ ὑπάρχει αἰσθησις πρώτῳ, τὸ δινάμει τοιοῦτόν ἔστι μόριον. τὸ γὰρ αἰσθάνεσθαι πάσχειν τι ἔστιν. ὅπερ τὸ ποιοῦν οἶον αὐτῷ ἐνεργέᾳ τοιοῦτον ἐκείνο ποιεῖ δυνάμει ὅν. διὸ τοῦ ὁμοίως θερμοῦ καὶ ψυχροῦ ἢ σκληροῦ καὶ μαλακοῦ

¹ An historical account of *μέτρον*, *μετρίτης*, *μέσον*, *μεσότης* in Plato and the Presocratics is beyond the scope of this paper. Aristotle inherited an ample legacy in regard to the Mean from Greek mathematics, medicine, and philosophy (Cf. J. Souilhé, *La Notion Platonicienne d'Intermédiaire* [Paris, 1919]), but the emphasis of this paper will fall upon what the writer regards as Aristotle's transmutation of his inheritance in applying it to his own uses.

² Chronologically, W. Jaeger places the *De Anima* later than the *Nicomachean Ethics*, in the period of exact scientific research (*Aristotle, Fundamentals in the History of his Development* [Oxford, 1934], p. 331). Nevertheless, his view that the *Nicomachean Ethics* embodies Aristotle's ethical views at their most mature stage and records the obliteration of older doctrines by new ones based on the "psychological observation of life," (p. 236, n. 2), and in particular his account of the conception of *φρόνησις* contained in the *Nicomachean Ethics* (p. 82), may permit the assumption that the general lines of Aristotle's psychological theory had been sketched out when the *Nicomachean Ethics* was composed. It is more difficult to assume the background of a developed psychological theory for the period to which Jaeger assigns the *Eudemian Ethics*, and as the term *μεσότης* has the same place in the *Eudemian* as in the *Nicomachean Ethics* (and, of course, in the *Magna Moralia*), this paper will have to be regarded as taking a place indirectly in the reaction from Jaeger's views about the chronological development of Aristotle's ethical doctrine.

οὐκ αἰσθανόμεθα, δλλὰ τῶν ὑπερβολῶν, ὡς τῆς αἰσθήσεως οἶον μεσότητός τυπος οὖσης τῆς ἐν τοῖς αἰσθήτοις ἐναντίωσεως. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο κρίνει τὰ αἰσθητά. τὸ γὰρ μέσον κριτικόν· γίνεται γὰρ πρὸς ἔκατερον αὐτῶν θάτερον τῶν ἄκρων (*De An.* 423b 30-424a 7).

Aristotle here describes sense perception as a process in which the sense organ is assimilated to its object. Each sense organ is sensitive to a set of qualities ranging between extremes, and to be sensitive to the whole range it must itself be a kind of mixture of the opposed qualities, in which neither extreme unduly predominates. The sense organ, or part in which the sense primarily resides, has potentially the qualities of its object, and in the moment of sensation actually has them. If the part already has the quality (as in the case where the object of touch is just as hot or cold as we are), there is no assimilation and no perception. Nothing happens. This implies, in Aristotle's view, that the sense is a kind of mediety, a capacity for achieving a middle quantity, or *μεσότητος*. This is why the sense passes judgment on its objects, or discriminates.

The conception of a range limited by extremes, as defining the objective fields of the special senses, is perhaps the only point at which Aristotle's account of sense perception touches that given by modern physiology.³ He was not fortunate in his choice of an illustration of the manner in which sense discrimination arises, for it is not well described in general as an effect of contrast. When he says that we do not perceive what is just as hot or cold as we are, he is indeed pointing to the fact that there is a physiological zero for the temperature sense, since a stimulus of 31°C (about the surface temperature of the body) gives no temperature sensation, while with a stimulus of 30°C cold is felt, and with one of 32°C warmth, for most skin areas. It is wrong, however, to generalize from this observation, as Aristotle seems to have done, to the other senses, or even to the other aspects of touch. Sight and hearing, far from having a neutral spot, are most acute in the middle of their range. Pressure zero is at the lower

³ The human ear is sensitive to all sound waves ranging between two extremes of pitch, provided that the intensity is adequate, but the cat's ear has a greater range and is sensitive to sounds too high in pitch to be audible to the human ear. The color range of the human eye is between ultra-violet and infra-red.

extremity of the range of this sense. The temperature sensations have a neutral point partly because the flesh is the medium of the sense, but partly also because there are separate sense organs for hot and cold, or hot and cold "spots." The warmth and cold receptors are situated at some small depth in the skin, and this depth any external stimulus must penetrate to reach them. An adequate stimulus must be colder than the skin, or surface flesh, to set off a cold receptor, and warmer to set off a heat receptor. Similarly, the pressure sense has only a neutral response to the fairly constant pressure of the surrounding atmosphere communicated through the flesh, and the actual flesh in which the sense organ is imbedded is not apprehended by that organ because a continued stimulus is ineffective. It simply is not true, however, that we do not perceive by touch what is just as hard or soft as we are, as anyone can prove by placing the tips of the fingers of the two hands gently together. Aristotle could not, of course, be expected to understand the matter in terms of pressure receptors, warmth and cold receptors, etc., although he did suspect that the sense of touch might include more specific senses,⁴ and he did raise the question whether the flesh was the organ of touch or its medium.⁵ It has been thought worth while to enter a little into the physiological particulars, because the matter is sometimes discussed as if the part played by the flesh really differentiated the sense of touch from the other senses. In fact, the separate sense organs for cold, warmth, pressure, are comparable to the hair cells of the ear, or the rods and cones of the eye; and all the hot and cold spots, with their varying distribution and thresholds, when taken together, are comparable, as covering a range, with the whole range of the ear in sound and the eye in color. Luckily it is not the tenability of Aristotle's physiology which at the moment concerns us, but only the association by him of the terms *τὸ μέτρον* and *μετρότης* with the idea of discrimination.

The conception of the *μετρότης* of sense is developed in a passage where Aristotle seems to be attempting the transition from physiology to psychology. This passage will be given in full, to display all its complications, although the strictly relevant clauses

⁴ *De An.* 422b 17-20, 33; cf. 425a 21.

⁵ *De An.* 422b 21—423a 12.

are at the beginning and end. A comparison is implied, although not quite stated, between sensation and nutrition. Both are forms of assimilation, but in nutrition, a faculty possessed by plants as well as animals, the matter of the food is absorbed; while sensation, or perception, possessed by animals and man, is receptive of form without matter.

καθόλου δὲ περὶ πάσης αἰσθήσεως δεῖ λαβεῖν ὅτι ἡ μὲν αἰσθησίς ἔστι τὸ δεκτικὸν τῶν αἰσθητῶν εἰδῶν ἀκεύ τῆς ὑλῆς, οἷον ὁ κηρὸς τοῦ δακτυλίου ἄνεν τοῦ σιδήρου καὶ τοῦ χρυσοῦ δέχεται τὸ σημεῖον, λαμβάνει δὲ τὸ χρυσοῦν ἢ τὸ χαλκοῦν σημεῖον ἀλλ' οὐχ ἢ χρυσὸς ἢ χαλκός· ὄμοιός δὲ καὶ ἡ αἰσθησίς ἐκάστου ὑπὸ τοῦ ἔχοντος χρᾶμα ἢ χυμὸν ἢ ψόφον πάσχει, ἀλλ' οὐχ ἢ ἔκαστον ἐκείνων λέγεται, ἀλλ' ἢ τοιοῦν, καὶ κατὰ τὸν λόγον. αἰσθητήριον δὲ πρώτον ἐν φῇ ἡ τοιαύτη δύναμις. ἔστι μὲν οὖν ταῦτον, τὸ δὲ εἶναι ἔτερον· μέγεθος μὲν γὰρ ἄν τι εἴη τὸ αἰσθανόμενον· οὐ μὴν τὸ γε αἰσθητικῷ εἶναι οὐδὲ ἡ αἰσθησίς μέγεθος ἔστιν, ἀλλὰ λόγος τις καὶ δύναμις ἔκείνου. φανερὸν δὲ ἐκ τούτων (1) καὶ διὰ τί ποτε τῶν αἰσθητῶν αἱ ὑπερβολαὶ φθείρουσι τὰ αἰσθητήρια· ἔαν γὰρ ἢ ἴσχυροτέρα τοῦ αἰσθητηρίου ἡ κίνησις, λύεται ὁ λόγος (τοῦτο δὴ ἡ ἡ αἰσθησίς), ὥσπερ καὶ ἡ συμφωνία καὶ ὁ τόνος κρουομέτερων σφόδρα τῶν χορδῶν. (2) καὶ διὰ τί ποτε τὰ φυτὰ οὐκ αἰσθάνεται, ἔχοντά τι μόριον ψυχικὸν καὶ πάσχοντά τι ὑπὸ τῶν ἀπτῶν αὐτῶν· καὶ γὰρ ψύχεται καὶ θερμαίνεται· αἵτινον γὰρ τὸ μὴ ἔχειν μεσότητα, μηδὲ τοιαύτην ἀρχὴν οἷαν τὰ εἶδη δέχεσθαι τῶν αἰσθητῶν, ἀλλὰ πάσχειν μετὰ τῆς ὑλῆς (De An. 424a 17-b 3).

It is here stated that sense in general is receptive of sensible forms apart from their matter, as wax receives the imprint of the signet ring apart from the iron or gold of which it is made. Sense as relative to each sensible is acted upon by that which possesses color, flavor, or sound, not in so far as each of these sensibles is called a particular thing, but in so far as it possesses a particular quality and in respect of its form (*λόγος*). The sense organ is then distinguished from the *δύναμις* which resides in it, since the organ is an extended magnitude, which *ἡ αἰσθησίς* is not. At this point it is stated that sensitivity in the abstract, or the sense, is *λόγος τις καὶ δύναμις* of the organ (*ἔκείνου*). In what has been said so far (*ἐξ τούτων*), is to be found the explanation of two things, (1) why excesses in the sensible objects destroy the sense organs, (2) why plants have no sensation. As regards (1), the sense is destroyed by excessive stimuli because it is put out of tune, its principle of organization is deranged. It is here reiterated that *ὁ λόγος* constitutes the sense. This seems to be a development of Aristotle's first definition of sense as a

μεσότης, which was apparently derived from his consideration of the sense of touch, for him the basic sense.⁶ That it is a development of the first definition, and not a substitution for it, is borne out by the clear identification of *μεσότης* at the conclusion of the passage as "a principle capable of receiving the forms of sensible objects without their matter," and by analogy with the *μεσότης* of the *Ethics*, which is ὡρισμένη λόγος.⁷ As regards (2), the non-existence of sensation is equated with absence of a *μεσότης*.

It is therefore precisely in virtue of the presence in them of a mediet, now defined as a principle capable of receiving the forms of sensible objects without their matter, that some living things are endowed with sensation. Again we are not immediately concerned with Aristotle's success or failure in his attempt to escape by this device from the materialism of earlier accounts of perception, but rather with his linking of the term *μεσότης*, by reference to the distinction between form and matter, with sensation and perception, and so with that discriminative power (*τὸ κριτικόν, διανοίας ἔργον ἐστὶ καὶ αἰσθήσεως*)⁸ which is the common ingredient in the highest as well as the simplest acts of cognition.

⁶ J. L. Stocks has made this passage and another (426a 27-b 7) the occasion for an article, "ΔΟΤΟΣ and ΜΕΣΟΤΗΣ in the *De Anima* of Aristotle" (*Journal of Philology*, XXXIII [1914], pp. 182-194) which was brought to the attention of the writer by Sir David Ross, after the first draft of the present paper was completed. Stocks here makes the suggestion that Aristotle in defining touch as a *μεσότης* was conscious that the flesh is not strictly the organ, but rather the medium, of touch; and that the proper generalization from his assertions about touch is that not the organs, or the actual sensations, but the media (*τὰ μεταξύ*) of the other special senses, partake in a mean degree of the qualities apprehended. He thinks that *λόγος*, rather than *μεσότης*, really defines the act of sensation. His interpretation of *μεσότης* as defining a negatively qualified medium of sense permits him to regard the field of *πάθος* and *πρᾶξις*, for which a *μέσον* is determined by the *λόγος*, as a similar negatively qualified medium in ethics, and he therefore arrives at an ingenious analogy between the *μεσότητες* of Aristotle's psychology and ethics. Stocks concentrates attention upon the transference of form from matter to mind, or from mind to matter. He does not connect the use of *μεσότης* both in the *Ethics* and the *De Anima* with the prominent place given to *αἴσθησις* in the *Ethics*. The present writer sees an analogy between the association of responsiveness with *μεσότης* in the *De Anima* and the responsiveness of emotion informed by judgment in the virtue of the *Nicomachean Ethics*.

⁷ *Eth. Nic.* 1106b 37.

⁸ *De An.* 432a 16.

The principle by which Aristotle explains the special senses is retained for the doctrine of the unity of sense by which he accounts for our perception of the common sensibles, for concurrent perceptions relating to the same object and for our perception that we perceive. A pair of contraries determines the range or field of one sense, at the extremities of which they lie, while the mean, which possesses the contraries in equipoise, occupies the centre; "but more than one pair of contraries may be found within the same field, the mean being equally central to all of them."⁹ The term *μεσότης* is not directly related to the term *ἡ κοινὴ αἰσθήσις* in the *De Anima* (the latter expression itself occurs only once in that book), but it is stated that *τὸ ἔσχατον* in the realm of sense is a single mean (*μία μεσότης*) and the words *ἡ αἰσθητικὴ μεσότης* are used as if *μεσότης* were a technical term expressing the essence of sense.¹⁰ The passage in question occurs, interestingly enough for our present purpose, in the chapter in which Aristotle makes the transition from theoretical to practical intellect:

τὸ μὲν οὖν αἰσθάνεσθαι ὅμοιοι τῷ φάναι μόνον καὶ νοεῖν· ὅταν δὲ ἥδη ἡ λυπηρόν, οἷον καταφᾶσα ἡ ἀποφᾶσα, διώκει ἡ φεύγει· καὶ ἔστι τὸ ἥδεσθαι καὶ λυπεῖσθαι τὸ ἐνεργέεν τῇ αἰσθητικῇ μεσότητι πρὸς τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἡ κακὸν ἢ τοιαῦτα. καὶ ἡ φυγὴ δὲ κοὶ ἡ ὅρεξις ταῦτο ἡ κατ' ἐνέργειαν, καὶ οὐχ ἔτερον τὸ δρεκτικὸν καὶ φευκτικόν, οὔτε ἀλλήλων οὐτε τοῦ αἰσθητικοῦ· ἀλλὰ τὸ ἔγαιοι ἀλλο. τῇ δὲ διανοητικῇ ψυχῇ τὰ φαντάσματα οἷον αἰσθήματα ἡπάρχει. ὅταν δὲ ἀγαθὸν ἡ κακὸν φήσῃ ἡ ἀποφῆσῃ, φεύγει ἡ διώκει (διὸ οὐδέποτε νοεῖ ἀνευ φαντάσματος ἡ ψυχῇ), ὕσπερ δὲ ὁ ἄλλος τὴν κόρην ταιανὸν ἐποίησεν, αὕτη δὲ τοιούτην, καὶ ἡ ἀκεὴ ὠσαύτως, τὸ δὲ ἔσχατον ἔν, καὶ μία μεσότης, τὸ δὲ ἔναι τοιούτην πλέω (De An. 431a 8-20).

The point at issue here is a comparison between the unity of sense perception and the unity of practical judgment. Three situations are indicated: (i) that in which a central faculty of sense co-ordinates the impressions of the special senses, (ii) that in which the bare perception that an object is pleasant or painful is the equivalent of pursuit or avoidance, (iii) that in which the mental image takes the place of sensation in the thinking soul, and the

⁹ See J. A. Smith's note on his translation of the *De Anima* 424a 6, Oxford translation of Aristotle's Works, vcl. III.

¹⁰ See R. D. Hicks' note to *De An.* 431a 10.

soul's affirmative judgment of good or bad in regard to it is the equivalent of desire or aversion. The acknowledged unity of sense perception is used to illustrate the unity achieved when in desire or aversion it is a single faculty of thought (not one tendency overcoming another tendency) which affirms or denies. Case (ii) is the rudimentary form of case (iii). It is therefore in this rudimentary case that we have $\dot{\eta}$ αἰσθητικὴ μεσότης, the sensitive mediety, represented here as performing a quasi-synthesis of the sensible and the pleasant, or the sensible and the painful. Thus, in the *De Anima*, we have an indication of the part played by perception in the ethical theory of Aristotle. For a more precise account of the relation of $\alphaἰσθητος$ to practical judgment we must turn to the *Nicomachean Ethics*.

According to Burnet the systematic use of the term *μεσότης* underlying what soon becomes a broader use in the *Ethics* is that in which it is explanatory of the formal cause. The γένεσις and φθορά of virtue arise in its subject matter, the emotions, according to a ratio (*κατὰ μεσότητα*), i. e., goodness from what is not goodness and evil from what is not evil, just as, for example, the organic tissues arise *κατὰ μεσότητα* from what is inorganic, the opposites, hot and cold, moist and dry.¹¹ This analogy coincides with what has been regarded as a characteristic contribution of Aristotle to early ethical theory, namely that the emotions are morally neutral and must neither be thwarted ascetically nor exploited naturalistically, but moderated in a proportion, a proportion relative to us, which will make our virtue the complete fulfillment of the nature proper to us.¹² The association of the term *μεσότης* with the formal cause is obviously fundamental. It appears in the psychological theory of the *De Anima* no less than in the philosophy of nature of the *De Generatione et Corruptione*, in that *μεσότης* in the *De Anima* is a principle which receives the forms of sensible objects without their matter. There are some considerations, however, which suggest that it may be a mistake to press the basic analogy at the expense of the more closely related psychological one. In the first place, while the idea of the neutrality of the emotions may be an interesting one to a modern philosopher in reaction equally from Victorian asceticism

¹¹ J. Burnet, *The Ethics of Aristotle*, pp. 72-73, *in Gen. Corr.* 334b 2.

¹² W. D. Ross, *Aristotle*, p. 195.

and contemporary naturalism, still the idea is implicit rather than explicit in Aristotle. It is, of course, implied in the passage where he points out that virtue is not a *πάθος* but a *έξις*.¹³ Secondly, balance, or even emotional control, is not the *whole* content of Aristotelian virtue. Even the citizen virtue of the first four books of the *Nicomachean Ethics* involves a reference to judgment, and, on the other hand, in the fuller account of the cognitive processes of the moral situation given in Book VI virtue is never quite transcended, but itself implies a capacity for judgment.¹⁴ It is quite possible that Aristotle's postponement of his discussion of the intellectual element in virtue has resulted in its failing to assume its full importance for many readers. This in turn may explain why the use of the term *μεσότης* in the *Ethics* is not ordinarily more closely associated with the use in the *De Anima* where it appears in *αἴσθησις* at the very foundation of all cognition. It is submitted that the notion of perceptive discrimination is what underlies the use of *μεσότης* in the definition of virtue, and that it is in this sense that virtue is in its essence and by definition (*κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ τὸν λόγον τὸν τί ἦν εἶναι λέγοντα*) a *μεσότης*.¹⁵

The discussion of virtue as a *μεσότης* is introduced in Book II when Aristotle, having established the genus of virtue, that it is a *έξις*, turns to a consideration of its differentia. Virtue is called a mediety because it aims at a middle quantity, an equilibrium, in emotion and action (*μεσότης τις ἡδρά ἐστιν ἡ ἀρετή στοχαστική γε οὖσα τοῦ μέσου*),¹⁶ but it is a middle quantity relative to us, and the discussion of this relativity immediately brings into prominence the importance of perceptive discrimination in ethics.

¹³ *Eth. Nic.* 1105b 19–1106a 2. We are also told that there are certain *πράξεις* and *πάθη*, forms of action and emotion, which do not admit of quantitative distinction because some of them in their very names imply vice (*Eth. Nic.* 1107a 8–17).

¹⁴ The present context is not suitable for a discussion of the assignment of the “disputed books”; it will be enough for the immediate purpose that there is no dispute as to Book VI being “the genuine outcome of the mind of Aristotle” (St. G. Stock, Introduction to the Oxford translation of the *Magna Moralia* and *Ethica Eudemia*, p. xix).

¹⁵ *Eth. Nic.* 1107a 6.

¹⁶ The *τις* is used in exactly the same way when *αἴσθησις* is defined as a *μεσότης* in the *De Anima* (424a 4) as when *ἀρετή* is similarly defined here (*Eth. Nic.* 1106b 27).

The doctrine that vice consists in excess or defect appears as a corollary, and the complete definition of virtue is then stated with its reference to a λόγος and to δὸς φρόνιμος pointing forward to Book VI:

ἔστιν ἄρα η̄ ἀρετὴ ἔξις προαιρέτική, ἐν μεσότητι οὐσίᾳ τῇ πρὸς ἡμᾶς, ὠρισμένη λόγῳ καὶ ϕῷ δὲ δὸς φρόνιμος ὁρίσειν (Eth. Nic. 1106b 36).

It is significant that at the crucial moment of the definition μεσότητι is the active principle of virtue in operation just as it is of perception in the *De Anima*, a capacity for achieving a quantity between extremes. It is not surprising, therefore, that in the ensuing passage where a verification of the theory that virtue is a mean is attempted by reference to a list of virtues, the effect of the exposition is that the theory came first and the consideration of the accepted virtues as a sequel. The descent to particularity involves a transition from the general theory of the mean to its corollary, that each virtue is a μέση ἔξις between two vices which are its extremes. It is not proposed to repeat here the time-honored academic exercise of exhibiting the failure (in some cases admitted by Aristotle himself) of the trinitarian scheme of virtues and vices—with its customary conclusion that the corollary may be dismissed as a rather unsuccessful extension of the general theory. Rather let us turn to the conclusion of the discussion of the principle of the mean in the *Nicomachean Ethics* where, after some remarks to the effect that it is difficult to be good, because in every case it is difficult to find τὸ μέσον and especially τὸ μέσον πρὸς ἡμᾶς in particular cases, Aristotle finally says that in practical ethics *the decision rests with perception*:

δὸς μέχρι τίνος καὶ ἐπὶ πόσον ψεκτὸς οὐν ῥάδιον τῷ λόγῳ ἀφορίσαι· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἄλλο οὐδὲν τῶν αἰσθητῶν· τὰ δὲ τοιαῦτα ἐν τοῖς καθ' ἔκαστα, καὶ ἐν τῇ αἰσθήσει η̄ κρίσις¹⁷ (Eth. Nic. 1109b 20; cf. 1126a 36).

¹⁷ W. Jaeger connects the *αἰσθησίς* of this passage, not with the *αἰσθησίς* of the *De Anima*, but with the medical *αἰσθησίς* of the *περὶ ἀρχαλη̄ς ιητρικῆς*. He states (*Diokles von Karystos*, p. 47, a reference for which I wish to thank Dr. Ludwig Edelstein) that Aristotle *takes over* the conception of *αἰσθησίς* from the author of this treatise, referring to Hippocrates, *De vet. med.*, 9: δεῖ γὰρ μέτρον τινὸς στοχάσσειν· μέτρον δὲ οὐτε ἀριθμὸν οὔτε σταθμὸν ἄλλον, πρὸς δὲ ἀναφέρων εἰση τὸ ἀκριβές, οὐκ ἢν εἴρους ἀλλ' η̄ τοῦ σώματος τὴν αἰσθησίν. While not wishing to deny the influence of medical analogy upon Aristotle's ethical thought, the writer would

It is in this passage that the connection between the ethical and psychological theories is most clearly indicated, for this perceptive scrutiny of the particulars of the moral situation is an integral part of virtue itself. The real evidence for a connection between the *De Anima* and the *Nicomachean Ethics* is the existence of a doctrine of "moral sense" underlying the use of *φρόνησις* in the *Ethics*.¹⁸

It may be as well to meet at once the difficulty sometimes raised that the announcement that *αἰσθησίς* is to hold the scale suggests that while the particularity of the moral situation is to have full weight, the universal aspect may be lost sight of. It is, of course, a great merit of Aristotle's ethical theory that it recognizes that the moral situation is concrete, that it has to do with particulars;

nevertheless call attention (i) to the verbal echo in <*ἡ αἰσθησίς κρίνει τὰ αἰσθητά*> in the *De Anima* and *ἐν τῇ αἰσθήσει ἡ κρίσις* here, and (ii) to the circumstance that the reference to *αἰσθησίς* does not come in chapter 6 of Book II, where the matter of diet relative to individual needs is compared to the situation in ethics (the natural medical context) but in chapter 9 where the difficulty of *στοχάζεσθαι τοῦ μέσου* is illustrated by reference to Calypso and Helen, and where the general reference is psychological rather than medical. In his *Aristotle*, p. 44, n. 1, Jaeger speaks of the Aristotelian mean as "a conscious return" to the ethics of measure of Plato's *Philebus*, which "rest on a transference into the mental sphere of contemporary mathematical views in medicine." It may be worth observing that *μεσότης*, in so far as it is a Platonic word, occurs in the *Timaeus* (32 A and 43 D) where it is, first, the mean term of the proportion which is "the best of bonds," "that which makes itself and those which it binds as complete a unity as possible"; and secondly, in a much vaguer context concerned with the birth of the sensations (*αἰσθῆσις*) in the myth of creation. Either of these passages might have a poetic and literary association with Aristotle's adoption of the term *μεσότης* to describe the bond between the perceived object and the perceiving mind, and in any case the Aristotelian technical term is *μεσότης* not *μέτρον*. It is the purpose of this paper, as has already been pointed out, to deal less with the historical derivation of Aristotle's views than with the co-existence in his mind of a whole complex of related psychological and ethical concepts. To say, however, as Jaeger does in *Diodorus von Karyiszia*, that Aristotle "den Begriff der *αἰσθησίς* . . . übernimmt" from the author of *περὶ ἀρχαῖς ιητρικῆς*, seems to be an exaggeration which neglects the elaborate treatment in Book VI of the *Nicomachean Ethics* of the relation between *αἰσθησίς* and *φρόνησις*.

¹⁸ Burnet recognizes the presence of an Aristotelian theory of "moral sense" (p. 107); but he does not seem to relate the uses of *μεσότης* in the *De Anima* and the *Ethics*.

but it is not everywhere considered that his theory does equal justice to the universal aspect of ethics.¹⁹ Our first answer will be that *αἰσθησις* has to do with the assimilation of form, not matter, as we have seen. The sensible forms of the *De Anima* are the forms of sensible things, the qualities in them which constitute them what they are, the red of the red thing, the sound of the resonant thing, the flavor of the flavored thing. Each of these qualities, taken in itself, is a universal (*καθόλον*), in Aristotle's language *τούνδε*, not *τόδε τι*.²⁰ The full answer can be obtained only by pursuing ὁ φρόνιμος, who has been awarded the arbitral position in Book IV, into Book VI, where *φρόνησις* is fully discussed.

Book VI begins with a reminder that we have still to consider how the mean is determined by the right rule. It proceeds to a discussion of practical and theoretical truth as relating respectively to the variable and the invariable, and it undertakes a comparison of human gifts relative to truth with a view to clearing up the nature and distinction of three things (or two, as one takes it) : *πολιτική*, *φρόνησις* and *σοφία*. The upshot is that the first two belong together, and *σοφία* is a product of the combination of *ἐπιστήμη* and *νοῦς*, the first having to do with what is mediated in knowledge, the second with what is immediate. In other words, philosophic wisdom (*σοφία*) is scientific knowledge (*ἐπιστήμη*) based on intuitional reason (*νοῦς*) which supplies the starting points (*ἀρχαῖ*) of discursive thought. We may now return to *φρόνησις*, of which the distinguishing feature is that it is concerned with the ultimate particular fact (*τὸ ἔσχατον*), since the thing to be done is of this nature (*τὸ γὰρ πρακτὸν τοιοῦτον*). In this respect it is opposed to *νοῦς*.

ὅ μὲν γὰρ *νοῦς* τῶν ὅρων, ὃν οὐκ ἔστι λόγος, ἡ δὲ <*φρόνησις*> τοῦ ἔσχάτου, οὗ οὐκ ἔστιν *ἐπιστήμη* ἀλλ' *αἴσθησις*, οὐχ ἡ τῶν ἰδίων, ἀλλ' οἵα αἰσθανόμεθα ὅτι τὸ ἐν τοῖς μαθηματικοῖς ἔσχατον τρίγωνον· στήσεται γὰρ κάκει. ἀλλ' αὐτῇ μᾶλλον *αἴσθησις* ἡ <*ἥ*> *φρόνησις*, ἐκείνης δ' ἄλλο εἶδος (*Eth. Nic.* 1142a 25-30).

¹⁹ Jaeger's account of the development of Aristotle's ethical theory expresses the view that the attainment of greater concreteness for ethics is a philosophical advance (see his *Aristotle*, pp. 239-40). He perhaps overstates his case, however, in his account of the paring down of *φρόνησις* in Book VI of the *Nicomachean Ethics* (*Aristotle*, pp. 82-3). Cf. the remarks of Sir David Ross on p. 219 of his *Aristotle*.

²⁰ *Anal. Post.* 87b 28.

What we have here is a sort of hierarchy of *aiσθησις*: (i) *ἡ τῶν ιδίων αἰσθητῶν*, perception of the qualities peculiar to each sense; (ii) *κοινὴ αἰσθησις*, recognition of a particular shape, one of the *κοινὰ αἰσθητά*,²¹ or, according to Burnet, mathematical induction;²² (iii) *φρόνησις*, the apprehension of the ultimate particular in conduct. As soon as Aristotle abandons metaphor (e. g., the hitting of a mark or the tuning of a lyre, in *ἔστι τις σκοπὸς πρὸς ὃν ἀποβλέπων δὲ τὸν λόγον ξχων ἐπιτείνει καὶ ἀνίστων* in the second sentence of Book VI) and analogy (e. g., exercise and food in relation to the maintenance of health in Book II and Book VI) to give the fundamental explanation of the relativity of ethical judgments as expressed in his doctrine of the mean, his analysis leads him to the principle that "practical wisdom is concerned with the ultimate particular, which is the object . . . of perception" of a special kind, *φούνησις*, i. e., apprehension of the ultimate particular in conduct.

We naturally look forward to finding in *φρόνησις* the cornerstone upon which the Aristotelian theory is founded, for, as we have already observed, it was with *ὅ φρόνιμος* that the ultimate decision was left in the formal definition of virtue, and we are told that it is *φρόνησις* which gives unity to the particular virtues, *ἄμα γὰρ τῇ φρονήσει μιᾷ σύσηη πᾶσαι οἱ ἀρεταὶ* *ὑπάρξουσιν*.²³ It is perhaps disappointing, therefore, to find *φρόνησις*, which gives virtue its rationality, so exclusively concerned with means to the end. *ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀρετὴ τὸν σκοπὸν ποιεῖ ὁρθόν, ἡ δὲ φρόνησις τὰ πρὸς τοῦτον*,²⁴ or again *ἡ εὐθυνλία εἴη δὲ ὁρθότης ἡ κατὰ τὸ σύμφερον πρὸς τὸ τέλος οὐκ ἡ φούνησις ἀληθῆς ὑπόληψίς ἔστω*.²⁵ Putting the matter in terms of the practical syllogism, we find that in deliberation we work from the top downwards of the series of terms which lead to the end until we come to something which we can do. It is the part of *φρόνησις* to *see* that this last link in the chain, a particular act, is the means to the end. In this sense it is a form

²¹ *De An.* 418a 7 ff.

²² It makes no difference to the general argument to accept Burnet's rendering "that the ultimate constituent of figures arrived at by analysis is a triangle." That the last figure into which a complex figure can be analyzed is a triangle, i. e., that it takes three straight lines to enclose a space, is something which we simply *see*. The place of this perception as intermediate between i and iii is unaltered.

²³ *Eth. Nic.* 1145a 1. ²⁴ *Eth. Nic.* 1144e 7. ²⁵ *Eth. Nic.* 1142b 32.

of *αἰσθησις*, not the simple *αἰσθησις* of the qualities peculiar to one sense, but more like the perception (or, as we sometimes say, intuition) by which we see things in the process of mathematical analysis, although this too, because of our use of sensible figures as aids to thought, is closer to simple *αἰσθησις* than *φρόνησις* can be, since the latter brings us to the level of pure thought. The *φρόνησις* of ethical judgment is an intellectual, although not a sensuous, perception.²⁶ We simply *see* in exercising *φρόνησις* that this is the particular act which will serve as means to our end, the good for man.

To the question of how we grasp the end to which the means stand in relation we have Aristotle's formal answer that *ἀρετή* determines the end.²⁷ We have observed that *νοῦς* is the ingredient of theoretical wisdom which provides the immediate grasp of first principles upon which discursive thought or scientific knowledge is based. One would expect to find the equivalent of *νοῦς* in *φρόνησις*. Instead, we have been told that *φρόνησις* is opposed to *νοῦς* because the former has to do with the ultimate particular act and the latter with the universal limiting premise.

There is one passage in Book VI in which *φρόνησις* and *νοῦς* are brought very close together. Aristotle has pointed out that the same sort of man may be said to have *φρόνησις* and *νοῦς*. Remembering the association of *νοῦς* with first principles in theoretical wisdom, we look forward to its exercising a similar function here. However, the passage proceeds:

καὶ ὁ νοῦς τῶν ἐσχάτων ἐπ' ἀμφότερα. καὶ γὰρ τῶν πρώτων ὅρων καὶ τῶν ἐσχάτων νοῦς ἔστι καὶ οὐ λόγος, καὶ ὁ μὲν κατὰ τὰς ἀποδείξεις τῶν ἀκινήτων ὅρων καὶ πρώτων, ὁ δὲ ἐν ταῖς πρακτικαῖς τοῦ ἐσχάτου καὶ ἐνδεχομένου καὶ τῆς ἑτέρας προτάσεως ἀρχαὶ γάρ τοῦ οὐ ἔνεκα αὗται. ἐκ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα γάρ τὰ καθόλου· τούτων οὖν ἔχειν δεῖ αἰσθητιν, αὕτη δὲ ἔστι νοῦς (*Eth. Nic.* 1143a 35–b 5).

We have already been told (*Eth. Nic.* 1142a 25) that *φρόνησις* is opposed to *νοῦς* because the former has to do with the particular,

²⁶ This is as good a moment as any to point out that the writer is not overlooking the fact that Aristotle does not regard the intellectual virtues, of which *φρόνησις* is one, as *μεσότητες*. It is the total situation summed up in ἡ ἡθικὴ ἀρετή which he compares to the perceptive situation, and it is ἡ ἡθικὴ ἀρετή, not any single one of its ingredients, which he calls a *μεσότητη*.

²⁷ *Eth. Nic.* 1144a 7–9.

the latter with the universal. Here it appears that there is a sort of *νοῦς* entering as an element into *φρόνησις*. This *νοῦς* is an *αἰσθῆτος*, an intellectual, not a sensuous, form of it. It has to do with particulars (the minor premises of practical syllogisms) in so far as they are starting points for the apprehension of the universal rules of conduct as embodying the good for man. We have here a parallel with the process of induction (*ἐπαγωγή*) in the realm of the theoretical. In induction, of whatever kind, we have a number of particular instances. The universal proposition of which we decide, after inspection, that each of these particulars is an instance, is not proved by them. We merely *see* or grasp the universal in the instances by means of *νοῦς*, our rational intuition. In the passage just quoted Aristotle seems to admit that there is a sort of practical induction and that *φρόνησις*, or the *νοῦς* entering as an element into *φρόνησις*, grasps the universal in the particular and apprehends the good for man.

This conclusion must be modified by, or brought into relation with, the fact that Aristotle insists that it is not *φρόνησις* but *ἀρετή* or *ἡδονή* which makes what seems good to us the true good, or, in other words, he insists that the first principles of ethics are apprehended, not by perception (*αἰσθήσει*), nor by induction (*ἐπαγωγῇ*), but by habituation (*ἔθισμῷ τῷν*). The three processes are all related and the earlier terms in the enumeration all enter as factors into the later, i. e., perception is a factor in induction, and perception and induction are factors in habituation. The fact of the dilemma which constitutes choice must be taken into consideration. If we are not habituated in the right way, we make too many wrong choices and we do not get the instances of right action in which we shall see the good and develop our eye.²⁸ Rather our moral vision will be distorted. It is to prevent waste of good instances that we must attend to the statements and beliefs of experienced and elderly people.²⁹ As Burnet says, "their experience has given them an eye for such things and they see aright." But, as he goes on, "it is the eye and not the experience which really secures the truth of these statements," and the pupil does not become a fully developed moral agent until his own discernment has achieved a certain independence.

²⁸ Cf. Burnet, Introduction to the *Ethics of Aristotle*, p. xxxviii.

²⁹ *Eth. Nic.* 1143b 11.

Thus we see that the doctrine of "moral sense" is not opposed to, but involved in, the doctrine that it is the *θεός* which gives us our vision of the good.

That we know what is right does not involve that we do it. This is Aristotle's criticism of what Socrates says in the *Protogoras*.³⁰ His own general account of the origin of motion is to be found in the *De Anima* and in the *De Motu Animalium*,³¹ and it becomes relevant in the *Nicomachean Ethics* in the discussion of incontinency in Book VII. We have already seen in Book VI (1139a 19) that η̄ αἰσθητὸς οὐδεμιᾶς ἀρχὴ πράξεως, i. e., perception originates no action; but the point at issue there is a contrast between *πρᾶξις* and *κίνησις*. We see from the *De Anima* that *αἰσθητός* and *ὄρεξ* taken together will account for τὴν κατὰ τόπον κίνησιν of the lower animals, but we do not call a *κίνησις* a *πρᾶξις* unless it arises from an *ὄρεξ* moved by *νοῦς*. Again in Book VI (1139a 35) we have the dictum, δάνοντα δὲ αὐτὴν οὐθὲν κινεῖ. This refers us once more to the *De Anima* and the double source of motion in *ὄρεξ* and *νοῦς*. There the cases of the continent and incontinent are quoted to show that (a) desire may be set aside by reason, because the former obey reason although they feel desire, and (b) action may be determined by desire in spite of the counsels of reason, because the latter yield to desire, although the intellect has issued an order against it.³² The case of conflict between reason and desire occurs in beings which have a perception of time. Desire takes the pleasurable of the immediate future for the absolutely pleasurable and prompts to indulgence. Reason out of regard for the more distant future bids us refrain.

In Book VII of the *Nicomachean Ethics* Aristotle undertakes to deal φυσικῶς, i. e., in this case from the psychological point of view, with the problem whether incontinent people act knowingly or not, and in what sense knowingly. His solution is expressed in terms of the practical syllogism. We begin with the major premise, *everything sweet is pleasant*, and we have a minor premise, *this is a sweet thing*. On the intervention of desire,

³⁰ *Eth. Nic.* 1145b 23 ff.; *Plato, Protagoras* 352 B.

³¹ *De An.* 432a 15 ff. and 433a 9–434a 21; *De Mot. Animal.* 701a 7–33 and 703b 19;

³² *De An.* 433a 1–8.

which replaces the major premise with, *I want to taste something sweet*, the particular perception of the minor premise, *this is a sweet thing*, immediately renders the desire effective and the sweet thing is tasted. Now there may have been at the back of the mind of the incontinent person a knowledge that some sweet things are unhealthful, but the minor premise which does not coincide with desire, *this is a case of an unhealthful sweet thing*, does not emerge in a clear perception, and there is no action in this direction. This looks like the detailed working out for a special case of the germinal idea in the passage from the *De Anima* quoted earlier (431a 8-20), where stress is laid on the unity achieved in practical judgment, and it reinforces the case for a close relationship between the psychological and ethical theories.

The case in which Aristotle has undertaken a detailed analysis of the relation between deliberation and desire which is fundamental to his conception of the will ($\eta\ \delta\rho\epsilon\kappa\tau\kappa\delta\ \nu\omega\varsigma\ \eta\ \pi\rho\alpha\imath\rho\epsilon\sigma\varsigma\ \eta\ \delta\rho\epsilon\zeta\varsigma\ \delta\iota\alpha\no\gamma\tau\kappa\kappa\eta$)²³ is a negative and a pathological case. Even its immediate converse, the case of the continent man, will not serve, since continence is not strictly a virtue. We may perhaps construct for ourselves the practical syllogism of the virtuous man. The minor premise is the outcome of his practical deliberation, and granting that his virtuous character has provided the major premise embodying the good for man, and a rational wish to coincide with it, he cannot be moved to action unless he has the perception that this is a particular case of the good for man. This is the domain of moral sense, the fusion of universal and particular, for, as always in a judgment of perception, the subject is particular and the predicate universal. Aristotle was supremely right in holding that this fusion is what determines action. The good will and the free will is the clear-sighted will. Although many will decry the suggestion that there is symbolism in Greek tragedy, the connection with being able to *see* which attaches to moral decisions is typified for the writer in the tragic action of Oedipus who put out the eyes which could not see.

We may now briefly sum up the results of the argument. (i) The doctrine of "moral sense," in so far as it is present in Aris-

²³ *Eth. Nic.* 1139b 4.

totle, does not mean that we have a general intuition of the good for man. The universal aspect of ethics must be left in the hands of those of good character and the statesman, who will doubtless frame maxims to illustrate it and embody it in the laws of the ideal state. These maxims and laws will in fact derive from the ethical experience of their individual authors. The individual practical intellect is deliberative and its conclusion is in one sense a particular conclusion; but the predicate of the practical judgment involves the universal and in that judgement we *see* what is right.³⁴ This is what is meant by making *aiσθησις* an ingredient in *φρόνησις* and, in one passage, equating *aiσθησις* with *vōs*:

(ii) In the second place, in view of the prominence which is given to *aiσθησις* in the *Nicomachean Ethics* (especially in *Eth. Nic.* 1109b 23 and in Book VI in connection with *φρόνησις*) it seems natural to refer to the account of *aiσθησις* given in the *De Anima*. There we find that the essence of *aiσθησις* is *μεσότης*, by virtue of which it assimilates form apart from matter. It has therefore been submitted that this is the fundamental sense of *μεσότης* in the *Ethics*. If this significance is granted to the use of *μεσότης* in the definition of virtue, that definition becomes much more expressive of the quality of perceptive judgment which is an ingredient of first importance in virtue as conceived by Aristotle. What has heretofore been regarded as the general theory of the mean becomes a corollary of the doctrine that the exercise of virtue is a form of perception, just as the doctrine of the *μέσην ἔξις* has always been regarded as a corollary of the general theory. It is doubtful if there is much to be gained from an attempt to interpret moral perception rigidly in terms of Aristotle's theory of sensuous perception, because, after all, his explanation of the latter as a *μεσότης* is inadequate to us now either as physiology or psychology;³⁵ but, broadly, it is not nonsense

³⁴ Cf. W. D. Ross, *Aristotle*, p. 219: "Aristotle recognizes a secondary sort of practical wisdom which knows the right thing to do without arriving at it by a process of deliberative analysis—a wisdom about details which is found in those who have had a certain experience of life. . . . In this wide sense practical wisdom of the direct, unreasoned kind is a kind of perception; good is for well-brought-up people a kind of common sensible, as shape is for all men."

³⁵ It is even, perhaps, going a little far to treat his theory of the origin of organic tissues, as Burnet does, almost as if it were an intuitive prophecy of the principles of modern biochemistry. What Aristotle has

to compare the emotional sensitivity, informed by the power of judgment, of the virtuous man with sense perception. The virtuous man has an emotional and intellectual responsiveness to the good, a tendency for all his faculties, emotion, desire, thought, to converge in right action. One is tempted to coin an expression "wisdom of the emotions" in extension of the expression "wisdom of the body," popularized in physiology from the work of Dr. Cannon of Harvard, to describe the identification of equilibrium and critical balance, including reference to environment, with rightness and health. The Aristotelian doctrine of pleasure as the accompaniment of unimpeded activity of a natural state is a corroboration of the general view. To include, as Aristotle does, the contribution at the level of intellect to the attainment of the emotional balance characteristic of his virtues, we should perhaps speak less of *balance* and more of *sense of balance*. In fact, Aristotle seems to have expressed one truth in two ways when he spoke of virtue as a *μεσότης* in the field of emotion and action in the *Ethics* and when he described the unity of practical judgment in the *De Anima*.

A commentary on the success of Aristotle's application of the idea of *μεσότης*, however derived, to the definition of virtue is the recurrent undertone of opinion among his critics that he was "ill-advised" in his adoption of the principle of the Mean. It is not only that there has existed a misleading view of the Mean as a mere *medio tutissimus ibis* "due to the unfortunate isolation in which Aristotle's doctrines are commonly studied" (Burnet, p. 73), but even commentators who are fully aware that such a view is an inadequate expression of Aristotle's theory doubt whether the Mean is the "correct way" of expressing the "sane and true view" which mediates between the ascetic and naturalistic attitudes (W. D. Ross, *Aristotle*, p. 195). Is it not possible that this verdict of unsatisfactoriness is the result of it not having been considered that the notion of *μεσότης* was not first worked out by Aristotle from the existing medical and mathe-

in common with modern science may very nearly be reduced to (i) his grasp of the principle of scientific induction and (ii) his conviction that the ultimate expression of scientific knowledge is a formula of some kind, a ratio or proportion, a *λόγος* or a *μεσότης*; and (iii) his acute observations in natural science.

matical analogies as an ethical doctrine of the type implied, but was carried over from his psycho-physical theory of knowledge?³⁶ The analysis of virtue as a species of perception of the good in particular moral decisions is absolutely sound. We have no other way of access to goodness, the universal, than through the particular moral situations in which we strive to discern it. The classic objection that Aristotle's distinction is quantitative rather than qualitative is from one point of view removed, because the psychological theory makes the quantitative aspect of sense perception merely the means for the transmission of the qualitative, or, speaking more concretely, the point at which all distinctions

³⁶ Jaeger says (*Aristotle*, p. 332) that the ethics of Aristotle "is built on a very primitive theory of the soul, namely the division of it into a rational and an irrational part," and this is part of his argument for giving a late date to the first two books of the *De Anima*. But surely the broad doctrine of rational and irrational parts of the soul, although primitive, and here provisionally accepted and criticized by Aristotle, is one peculiarly relevant to ethical discussion. The general result of Jaeger's argument ("In ethics it remained convenient to work with the old ideas"; in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, or final version, Aristotle "thinks it necessary to apologize for thus simplifying his problem"; the statesman's knowledge of psychology is indicated to be the "minimum" of that science; the conception of "parts of the soul," although used, is criticized as "problematic") seems to be that he allows for a developed state of Aristotle's psychological theory as a *background* for the *Nicomachean Ethics*, but he thinks that no appreciable intrusion of such theory has taken place. One of his principal points, however, is that the *Nicomachean Ethics* contains an advanced and un-Platonic account of *φρόνησις*, and it has been the object of the present writer to connect this account of *φρόνησις* with the psycho-physical theories of the *De Anima* through the common occurrence in the ethical and psychological doctrines of the term *μεσότητης*. The chief difficulty in regard to Jaeger's theory of Aristotle's philosophical "development" comes in connection with his placing of the *Eudemian Ethics* as intermediate between the *Protrepticus* and the *Nicomachean Ethics*. As the theory of *μεσότητης* is present in the *Eudemian Ethics*, according to the present writer's view, a treatment of *φρόνησις* closely related to that of the *Nicomachean Ethics* is implied for the missing books of the *Eudemian*. It may be worth while to point out, since an examination of the use of *φρόνησις* in the *Eudemian Ethics* is not to be undertaken at the moment, that it is precisely in his contention for an early "Platonic" use of *φρόνησις* by Aristotle that Jaeger has been attacked by some of his critics (see M. C. Needler, *C. P.*, XXIII [1928], pp. 280-84, commenting on Gadamer's paper in the April, 1928, number of *Hermes*).

are quantitative is placed where the psychological becomes the physical. The analogy between sense perception and ethics is bound in the end to become unsatisfactory, however, for while Aristotle's analysis of sense perception conveyed some of the gross facts about it, it was an ideal construction and not really precise in its reference to reality. It contains no real anticipation of modern physiology beyond the general notion of a range with limits. It seems fairer, therefore, to judge Aristotle's ethical theory of the Mean, not in its details, but in its broad implication. It is submitted that what Aristotle meant by saying that virtue was in its essence and according to its definition a Mean was to point out that it is of the essence of virtue to be able to deal with the particular moral situation clear-sightedly.

E. HARRIS OLMIESTED.

CLAUDIAN'S *IN RUFINUM* AND AN EPISTLE OF ST. JEROME.

In discussing the dissemination of Claudian's poems during the poet's own lifetime, Birt¹ advances the suggestion that the *In Rufinum* was read by St. Jerome, and influenced him in the composition of a notable chapter in one of his epistles,² a chapter in which Jerome laments the devastation of the Roman Empire by the barbarians. The suggestion is an interesting one, for though St. Jerome's indebtedness to Vergil and to other Roman poets who wrote before the second Christian century is substantial and well known,³ a connection with Claudian, if it could be established,⁴ would be almost⁵ the only link between the great Christian scholar and the pagan poetry of his own day.

In support of his theory, Birt adduces the following three parallels between Claudian's poem and St. Jerome's epistle:

I. Claudian, *In Rufinum*, II, 32: iam rubet altus Halys,
35: proterit imbellem sonipes hostilis Orontem; Jerome,
Epistles, LX, 16, 4f.: quantae fluviorum aquae humano
cruore mutatae sunt! Obsessa Antiochia et urbes reliquae,
quas Halys, Cnydus, Orontes, Eufratesque praeterfluunt.

¹ T. Birt, *Claudii Claudiani Carmina* (= *Mon. Germ. Hist., Auct. Ant. X* [1892]), pp. lxxviii, 35, 48, 50.

² Jerome, *Epistles*, LX, 16; cf. C. N. Cochrane, *Christianity and Classical Culture* (2nd ed., Oxford, 1944), p. 351.

³ Cf. A. Luebeck, *Hieronymus Quos Noverit Scriptores . . .* (Leipzig, 1872), pp. 105-17, 160-98; G. Grützmacher, *Hieronymus* (Leipzig, 1901-08), I, pp. 114-17; A. S. Pease, "The Attitude of Jerome towards Pagan Literature," *T. A. P. A.*, L (1919), pp. 160-87; H. C. Coffin, "The Influence of Vergil on St. Jerome . . .," *C. W.*, XVII (1923-24), pp. 170-72; J. Dziech, "De Vergili Cultu apud Hieronymum," *Eos*, XXXIII (1930-31), pp. 101-15; H. W. Linn, "The Dream of St. Jerome," *Class. Bull.*, X (1933-34), pp. 22-24.

⁴ Attempts have been made, on scanty evidence, to connect passages in Jerome's works with Claudian's *Gigantomachia* (cf. Luebeck, *op. cit.*, p. 199; Birt, *op. cit.*, p. 346, *ad fin.*; E. Arens, *Quaestiones Olcudianeae* [Münster, 1894], p. 21, n. 1), *In Eutropium* (cf. Birt, *op. cit.*, pp. lxxviii, 110; Arens, *op. cit.*, p. 17), and *Panegyricus Dictus Probino et Olybrio* (cf. Arens, *op. cit.*, pp. 20 f.; M. Petschenig, *Wochenschr. für Klass. Philol.*, XII [1895], col. 947).

⁵ Jerome makes a single reference to the translation by Avienus of Aratus' *Phaenomena: Comment. in Epist. ad Titum*, I (= Migne, *Patrol. Lat.*, XXVI, col. 607A); cf. Pauly-Wissowa, *R.-E.*, s. v. "Avienus," col. 2386, lines 61-65.

II. Claudian, *In Rufinum*, II, 434-37: prodigiale caput . . . iam de cuspide summa / nutabat, digna rediens ad moenia pompa./ Dextera quin etiam ludo concessa vagatur / aera petens; 498 f.: insatiabilis auri / proluvies; Jerome, *Epistles*, LX, 16, 1: Rufini caput pilo Constantinopolin gestatum est et abscissa manus dextera ad dedecus insatiabilis avaritiae ostiatim stipes mendicavit.

III. Claudian, *In Rufinum*, II, 440 f.: Desinat elatis quisquam confidere rebus / instabilesque deos ac lubrica numina discat; Jerome, *Epistles*, LX, 16, 2: Non calamitates miserorum, sed fragilem humanae concisionis narro statum.

To this theory of Birt's, Arens devotes a chapter of his *Quaestiones Claudianeae*.⁶ He impugns the probative value of Birt's three parallels on two different grounds: (1) as to the first parallel, which he discusses apart from the other two, he holds that any similarity of expression may be fully explained as arising from the identity of the subject-matter;⁷ (2) he attempts to set aside the remaining two parallels on grounds of chronology and of general probability.⁸ Since the latter arguments, if valid, would apply equally to all three parallels, and not merely to the last two, it may be well to examine them first.

Arens' chronological objection is based on the assumption that the *In Rufinum* was first published in 397 A. D.; if this were so, it could not possibly have influenced the composition of Jerome, *Epistles* LX, for the latter was written during the Summer of 396.⁹ We may dismiss this argument at once, for the date of 397 which Arens uses is that of the Preface to Book II of the *In Rufinum*, which preface was composed for the second presentation of the poem. The two books of the *In Rufinum* proper, together with the Preface to Book I, were first made public at Milan in the early part of 396.¹⁰ Since, as we have seen, Jerome wrote his sixtieth epistle in the Summer of that year, and since he was in frequent communication with friends in Italy throughout this period,¹¹ there is no chronological bar to the acceptance of Birt's theory. Anticipating objections to his dating of the *In Rufinum*,

⁶ Arens, *op. cit.*, pp. 16-21. ⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 17 f. ⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 19 f.

⁹ Cf. F. Cavallera, *Saint Jérôme* (Louvain and Paris, 1922), II, pp. 44-46, 158; Grützmacher, *op. cit.*, I, pp. 79 f.

¹⁰ Cf. P. Fargues, *Claudien* (Paris, 1933), pp. 15 f.

¹¹ Cf. Grützmacher, *op. cit.*, II, pp. 145-270.

Arens¹² offers an alternative argument: it is not to be supposed, he holds, that Jerome, writing in Bethlehem on Eastern affairs, would consult the works of a Roman poet or matters concerning which he could more easily and quickly have gained information on the spot. I doubt very much that Birt meant to imply that Jerome used the *In Rufinum* as a factual source; at any rate, such an implication would be wholly unwarranted. Jerome evidently had quite independent sources of information regarding political affairs in the East, for he links Rufinus' downfall with those of two other consuls: Timasius, whom Claudian never mentions, and Abundantius, to whom Claudian was not to refer until the publication of the *In Eutropium* some years later.¹³ Entirely apart from the question of borrowed factual material, however, is that of the borrowing of rhetorical *flosculi*. With regard to the latter point Arens' objection is without force. His final argument is based on the ground that Jerome "solet falsa poetarum carmina et vanas fabulas irridere et vilipendere."¹⁴ This line of reasoning is summarily rejected by Koch,¹⁵ and rightly so. Not only is Jerome's deep and continued interest in Roman poetry well known as a general trait,¹⁶ but the very chapter which we are discussing contains two quotations from Vergil and one from Horace! Thus the chronological and other external objections voiced by Arens are without any real cogency.

On the other hand, Arens' first objection, if we once more apply it to all three parallels, instead of confining it, as he does, to the first, appears to be very well taken. Aside from the common mention of the rivers Halys and Orontes, and of river-water reddened by human blood—and these three common elements alone scarcely seem to furnish sufficient ground upon which to base a theory of literary influence—there would appear

¹² *Op. cit.*, p. 19, n. 2.

¹³ Cf. Claudian, *In Eutr.*, I, 154-70, Fargues, *op. cit.*, pp. 23 f. Even in the passage from Jerome appearing in Birt's second parallel, the word *ostiatim* seems to indicate an independent source of information; Claudian nowhere speaks of a door-to-door canvass.

¹⁴ Arens, *op. cit.*, p. 20. How little Arens himself thought of this argument is shown by the fact that in the very next paragraph he holds that Jerome read Claudian's panegyric on Probinus and Olybrius.

¹⁵ *Phil. Wochenschr.*, XVI (1896), col. 301.

¹⁶ Cf. n. 3, above.

to be no correspondences between the two works which could not readily be ascribed to the identity of the subject-matter. Thus, despite any faults which one may find in Arens' methodology, one must, I feel, agree with his conclusion that Birt does not succeed, with the parallels which he offers, in convincing us that Jerome was influenced by the *In Rufinum* in writing the chapter under discussion.

It is the purpose of this note to reopen the question by calling attention both to a parallel between the two works which is noticed neither by Birt nor by Arens, and to certain circumstances of St. Jerome's life which, though I believe they may be quite pertinent, have apparently not been discussed in this connection.

The parallel is one which is noted by Mommsen¹⁷ in his discussion of the devastation of Greece by the Goths after the withdrawal of Stilicho's army in 395. Claudian (*In Rufinum*, II, 187-91) asserts the claim that, had Stilicho not been forced to withdraw,

prodita non tantas vidisset Graecia caedes,
oppida semoto Pelopeia Marte vigerent,
starent Arcadiæ, starent Lacedaemonis arces;
non mare fumasset geminum flagrante Corintho,
nec fera Cecropiae traxissent vincula matres.

With Claudian's enumeration compare the words of Jerome, *Epistles*, LX, 16, 4, on the same general subject: *Quid putas nunc animi habere Corinthios, Athenienses, Lacedaemonios, Arcadas, cunctamque Graeciam, quibus imperant barbari?* With the possible exception of *oppida . . . Pelopeia*,¹⁸ Jerome's list duplicates Claudian's. This fairly extended parallel, together with the slight correspondence noted above in regard to the rivers, might perhaps incline one to agree with Birt's theory. These internal indications would be much more convincing, however, if external evidence could be adduced which would

¹⁷ *Hermes*, XXXVIII (1903), p. 107, n. 1.

¹⁸ By these words Claudian may simply anticipate the reference to Arcadia and Sparta in the next verse (as *Graecia* in the first verse quoted anticipates the references in the remaining four verses), or he may refer to the cities of Argolis; cf. Pauly-Wissowa, *R.-E.*, s. v. "Peloponnesos," cols. 382 f.

render it probable that Jerome should have sought a copy of the *In Rufinum* soon after the poem was published, or should have been sent a copy by a friend resident in Italy. I believe that such evidence is perhaps available.

In the year 395 Jerome was engaged in a violent controversy with John, Bishop of Jerusalem.¹⁹ The latter, to rid himself of a troublesome adversary, procured a sentence of exile against Jerome. This sentence was never carried out.²⁰ Jerome refers to it in two passages: *Contra Iohannem Hierosolimitanum XLIII:*²¹ *<Iohannes> fratrum exsilia postulat . . . potentissimam illam feram, totius orbis cervicibus imminentem, contra nostras cervices specialiter invitavit . . . ; Epistles, LXXXII, 10, 1: Nuper nobis postulavit <Iohannes> et impetravit exsilium; atque utinam implere potuisset.* Now the *fera* in question is identified by Rauschen²² and by Grützmacher²³ as Flavius Rufinus, the Praetorian Prefect of the East, against whom Claudian's invective *In Rufinum* is directed. This identification seems to me to be established almost beyond reasonable doubt.²⁴ To no one else in the East, in the period which we are discussing, could the terms *potentissimam* and *totius orbis cervicibus imminentem* have been so aptly applied.²⁵ Rufinus is known to have used banishment as a weapon in religious disputes.²⁶ Moreover, as Rauschen²⁷ points out, the presence in Jerusalem at this time of the Pilgrim Salvia (or Silvia), who was the Prefect Rufinus' sister, helps to account for John's success in obtaining the sentence of exile. The fact that the sentence was never carried out is most easily explained as being due to Rufinus' murder on 27 November 395.²⁸

¹⁹ Cf. Cavallera, *op. cit.*, I, pp. 193-220.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, I, p. 219.

²¹ = Migne, *Patrol. Lat.*, XXIII, col. 411C.

²² G. Rauschen, *Jahrbücher der Christlichen Kirche* (Freiburg, 1897), p. 460.

²³ *Op. cit.*, III, p. 12.

²⁴ Cavallera, *op. cit.*, I, p. 219, n. 2, seems to me unnecessarily cautious. His "On pense" apparently echoes the tentative language of Migne, *Patrol. Lat.*, XXIII, col. 411, n. 2.

²⁵ On Rufinus' supreme power in the East between the date of Theodosius' departure for the West (394) and the date of Rufinus' death (November, 395), cf. H. L. Levy, *The Invective In Rufinum of Claudius Claudianus* (Geneva, N. Y., 1935), pp. 18-26; cf. also *ibid.*, pp. 11-14.

²⁶ Cf. *Cod. Theod.*, XVI, 5, 29; Levy, *op. cit.*, p. 22.

²⁷ *Op. cit.*, p. 460, n. 3.

²⁸ Cf. Levy, *op. cit.*, pp. 25 f.

It may also be noted that the word *fera*, which is not a regular part of Jerome's vocabulary of abuse,²⁹ and which is generally quite rare as an epithet applied to a human being,³⁰ is one of the terms which Claudian³¹ applies to Rufinus. I believe, then, that we may safely assume that the Praetorian Prefect Rufinus was the official who issued the decree of exile against Jerome.

If this assumption is granted, it becomes quite probable that Jerome should have taken a lively interest in a poem celebrating the downfall of his would-be oppressor. Easy forgiveness of his adversaries was by no means a trait of Jerome's character.³² A work of vigorous invective, an art in which Jerome himself was adept,³³ may be supposed to have been congenial to his tastes. I therefore suggest that either (1) Jerome, hearing of the existence of Claudian's invective against Rufinus, sent to Italy for a copy of it, just as he had, on an earlier occasion,³⁴ asked Paul of Concordia that there be sent him (then, too, he was in the Orient)³⁵ a work of the pagan³⁶ Aurelius Victor, which he desired *propter notitiam persecutorum*, or (2) that friends of Jerome's in Italy, perhaps members of the Anician family (who were Claudian's first patrons),³⁷ hearing of Jerome's

²⁹ Cf. S. Seliga, "Quibus Contumeliis Hieronymus Adversarios Carpserit," *Eos*, XXXIV (1932-33), pp. 395-412.

³⁰ Cf. *Thes. Ling. Lat.*, s. v. "ferus," col. 807, lines 55-59.

³¹ In *Ruf.*, I, 262.

³² Cf. Grützmacher, *op. cit.*, I, pp. 14, 271, 275; II, p. 179; M. Schanz, *Geschichte der Römischen Literatur* (2nd ed., Munich, 1914), IV, p. 492; Cavallera, *op. cit.*, I, pp. vii, 12.

³³ Cf. Seliga, *loc. cit.*; cf. also *idem*, "De Hieronymi Scriptorum Colore Satirico," *Charisteria Gustavo Przychocki . . . Oblata* (Warsaw, 1934), pp. 277-94. "L'Invective dans les Écrits de Polemique de Saint Jérôme" is the title of an unpublished study reported in *Rev. Et. Lat.*, XIV (1936), p. 389.

³⁴ Jerome, *Epistles*, X, 3, dated about 380. Cf. Cavallera, *op. cit.*, I, p. 43, n. 2; II, p. 155; Grützmacher, *op. cit.*, I, p. 127.

³⁵ Cf. Jerome, *Epistles*, X, 3, *orientalibus mercibus*; Cavallera, *op. cit.*, II, pp. 154 f.

³⁶ Cf. T. Opitz, *Acta Soc. Philol. Lipsiensis*, II (1872-74), p. 203; Schanz, *op. cit.*, IV, 73. On Jerome's lack of active hostility towards pagans, cf. Grützmacher, *op. cit.*, I, pp. 275-77.

³⁷ Cf. Fargues, *op. cit.*, pp. 10-12. For a later connection between Jerome and the Anicii, cf. Jerome, *Epistles*, CXXX; Cavallera, *op. cit.*, I, p. 322; Grützmacher, *op. cit.*, III, p. 252.

near escape from exile at Rufinus' hands, sent him a copy of the poem in token of his deliverance.

The foregoing considerations, while admittedly falling short of furnishing conclusive proof, do, I suggest, render much more plausible the suggestion of Birt that St. Jerome was influenced by Claudian's invective *In Rufinum* in composing the sixteenth chapter of his sixtieth epistle. It would be quite in keeping with the character of the period in which Jerome and Claudian wrote, that strange era of endings and beginnings,⁸³ if we were to find that the first great master of newly-arising Christian scholarship,⁸⁴ in composing his lament for the collapse of the Roman world, borrowed a few touches from the pagan poet who was the last great singer of that world's fast-vanishing glories.

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⁸³ Cf. Cochrane, *op. cit.*, pp. 318-57.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 344.

NOTES ON ATTIC INSCRIPTIONS.

One finds in the European journals now reaching America an occasional lag in the mutual understanding of many epigraphical problems which during the war have been studied separately on two continents. For example, Cavaignac had not yet received the new edition of the *Anonymous Argentinensis*, published as T9 in Meritt, Wade-Gery, and McGregor, *The Athenian Tribute Lists*, I (1939), p. 572, when he used the old version to support again arguments about the calendar in 431 B. C.,¹ and—going back much earlier even than this—he suggests² the restoration [$\epsilon\pi\lambda$ K| ρ teros $\alpha\rho\xi\omega$]vros in *I. G.*, I², 295, lines 1-2, in order to avoid what seems to him the difficulty of having the Panathenaia, with the change in the boards of Treasurers of Athena, fall between Pryt. I, 13 and Pryt. I, *ultimo*, as must be the case with the accepted restoration [$\epsilon\pi\lambda$ 'A| $\phi\sigma\epsilon\bar{\imath}\delta\sigma$ $\alpha\rho\xi\omega$]vros. He revives a restoration that has been abandoned since the days of Rhangabé, and which Jotham Johnson has shown to be technically incorrect,³ the syllabic division of lines making 'A $\phi\sigma\epsilon\bar{\imath}\delta\sigma$ the only possible restoration.⁴

These are small matters to correct, but the discussion must be brought up to date in order to spare further effort in the championing of lost causes. Even more spectacular has been the disappearance of certain false evidence concerning the sequence of prytanies in the conciliar year of Athens brought about by Wilhelm's new reconstruction of *I. G.*, I², 166.⁵ There is no evidence that the prytany next to function after any current prytany was ever known in advance except during the next-to-last prytany of a year, when of course the name of the last prytany was known by

¹ "La chronologie attique 433-404," *Rev. Et. Gr.*, LVII (1944), pp. 41-60, especially p. 47.

² *Loc. cit.*, p. 46.

³ *A. J. A.*, XXXIII (1929), pp. 398-400.

⁴ Cavaignac (*loc. cit.*, p. 51, note) also assigns Prepis as first secretary to the year 422/1. His date in 421/0 and his relation to Menekles, also of that year, have been discussed at length in *A. J. P.*, LXII (1941), pp. 10-15.

⁵ "Attische Urkunden IV," *Wien. Sitzb.*, 1939, pp. 61-63 and Plate IX. Cf. also *Hesperia*, X (1941), pp. 332-33.

the simple process of elimination.⁶ Hence Kahrstedt's latest suggestion to use *I. G.*, I², 166 as proof that at one time the sequence of prytanies in a year was regularly determined at the beginning of the year is invalid and must be rejected by all who study the constitutional antiquities of Athens.⁷ Only in the year 408/7, by way of exception, does there seem to have been a prearranged order; here the prytanies took their turns in the reverse of the so-called official order: the first prytany was Antiochis and the tenth was Erechtheis.⁸ I have attempted elsewhere to resolve an apparent conflict of evidence about this year between *I. G.*, I², 118, which names Eukleides as secretary when Antiochis was the phyle in prytany—hence the first secretary of the year—and *I. G.*, I², 313, line 175, where the restoration has indicated Dorotheos as the first secretary.⁹ The following text was proposed as part of *I. G.*, I², 313, and I suggested that Dorotheos was secretary of the Treasurers of Athena, thus causing no conflict with *I. G.*, I², 118:

ταρίαι[*s* *ἱερῶν χρεμάτων τῆς Ἀθηναῖς*]
 ἐπὶ Εὔκ[*τέμονος ἀρχοντος καὶ ἐπὶ*]
 175. Δοροθέα [*γυαμματεύοντος παρέδομεν*]
 κατὰ φσέ[*φισμα τὸ δέμο ἀργύριον*]
hνποθεμ[*ἐνών χρυσίον τὸ ἐν τῷ*]
 'Οπισθοδ[*όμοι ἐν κοίτει χαλκέι*]
 ἐκ τῆς τε[*τάρτες θέκες*].

The restoration seems to me valid, but I wish to propose now, not that Dorotheos was secretary of the Treasurers, but that he served as secretary of the Council in some prytany other than the first. His name occurs, I believe, in *I. G.*, I², 120, which I re-edit here:

PREAMBLE OF A DECREE. The upper left corner of a stele of Pentelic marble, found near the Stoa of Attalos, and now in the Epigraphical Museum (E. M. 6818). H. ca. 0.18 m.; W.

⁶ See now *C. Q.*, XL (1946), pp. 45-46, for an example from 417 B. C. in *I. G.*, I², 94.

⁷ U. Kahrstedt, "Untersuchungen zu athenischen Behörden, IV: Bemerkungen zur Geschichte des Rats der Fünfhundert," *Klio*, XXXIII (1940), pp. 1-12.

⁸ W. S. Ferguson, "The Athenian Secretaries," *Cornell Stud. Cl. Phil.*, VII (1898), p. 26, note A.

⁹ See *Athenian Financial Documents* (1932), pp. 28-29.

ca. 0.13 m.;¹⁰ Th. 0.08 m. The fascia on which line 1 is inscribed and the moulding below it do not return across the lateral face. Part of the flat top is preserved.

The writing of lines 4 ff. (ΕΣΥ) is stoichedon with a chequer-unit which measures 0.015 m. across and 0.022 m. down. Letters in line 1 are Ionic and in lines 2 ff. Attic; the one preserved letter in line 3 is 0.02 m. high, and other letters are 0.01 m. high.

I. G., I², 120 +. A drawing, showing also the profile of the moulding at the top of the stele, is given by S. A. Koumanoudes, 'Εφ. Ἀρχ., 1885, Plate between pages 160 and 161.

Δωρὶ [όθεος^{ca. 8} . . . ἐγραμμάτευν]

θ [ε ο ρ χ ε ν]

ΣΤΟΙΧ.

408/7 Ε [ν κ τ ἐ μ ο ν ἐ ρ χ ε ν]

ξδοχσ[εν τει βολει και τοι δέμοι·^{ca. 9} . . . ἐπρυτά] 41 (?)

5 νενεν, Δορόθεος ἐγραμμάτευν,^{ca. 9} . . . ἐπεστάτ]

ε, Εύκτ[έμον ἐρχεν, ——— επεν ———]

Koumanoudes (*loc. cit.*, p. 164) thought it hazardous to suggest restorations in lines 1 and 3, but the examples of *I. G.*, I², 119, 123, and 124 make it extremely probable that the name of the archon should be supplied in line 3. A regular spacing of the letters allows a text in lines 4 ff. of 41 letters on a line. This is an approximate figure, and may have been less if ἐρχε was written in line 3, and either more or less if the spacing in line 3 was irregular. The retention of nu-movable is recommended by the reading from the stone in line 5. Although Kirchhoff warned that the final nu in this line might be the beginning of the name of the secretary (*I. G.*, I, Suppl., p. 63, no. 62a), it seems preferable to take the name in line 1 as that of the secretary, for Dorōtheos is otherwise known to have been a secretary in the year of Euktemon (*I. G.*, I², 313, line 175, quoted above). The restoration of line 1 given here is supported by the new text of *I. G.*, I², 313. Indeed, it is not impossible that this inscription is the decree to which reference is made in *I. G.*, I², 313, line 176, the date of the decree being given by the name of the archon and by the name of the secretary (usual in dating decrees) during the prytany in which it was passed.

Inscriptions published in American journals during the war have also begun to figure in comment and review from Europe.

¹⁰ The height and width as here given are estimated from a squeeze and from the drawing published by Koumanoudes. The thickness is given by Koumanoudes, 'Εφ. Ἀρχ., 1885, p. 163.

A large part of the last *Bulletin Épigraphique* edited by the Roberts (Jeanne and Louis) and printed in the *Revue des Études Grecques* (LVII [1944], pp. 175-241) is concerned with epigraphical studies which have appeared in America. It is a characteristic *Bulletin*, learned, comprehensive, and of inestimable value to the student of inscriptions who needs a competent bibliographical guide. It is also subject to judgments which are not always justified and it frequently confuses the important with the trivial. Commenting on my restorations in *I. G.*, I², 70, for example, Robert says (p. 186), "les changements apportés à l'édition de Wilhelm sont infimes." This is a critical judgment which the reader can control only by exploring the facts for himself; Robert gives none of them. But the changes involve corrections in one fragment which allow the text of lines 11-17 to conform to the letters on the stone and which remove an unwanted solecism in epigraphical style; they eliminate an impossible embarrassment in the interpretation of constitutional procedure by reading ἐν τ[έ]ι αὐτέι] ἐμέραι instead of ἐν τ[έ]ιδε τέι] ἐμέραι in line 28; and they remove what I consider a major blemish by substituting *hé[os ἀν ξει ε Eὐρυτ]ίον ho huόs* for *ἡ E[ύρυτον {ε Eὐρυτ}]ίον ho huόs* in line 31. There is no defense for an assumed dittography or for reading a clear *duseia* as *ἡ*. These technical details and matters of interpretation may seem to Robert "infimes" and part of those "détails qui sont parfois de faible ou de nulle importance" with which he indicts the entire article. I mention only these three items from *I. G.*, I², 70; there are other corrections too, of lesser importance, and perhaps Robert noticed only these.

Minor points again draw attention in Robert's comment on *Hesperia*, XIII (1944), p. 253. He notes the re-publication of this text with the observation that I "discute sur la restitution de deux lignes et republie le document entier."¹¹ But principally he scorns the corrections of *τόν* to *τόπ* in line 19 and of *[έταυ]έσαι* δέ to *[έταυ]έσαι δέ καὶ* in line 14. These are indeed trivial

¹¹ Robert does not print a new text, but he repeats the old one in its entirety, except for the citations, in *Études Épigraphiques et Philosophiques*, pp. 62-63 ff. Where complete republication of a new text is possible it is usually desirable in order to avoid the necessity for cumulative references.

matters, but since the text ought to be as nearly correct as care and attention can make it I have felt that the corrections should be introduced. This was managed as inconspicuously as possible in footnotes—and if the text were to be re-edited I should do the same again. These changes, however, were not the reason for republishing the inscription. Robert had given his own readings of the opening lines, but his text and commentary left these erroneous conclusions: (1) that the decree sanctioned only the appointment of a theorodokos, (2) that the formula of resolution should be supplied in line 5, and (3) that lines 1-5 belonged to the clauses of motivation. These misconceptions had to be corrected, and after Robert's preliminary work the clue that indicated how it could be done was easily discovered. It was another example, to be added to the many which every epigraphist can recall, of the way in which one study aids another until after a time a text can be established in which more than one contributor has had a share.¹² But in the *Bulletin Épigraphique* there is no mention of this, no reference to restorations in the *Etudes* that had to be rejected or improved, only the statement that I added a *kai* and spelled *tōv* as *tōμ*. This is irresponsible reporting, and the Roberts can do better when they wish. Other similar examples occur, most of them hardly worth individual comment or rebuttal, but in their cumulative effect they do much to lessen one's confidence in the objectivity of the report.

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¹² See, for example, B. D. Meritt, *Epigraphica Attica*, pp. 119-29.

THE HERSFELD MANUSCRIPT OF FRONTINUS'
DE AQUAEDUCTU URBIS ROMAE.

Ever since Bücheler's edition of 1858, it has been generally admitted that the codex Casinensis 361 (= C) is the source of all other surviving manuscripts of Frontinus' treatise *De aquaeductu urbis Romae*. Therefore all other manuscripts are virtually worthless. Bücheler and others assigned the Casinensis to the thirteenth century rather than to the twelfth, and only Gundermann in *Phil. Wochenschr.*, 1903, p. 1455, followed by F. Krohn in his good edition (Teubner, 1922, p. III), accepted Peter the Deacon, librarian of Monte Cassino in the first half of the twelfth century, as the writer of the manuscript. A facsimile of the Frontinus text was published by Clemens Herschel in *The Two Books on the Water Supply of the City of Rome* (Boston, 1899), and again by Dom Mauro Inguanez, librarian of Monte Cassino, in *Sexti Julii Frontini De aquaeductu Urbis Romae* (Monte Cassino, 1930), with important additions from the same manuscript, which secure beyond doubt the identity of the writer as Peter the Deacon. This makes it possible to give a much more accurate date for this manuscript than has been hitherto recognized. Peter the Deacon—who will be the central figure in a forthcoming study of the author—must have copied the *De aquaeductu* in or more probably before the year 1137. For in this year he dedicated to abbot Wibald of Monte Cassino the *Liber de locis sanctis*, the autograph of which follows the text of Frontinus in the cod. Cas. 361, separated only by an excerpt from the fifth book of Varro's *De lingua latina*. Since Peter was compelled to leave Monte Cassino in 1128 and returned before 1133,¹ it seems safe to conclude that this, the earliest extant manuscript of Frontinus' work, was written in Monte Cassino during the thirties of the twelfth century, but not after 1137.


In his recent new edition of *De aquaeductu* Pierre Grimal has re-examined the problem of the manuscript tradition.² He

¹ On this phase of Peter the Deacon's life cf. E. Caspar, *Petrus Diaconus und die Monte Cassineser Fälschungen* (Berlin, 1909), pp. 22-23.

² Frontin, *Les Aqueducs de la Ville de Rome*. Texte établi, traduit et commenté par Pierre Grimal (Paris, 1944), pp. XVI-XXI.

has collated, besides the Casinensis (= C), the Urbinas (Vaticanus 1345) (= U), the Vaticanus 4498 (= V), and the Middlehillensis 1706 (= M), copied from V. But while Bücheler and Krohn had declared V also a descendant of C, Grimal offers a different solution.

In a letter written in 1425 to Niccolò Niccoli, Poggio Braciolini mentions a manuscript (or manuscripts?) in Hersfeld containing among other works Frontinus and *aliqua opera Cornelii Taciti*.³ Grimal rashly asserts that the Vaticanus 4498 is a copy of this lost codex Hersfeldensis and comes to the following stemma (*op. cit.*, p. XX):



He, like all others who have dealt with Frontinus in the last thirty years, has not taken into account the fact that something definite is known about the Frontinus Hersfeldensis.

In 1913 a copy of the inventory which a Hersfeld monk had in person brought to Poggio in 1425 came to light within a larger inventory (*Commentarium*) prepared by Niccolò Niccoli in 1431. This *Commentarium* was intended to be used by two Cardinal Legates about to depart for the North. Niccolò's *Commentarium* is found at the end of a Cicero manuscript now in the Pierpont Morgan Library. It was first published in a catalogue of the Florentine dealer T. De Marinis. E. Jacobs called scholars' attention to the document;⁴ it was republished by R. Sabbadini⁵ and in definite form by R. P. Robinson.⁶

But in the excitement over the information which the new document conveyed in regard to the text history of Tacitus' minor works, its relevance for Frontinus was forgotten. W. Aly, not knowing the actual text of the *Commentarium*, thought it possible that the Vaticanus 4498 was derived from the Hersfeldensis, because, like the latter, it contained Frontinus, the

³ Cf. Rodney Potter Robinson, *The Germania of Tacitus* (*Am. Philol. Ass.*, Monograph V [1935]), pp. 2-3.

⁴ *Phil. Wochenschr.*, XXX (1913), pp. 701-702 (without reprinting it).

⁵ *Storia e critica di testi latini* (1914), pp. 4-5.

⁶ *Class. Phil.*, XVI (1921), pp. 251-255; cf. also his *Germania*, pp. 6-7.

minor works of Tacitus, and Suetonius' *De grammaticis*, though intermingled with other works and in a different order.⁷ If Aly had known the text of the *Commentarium*, he never would have made this suggestion, which has created so much confusion.⁸ Both Krohn⁹ and Hosius¹⁰ have ignored the whole question. Therefore it will be suitable to reproduce the part of the inventory which deals with Frontinus (taken from Robinson's edition, *Class. Phil.*, XVI [1921], p. 252).

In Monasterio hispildensi^a haud procul ab alpibus continentur haec opuscula. videlicet.

Repertus. Julii Frontini De aquae ductis quae in urbem inducunt liber .j.^b Incipit sic. PERSECVTVS ea quae de modulis dici fuit necessarium. Nunc ponam quemadmodum queque aqua ut principium^c commentariis comprehensum est usque ad nostram curam habere visa sit &c. Continet hic liber XII.j.

Repertus. Item eiusdem frontini liber incipit sic. Cum omnis res ab imperatore delegata interiorem^d exigat &^e curam, & me seu naturalis solicitude seu fides sedula, non ad diligentiam modo, verum ad morem^f commisse rei instigent, sitque mihi nunc^g ab nerva augusto, nescio diligentiore an amantiore rei. p. imperatore aquarum iniunctum officium &^h ad usum &c. Continet XI. folia.

^a scil. hersfeldensi. ^b Incipit prologus iulii frontini in libro de aqueducto urbis romae C. ^c principum C. ^d intentiorem C. ^e et om. C. ^f ad amorem quoque C. ^g nunc mihi C. ^h et om. C.

A comparison between Hersfeldensis (= H) and Casinensis (= C) reveals far reaching differences. The title in H does not inspire much confidence: the form *aqua ductum* (plural *aqua ducta*), while understandable in the African inscription *C.I.L.*, VIII, 2728 = *I.L.S.*, 5795, cannot be by Frontinus. Panormita, who undoubtedly had seen a copy of the inventory of the Hersfeld monk, gives in a letter to Guarino a corrected version of the title "*de aqueductibus qui in urbem Romam inducuntur.*"¹¹

⁷ *Rh. Mus.*, LXVIII (1913), pp. 636-637.

⁸ E. g., Grimal, *op. cit.*, p. XVIII.

⁹ In his edition of 1922, and in his report on Frontinus, *Burs. Jahresber.*, CCXVII (1928), p. 105, where he even quotes the inventory.

¹⁰ Schanz-Hosius, *Röm. Literaturgesch.*, II (1935¹), pp. 798-799. Cf. also Kappelmacher, *R.-E.*, X, 1 (1917), cols. 604-605.

¹¹ Cf. Robinson, *Germania*, p. 3.

More important is the reversal of the order of the two books in **H**, where the first book follows the second (cf. also Panormita's letter, *loc. cit.*). All known manuscripts have the correct order of **C**.¹² This difference alone is sufficient to dispel Aly's hypothesis and Grimal's stemma. The variants in the text may be in part explained as errors of the Hersfeld monk or later copyists. But neither **V**'s wrong reading *aquarum* for *aqua ut* of **C** (in ch. 64) is found in **H**, nor does **V** have any of **H**'s faulty readings.

It remains now to be seen whether a closer examination of **V** will not enable us to clarify the relationship between **C** and **V**. The Casinensis is, especially in the beginning, full of lacunae, many of which Peter the Deacon indicated by leaving space. Attempts at filling in these gaps such as in chs. 2, 6, and 129 demonstrate that at least not all these lacunae were caused by gaps in Peter's model, but rather by reading difficulties which Peter was unable to overcome. If **V** belonged to a different family, we should have to expect a rather wide divergence between **C** and **V**, particularly in the extent of the lacunae. Instead **V** has exactly the same gaps as **C**, frequently filled with reckless "emendations" which almost always turn out to be preposterous distortions of an already badly damaged text. To call the readings of **V** "parfois aberrantes"¹³ is an inconceivable understatement. A few examples may illustrate this point:

- ch. 2: *precosit ei adi...orua decurrit* **C**; *praepositi ad i<ll>orum decurrit* editors; *praecessit ei a divo Nerva decurrit* **V**.
 ch. 7: *statium preture* **C**; *spatium praeturae* editors; *statuit preturam* **V**.

ch. 22: *frontem Saeptorum* **C**, editors; *fontem scipionum* **V**.

What does it matter then, in view of this helpless fumbling, that **V** in ch. 17 has skipped a line (*maiorem—muniendi rivi*), where **C** is legible, or that **V** reads *inde* in the beginning of ch. 23, where **C**—correctly—has *quoniam*? For Grimal¹⁴ these are indications of an independent tradition! The method of **V** is—aside from his incredible carelessness—to change words which for any reason are beyond his grasp into words which he does understand, even if the resulting sentence is patent nonsense.

¹² Also the codex Ambrosianus I, 29 sup., written in Rome in 1454 (Sabbadini, *Studi Ital.*, XII [1903], p. 307), which seems to have hitherto escaped notice of commentators on Frontinus.

¹³ Grimal, *op. cit.*, p. XIX.

¹⁴ *Op. cit.*, p. XIX, n. 5.

It should be noted, in this connection, that Poggio himself, the discoverer of the Frontinus in Monte Cassino, emphasized the difficulties which he experienced in reading the Casinensis in a letter written on July 9, 1429:¹⁵ *Portavi volumen hoc* (scil. cod. Cas. 361) *mecum, ut transcribam libellum Frontini, cum sit mordosus, et pessimis litteris, adeo ut vix queam legere.*

Grimal has a hard time to find passages in which the readings of **V** should be adopted in preference to those of **C**. He refers to three passages in particular which seem to him improvements by **V**.

1) In ch. 14 he reads in **C**: *adiectiones sex*; **V** has *adiectiones VI*. The correct reading as suggested first by Iucundus is *adiectione sui*. According to Grimal, the error in **V** represents a stage of the text anterior to **C**. Since **V** has systematically changed numerals given by **C** in letters into numbers, the reading *VI* is the logical result of this method. Peter's model had *adiectione sui* in continuous writing, which Peter misunderstood as *adiectiones VI* and transcribed as *adiectiones sex*; **V** simply changed *sex* back into *VI*.

2) In ch. 8 **C** has: *Tepula concipitur via Latina ad decimum miliarium, deverticulo ex tibus ab Roma dextrorsus milium passuum duu<m>*. **V** reads *XI* instead of *decimum* and *unum* instead of *duu<m>*. A. Rocchi in *Studi e documenti di storia e diritto*, XVII (1896), pp. 125-142, tried to show that the *deverticulum* meant by Frontinus was not the via Cavona at Ciampino, exactly ten miles from Rome, but a rather hypothetical road which reaches the via Latina between the tenth and the eleventh milestone. It was the height of pedantry on the part of Rocchi on the basis of this hypothesis to reject the reading *decimum* (which Ashby, *Aqueducts of Ancient Rome*, p. 159, and Van Deman, *The Building of Roman Aqueducts*, p. 149, maintain) in favor of the reading *XI*, a change which is unnecessary even if one accepts Rocchi's opinion concerning the *deverticulum*. To claim the *XI* of **V** as an argument for the autonomy of this manuscript is all the more astonishing if one sees how often **V** has corrupted numbers: one example is given in the very sentence here discussed (*unum* for *duu<m>*); cf., besides, ch. 14, where **C** has correctly a *septimo miliario*, and *sexcentos novem*, whereas

¹⁵ *Epistolae*, III, 37, ed. Th. de Tonellis, vol. I, p. 284.

V gives VI and dVIII (== 509), or ch. 15, where C has *sex milia*, but V *X milia*.

3) ch. 7: *fontin sub buspetrei stat im<mobilis> stagni mo<do> colore praeviridi.* V reads *fontium* and *buspene*. Grimal adopts the long accepted emendation of the second part by Schultz and gives as his text of the first part: *fontium <aqua> sub <rupi>bus pene statim <stat>*, etc. But the explanation by way of dittotherapy is not warranted in this case since Peter left space before *stat*, and both *jontium* and *pene* are easily misread for what C offers.

To base the opinion of an independent origin of a manuscript on passages like these is nothing but begging the question.¹⁶ We may conclude that R. P. Robinson was perfectly justified when he said that "of the Frontinus mentioned in the *Commentarium* all traces appear to have been lost."¹⁷

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¹⁶ It would have been better if Grimal had refrained from introducing highly conjectural readings of his own into the text which deserve hardly a place in the apparatus or in the notes. For instance, in ch. 6 he reads [*extra Portam Tiberinam*] for *extra portam RRA nam*, although he is compelled to declare that these words were interpolated after the third century, and in ch. 21 he chooses to bracket [*in regionem Viae Novae*], again as a late antique interpolation, identifying the street with the road built by Caracalla. Instead he should have assumed that it was an earlier street unknown to us (cf. Platner and Ashby, *Top. Dict. of Anc. Rome*, p. 565). Unfortunately, we do not have a complete street list of Rome in the time of Trajan. But it should be remembered that at least one other *Nova Via* existed since old times between Forum and Palatine. In ch. 76 C has: *sed postquam Nero imperator Claudiam opere arcuato + ascus excepta usque ad templum divi Claudi perduxit*, etc. Grimal reads *a specu exceptam* and translates "eut capté au conduit." There can be little doubt that Bücheler's reading *ad Spem excepta<m>* is the right solution, especially if one compares the parallel passage in ch. 19: *Prius tamen pars Iuliae ad Spem Veterem excepta castellis Caelii montis diffunditur*.

Philologists who suffer from *horror vacui* had better keep their hands from this treatise. Whoever desires a clear picture of the text of Frontinus still must consult Krohn's and even Bücheler's editions, by no means replaced by Grimal's work. A good edition of the chapters dealing with the topography of Rome (*De aqu.*, 1-22; 79-93) is found in R. Valentini and G. Zucchetti, "Codice Topografico della Città di Roma I," *Fonti per la Storia d'Italia*, LXXXI (1940), pp. 9-36.

¹⁷ *Germania*, p. 27, n. 4.

CICERO AND THE *TRACTATUS COISLINIANUS*.

It has more than once been suggested¹ that the source of the passage on wit and humor in the second book of the *De Oratore* of Cicero² is the anonymous epitome of an essay on comedy known as the *Tractatus Coislinianus*³ (the source of which is itself a matter of doubt⁴) or that the contents of both documents so nearly correspond as to justify the assumption of a very close relationship.

What actual resemblances are there? The first and most obvious is the common division of wit into content and expression. Lane Cooper, Atkins, and Bernays,⁵ among others, are inclined to emphasize this, yet it can of itself establish no sort of relationship, for it is clear that such antitheses were part and parcel of rhetoric and of much other ancient thought as well. It is exactly similar to that antithesis between word and act which appears explicitly about fifty times in Thucydides, and it is in fact the

¹ J. W. H. Atkins, *Literary Criticism in Antiquity* (Cambridge University Press, 1934), II, p. 138; J. E. M. Arndt, *De ridiculi doctrina rhetorica* (Kirchhain, 1904), especially p. 35.

² *De Or.*, II, 216-234 (introductory), 235-290.

³ This treatise, probably of the first century B.C. (so Kayser; but the evidence is slight, and it may well be of later date), was discovered by Cramer in a tenth-century MS (*codex Coislinianus* 120) in the De Coislin collection in Paris, and published in his *Anecdota* in 1839; it has also been published in Joachim Bernays, *Zwei Abhandlungen über die aristotelische Theorie des Drama* (Berlin, 1880), p. 137, in Georg Kaibel, *Comicorum graecorum fragmenta* (Berlin, 1899), I, 1, pp. 50-53, and elsewhere. It is discussed at length in W. J. M. Starkie, *The Acharnians of Aristophanes* (London, 1909), and in Lane Cooper, *An Aristotelian Theory of Comedy* (Oxford, 1924), more briefly in Atkins, *op. cit.*, II, pp. 138-143, in J. F. D'Alton, *Roman Literary Theory and Criticism* (London, 1931), p. 361, and in M. A. Grant, *Ancient Theories of the Laughable: The Greek Rhetoricians and Cicero* (University of Wisconsin Studies in Language and Literature, no. 21, 1924), pp. 100-31.

⁴ Some—e.g., A. P. McMahon (“On the Second Book of Aristotle's *Poetics* and the Source of Theophrastus' Definition of Tragedy,” *H. S. C. P.*, XXVIII [1917], pp. 1-46)—regard it as the work of an illiterate; others—notably Bernays, Arndt, Rutherford, Starkie, and Cooper—believe that it embodies genuine Peripatetic tradition.

⁵ Lane Cooper, *op. cit.*, pp. 89, 92; Atkins, *lac. cit.*; Bernays, *op. cit.*, p. 169, n. 1.

same type of antithesis as that between φύσις and νόμος.⁶ Rhetorical theory is a mass of such—θέσις and ἐπόθεσις, θέσις of *cognitio* and θέσις of *actio*, πίστις ἐντεχνος and πίστις ἀρεχνος, πίστις ἐντεχνος derived *ex toto* and that derived *ex partibus*, argument *ex inductione* and argument *ex ratiocinatione*, *probabilia* as opposed to *necessaria*, and so on. The division of wit into content and expression was at least as old as Aristotle,⁷ and must have been a threadbare commonplace by the time of Cicero; and even if, as some believe, Cicero had never read Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, he was certainly already aware of the content-expression antithesis in the figures of thought and speech, an antithesis here worked to death by the later Greek⁸ and Roman⁹ rhetoricians.

When we turn to examine details, no truly significant resemblance appears. Under wit derived *ἀπὸ τῶν πραγμάτων*, the *Tractatus* lists nine divisions; Cicero enumerates twenty-six types of wit *in re*,¹⁰ and then six main heads under which these are to fall.¹¹ In these two sets, Cicero's *expectationes deceptae* (consisting of *discrepancia*,¹² "biter bit,"¹³ and two types of *παρὰ προσδοκίαν* in situation, not verbal expression¹⁴) correspond to *παρὰ προσδοκίαν* in the *Tractatus*, as *similitudo* (consisting of *similitudo conlationis*¹⁴ and *similitudo imaginis*¹⁵) to *ὅμοιώσις*.

⁶ Cf. Aristotle, *Rhet.*, 1371b34–1372a1. H. Jentsch (*Aristotelis ex arte rhetorica quaeritur quid habeat Cicero* [Berlin, 1866]) believes that Cicero had not read the *Rhetoric*; Wilhelm Kroll ("Studien über Cicero's Schrift *De Oratore*," *Rh. Mus.*, LVIII [1903], pp. 552-97) agrees; contrast Friedrich Solmsen, "The Aristotelian Tradition in Ancient Rhetoric," *A.J.P.*, LXII (1941), pp. 35-50, 169-90; *idem*, "Aristotle and Cicero on the Orator's Playing on the Feelings," *C.P.*, XXXIII (1938), pp. 390-404. Certainly his knowledge of the *Ethics* and *Politics* was inaccurate and second-hand.

⁷ The authors in vol. VIII of Walz's *Rhetores Graeci*.

⁸ Rutilius Lupus, Aquila Romanus, Julius Rufinius, and sundry *anonymi*.

⁹ *De Or.*, II, 264-290.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, II, 289; it is not easy to arrange all the subdivisions under these six divisions; two subdivisions (*consentaneum* in 283 and *sententiose ridicula* in 286) refuse to fit into the scheme at all; perhaps they belong to a hypothetical seventh class, on which cf. A. S. Wilkins and K. W. Piderit on 289.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, II, 281.

¹² *Ibid.*, II, 277.

¹³ *Ibid.*, II, 274; 284-5.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, II, 265.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, II, 266.

Neither correspondence should be urged as a proof of close relationship: if Professor X writes a Greek grammar and says the genitive of ἄνθρωπος is ἀνθρώπου, is he thereby indebted to Roger Bacon's thirteenth-century Greek grammar? As Kirby Flower Smith says in another connection, "one may speak of a 'gay Lothario' without incurring the suspicion of being acquainted with Nicholas Rowe even by name." The principle of unexpectedness was a commonplace emphasized since the day of Aristotle,¹⁶ while the concept of *similitudo*, another commonplace, was more likely derived from Cicero's rhetorical studies: as later rhetoricians might have put it, ὁμοίωσις πρὸς τὸν χείρον¹⁷ is an obvious reflex of ὁμοίωσις πρὸς τὸν βελτίονα in the encomium.¹⁸ Of the other seven types of content-wit in the *Tractatus*, there is no trace in Cicero.

Arndt admits the lack of significant correspondence between the divisions *in re* and those ἀπὸ τῶν πραγμάτων, but endeavors to show that the six divisions *in verbo* and the seven ἀπὸ τῆς λέξεως are closely related, indeed, are virtually identical. *Ambiguum*¹⁹ in Cicero, to be sure, corresponds clearly and definitely to ὁμονυμία, but this is the one precise correspondence between the two sets. We are on far less certain ground when Arndt explains σχῆμα λέξεως as equivalent to ἀντίθεσις (i. e., Cicero's *verba relata contrarie*²⁰), citing Aristotle's *Rhetoric* 1410 b 29,²¹ and endeavors to identify παρονυμία with Cicero's *adnominatio*²² (for which the corresponding Greek term is παρονομασία); but σχῆμα λέξεως has

¹⁶ *Rhet.*, 1412a17-1412b29.

¹⁷ Cicero actually uses the phrase *similitudo turpioris* (*De Or.*, II, 289). On the close connection between rhetoric and the "academic" study of wit, cf. *infra*, notes 20 and 42.

¹⁸ Cf. Doxopater *apud* Walz, *Rhetores Graeci* (Stuttgart and Tübingen, 1832-6), II, p. 446.

¹⁹ *De Or.*, II, 250-4; already emphasized by Aristotle: *Soph. Elen.*, 165b30; *Rhet.*, 1404b37-39; *An. Post.*, 85b11.

²⁰ *De Or.*, II, 263; properly, this is a *figura*, but *eἰδη* of wit and *figurae* are confused in the *ad Herennium*, in Cicero, in Quintilian, and in Demetrius *nepl ἐρημεῖας*: cf. M. A. Grant, *op. cit.*, pp. 105, 149 (n. 13), 153 (n. 55).

²¹ Cf. also Aristotle, *Rhet.*, 1401a1-7 and Cope-Sandys, *The Rhetoric of Aristotle* (Cambridge University Press, 1877), II, pp. 303-4, III, p. 110.

²² *De Or.*, II, 256; with this is associated *interpretatio nominis*: II, 257.

been correctly explained by Kaibel,²³ and *παρωνυμία* (which refers in the *Tractatus* to comic word-coinage) in the sense of *παρονομασία* occurs only in Aquila Romanus,²⁴ where the text is correctly emended to *παρονομασία*. Arndt further identifies ἔξαλλαγή in the *Tractatus* with Cicero's *unius verbi translatio*²⁵ (i. e., metaphor; ἔξηλλαγμένα ὄνόματα²⁶) as does Kaibel.²⁷ This is possible only if Johannes Tzetzes' text of the *Tractatus* be read,²⁸ but both Arndt and Kaibel read the received text, where the meaning can only be "through a variation (ἔξαλλαγή) produced by voice inflection and similar means."²⁹ But if Tzetzes' text be read and Arndt's explanation of ἔξαλλαγή accepted, his interpretation of *σχῆμα λέξεως* becomes flatly impossible. In the remaining divisions *in verbo* and *ἀπὸ τῆς λέξεως* there are no correspondences: in the Greek treatise, comic substitution of a synonym (*συνωνύμια*), verbosity (*ἀδολεσχία*), and comic use of diminutives (*ὑποκόμιμα*) have no connection with Cicero's verbal unexpectedness (*aliud exspectamus, aliud dicitur*³⁰), comic use of quotations (*versus interpositi*³¹) and proverbs (*proverbia*³²), and comic use of literal interpretation (*id verbum accipere*³³), of allegory (*irmutata oratio*³⁴), and of irony (*verborum inversio*³⁵).

²³ *Op. cit.*, p. 51, n. 16, referring to Aristotle, *Soph. Elen.*, 168a10-14; Starkie's explanation is similar.

²⁴ Karl Halm, *Rhetores Latini Minores* (Leipzig, 1863), pp. 30, 32. The corruption arose from the false form *παρωνομασία*, on which cf. Spalding on Quintilian, VI, 3, 53. For *παρονομασία* as opposed to *παρωνυμία*, cf. Alexander, *De Figuriis* (Walz, *Rhet. Graec.*, VIII, 477) and Herodianus, *De Figuris* (*ibid.*, 595).

²⁵ *De Or.*, II, 261.

²⁶ Cf. Aristotle, *Poet.*, 1457b3, 1458a6, 1458b2-3; *Rhet.*, 1404b8.

²⁷ *Op. cit.*, p. 51, n. 15.

²⁸ *Prooemium A*, IV, 17 (cp. Kaibel, *op. cit.*, p. 9), where ἔναλλαγήν was originally read for ἔξαλλαγήν, and τῇ φύσει καὶ τοῖς δμογενέσι is attached to κατὰ σχῆμα λέξεως: (which seems impossible: cf. Bernays, *op. cit.*, p. 176). Starkie (Introd., p. lvii) explains ἔξαλλαγή as *παρονομασία*, *παραγραμματισμός*, which seems even less likely than Arndt's and Kaibel's view.

²⁹ And so Lane Cooper (*op. cit.*, p. 236); but δμογενής in the sense (almost) of *τοιοῦτος* is odd. Bernays (*op. cit.*, p. 177) explains δμογενής as "Wörter, deren Begriffe zu derselben Gattung, aber zu verschiedenen Species gehören"; this, however, trespasses on the domain of *συνωνύμια*.

³⁰ *De Or.*, II, 255-6.

³² *Ibid.*, II, 259-260.

³¹ *Ibid.*, II, 257.

³³ *Ibid.*, II, 261.

³² *Ibid.*, II, 258.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, loc. cit.

Since the divisions *in re* and ἀπὸ τῶν πραγμάτων have no significant common features, and since of those *in verbo* and ἀπὸ τῆς λέξεως only one pair clearly corresponds, Arndt's *congruunt catalogus Coislinianus et Ciceronis disputatio* (p. 35) is an overstatement.

Of course, it is true that neither author is attempting to work from first principles in order to construct a universally valid theory of the psychological basis of laughter; by the one, wit is considered solely as it applies to the comic playwright, by the other, it is discussed in its rôle as an adjunct of rhetoric, as an additional means of holding an audience, of making them *benevolos et attentos*. Accordingly, one might argue (as does Arndt) that Cicero took from the *Tractatus* only so much as served his immediate purpose, omitting what was suitable only for the stage, as, for example, φορτικὴ χρῆσθαι ὁρχήσει. The only item derived from the *Tractatus* would in that case be *ambiguum* (ὅμωνυμία). But a good many of the divisions of λέξις and πρᾶγμα could have been transferred bodily: although the number of diminutives in Latin falls far below that in Greek, ἵποκόρισμα might well have been employed somewhere,³⁶ as might παρωνύμια³⁷ and others; even ὅταν . . . λαμβάνῃ could have been adapted to Cicero's purpose, considering the frequency in the Roman courts of jests made at the orator's own expense,³⁸ and φορτικὴ χρῆσθαι ὁρχήσει could, in a pinch, have been adapted to refer to vulgar or indecent gesticulation, in which Cicero indulged at least once in his career:³⁹ for that matter, the *actio* of many a Roman orator was not far removed from ὁρχησία.⁴⁰

The only resemblances, then, are the common division into content and expression, the correspondence of *ambiguum* and διωρυμία, and a common emphasis⁴¹ on τὸ ἀπροσδόκητον, all three already emphasized by Aristotle. Considering how widespread

³⁰ A diminutive appears in a particularly unpleasant witticism in *De Or.*, II, 262; it is, however, an example of wit *ex inversione verborum*, and the point does not depend on the use of a diminutive form.

³⁷ Cf. such Latin examples as those in Plautus, *Trin.*, 988; *Persa*, 830; *Capt.*, 775; *Oure.*, 506; *Poen.*, 991, 1197, etc.

³⁸ Noted (with disapproval) by Quintilian (VI. 3. 82).

³⁹ *Ibid.*, VI, 3, 25, with H. E. Butler's note (Loeb edition, II, p. 450).

⁴⁰ *Brut.* 225 (*saltatio*). 303; cf. also 216.

⁴¹ But not a common treatment; in the *Tractatus*, verbal παρὰ προσδοκῶν is ignored, whereas in Cicero its treatment is quite elaborate.

were the leading ideas of rhetorical theory, one cannot regard such coincidence as remarkable: some slight similarity was practically inevitable. Cicero was dealing with a topic which, he realized, had been thoroughly canvassed by the Greek rhetoricians,⁴² one indication being the fact that he makes no claim to originality: if he had had any such claim to make, we may be sure that Cicero was not the man to hide his light.⁴³ Nor is it conceivable that, with an abundance of treatises from which to choose, he should have turned to a rather obscure essay on a form of literature of which (theoretically, at least) he disapproved on ethical and moral-didactic grounds.⁴⁴

Cicero's interest in literary theories of tragedy and comedy must have been languid at best. He knew the Greek and early Roman⁴⁵ drama well, and could quote them appositely, but there is no evidence in any of his writings that he was interested in dramatic criticism as such. It is most likely that he had never read Aristotle on tragedy; it is even less likely that he had ever seen the *Tractatus*.

⁴² *De Or.*, II, 217: Arndt regards this passage as an allusion to Theophrastus and Demetrius of Phalerum; but it is possible that the books here referred to were merely collections of anecdotes like Dean Ramsay's *Reminiscences of Scottish Life and Character*: cf. Wilkins *ad loc.* J. M. Edmonds (*The Characters of Theophrastus* [London, 1929], Introd., p. 6) remarks that the ηθικαὶ χαρακτῆρες of Theophrastus introduced a vogue for light literature; this together with Theophrastus' and Demetrius' treatises περὶ γέλοος (cf. Diogenes Laertius, V, 46; Athenaeus, VIII, 348; Christ-Schmidt, II, 1, p. 65), various treatises περὶ κωμῳδίας, and, of course, the New Comedy, must have stimulated an interest in the rhetorical study of wit. But the connection between wit and academic rhetoric was as old as Gorgias (Aristotle, *Rhet.*, 1419b2-7; cf. M. A. Grant, *op. cit.*, p. 18).

⁴³ He is proud, for example, of his original treatment of prose-rhythm: *Or.*, 226.

⁴⁴ *Tusc. Diel.*, IV, 69; *De R. P.*, IV, 11; but he enjoyed Aristophanes (*De Leg.*, II, 37) and it was Cicero who described comedy as *imitationem vitce, speculum consuetudinis, imaginem veritatis* (*De R. P.*, IV, 13; cf. Donatus, *De Com.*, *apud Kleibel, op. cit.*, p. 67; for the later history of the phrase, cf. J. W. H. Atkins, *English Literary Criticism: The Mediæval Phase* [Cambridge University Press, 1943], pp. 32-3) although he denied the name of poet to the comic dramatist: *Or.*, 67. On Cicero and comedy, cf. further M. A. Grant, *op. cit.*, pp. 96-9.

⁴⁵ Cf. Wilhelm Zillinger, *Cicero und die altrömischen Dichter* (Würzburg, 1911); Ernst Schollmeyer, *Quid Cicero de poetis Romanorum iudicaverit* (Diss., Halle, 1884).

There seems at present no good reason for departing from the notion⁴⁶ that Cicero's main source—apart from his own long and varied experience in the court-room⁴⁷—was the περὶ γελοῖον of Theophrastus or that of Demetrius of Phalerum. It is possible that in his discussions of style Cicero did not directly use Theophrastus' περὶ λέξεως but some intermediate source based upon it;⁴⁸ the same possibility, of course, holds true for the περὶ γελοῖον.

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⁴⁶ Christ-Schmid, II, 1, p. 79, n. 4. Doubtless there was some connection with Panaetius as well: cf. G. C. Fiske, *Lucilius and Horace* (University of Wisconsin Studies in Language and Literature, no. 7, 1920), chap. 2; *idem*, "The Plain Style in the Scipionic Circle" (*ibid.*, no. 3, 1919), pp. 62-10f.

⁴⁷ Cicero himself was notorious for the vigor of his wit and repartee: some thought he went too far (Quintilian, VI, 3, 2-3; Plutarch, *Cic.*, 27, 1) but not so Quintilian (VI, 3, 3), far less Cicero himself (*pro Planc.*, 35). Every witty saying current in Rome came to be attributed to him (*ibid.*), including some he never uttered (*ibid.*; Quintilian, VI, 3, 4; cf. Spooner and Jowett). C. Trebonius, one of the murderers of Caesar (Caesar, incidentally, claimed to be able to distinguish a true Ciceronian *mot* from a false: *Ad Fam.*, IX, 16, 4), made a collection of Cicero's witticisms (*ibid.*, XV, 21, 2), as also did Tiro (Quintilian, VI, 3, 5). On Cicero's oratorical practice, cf. Paul Faulmüller, *Ueber die rednerische Verwendung des Witzes und der Satire bei Cicero* (Grünstadt, 1906).

⁴⁸ Cf. Ludwig Radermacher, "Theophrast περὶ λέξεως," *Rh. Mus.*, LIV (1899), p. 376.

TWO NOTES ON THE GREEK DANCE.

I. "THE FOX."

In Greek and Roman literature a female Dionysiac dancer is sometimes called a *βαστάρα*, or *βαστάρη*, or *βασταρίς* (Athenaeus, V, 198 E; Aeschylus, II, pp. 386-7 [Loeb]; Anacreon, frag. 57 [Loeb]). The word *βαστάρα*, *βαστάρη* also denotes a fox (Lycophron, 771; Hesychius, s. v. *βαστάρη*; *Et. Mag.*, 190, 52). Herodotus, in naming the animals of Libya (IV, 192) uses *βασταρίον* with similar meaning. Again, *βαστάρα* means the characteristic garment of the Thracian Bacchantes, probably originally made of fox-skins (Anacreon, frag. 29 [Loeb]; Hesychius, s. v. *βαστάραι*). Anacreon (frag. 76, line 6 [Loeb]) uses *βασταρίω* to mean "take part in a Dionysiac dance."

On a highly significant inscription of the second century of the Christian era, discovered recently near Tusculum, and now in the Metropolitan Museum in New York, there is a list of members of a Dionysiac *thiasos*, in which not only names, but also "degrees" or grades of initiation are given. Among the members, four are ranked as "Chief Foxes"; two are men (*ἀρχιβαστάροι*), two are women (*ἀρχιβαστάραι*).¹

The ancient writers are aware that *βαστάρα* is a non-Greek word, and they speak of it variously as Thracian, Phrygian, Cyrenian, Libyan, or Lydian. In general, they seem to favor a Thracian origin. In Thrace, of course, the fox was a particularly sacred animal. It figured not only in the cult of Dionysus, but as a totem animal as well. The fox-skin garments and caps affected by Thracian worshippers were not merely warm clothes; for the skin of an animal, when worn in primitive religious ceremonies, is always of ritualistic significance.

It is known that the Thracians practiced tattooing.² Fre-

¹ Achille Vogliano, "La grande iscrizione Bacchica del Metropolitan Museum," *A. J. A.*, XXXVII (1933), pp. 215-31.

² Herodotus, V, 6; Cicero, *De Off.*, II, 25; Pausanias, IX, 30; cf. Wilhelm Tomaschek, "Die alten Thraker," *Wien. Sitzb.*, CXXVIII (1893), No. IV, pp. 101, 117; William Ridgeway, *The Early Age of Greece* (Cambridge Univ. Press, 1901-31), II, pp. 482-98; Gawril Kazarow, *R.-E.*, s. v. "Thrake, Religion."

quently the device used was an animal, with totemistic or ritualistic implications. A fragmentary cylix of the fifth century, found on the Acropolis at Athens, depicts a Thracian woman attacking Orpheus.³ Upon her right upper arm is tattooed a schematic representation of an animal variously interpreted as a stag or a goat. The legs of the creature, as depicted, are certainly too short for a stag. Beyond that, the identity of the animal is difficult to determine; but the head and neck do not resemble those of a goat. It seems to me that the drawing rather suggests a fox.

As it happens, we have a record of a Greek dance called "the fox"—ἀλωπηξ. Hesychius defines it as follows: ὅρχησίς τις. καὶ ἀλωπεκίαι μώμων, ὡς Σοφοκλῆς (usually emended to ὡς Σοφοκλῆς Μάμω). ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἐπί σάματι πάθος γενόμενον. Commentators have generally agreed that the last clause is an intrusion, and that it probably indicates a confusion of ἀλωπεκίας, -ov, with ἀλωπεκία, "mange" (common to foxes and other animals). The word ἀλωπεκίας is used also by Lucian (*Pisc.* 47), in a passage referring to the proposed branding of false philosophers with the representation of a fox or an ape: Parrhesiades tells Philosophy that she will soon see a great many ἀλωπεκίας ἢ πιθηκοφόρους. It seems to me that in Greek the word ἀλωπεκία must denote "wearers of the representation of a fox," whether they be branded or tattooed or masked. Perhaps Lucian's usage is even a sort of pun, with a side reference to the Bacchantes. I believe that the gloss of Hesychius, corrupt as it is, permits us to infer that Sophocles used the plural ἀλωπεκίαι to denote dancers—i. e., "fox dancers"—or the dance itself. It is not uncommon to find a plural noun used as the name of a dance—for instance, πινακίδες (Pöllux, IV, 103), δάκτυλοι (Athenaeus, XIV, 629 E); and, named for the participants, σκῶπτες (Hesychius, s. v.), ιαλκάδαι (Hesychius, s. v.), καλλιβάντες (Hesychius, s. v.), ὑπογύπτωνες (Pollux, IV, 104).

On the marble drapery found in the shrine of Despoina at Lycosura,⁴ eleven female figures wearing animal masks and foot-gear run along in a rapid processional dance, to the music of

³ A. B. Cook, *Zeus* (Cambridge Univ. Press, 1914-40), II, pp. 121-3 and Fig. 76; Furtwaengler-Reichhold, *Gr. Vasenmalerei*, I, 284.

⁴ Guy Dickins, "Damophon of Messene," *B. S. A.*, XIII (1906-7), pp. 392-5 and Plate 14.

lyre and double flute. The marble drapery seems to be a reproduction of actual embroidered drapery offered to the goddess in earlier times, and to reflect ritual practices of great antiquity. Despoina, "the Lady," is an old deity of fertility, a "Mistress of Animals," among other things. We know that mystery rituals had a place in her cult; probably the "dancing beasts" of the drapery participated in them. At least one of the figures on the drapery (and perhaps two) wears a fox-mask.

Several terracotta figurines of the early Iron Age, found in Cyprus, portray votaries wearing or removing animal masks. Some of these figures wear a rough, shaggy garment suggestive of an animal's skin. At least one of the votaries wears a mask which looks very much like the head of a fox.⁵

There seems to have been a great deal of animal mummery, with or without masks, in primitive worship throughout the Mediterranean region. Sometimes, as on the Lycosura drapery, various animals are imitated in one procession, and at other times all the mummers portray one type of animal. Evidently there was fawn, goat, horse, bird, and other mummery in the Greek worship of Diorysus. Among the names of Greek dances which are preserved, several are the names of animals—"lion," "owl," "boar," etc. In like manner, a dancer is sometimes called a "bear," a "raven," a "griffin," etc., and certain priests and priestesses (presumably dancers also) are called "bees," "colts," "bulls," "doves," etc. Titles of comedies are frequently animal names, usually with reference to a singing and dancing chorus of animal mummers. Evidently participation in ritualistic mummery was from earliest times considered and called a dance.

I believe, then, that, in the terminology of the dance, *βαστάρα* and *ἀλωπηξ* may be two different words, one native Greek and one foreign, for virtually the same thing—participation in, or a participant in, fox mummery in honor of a divinity of fertility and animal life. Variant terms for the participants seem to have been the plural nouns *βαστάραι*, *βαστάροι*, *βασταρίδες*, *ἀλωπεκίαι*. The mummery may have contained little actual mimicry of the animal—cf. our "fox trot." As in other types of beast mum-

⁵ John L. Myres, *Handbook of the Oesnola Collection of Antiquities from Cyprus* (Metropolitan Museum, 1914), p. 342, No. 2077.

mery, the participant, in early times at least, must have identified himself with the animal whose skin or mask or attributes he wore, and hoped to acquire some of the animal's characteristics for himself. In later times the mask would disappear or become a cap, the garment would become merely a conventionalized representation of the animal's skin, and the mummery would be rather symbolical than realistic.

One odd bit of corroboration for our hypothesis may be seen in the fact that a city of the Thracian Chersonese was called Ἀλωπεκόνησος, and that a coin-type of the city was a βασσάρα—a dancing Bacchante.³

Quite evidently the fox and fox mummery were of more importance in Thracian religion than they were in that of Greece. This would be natural in view of the fact that the fox is more of a northern than a southern animal; however, the fox was common enough in Africa and in the Peloponnesus, as we are aware from Greek literature. Lycosura, of course, is in the Peloponnesus; and Cyprus had cultural connections with Africa.

It is an arresting thought that the legend of the Thracian Orpheus, playing and singing so beautifully that wild animals followed him (Euripides, *Bacch.* 561-4; Pausanias, IX, 30, 3-4), may be merely a poetic record of primitive beast mummery in Thrace, in which the masked and skin-clad performers, representing beasts of many types, followed a musician. The rocks and trees which also are said to have followed Orpheus may be a later elaboration.

II. "ECURING OUT THE BARLEY."

Among the obscure names of Greek dances which have been handed down to us is *ελφίτων ἐκχύσις*—"the pouring out of the barley meal." Athenaeus (XIV, 629 F) includes it in a list of "comical" dances of various sorts, but gives no further information on it.

In India, at a festival of the Nāgas, or serpent divinities, bruised rice is poured out on the ground, and the figure of a snake is molded or traced in it. An all-night dance then takes place, over and around the meal, during which the leader of the dance

³ Lewis R. Farnell, *Cults of the Greek States* (Oxford Univ. Press, 1896), II, p. 335.

imitates the writhing of a serpent.¹ In other parts of India, sandalwood powder or turmeric is used in much the same way.²

A similar element is found in the snake dance of the Hopi Indians. Before they take the snakes out of the "snake pit," the Hopi sprinkle corn meal on the ground or on the plank covering the pit, in such a way that the meal looks like a snake; and they then proceed to dance upon and around the corn meal, stamping heavily. Also, corn meal is poured on the ground after the snake-carrying, and the snakes are thrown on it.³

The physician Galen once visited the island of Lemnos to test stories that the earth of that place was efficacious in curing snake-bite and the bites of savage beasts, and in offsetting the effects of poisonous drugs (*De Temp. et Fac.*, IX, 1, 2). He found the priestess gathering the earth with various ceremonies, including throwing wheat and barley on the ground, and "doing certain other things prescribed by the ritual of the place." Surely among these must have been rhythmical movements around the poured-out grain. The rite looks like sympathetic magic, performed to invoke serpent-power in the earth to combat the poison of a wound or bite.

The dance called "the pouring out of the barley meal," then, could be an old serpent dance. It would have been originally of deep and dread significance. Later, as civilization developed, and as the fear of poisonous serpents lessened, it would have become merely a *tour de force*—one of the many "dances over a pattern on the floor" which are found in various parts of the world. With its exaggerated writhings and contortions of the body, it could have become Athenaeus' "comical" dance. It may have developed ultimately into a mere game—as our hop-scotch has done, although it, too, was originally a snake dance over a pattern on the floor.

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¹ J. P. Vogel, *Indian Serpent-Lore* (London, Probsthain, 1926), p. 275.

² *Ibid.*, p. 279.

³ D. H. Lawrence, *Mornings in Mexico* (New York, 1931), pp. 156, 170; Walter Hough, *The Moki Snake Dance* (Santa Fe Railroad, 1901), pp. 6, 9; John G. Bourke, *The Snake Dance of the Moquis of Arizona* (Scribner's, 1884), pp. 165-6.

REVIEWS.

Servianorum in Vergilli Carmina Commentariorum Editionis Harvardiana Vol. II, quod in Aeneidos libros I et II explanationes continet. Edited by EDWARD KENNARD RAND, HOWARD TAYLOR SMITH, JOHN JOSEPH SAVAGE, GEORGE BYRON WALDROP, JOHN PETERSEN ELDER, BERNARD MANN PEEBLES, ARTHUR FREDERICK STOCKER. Lancaster, Pa., Lancaster Press, 1946.- Pp. xxi + 509. \$5.00. (Special Publication of the *American Philological Association*.)

The appearance of the first volume of the "Harvard Servius" is reassuring evidence that the editors are making steady progress towards their announced objectives and encourages us to believe they will one day bring the great enterprise to completion. Optimists who may have hoped for new light on Vergil may be disappointed. Experienced hunters in the wilderness where the traces of ancient and mediaeval text-traditions must be sought will be ready to share the unexpressed disappointment of the editors that their magnificent palaeographical and critical efforts have not yet availed to settle "the Servius Question" or clear up as many of the smaller textual vexations, especially in the DS text, as might have been hoped. But disappointment is the wrong note to sound. The editors have presented a definitive edition of the "true Servius" and disentangled from it as well as can possibly be expected the text of another important commentary on Vergil, whether it be the work of Donatus or somebody else. In the welter of mediaeval scholia, here are two rocks to cling to. Vergilian scholarship cannot help but benefit. The students of other text-traditions, the sifters of other scholia collections, and students of mediaeval culture generally will profit beyond calculation. It may be necessary to wait some time still before one should attempt to make a fair appraisal of the new edition. This is only the first of five projected volumes. The editors have not published their prolegomena or even summarized for us their final opinions on many important matters. The rest of the *Aeneid* and the commentary on the *Bucolics* and *Georgics* pose textual problems of a different kind from those of *Aeneid* I-II. The following review must consequently be thought of as having a definitely provisional character.

Was a new edition of Servius necessary? Probably no one, from the time of Scaliger to the Harvard editors, who ever made a serious attempt to decide how much of the text in his hands was actually that of Servius, has ever doubted that a good edition of Servius would one day have to be made. At least, a dozen attempts have been made to do this, starting with Iacobus Rubeus in 1475 and ending with Thilo and Hagen (1881). The history of Servius scholarship and, in particular, of the "Servius Question," has become so familiar of later years, chiefly through learned papers contributed by the Harvard editors themselves, that only the briefest summary need be

given here. The vulgate Servius of the Middle Ages corresponds approximately in content and scope to what is now accepted as the commentary of Servius. There was also in restricted circulation, however, a version containing much additional material. The *editio princeps* (1471-72) reproduced the vulgate text. In 1600, however, Pierre Daniel, having found a few manuscripts of the longer form and becoming convinced that this was the true Servius, so published the text and thus posed the "Servius Question." Daniel's view remained unchallenged until the middle of the last century, when Thilo and others decided once more in favor of the shorter Servius (S) and dismissed the additional material of Daniel (DS) as mediaeval interpolations. Thilo's edition, based on this hypothesis, presented a readable version of S but introduced confusion into DS, parts of which printed in italics were allowed to remain on the page and parts arbitrarily dismembered and relegated to his labyrinthine apparatus. From 1911 the cause of DS was taken up again, not on the basis that DS was Servius but rather that DS represented another independent ancient commentary on Vergil, in fact, a commentary from which S had derived a great part of his material. Several scholars, notably the late Professor Rand, cautiously began to point to St. Jerome's teacher, the great Aelius Donatus, as the possible author of DS. This last view was impressively challenged in 1924 by A. H. Travis, who demonstrated that DS differed from Donatus' Terence commentary so much in style that the two works could hardly be considered the work of the same man. Meantime, however, the new Servius had been launched. In his original announcement in 1938, Professor Rand made it plain that the new edition, which had been suggested by a Harvard seminar project, would not be based on any hypothesis regarding the worth or identity of DS. Its purpose would be to present for the first time the authentic text of S and of DS and to present them in a format that should permit the reader to take in at a glance the content of both commentaries and their relation to each other. Statements by the editors since Professor Rand's death and the edition itself indicate that this conservative purpose has been religiously adhered to.

One of the serious charges against Thilo is the fact that he failed to profit from the advances that in his day had already been made in the field of palaeography and text criticism. Professor Rand remarked several years ago, that, after contemplating the *selva oscura* of Thilo's prolegomena and apparatus, one felt there should be inscribed above it

Lasciate ogni speranza, voi ch'entrate.

The Harvard editors have let in more than a little light and, although they have withheld their own prolegomena for the present and are extremely chary of details in their preface, they give us the bare outlines of a history of our two commentary texts. In addition to Servius (S), the fourth century bequeathed to later times another complete commentary on Vergil. In the seventh or eighth century some learned person, presumably an Irishman, conflated these two works producing the form of text eventually discovered by Pierre Daniel. Manuscripts of the DS type seem never to have been very numerous, although Daniel had access to more than we have now. The present text depends upon a ninth century codex written at

Fulda (C), a ninth century book from Fleury, and readings taken by Daniel from lost books of Fulda.

The text of Servius proper (S) had a wide circulation throughout the Middle Ages. Of the large number of extant manuscripts, Thilo selected about a dozen, mostly German and Swiss, that were accessible or appealed to him. Thilo was an able Latinist and produced a usable text of Servius, but, while calling many manuscripts to witness, he never actually penetrated the secret of the tradition. The present editors have found that most of Thilo's manuscripts and most others, with the exception of one small and very important group, trace their ancestry back to an archetype designated by the editors as α . This book probably came from Ireland (although it is not explicitly so stated or suggested by the editors). The α family is subdivided into γ (among whose books is the famous Bernensis E63), and β (β^1 including Thilo's A and K; β^2 consisting of two fine books of Tours: Paris. 7959 and Trev. 1085). The clear analysis of the tradition makes it possible for the editors greatly to simplify the apparatus. They find it necessary to cite only eight (five of the ninth century) of the known manuscripts belonging to the α group.

A major discovery by the Harvard editors is group σ , which consists of three manuscripts only: Vaticanus Latinus 3317 (V), written in the splendid Beneventan script of Montecassino of the end of the tenth century; Guelferbytanus 2091 (W) written in Italian Gothic of the late thirteenth century; and Neapolitanus Bibl. Publ. 5 (N), an early tenth century Beneventan book written, perhaps, in Naples. V, which originally had the complete commentary on the *Aeneid* at the end of the codex, now extends only to *Aen.* I, 35, but W has been shown to be a copy of V made before the mutilation occurred. Although N's text is not pure (there being an admixture of γ readings), it nevertheless affords valuable support for W in many passages. Thus, in addition to the evidence of α , the modern editor now has the testimony of an Italian family of considerable antiquity and purity. The nature and importance of this group has been discussed at some length by one of the editors, Arthur F. Stocker.

The control of this manuscript material has enabled the Harvard editors to reconstruct as good a text of Servius as it is probably possible to secure. As already indicated, the major operation performed by the editors has been the separation of the two ancient commentaries S and DS. What this means to the student is apparent at every turn. Thilo, having made up his mind that the longer text represented an interpolated version, was alert to distinguish all such "interpolations" from the true Servius by means of his italics. In cases where the vulgate S and the text of DS were quite different or DS the longer, Thilo's treatment was all right. A good example is the commentary on *Aen.*, II, 7. With his mistaken conception of DS, however, Thilo was lost when he came to sections of text in which the DS manuscript corresponded verbatim to his vulgate Servius. Here DS was treated simply as another witness to the text of Servius. The service performed for the reader in cases like this is remarkably illustrated in the Harvard edition of passages like *Aen.*, I, 720. One could multiply examples indefinitely, but readers or users of the new Servius will be doing it constantly for themselves (in a chorus of *Deo gratias*). DS is obviously still of inestimable value for the re-

constitution of the text of S, for it may be looked upon now without misgivings as representing the source of S in many passages. S also acquires a new importance as chief among the testimonia of DS.

The disentangling of these two texts is the most sensational change between the "old" and the "new" Servius. Less striking to the casual reader, but ultimately of great importance, are the hundreds of "small" changes necessitated or suggested by the editors' increased knowledge of the manuscript tradition. As Professor Rand stated in his original announcement, it has been necessary to alter Thilo's text on every page. Many alterations are not significant, of course, although necessary. With their present knowledge of *a* and *σ* the editors can, at least, be sure that they are clearing away mediaeval stylistic underbrush and bringing the text in detail back to Servius, even when they are faced with a choice between *a* and *σ*. Demonstration of this would be tedious and unnecessary. But it will be of interest to note some of the services performed for the text of S by the discovery of the value of *c*. In the S preface to *Aen.* I, ed. Harv. p. 1, l. 10 (Thilo, p. 1, l. 9), Bernensis 363 alone reads *ab illo hoc*. All the other (*a*) manuscripts and Thilo read *ab hoc*. The *σ* manuscripts: *uirgilio ab hoc V uirgiliius ab hoc W*. It seems plain that Vergil's name used as an explanatory gloss over *illo* in *σ*, later displaced *illo* (helpfully put into the nominative *uirgiliius* by W), but entered the text at the wrong place. B's *lectio difficilior* would seem to be the right one. On *Aen.* I, 1, VW back up the *inania sentire* of C against miscellaneous distortions by the rest of *a* and support Thilo too, who elected to follow C. At *Aen.* I, 2 *σ* agrees with the DS manuscripts in having the *pro ad Italiam venit* omitted by *a* (again supporting Thilo). On *Aen.* I, 3 (Harv. p. 12, l. 2) W has the DS reading *conclusit* against *a*'s *complexus est*. A most interesting case is *Aen.* I, 4 (Harv. p. 12, l. 5), in which VW and the *a* manuscript Ta have *insequantur* against the *insequebantur* of the rest of *a* (and Thilo). Similarly VW support C in reading *dum "dummodo"* at the end of the comment on *Aen.* I, 5, against the rest of the manuscripts. V breaks off at *Aen.* I, 35, but W and N continue to furnish valuable information to the end of *Aen.* II.

DS has profited greatly from re-editing, although many puzzling passages remain in spite of valiant efforts by the editors, their colleagues, and friends. Some passages despaired of by Thilo have yielded to the greater knowledge and superior technique of the modern scholars, but nearly a score of "daggers" point to still troubesome places. In the attack on these cruxes many experts have joined the original editors. A note like the following gives a vivid glimpse of this corporate undertaking:

(*Aen.* I, 2. The DS text reads in part: . . . quidam hic *profugus* participium volt, sane non otiose *fato profugum* dicit Aeneam verum ex disciplina Etruscorum. est enim in libro qui inscribitur *Terrae Iuris* Etruriae scriptum vocibus Tagae eum qui genus a periuris diceret fato extorrem et *profugum esse debere* . . .)

The note in the Harvard apparatus is as follows:

28 *terrae iuris*] *C vel ruris ss. C² terrae ruris f litterae iuris Bergk. p. 12 Thilo, sed rielius fort.* *Terrae Haruspicina Etruriae*

(*cf. ad VIII 393*) vel Terrae Haruspicium <dictatum XII pueris principum> Etruriae (*v. P. W. K. ad v. Tages et Pease ad Cic. De Div. II 50*) *vt* Terrae Iuris Etruriae (*Pease*) vel Terra Ius Etruriae (*Nock*) *vel ingeniosissime* Terrae vel Ruris (*id quod ad Tages nomen, quasi rā yīs spectat*) Etruriae (*Whatmough*).

By way of plunging one more dagger into the corpse, the reviewer would like to vote in favor of *Terrae Iuris Etruriae*, the text of C supported by Professor Pease. Just how hopeless some of the problems seem to be can be appreciated from a note like that on *Postvotam* (*Aen.*, I, 720, Harv. p. 295, l. 17):

17 *Postvotam*] *Dan. Fv Postvortam coni. Cuper.* (*Observ.*, 1670, II, 2, p. 164) *Schoell.* *Nescimus an, Peasio adsentiente, Postvotam retinendum sit, sub quo vocabulo vernaculum aliquod ut *postvufeta latere potest* (*Whatmough*).

All this concerns details. The DS text appears for the first time in the Harvard Servius truly *melior et auctior*, with its individuality definitely established, and in condition to facilitate the further pursuit of the Donatus question and similar matters.

The new edition formally adds forty-one words to the *vita Virgilii* (Harv. p. 3, ll. 69 ff.):

periiit autem Tarenti in Apuliae civitate. nam dum
Metapontum cupit videre, valetudinem ex solis ardore
contraxit. sepultus est autem Neapoli, in cuius tumulo
ab ipso compositum est distichon vale:

Mantua me genuit, Calabri rapuere, tenet nunc.
Parthenope. cecini pascua, rura, duces.

The couplet appears in other vitae (Philarg. II, Brummer p. 48; Gudianus III, Brummer p. 65). The rest has hitherto been known only from late manuscripts of Italian provenance. Thilo printed it in his apparatus and indicated a lacuna at this point in the text. Doubtless a full justification for the inclusion of these lines in the text of Servius will be given in the prolegomena of the editors. At present one cannot help raising the question: may this material not be merely a piece of south Italian tradition that has crept into the south Italian manuscripts of Servius but which has no serious claim to authenticity? The σ manuscripts, two of which go back to the tenth century, are now the oldest authorities for this fragment of Vergilian "biography." If the words had formed part of the original text of Servius, however, it is strange that no trace of them is left in the α group of manuscripts.

There is one further feature of the new Servius that should not pass unnoticed. In the *testimonia* the editors have made notable advances beyond the work of Thilo, in particular in having turned to good account their knowledge of modern research in the field of mediaeval glossaries.

Being deprived of the reviewer's usual function of pointing out misprints, I should merely like to suggest that in future volumes the apparatus to the S text might be cut down or considerably simplified by the exclusion of orthographical minutiae and many items of purely palaeographical interest. Anything significant of this sort would presumably be discussed in the prolegomena or final preface.

The Harvard editors have much unfinished business on their hands. They have staked out many claims in an important and interesting field of investigation. Students of all branches of classical and mediaeval studies must wish them long life and success. Their first volume is eloquent testimony to their capacity for cooperation, just as it is fresh evidence of the vision, insight, and wisdom of their late friend and chief Professor Rand.

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A. W. PICKARD-CAMBRIDGE. *The Theatre of Dionysus in Athens*. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1946. Pp. xvi + 288; frontispiece; 141 text figures; 3 maps.

The venerable author, who in his *Dithyramb, Tragedy, and Comedy* (1927) has given such a complete presentation of the origins and beginnings of early Greek drama, has here followed up with an excellent survey of the history of the theater of Dionysos Eleutherios in Athens, from the earliest to the Roman periods. He discusses the theater before Lycurgus in Chapters I-III, the Lycurgan Theater in Ch. IV, the Hellenistic in Ch. V and the Theater in the Roman Period in Ch. VI. Ten appendices to Chapters IV and V contain much valuable information or details. An excellent Summary in Ch. VII clearly states the results of the investigations. They are built partly on those of other scholars, from Doerpfeld to Roy Flickinger and J. T. Allen, partly on fifty years of the author's own observations and study during a number of visits to Athens.

The book is distinguished by a clear, conscientious, and fair presentation of all evidence available in monuments, literature, and inscriptions. For the theater building Pickard-Cambridge uses mostly the exhaustive research of E. Fiechter, *Das Dionysos-Theater in Athen*, Vols. I-III (1935-36), in *Antike griechische Theaterbauten*, V-VII.

In contrast to Fiechter or to such authors as A. von Gerkan, Pickard-Cambridge does not aim at describing minutely the succeeding forms of the theater. "It is a very hazardous proceeding to conjecture from the marks, etc., on each stone and the condition of its surface, what exactly was done with it at various periods, some two thousand years ago." He rightly omits whatever "would contribute little that is of human interest" (p. 149). The buildings are for him a setting for the drama.

Pickard-Cambridge thus dedicates the whole of Chapter II to the evidence of the plays of Aeschylus, Sophocles, Euripides, and Aristophanes, carefully examining play for play. I feel that he devotes a little too much space to the long-settled question of whether actors and chorus were on the same level (pp. 49 ff.). Apparently the author has only recently broken away from the absurd idea, still adhered to in his edition of Haigh's *Attic Theatre* (1907; see pp. 128, 132 f., 140 ff., 165 ff., 172), that the actor on a stage and the chorus in the orchestra performed simultaneously in the same performance (see p. 165). Pickard-Cambridge, indeed, still believes in the physical separation of the actors from the chorus in the Hellenistic period, when the chorus "only sang *intermezzi* unconnected

with the action and did not need to come into contact with the actors." "Henceforth the play was acted on the stage (with or without choral interludes in the orchestra)" (pp. 71 f.; 269). But these interludes were certainly also acted in the same place as the dialogues, whether it was in the orchestra in conservative Athens or on the stage in the later, more progressive theaters newly built in the Hellenistic period.

For the controversial problems of scenery, stage properties, and machinery much useful material has been collected from literary passages, which are soberly weighed. Particularly good is the discussion of the *eccyclema* (pp. 100-122, cf. p. 266) with the list of passages from lexicographers and commentaries (pp. 115-118, 30 numbers). We need such a collection of passages, and I had long ago planned one as a supplement to my theater books. I believe that Pickard-Cambridge is right in maintaining that heavy loads were not thrust forward on a platform, but were shown by throwing open the front wall of the scene building. On the other hand some use of a simple platform on wheels is certain for Euripides and Aristophanes. See August C. Mahr, *The Origin of the Greek Tragic Form* (1938), pp. 101 ff., Fig. 27.

The interpretation of the literary passages by Pickard-Cambridge is, of course, not always the same as that of the reviewer. I do not believe that there often was an altar in front of the house (pp. 47, 131 f.), for it would have been a duplicate of the altar in the center of the orchestra, around which the acting and dancing of the chorus took place. I also do not believe in any stock sets or conventional scenic arrangements in the Athenian theater of the fifth century (see pp. 46, 52, 54, 59, 69, 265 f.) made for the stage building and its decoration. There can only have been a scaffolding consisting of beams and timber, on which each year different painted scenery was fixed. These decorations certainly reflected and perhaps influenced decisively the development of perspective painting. The swift and logical development of the arts of architecture and painting during the fifth century does not allow the assumption that anything remained stationary during the time of the great tragic poets, whose demands on the scene painters also must have been one of the elements which influenced the development of the arts.

On the other hand I believe that not before the death of the great dramatic playwrights, when the drama had taken an established form, did a definite form of the scene building, the Paraskenion-theater with two side buildings and a center building with a porch as a conventional symbol for palace or temple, develop. This stabilization is reflected in the fourth century vase paintings illustrated in Figs. 9-32. While Pickard-Cambridge rightly rejects them as a source for the fifth century theater, he wrongly denies that the "aedicula" in the center of many is evidence for a porch in front of the central doorway in the fourth century (p. 266). It is, in my opinion, the fourth century form, the one which evolved from the necessities of the plays of Euripides and his followers and was erected in stone in the Lyceurgan theater.

There are some mistakes in the interpretation of the mythological figures of these vases also. The amphora in the Jatta Collection with Antigone and Heracles (Fig. 13, pp. 85 f.) has been convincingly

explained by Robert (*Oidipus*, I, pp. 381 ff., Fig. 51) from the *Antigone* of Euripides. The boy behind Creon is not "an attendant," but the son of Haemon and Antigone. He was acknowledged by his grandfather with the help of tokens in the box carried by Ismene. The ending was not "unknown," but happy, as Heracles when he appeared as *deus-ex-machina* in the "aedicula," that is, in his shrine, being the son-in-law of Creon could not plead in vain for forgiveness. The satyr on the krater with Iphigeneia in Tauris (Fig. 14, p. 86) signifies the Dionysiac festival in which tragedies were played, and perhaps also alludes to the satyr play which followed. The attendant of Iphigeneia on the krater in Naples (Fig. 19, p. 90) is not elderly but a young girl in her teens. Myrtilus on the situla in Villa Giulia (Fig. 23, pp. 93 f.) was not bribed by Pelops, who rather won with the help of Poseidon's divine horses in the older version followed in the Olympia East Pediment.

The Periaktoi, which Pickard-Cambridge (p. 126) rightly calls a simple and crude device, he also denies wrongly to the classical period (pp. 234 ff.).

The discussion of the Hellenistic Proskenion building is the least satisfactory part of the book. Pickard-Cambridge states rightly (p. 185) that "the proskenion was only built when it was required to support a stage for actors." He thus assumes that from the first the action took place on a raised stage at Priene, Oropos, and Sicyon, but it is wrong to include also Epidaurus (p. 190, note 2, and pp. 209 f.), which was built without a stage in the fourth century. The confusion in the conception of the development is clearly shown in Fig. 76 (p. 217), where the earliest half-columns in Assos and Delos are put at the end, the full round columns of Athens at the beginning. The order has to be reversed.

The reliefs discussed in Appendix II (Figs. 77-84, pp. 218 ff.) have nothing whatever to do with the Greek Hellenistic theater. They belong to the southern Italian farce and the Roman comedy and tragedy. The theater of Segesta is a monumental development, datable about 100 B. C., of the Assteas stage (Figs. 83-84).

Most of the wallpaintings (Figs. 87-88, 95-97, 99-111, 116-119, pp. 225 ff.) have nothing whatever to do with the Hellenistic theater, and they ought not to have such a big place in the book. The discussion of the three first Pompeian styles is unsatisfactory. Vitruvius published his book before 14 B. C., and therefore blames, not the third style, which is after his time, but pictures of the late second style like those of the Villa of Livia and the Farnesina. There is no trace of the second style in Alexandria before the Roman period. The old derivation of this style from other sites than Rome ought now to be generally abandoned.

The Boscoreale frescoes (Figs. 89-94, pp. 227 ff.) on the other hand are in my opinion the work of a scene painter, who worked for the Roman owner of the villa in about 50 B. C. The Romans did not like painted scenery, as the story of Apaturius (Vitruvius VII, 5, 5-7) shows. These painters, therefore, were free to work for the rich Romans in the manner described by Vitruvius (*ibid.*, § 2 and V, 6, 9): tragic, comic, and satyric scenes were painted on the wall. The motifs enumerated by Vitruvius agree with many of the Boscoreale frescoes. The big doors are not those leading into a garden but city entrances in a size too large in comparison with the houses behind

them; thus they are imitated from practicable stage doors. All other Roman wall paintings show persons in the landscape or against the architectural background. In Boscoreale the actors were the persons seen against the original painted screens. The Dionysiac masks allude to the festival in honor of Dionysus, which the Greek drama always continued to celebrate. The pillars which separate the single scenes are the pillars which separated the *thyromata* of the late Hellenistic high stage, into which the painted *pinakes* were inserted. The picture of Iphigeneia in Tauris (Fig. 115, p. 232) seems to me to show at least a reflection of a Roman imperial stage in its rich fourth style setting, but here also there is nothing Hellenistic. It is not possible to use such late evidence for the Hellenistic period. Vitruvius speaks of his own time. Pickard-Cambridge says himself that Vitruvius' and Pollux' statements on the function of the three doors (pp. 238 f.) cannot refer to the fifth century. It is, on the other hand, difficult to separate the Hellenistic from the Roman period. The valuable Appendix on theatrical performances outside Athens from the third century B. C. (pp. 240-246) rightly includes also the imperial period.

The chapter on the Theater in the Roman Period suffers from the fact that much material belonging to it has been used before. The reconstructions of the Neronian theater (Figs. 128-129) are unfortunately those of Dcerpfeld and Schleif without a stage, although Pickard-Cambridge knows that there must have been one in the low Roman form in this period (pp. 254 ff.). The later bema of Phaedrus was probably never decorated with the reliefs Figs. 132, 135-6, while the fragments Figs. 133 and 134 do not belong to the visible front of the bema at all. The reliefs came from the four sides of an altar, and were only used as building stones, as the cutting off of the upper part with all heads clearly shows.

But despite many differences of opinion in details the goals of this book and of the reviewer's *History of the Greek and Roman Theater* are similar, with the difference that Pickard-Cambridge intended to restrict himself to the one Athenian theater, while the reviewer tried to give a comprehensive picture of all the Greek theaters. But while, on the one hand, Pickard-Cambridge goes far beyond the Attic boundaries, I have, on the other hand, always come back to Athens, even when, in the Hellenistic and Roman periods, it is no longer leading but slowly following the Hellenistic-Asiatic and Roman trends. That our goal is similar can at once be inferred from the fact that 58 of Pickard-Cambridge's 145 illustrations are the same as the same number among my 556 illustrations. Pickard-Cambridge has asserted that my book "only imperfectly filled" the place of my German *Denkmäler zum Theaterwesen* (p. vi). I wish to refute this assertion. The *Denkmäler* is a systematic collection of monuments. The *History* gives the history of the theater as a reflection of and a reaction to the demands of the classical writers, of the Hellenistic actors, and of the luxury-loving Romans. It did not intend to fill and does not fill the place of the older book. Comparing it with an objective mind to the book of Pickard-Cambridge, I honestly believe that my interpretation of figurative monuments is better, while he surpasses me by far in the knowledge and interpretation of literary monuments.

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Unione Accademica Nazionale. *Inscriptiones Italiae, Academiae Italicae Consociatae ediderunt*. Vol. XIII — Fasti et Elogia. Fasc. I — Fasti Consulares et Triumphales, curavit ATILIO DEGRASSI. Roma, La Libreria dello Stato, 1947. Text, pp. xxxi + 574. Tabulae et Indices, civ plates + pp. 575-680 of text.

The great undertaking of the United Italian Academies was planned to provide a publication of the Latin inscriptions of Italy which should conform to modern requirements and avail itself of present-day technical resources: in particular, should use photographs and drawings in place of types. The advantages of such a mode of presentation need no emphasis for those who know B. D. Meritt's *Epigraphica Attica* (Martin Classical Lectures, IX, 1940, e. g. p. 20: "... the practice of publication now recognizes that majuscule text set in type must give way, in the interests of accurate presentation, to the line drawing and the photograph"), for what he says regarding Attic inscriptions is essentially, *mutatis mutandis*, true of the Latin inscriptions of Rome and Italy. Neither the exacting requirements of the new method of publication nor the conditions of the time conduce to speed, and at the present rate of progress some centuries may elapse before the volumes devoted to the various parts of Italy are all available to scholars: but, fortunately for the present generation, those directing the undertaking decided to deviate for once from the topographical framework, to devote one volume, numbered XIII, to a particular category of epigraphical document, Fasti et Elogia, and to entrust its preparation to Attilio Degrassi. In 1937 the first installment of this volume appeared: fasciculus III, Elogia; circumstances of a material nature have delayed until now the completion of the present fasc. I (p. 347 would appear to have been composed as early as 1935, since the volume of the Oxford *Livy* which was produced in that year is not cited; the slip in giving the name of one of the co-editors of earlier volumes of the *Livy* seems to have been a visual one); fasc. II is to contain the calendars, and its eventual appearance (not actually imminent) should complete a self-contained, homogeneous unit within the projected larger whole: three classes of more or less official archives of the Roman State will have been rendered available for the general use of scholars.

Circumstances have combined to swell the contents of the present fascicule as compared with *C. I. L.*, I², 1: fresh or inadequately known epigraphical documents have come to light, such as the Fasti Ostienses, the F. Teanenses, and the F. Magistrorum Vici; new portions have been added to the F. Capitolini; and with regard to the important question of the architectural setting of some of these monumental records, as will appear below, progress has been pronounced.

The main sections of the present fascicule are devoted to:

1. Fasti consulares et triumphales Capitolini.
2. Fasti feriarum Latinarum.
3. Fasti Antiates maiores.
- 4-16. Fasti municipales.
- 17-34. Fasti collegiorum et privatorum hominum.
- 35, 36. Fasti triumphales praeter Capitalinos.

These are followed by the reconstituted lists of magistrates and triumphs; the full indices; and, with separate title, the 104 plates, partly photographs taken from the stones, partly line-drawings, partly (in cases where unintelligent modern rubrication renders photographs from the stones deceptive) photographs from squeezes. A few plates supply graphic documentation, restorations, and plans, and also reproduce the plaster reconstitution of the F. Capitolini which Degrassi prepared for the Augustan Exhibition, an important prelude to this work.

It is not necessary to enlarge upon the technique of publication exemplified in this production: those using it will soon become familiar with its merits and will be grateful for what has been so generously and competently provided. Nor would it be requisite or profitable here to embark upon the far-reaching historical significance and implications of this unique material, as to which its Editor says (p. xv): ". . . has omnes quaestiones de origine, fide, auctoritate antiquissimorum fastorum . . . , utpote quae a fastorum editione alienae sint, alio loco persequi licebit; hic satis erit exemplum quam accuratissimum fastorum proponere," — a task quite sufficient in itself, which few epigraphists of our times — even with the able technical assistance here available — would have had either the courage to undertake or the skill and patience to carry to completion.

Such documents are among the most obvious instances of inscriptions which require to be envisaged not merely in two dimensions but in three, as elements in architecture; and not merely that, but in their topographical setting, as possessing a specific function in a definite local environment. It is clear that the great expenditure of both archival research and physical effort which their creation must have involved, as well as the degree of official approval which they imply, possessed some special motivation; in each instance, even if they resulted from the initiative of private benefactors, they presuppose a public or semi-public edifice of some sort, which the competent authorities deemed a suitable medium for their carving; though it is rare to find an instance in which, as in the case of the Fasti Feriarum Latinarum (see Degrassi, p. 143), the find-spot provides a clue to the ancient setting. In the instance of the Fasti Triumphales Barberiniani (Degrassi, p. 345), the provenance is not known; but subject-matter, kind of stone, and style of lettering lend plausibility to the conjecture that these records of the deposition of palms by victorious commanders were actually carved upon the wall of the Capitoline Temple at various times after it had been restored in the period of Sulla (it is purely due to chance that the triumphs recorded on the surviving blocks extend only from 43 to 21 B.C.); or, as I would suggest, on some appurtenance to the great temple, possibly the altar, which would have been less subject to damage by subsequent fires. The limitation of the provenance of all the classes of records included in this volume of *Inscriptiones Italiae* to an area of the Italian peninsula within several days' reach of Rome itself (Degrassi, pp. 167-8) suggests close relations with the life of the Capital, which in fact are implicit in the nature of their contents.

A position of distinction, on several grounds, is assumed by the (so-called) Fasti Capitolini (the adjective denotes their location in Renaissance and modern times only); and it is peculiarly fortunate

that Degrassi's researches, which started as an edition of the text, should have led him, with the collaboration of the architect Guglielmo Gatti, to a consideration of their monumental setting: the conclusions of these investigators, which had not been anticipated at the time that the bulk of Degrassi's work was being set up in type, are merely recapitulated on pp. 17-19, but have been fully presented in the *Rendiconti* of the Pontifical Roman Academy of Archaeology, XXI (1945-6), pp. 57-122, a publication which thus becomes, for practical purposes, a supplement to the epigraphical presentation: L. B. Holland (*A. J. A.*, L [1946], pp. 52-9) and L. R. Taylor (*C. P.*, XL [1946], pp. 1-11) had been led in the same general direction (cf. Degrassi, p. 571), so that American readers are already acquainted with some of the points at issue. We do not enter into controversial matters, but it will be generally recognised as proven that these inscriptions were carved upon the inside walls of the two lateral passages of the arch at the southeast corner of the Roman Forum which commemorated the victory at Actium; and this conclusion confers upon these fasti a position of unique significance.

To those with memories of a certain length, it is humiliating to recall the practical unanimity with which some two generations of scholars followed the dicta of their leaders as to the original location of the Capitoline Fasti—a flagrant instance of mass-suggestion, which may be in part explained, but cannot be entirely condoned, by the comparative inaccessibility and intractability of the material evidence. Rather than linger over an unedifying spectacle—*et nos in Arcadia!*—, it appears more profitable to turn to the fresh topographic-historical vistas opened out by the work under review, especially since the restraint with which the Italian colleagues have expressed themselves has left others free to carry the line of reasoning somewhat further. When it was thought that these inscriptions had constituted a feature of the exterior walls of the Regia, the reason for their presence was found—though with somewhat halting logic—in the relation of the Pontifex Maximus to the official Annales. Now, however, a different explanation must be sought. Degrassi and Gatti's work will stand in the history of these studies as a classical example, at the very center of the Roman world, of the effectiveness of architectural epigraphy: but it is permissible to proceed still further, and to ask the questions: What was that function of the arch which motivated the carving of the inscriptions? and, What relation did the inscriptions bear to this function?

Both arch and inscribed records are intelligible if the structure spanned the ceremonial route leading to the Capitoline Temple, the course followed by (1) the supreme magistrates on assuming office, (2) the triumphal processions, and (3) the progress at the Secular Games. The lists recorded the successive occasions upon which the street which was eventually spanned by the arch was thus used. And here, some clear thinking is required. The venerable route passed from the valley of the Colosseum (as it eventually became), over the ridge connecting Palatine and Esquiline—where it was joined by a street from the former of these two hills—, descending into the valley of the Forum; there is the authority of Varro (*De L. L.*, V, 47; Festus, p. 372 L.) for stating that its slope from the residence of the Rex Sacrorum down to the Regia,—in other words, from the

crest of the saddle between Palatine and Esquiline to the edge of the valley of the Forum—, was commonly called *Sacra Via* (we add, occasionally by the poets *Sacer Clivus*). Varro's own proposal to apply the term *Sacra Via* to the whole extent from the Sacellum Streniae to the summit of the Capitoline Hill in the general sense—for this is surely what he means by *arx*—was doctrinaire and did not win general acceptance in antiquity; in order that the term should have been used as it was, in both literature and inscriptions, for indicating the location of residences and places of business,—and there is also the collective noun *sacravienses* of Festus (pp. 190-1, L.)—, its topographical connotation must have been restricted and definite. Its use by our contemporaries, as in Degrassi's plan, pl. I, and the text of his article, and also in both text and plans, pls. III, IV of Lugli's recent volume, for the stretches of road at and near the Forum, is misleading.

In front of the Regia, at a point which was marked (as is now generally recognised) by the Arch of the Fabii, the route to the Capitol diverged to the left, in order to pass between the Regia and the Aedes Vestae, to skirt the south side of the Forum, and to reach the juncture of the Clivus Capitolinus with the Vicus Jugarius, from which point the processions would follow that clivus up to the area before the Capitoline Temple. This branch, from the Regia to the southeast corner of the Forum, is aligned not with the later Forum but, roughly, with earlier monuments and in particular with the south side of the Regia itself, which it skirts. The right-hand branch—which was no longer a part of the ceremonial route—followed the north side of the Forum, eventually reaching the juncture of the steep ascent to the Arx (in the narrower sense) with the street that led to the Campus Martius. The ceremonial processions, then,—magistrates, triumphators, and celebrants,—having as their goal the Capitoline Temple, would naturally have followed the left-hand street, passing between the Regia and the Shrine of Vesta. And it appears that the short stretch of this from its point of bifurcation by the Arch of the Fabii as far as the Forum was sometimes included in the denomination *Sacra Via*; as indeed was only natural, in everyday speech. This is the setting of Ovid, *Tristia*, III, 1, 27-30: “*Haec sunt fora Caesaris*,” *inquit*, / “*haec est a sacris quae via nomen habet, / hic locus est Vestae, qui Pallada servat et ignem, / haec fuit antiqui regia parva Numae.*” Coming from the Forum of Caesar, the poem would have crossed the great Forum obliquely to its southeast corner, in order to reach this thoroughfare, the Shrine of Vesta and the Regia. And this was Martial's understanding of the route followed by the predecessor of his own volume: for, surely with Ovid's lines in mind, he writes (I, 70, 3-5): *vicinum Castora canae / transibis Vestae virgineamque domum; / inde sacro veneranda petes Palatia clivo*, where the mention of the Temple of Castor leaves no room for doubt as to the route to be taken, though the Flavian poet is less precise as to the exact point at which the *Sacra Via* assumes its name. It was natural that Horace's steps on his (real or pretended) way to Caesar's Gardens on the unfortunate morning described in *Sat.*, I, 9 should have brought him—in the opposite direction—along this thoroughfare. But what is more important, topography supplies the setting for those noble lines of his, *Od.*, III,

30, 8 f.: *dum Capitolium / scandet cum tacita virgine pontifex:* for whether the priest and priestess started from their ritual posts at the Regia and the Aedes Vestae respectively or from their official residences, the Domus Publica (as it seems) and the Atrium Vestae, on their way to the Capitol, this is the route which they would have followed. It was in parts a very narrow thoroughfare: but this quality was inherent in *vetus illa forma* of the city (Tacitus, *Ann.*, XV, 43, cf. Cicero, *De Leg. Agr.*, II, 96). The solemn cadences of Horace's ode confer upon the recurrent ceremonial procession a symbolical significance, as the visible token of the eternity of Rome: a significance possessed also, for the thoughtful observer, by the inscribed lists of the three classes of functionaries who passed this way. (Documentation available in Platner-Ashby and *R.E.*, s. v. "Sacra Via.")

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LOUIS E. LORD. *Thucydides and the World War.* Published for Oberlin College by Harvard Univ. Press, Cambridge, 1945. Pp. xiv + 300. \$3.50. (*Martin Classical Lectures*, XII.)

It is altogether appropriate that Louis E. Lord should himself produce a volume in the series which he did so much to found. Professor Lord has devoted a lifetime not merely to the teaching of Classics at Oberlin College but to the promotion, throughout and beyond this continent, of the cause in which he so firmly believes. Although he has retired from active teaching, most classicists know of and many have benefited from his distinguished work as Chairman of the Managing Committee of the American School of Classical Studies at Athens, a position which, fortunately, he continues to hold.

This book, I suspect, is the result of many years of thought, which the author has only now committed to paper. It contains eight chapters, not all of which were delivered as lectures in the series. Chapters IV-VI, a summary of Thucydides' narrative, have been added and provide Lord with an opportunity to point to the more significant features in the *History*; chapters II and III ("Thucydides' Athens" and "The Setting") were written to give background to the general reader. Chapter VII ("The *History*," including sections on science, economies, digressions, style, character sketches, and the mind of Thucydides) is, I imagine, based upon an actual lecture (Lord does not say). The first and last chapters ("Thucydides and the Writing of History" and "Thucydides and the World War") are "substantially two of the lectures as they were delivered" (p. xi).

To the lay reader this book will prove interesting and provocative throughout. The student who is already on intimate terms with Thucydides, however, will find his attention more strongly focused upon the original lectures (chapters I, VIII, and VII), though he will derive profit from the rest.

Chapter I is in fact an essay on the philosophy of historical writing and the fate which history has suffered through the ages. Lord is particularly scrupulous of the "scientific" (economic, geographical,

sociological, psychological) historians of the nineteenth century and of the incredibly conceited and ignorant apostles of the "new history," an unwelcome twentieth century importation from Germany.

Lord urges a return to common sense, i.e., to the principles of such men as Thucydides, son of Oloros. "Causes are the most important object of the historian's research" (p. 22). "Future historians will increasingly be inclined to confine themselves to specialized branches or single periods" (p. 23). "History can never become an exact science" (p. 25). "History must deal chiefly with personalities" (p. 25). "To believe that history can be written objectively is a palpable illusion" (p. 26). "Political history will always be the dominant type" (p. 30).

Thucydides is then fitted into these principles and Lord is well pleased with the result. In addition, Thucydides' achievement is more remarkable in that he reported contemporary history, which only a profound mind could do successfully. (As I read p. 33 I wonder if Lord is familiar with Buchan's history of the First World War.)

The first chapter is useful to all students of history. It is the product of logical thought and a wise contemplation of centuries of historical writing.

Before passing on I raise a question concerning the term "civil war" as applied to the conflict between Athens and Sparta (p. 33). This is common practice and makes effective material for lectures; but I have often considered the nomenclature misleading. It is true that Hellene fought Hellene; yet the Greek *polis*, as a sovereign unit, is the equivalent of the modern state. The *stasis* of 411/10 B.C. in Athens was true civil war. The Peloponnesian War was a fight to the finish between two independent powers and their allies; it was as much "civil" as the War of 1812.

Chapter II gives a sketch of Thucydides' life and the spirit of Athens during the war, with emphasis upon the inquiring skepticism of men like Euripides. "The Setting" is a short account of the rise of the Athenian empire, the Spartan regime, and the course of the war. Here there are certain details which I should dispute. I am reluctant to believe, for example, that it was Spartan inertness of character that prevented her from taking the lead against Persia (p. 52); we have been too credulous in accepting Corinthian testimony (I, 68-71). Spartan foreign policy was based not upon inertness but upon deliberate isolation. The framers of that policy may have been selfish, they may have been misguided; they were also intelligent and full of guile.

Again, although the Delian League may have been a "haphazard, loose arrangement" (p. 53), yet the casting of the weights into the sea (*Aristotle, Ath. Pol.*, 23, 5) surely indicates a permanent alliance. The student should be directed to the recent work of Larsen, which sheds considerable light upon the original constitution (*Harv. Stud. Class. Phil.*, LI [1940], pp. 175-213). On p. 54 I do not follow the distinction between the "something over two hundred cities, each of which contributed money annually but managed its own affairs," and "cities like Carystus and Naxos," which paid tribute. In any case, this is not consistent with the doubtful statement (p. 55) that "these free Greek cities . . . were forced to maintain a democratic, as opposed to an aristocratic, constitution."

Whatever the allies may have thought, to say that about 450 B. C. Persia was "not even a vague danger" (p. 55) is quite false. Lord ignores the campaigns of the Eurymedon, Cyprus, and Egypt; when opportunity finally recurred (in the Deceleian War) the Persians were quick to seize it. Pericles envisioned an empire that was to bestow the benefits of peace not merely upon the people of Athens (as Lord says or p. 57), but upon the states of Hellas; permanent protection from the Persian neighbor was one of these benefits.

The seventh chapter lays stress upon the comprehensive nature of Thucydides' work. Especially noteworthy is the fact that Thucydides did not neglect the economic aspects in history; as Lord remarks (p. 185), the skeptics should read the *History*. In the treatment of digressions the statement (p. 188) that Thucydides for once "almost descends to Herodotus' level" will raise many an eyebrow. Lord finds Thucydides' style crabbed and difficult, "a heroic and only partially successful effort to create concise and artistic prose in a new medium" (p. 195).

Lord feels that Thucydides does not pass judgment on the morals of his characters (p. 213). Would he not call the terrible indictment of war and its effect upon men's characters in III, 82-83 a moral judgment? Further, my impression is that Thucydides thoroughly disapproved of the character of Alcibiades (cf. VI, 15, 3-4; 28), though he may have respected his intellectual talents.

In March, 1943, Lord wrote chapter VIII, "Thucydides and the World War," in which he takes the Athenian at his word ("... the events which have happened, and the like events which may be expected to happen . . .") and draws the many parallels between the Peloponnesian and the Second World Wars. Lord fully recognizes the dangers in such an undertaking; nevertheless he has constructed an interesting narrative, which by its very nature invites debate (rather than criticism).

To my mind Lord is scarcely just to the "sleepwalkers in the British government" before 1939 (p. 235). These sleepwalkers lead him to Nicias, who is likened to Stanley Baldwin, and who appears in a very bad light here and elsewhere in the book. Yet Nicias was not a stupid man and, despite his misfortunes and errors in Sicily (although he was not "solely responsible for the disaster"), his record had been a good one and his policy before the western expedition would have saved Athens from destructive losses, not once, but many times. Thucydides, who could not condone inept failure, writes of Nicias (VII, 86, 5), *ηκιστα δὴ ἀξιος δν τῶν γε ἐπ' ἔμοι Ελλήνων ἐς τοῦτο δυστυχίας ἀφικέσθαι διὰ τὴν πᾶσαν ἐς ἀρετὴν νεομισμένην ἐπιτῆδεσσον*.

The flamboyant and often repulsive Cleon of Thucydides and Aristophanes does not suggest to me the peaceful, if gullible, Neville Chamberlain. Cleon was the man who prevented an honorable peace and to describe the Peace of Nicias as brought about in part by appeasers (e.g., Nicias, p. 243) is to misunderstand the issues of the Archidamian War. The Peace was an Athenian triumph, constructed upon the policies of Pericles himself and consummated by the heir to his statesmanship, Nicias. The Peace failed not because it was bad in itself, but primarily because a despicable man of extraordinary abilities, Alcibiades, meant it to fail.

Lord's prophecy of what would follow the campaigns of 1943 has proved remarkably accurate. His picture of our post-war world, based upon Thucydides and stated with daring, is a striking likeness. His vigorous indication of the menaces which he sees to our democratic system deserves attention.

The text is followed by "Notes," which supply ample documentation. The "Bibliography" lists the most important and best known studies of Thucydides; of these Lord gives a succinct opinion. Schwartz is dismissed scornfully (p. 273) and Cornford wrote "probably the worst book on Thucydides in English" (p. 274). The "Indices" are copious and built with care. A small and rather cramped map completes the volume.

The book is well made, the print is excellent and the proof has been conscientiously read. Many a reader will stumble over "interpretive" on p. 6. There is some confusion concerning the spelling of "Chaleis" (pp. 120, the map and its index) and "Chalcedon" (pp. 53, 287, the map and its index). Were there nine ephors in Sparta (p. 58)? The statement on p. 79 that Thucydides "devotes the last thirty chapters of Book I" to the *pentekontaetia* is wrong.

I should question Lord's (or rather Jowett's) translations of two passages of Thucydides. Of V, 1 (*αἱ μὲν ἐναύσοις στονδαι διελέλυντο μέχρι Πυθίων*) Lord writes (p. 124), "The truce came to an end . . . but no fighting was indulged in until after . . . the Pythian Games." The Greek must mean the exact opposite, that the truce came to an end and there was a state of war until after the *Pythia*. On p. 204 a clause from VIII, 86, 4 (*καὶ δοκεῖ Ἀλκιβιάδης πρῶτος [v. i. πρῶτον] τότε καὶ οὐδενὸς ἔλασσον τὴν τόλμην ὡφελῆσαι*) is rendered as follows: "Alcibiades did 'as eminent a service to the state as any man ever did'." The text, it seems to me, means that Alcibiades was second to none at that time in aiding the state; either he was the first (*πρῶτος*) to benefit Athens in her crisis or this was the first time (*πρῶτον*) that he did the state a service.

It is not an adverse criticism to say that this book will arouse discussion and disagreement. The casual and informal style allows Lord free expression of his opinions, whether they be immediately pertinent or not. The reader may consider that the illustration of Agricola's death, which appears intermittently in the first chapter in various forms, is overdone. Yet such passages, along with the incisive comment, especially in chapters I and VIII, must have been effective and witty before an audience. I am sure the listeners relished Lord's forthright references to the pedagogical quacks who profess the "new education."

This is a book which I have enjoyed and which I shall have no hesitation in recommending. "I realize that these lectures are not in the same class with the eleven fine scholarly volumes which have preceded this one" (p. xii). But there are various types of scholarship and Professor Lord is entirely too modest.

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DAG NORBERG. Syntaktische Forschungen auf dem Gebiete des Spätlateins und des frühen Mittellateins. Uppsala, A.-B. Lundquistka Bokhandeln; Leipzig, Otto Harrassowitz, 1943. Pp. 285. 10.50 kr. (*Uppsala Universitets Årsskrift*, 1943, no. 9.)

In the past two decades, especially since the publication in 1929 of Professor Muller's challenging *Chronology of Vulgar Latin*, research has been active in the fascinating field which lies open to Romance philologist and Latinist alike in the borderland of language revealed by the written texts which actually exist in the Merovingian Age. It is in this field that Dr. Norberg, one of the younger members of the faculty at the University of Uppsala, long a center of linguistic studies, has made an important and solid contribution in these penetrating syntactical investigations.

Perhaps in order to avoid the use of a term which has become highly controversial, the author, it is true, does not employ the expression "Vulgar Latin" in his title but speaks rather of "late Latin" and "early mediaeval Latin syntax." The late Latin which is the object of his interesting and fruitful researches is, however, not the literary tongue, but rather the language of chronicles, laws, and official documents. His examples are taken most commonly from the *Monumenta Germaniae Historica*, though a wealth of other material of the Merovingian period is also drawn upon and illuminated by illustrative parallels from Latin literature from Plautus to Pliny.

The book consists of seventeen chapters, preceded by a very full bibliography, conveniently divided into 1. Texte and 2. Sonstige Literatur and followed by indexes, 1. Sachindex, 2. Wortindex, and 3. Stellenindex.

In Chapter I (Einleitung) we have an extremely clear and thoughtful discussion of the whole vexed question of the relation of the written language of the 6th, 7th, and 8th centuries to the popular, spoken language of the same period. Here, as is perhaps natural to a Swedish scholar, Norberg adopts "the middle way." Although he gives full credit to "dem Amerikanischen Romanisten H. F. Muller¹ und seinen Schülern Taylor,² Pei³ und Sas"⁴ for the great and permanent service that they have rendered in emphasizing the fact "dass man im Latein der Merowingerzeit die organische Entwicklung der lebendigen Sprache deutlich erkennen kann," Norberg directs a penetrating criticism toward the more extreme positions taken by this school of Romance philologists. In particular he attacks their view that the Latin, e.g., in the Diplomas of the Merovingian kings from the earlier half of the 8th century was almost identical with the contemporary spoken language—in Pei's words (p. 357) "a tongue which bears every mark of being not merely

¹ H. F. Muller, *A Chronology of Vulgar Latin* (Halle, 1929). See also Muller's recent book, *L'Époque Mérovingienne, Essai de Synthèse de Philologie et d'Histoire* (New York, 1945).

² P. Taylor, *The Latinity of the Liber Historiae Francorum* (Diss., New York, 1924).

³ M. A. Pei, *The Language of the Eighth Century Texts in Northern France* (Diss., New York, 1932).

⁴ L. F. Sas, *The Noun Declension System in Merovingian Latin* (Diss., Columbia University, Paris, 1937).

written, but spoken as well, and spoken not by an intellectual *élite* alone, but by the vast mass of the population."

In this connection Norberg shows most interestingly (p. 17) how such an idiom of documentary language as that which occurs in the *Formulae Marculfi* (which were probably written in the first half of the 8th century): *idcirco vindedisse me tibi constat et ita vindedisti villa* (2, 19, p. 89, 13) or *Constat me a vobis accepisse, et ita acceperam, debere et debo, hoc est solidos tantos* (2, 26, p. 92, 22) can be traced back through more than 500 years with little change to the 2nd century after Christ where it appears several times in the wax tablets from Dacia published in *C.I.L.*, III, 2, pp. 921 ff., e.g., 12 (p. 949) *Vero III Quadrato cons. IIII kal. Iunias quinquaginta L commendatos Lupus Carentis dixit se accepisse et accepit a Iulio Alexandro, quos ei reddere debet sine ulla controversia.*

With much acumen, it seems to me, Norberg points out that the meaning of the linguistic reform instituted and carried out by Pepin and Charlemagne depends on a difference between the written and the spoken language. As he says, "Wenn man am Hofe der Merowingerkönige wirklich so, wie man schrieb, gesprochen hatte, fehlte überhaupt jeder innere Grund, die Schriftsprache zu reformieren. War aber damals die Schriftsprache eine Mischung von Reminiszenzen aus der älteren Schriftsprache und Vulgarismen, die sich aus der Volkssprache eingeschlichen hatten, so versteht man leicht, dass eine sprachliche Reform notwendig war."

So, for example—to give a single illustration—from a linguistic point of view it seems to this reviewer that Norberg is almost certainly right in criticizing the theory (of Müller, Pei, and Sas) that the confusion of case usage found in written documents of the Merovingian period mirrors the actual state of the living speech. After the speakers of Vulgar Latin had once developed the convenient two-case system which later characterized Old French and Old Provençal—a *casus rectus* and a general *casus obliquus*—it appears improbable that they would have continued to use in daily speech the old six-case system of the classic tongue.

According to Norberg the Latin that has been preserved from the Merovingian time is in large part a *Kunsterzeugnis*, yet the many offences against classic norms which are to be found in Merovingian Latin are to be attributed chiefly to the influence of the *Volkssprache*. He rejects decidedly the view of Ferdinand Lot⁵ that the "errors" of these late Latin texts are due merely to ignorance on the part of their compilers.

The author's chief purpose, as it emerges from this excellent historical introduction, is to throw new light, by the investigation of certain selected problems of syntax, on the obscure but fascinating time of transition (*Übergangszeit*) from Latin to Romance (ca. 600-800 A. D.). As he observes (p. 24), "Die Latinisten schliessen, wie Thesaurus Linguae Latinae, ihre Forschungen meist mit dem Jahre 600 ab. Die Romanisten aber scheinen mehr geneigt, Rückschlüsse aus dem romanischen Material zu ziehen als das Zeugnis des vorromanischen Lateins zu verwerten." This neglect of so important a

⁵ *Archivum Latinitatis Medii Aevi*, VI (1931), p. 140.

period he attributes to the erroneous idea that the texts which actually are extant from the Merovingian Age are purely an artistic product.

In the second chapter (*Zur Geschichte der lat. Deklination*) we have an exceedingly careful, detailed, and well-considered treatment of the phonetic, morphological, and syntactical circumstances through which the six Latin case forms were gradually reduced in Old French and Old Provençal to two, in the other Romance languages to one. A point of particular interest to classicists (and indeed to Indo-Europeanists generally) is Norberg's explanation of the use of the form in *-as* in Gallo-Romanic for nominative as well as accusative (Old Prov. *rosas*, Old French *roses*, while nominative *li mur*, e. g., is distinguished from the Obliquus *les murs*). This phenomenon, Norberg thinks, can have nothing to do with a supposed general pressing forward of the Accusative as a Universal Case because otherwise in Gaul the distinction between Nominative and Accusative is strictly maintained. Its origin is rather to be sought in the Italic dialects in which the IE ending *-as* in the nominative plural of the first declension had been preserved. This Osco-Umbrian-provincialism had gained a certain currency in the Roman empire generally and finally in Gaul suppressed altogether the old ending *-ae*.

It would obviously be impossible within the compass of a review even to summarize the content of the remaining fifteen chapters. But it may be said briefly that chapters III-X deal with various special case uses, chapters XI-XIII with the history of deponent and reflexive verbs and certain other voice uses, the next three chapters with the prepositional infinitive, the history of the conjunction *quod*, and the use of adverbs and prepositions as conjunctions, and the final chapter contains an interesting discussion of some types of "contamination" in subordinate clauses.

The essential originality of Norberg's method consists in the fact that he not only clarifies the idioms which he finds in his late Latin texts by setting them against a background of similar uses in earlier Latin authors, especially those that have something of the "volkstümlich" in their style, such as Plautus or Petronius, but also in almost every chapter shows how the particular syntactic usage that he is discussing appears in the Romance languages. His examples are taken most commonly from Old French and Old Provençal, occasionally also from Italian, Spanish, or other Romance dialects. This continuance of the construction in Romance proves, our author believes, that the idiom in question, as it occurs in our late Latin texts, belongs to the living speech. Thus the reader sees not only the rooting of the usage in ancient Latin but also its flowering in Romance.

Cf especial interest to the present reviewer is chapter XI (*Zur Geschichte der deponentiellen und reflexiven Verben*). The author starts from the perfectly sound premise that Latin "passive" verbal forms had from the beginning middle meaning and that accordingly *nascor*, *morior*, *sequor*, and other deponents are in reality inherited Media tantum. The uncertainty in the use of deponents which we find in post-classical writers he attributes to the fact that in popular speech the deponents were gradually disappearing. Active forms of deponent verbs occur (as for example *nascere* and *morire*) and on the other hand new deponents are created on the analogy of those

that were inherited. In fact in latest Latin deponential forms are found from almost any verb you please. This free use of deponents in late Latin authors Norberg considers the reaction of the written language against the loss of deponents in the spoken language.

The misuse of the deponent form was also, according to Norberg, a literary reaction against the extended use in everyday speech of reflexive verbs. As the old middle forms of Latin were replaced in the living language by reflexives, the complex workings of creative analogy brought about many new reflexive constructions in which both the accusative and the dative of the reflexive pronoun function. It is of great interest to note that these new constructions fall into the familiar groupings of the Indo-European middle voice uses—verbs of emotion, of movement, of utterance, of change of condition, etc. Sometimes the reflexive is even added quite pleonastically to a verb that is already middle in form, as in *Kleine Texte zum Alexanderroman*, ed. Pfister, p. 2, 32: *tantum pelles pecorum sibi vestiuntur*.

Good and well-documented as this chapter is, Norberg slips occasionally into the all too common error of considering a verb passive merely because it is in a form which is usually called so. On p. 166, for example, having cited as of special interest the phrase *iuratus se*, occurring in a Lombard document of the year 764, he comments: "Hier steht das Reflexivpronomen einer passivischen Form beigefügt, was ja eigentlich dem Wesen des reflexiven Pronomens ganz widerspricht." But *iuratus* is really not passive even in Classical literature. It commonly means "having sworn." Cf. Plautus, *Rudens*, 1372-73:

Gr. non tu iuratus mihi es?

La. iuratus sum et nunc iurabo siquid voluntati est mihi.

Harpers' Latin Dictionary admits a deponent form of *iuro*. But what we actually have is not so much a deponent verb *iuror* as a survival in Latin in certain instances of the original capacity of the Indo-European participle in *-tos* to be of any voice, active, middle, or passive.

The late Latin idiom that the phrase *iuratus se* illustrates is thus seen to be not the addition of a reflexive pronoun to a passive verb but the use of reflexives with intransitives. An interesting instance of this idiom is cited by Norberg on p. 160 from the *Peregrinatio Aetheriae* 25, 7: *recipit se episcopus et vadent se unusquisque ad hospitium suum*, with the comment: "Offenbar hat hier *recipit se* eingewirkt." No doubt *se recipere* may have had some influence on the use of *se vadere* in this particular passage. More important, however, in this and other similar reflexive expressions, which, as Norberg indicates (p. 161), are the precursors of Ital. *andarsi*, *venirsi*, Old French *soi en aler*, *soi venir*, Span. *andarse*, *irse*, *venirse*, is the general tendency of the verbal idea "go" toward the middle voice or the reflexive construction, a tendency which manifests itself from Homeric Greek *véouai* to modern Neapolitan *io me ne vag'* "I'm going," *vui ve n'iat'*? "You're going?"

The book is beautifully printed on excellent paper and is remarkably free from misprints. The author writes a fluent and idiomatic German. His dissertation (*In Registrum Gregorii Magni Studia Critica* [Upsala, 1937, 1939]) laid a secure foundation for the present

work, one of the best features of which is a careful regard to questions of textual criticism. It is illuminating to note in how many instances both mediaeval scribes and modern editors have "corrected" interesting late Latin idioms out of existence.

In the almost total eclipse of culture on the European continent in these recent war years, it is gratifying indeed that the Swedish universities have been sponsoring works of such thorough and sound scholarship as the book under review.

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MARIE DELCOURT. *Oedipe ou la légende du conquérant*. Paris, Librairie E. Droz, 1944. Pp. xxiv + 262; 16 figs. (*Bibliothèque de la Faculté de Philosophie et Lettres de l'Université de Liège*, CIV.)

This book is not a philological or literary work, but a study of certain aspects of Greek folklore and mythology. It is rather more comprehensive than might be imagined from its title and, in a way, supplements other works by the same author in the same general field. Its contents may be inferred from the headings of the chapters, of which there are eight. After an introduction of twenty-four pages she discusses in turn: *l'enfant exposé*; *le neutre du père*; *la victoire sur la Sphinx*; *l'éénigme*; *le mariage avec la princesse*; *l'union avec la mère*; *les épilogues*; *les mythes et la mémoire*. Three appendices follow, entitled: I. *Légendes et cultes d'enfants jumeaux*; II. *Les contes d'animaux en Grèce*; III. *La valeur religieuse du butin dans les poèmes homériques*.

As to Oedipus, the author states her belief near the beginning (pp. xii f.): "Oedipe n'est ni une figure historique ni un dieu mineur anciennement humanisé. Il est le type même de ces héros d'origine essentiellement — sinon uniquement — rituelle, dont les actes sont antérieurs à la personne."

The Oedipus story, or rather the first part of it, she thinks, originated in a religious rite by which deformed infants, which were supposed to be a danger to the whole people (cf. Laius) were done away with for the safety of the community, for Oedipus was exposed because of a deformity of his feet. That this was done in consequence of an oracle was a later invention. The exposure of the afflicted child was either in a chest cast into the sea as in the case of Perseus, Telephus, and others; or on a mountain like Oedipus. The story of the pierced ankles she thinks absurd, and that the recognition of Oedipus by the scars was an invention of Euripides. She has no proof of this, or that the name Labdacus (which she explains as *boiteaux*) was invented and inserted in the Theban genealogy, the physical defect of the grandsons being transferred to the grandfather. In fact in all of this there is much conjecture, which seems to the reviewer to be a weak point in the book. When a child was exposed and survived the ordeal he attained great honor. Oedipus is the only example of a child exposed by his father.

The conflict between Oedipus and Laius, she thinks, was a ritual contest for power between men of two generations, a contest in which

the younger man always triumphs and the vanquished must die; that the idea really goes back to a time when the right of succession was by murder,—a practice which had disappeared in Greece in historical times, but which persisted in Latium in the case of the priest of Nemi, slain by his successor. It was only in later times that parricide was regarded as a crime; and when it occurred father and son were represented as unknown to each other.

Closely associated with this struggle between the men of two generations, she says, was marriage with the princess, who is sometimes the daughter of the king, and sometimes his widow. The contest for her hand might be in the form of a race, as in the case of Oenomaus and Pelops, or some other test. There are various stories in which the hero wins the hand of the princess after performing some feat and so succeeds to the throne. That the widowed queen was the mother of Oedipus was an independent development of later date. No other instance occurs in Greek mythology.

The Sphinx was not a slayer of men but an erotic demon, as were the Sirens, and she may be found so represented in Greek art. The riddle was a later addition to the story, or a substitution to explain the victory of the man over the beast. It appears in folklore in two contexts in the struggle against the monster, and in the winning the hand of the princess. To be successful the hero must know a password, or have the right answer to a question. That an oracle decreed death for the defeated Sphinx was a later addition.

The author points out that there are variants in the Oedipus story, e. g. 1. he rules without loss of sight (Homer and Hesiod); 2. he dies blind (Aeschylus); 3. he blinds himself (the invention of Sophocles or of one of his immediate predecessors). Myths take on variants when the original cause of the story ceases to be understood. They develop from rites, or are invented to instruct. The desire to persuade comes when rites or customs begin to be disregarded.

This summary will give some idea of the book. It is apparent that the author has read extensively, but in her treatment of her material she uses her imagination freely. The very nature of the material, however, makes absolute proof impossible. The book is fully documented.

Misprints are rather numerous where Greek is quoted. Thus on p. 162 ζέετι should be ζέετι; p. 162, n. 1 and again p. 184, n. 3 Σεῖς should be Ζεῦς; p. 213 ιὐὸν should be ιὐὸν; p. 213 Βοῶται should be Βοῶτοι; p. 240 τεύχε ἔστιλα should be τεύχε ἔστιλα; p. 213, n. Κολω όν should be Κολωνόν; εccents are lacking on οὐνίοι p. 162, n. 1; ιπποιο p. 213; and ἀράβησε δὲ p. 240.

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JEAN HUMBERT. *Syntaxe grecque*. Paris, Librairie C. Klincksieck, 1945. Pp. 396.

This syntax is designed to meet the needs of students of grammar and literature in the Facultés and the upper classes of the Lycées. The lack of a suitable textbook in French, the author feels, has resulted in a weakness on the part of the students which manifests itself sometimes in slavish dependence on formal rules and sometimes

in vagueness caused by the application of principles which are too broad. The present work aims to bring the rules of Greek syntax into line with general principles and to define the categories of usage more precisely. The treatment of the subject is not primarily historical and most of the material is taken from the verse and prose of the fifth and fourth centuries. Attic and Epic usage are often compared, however, and some features of the language are traced backward to Indo-European and forward to the spoken Greek of the present day (e. g., the prepositions).

The eleven chapters into which the book is divided deal with agreement, number, demonstrative pronouns, personal pronouns, voices, moods in independent clauses, tenses, moods in dependent clauses, cases, prepositions and verbal prefixes, negatives. The chapter on demonstratives includes not only the familiar *óuros*, *óde*, *ékeínos*, and *aúrós*, but also the indefinite *tis*, the poetic *μαν* and *νιν*, and a detailed treatment of the article. Reflexive pronouns and possessive adjectives are treated in the chapter dealing with personal pronouns. The omission of any treatment of relative pronouns as such, apart from their incidental appearance in relative clauses, must be considered a gap in the work. A short discussion of case-attraction of relative pronouns might also have been helpful, especially in a book which takes special account of the difficulties encountered by young students.

In the treatment of the verb strong emphasis is placed on the predominant rôle of aspect as against relative time, and the subject is developed with equal thoroughness for the indicative and other moods in principal as well as in subordinate clauses. The sections on the imperfect, aorist, and perfect tenses are excellent. That on the future offers more ground for criticism, because of the rather speculative character of the comparison between the Greek future and the corresponding tense in Latin and French (p. 113), and also because of a certain over-indulgence in the dangerous words *subjectif* and *objectif*. The existence of distinctions of aspect in certain futures (*ἔξω*: *σχήσω*, *περιθρέξομαι*; *περιδραμοῦμαι*) is well treated on p. 134, but no mention is made of the similar and better attested distinction between passive futures and middle futures used in a passive sense (Kühner-Gerth, I, pp. 170 f., but more especially pp. 113 ff.). The infinitive is well treated on pp. 142-54, where special attention is given to the element of time in statements, the element of aspect in commands and wishes, and the concurrence of the two factors after *δητίξω*, *όμαλογῶ*, *δύνυμι*, etc. On the historical side the treatment of the infinitive is more questionable. On p. 98 it is said that in comparison with the other moods the infinitive is of recent origin and presupposes powers of abstract thought which could exist only among speakers of high intellectual development. Reasoning of this kind is seldom safe. The real innovation, I believe, consists not in the fact that Greek has infinitives, but in the fact that these infinitives show morphological distinctions of tense and voice. Infinitives as mere names of action exist in nearly all Indo-European languages, regardless of the cultural level of the speakers or of their capacity or incapacity for abstract thought.

In the syntax of the cases there is much to praise and little to censure, though here also I object to the distinction of "abstract"

and "concrete" usages as a ground on which to explain the late development or early disappearance of certain case-forms (pp. 237 f.). The descriptive side of case-syntax is handled with good judgment and thoroughness, and there are no important omissions except perhaps the lack of sections on the genitive and dative with compound verbs ($\xi\kappa\lambda\alpha\nu\tau\omega\tau\omega\tau\eta\varsigma$, $\epsilon\pi\beta\omega\lambda\epsilon\nu\tau\omega$, etc.). Some of these constructions appear incidentally along with closely related types, but the half-chapter on verbal prefixes is concerned with the semasiology of these prefixes and not with their case-regimen.

The final chapter, on the negatives $\omega\nu$ and $\mu\nu$, is thorough, orderly, and very valuable.

The author has wisely followed the practice of glossing all the passages quoted as examples of usage, and the translations are accurate and well adapted to their purpose of helping to illustrate the points under discussion. It is regrettable that as much cannot be said with regard to accuracy in citing passages by chapter and paragraph, but unfortunately it seems difficult to abstain from serious criticism on this matter. On p. 49 Plat. Theaet. 174 A should be cited as 173 C; on p. 96 in § 143 the missing cross-reference is to § 326; on p. 122 the reference to Kühner-Gerth should read I., p. 157 instead of II., p. 157; on p. 135 the passage from Ar. Lys. is 634; on p. 191 Dem. 18, 24 should be cited as 18, 64; on p. 207 Xen. Cyr. should be cited as Xen. Cyn.; on p. 219 Plat. Ap. 32 B should be cited as 22 B; on p. 231 the cross-reference should be to § 278 rather than to § 268; on p. 247 Dem. 318, 8 should be cited as 18, 258; on p. 278 Ψ 635 should be cited as Ψ 677; on p. 280 in the remark Plaut. Asin. 530 should be cited as 830; on p. 285 Lyc. 104 B should be cited as Plat. Menex. 241 B (see Kühner-Gerth I., p. 443); on p. 286 O 34 should be cited as ο 34; on p. 304 Dém. 238, 12 ὁ ἐπὶ τῶν ὄπλων should be cited as Dém. 18, 38 ὁ ἐπὶ τῶν ὄπλων; on p. 314 Plat. Theaet. 173 B should be cited as 173 D; on p. 315 in § 471 the cross-reference to § 441 should be to § 442; on p. 323 Plat. Phaed. 98 C should be cited as 66 E; on p. 328 A 110 should be cited as A 214; on p. 333 Dem. 278, 23 should be cited as 18, 154; on p. 359 the passage from Demosthenes is 42, 23. On p. 79 read πέπρακται for πέρακται; on p. 158 in Dem. 18, 176 read ἐφεστηκότα for ἀφεστηκότα; on p. 168 read ἀπόκριναι δή for ἀποκρίναι δή; on p. 173 in Xen. Cyr. 2, 4, 15 ὅτι is probably corrupt; on p. 187 Xen. An. 7, 6, 31 should be cited as 7, 6, 43 with ἀποθανότο for ἀποθάνοτο; on p. 247 in Aesch. Ag. 814 read accus. φθορᾶς for gen. φθορᾶς; on p. 302 in § 442 read: $\epsilon\xi$ devant voyelle et $\epsilon\kappa$ devant consonne; on p. 209 in § 437 the dialectal distribution, according to Buck, *Greek Dialects*, § 135.4, should be: $\epsilon\nu$ (or equivalent forms with extension -s) in Attic-Ionic, Lesbian, Doric; $\epsilon\nu$ (ν) with accusative of goal in Arcado-Cyprian, Thessalian, Boeotian, and Northwest Greek. For sporadic examples in Doric see Thumb-Kieckers, *Griechische Dialekte*, I, pp. 108, 142, 182.

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PAULA PHILIPPSON. Thessalische Mythologie. Zürich, Rhein-Verlag, 1944. Pp. 195; 1 plate; 1 map.

Miss Philippson stresses the importance of Thessaly in the history of Greece, for it was in Thessaly that Greek invaders first settled and mingled with the Aegean aborigines. The union of the two peoples brought Hellas into being and the Hellenic view of the world as manifested in myth and cult. Hence, she believes, many features of historic Greek mythology and religion have a Thessalian origin. In her task of revealing Thessalian origins in the second millennium B. C. she necessarily relies upon the literature and coins of historic times and must, not always convincingly, distinguish earlier from later traditions.

She finds that the Earth-goddess and her male consort were of supreme importance in prehistoric Thessaly. This goddess was still to be seen in Pherae in historic times under the name of Pheraea, who was sometimes identified with Hecate. As her worship spread southwards she was given different names: Demeter, Hera, Artemis; and these names developed into distinct goddesses. Likewise, her original consort, named Posidan, i. e. Earth's husband (known also as *Gaeiochos*), became not only Poseidon, but also Zeus, Hades, Cronus, Hermes, Asclepius, Chiron, Peleus, and Admetus.

In developing her argument Miss Philippson gathers material from many sources and in a number of details shows genuine insight. But one remains sceptical about her main conclusions. What can one say about her many identifications of divine beings? She may be right, but the chain of argument is extremely weak in places. And when she says (p. 41) that Zeus Hypatus, Thyechous, and Poseidon-Erechtheus were one and the same, the reader wonders why these deities were distinguished in the Athenian worship of the fifth century B. C.

Her etymologies are very dangerous. She revives the ancient interpretation of Demeter as Earth-mother and holds that Da = Gaia. So far as I know, this etymology is no longer accepted. And if Da cannot be Gaia, then Posidan cannot be Earth's husband. Moreover, could the compound have been formed in this way, even if we suppose that she is right about the two elements in it? Would it not be Daposis, a *tatpuruṣa* compound? I cannot think of an example in which the dependent element is final. *Philadelphos* might be cited, but it can be interpreted as a *bahuvrīhi* compound, "whose sister is beloved." It is amusing to reflect that while Miss Philippson can get "Earth's husband" out of *Posidan*, A. B. Cook finds that it means "Lord Zeus."

There are some misinterpretations of Greek sentences. Pausanias, VIII, 2, 3, δέ μὲν (Κέκρωψ) γὰρ Δίς τε ὕνόμασεν "Υπατον πρῶτος, is translated (p. 41), "Der aber hat Zeus als erster Hypatos benannt." But γάρ cannot mean *aber*, only *denn*. A few lines later she speaks of "Hypatos, den Kekrops zuerst 'Zeus' nannte," and adds that Pausanias' words can also be understood in this way, citing Eusebius, *Praep. Evang.*, X, 9, 22. But it seems to me that context and word order demand her first interpretation, except her *aber*, and that neither ancient nor modern reader or hearer could understand it otherwise.

Later (p. 75) she quotes Hesychius, s. v. Φέραϊα· Ἀθήνησι ἔνυκός θεός· οἱ δὲ τὴν Ἐκάτην, and translates, "Pheraia: in Athen (ist sie) eine ausländische (fremde) Göttin; denn diese (verehren) die Hekate." The second clause is better interpreted, "but some say that she is Hecate." Again the authoress appears to be vague about particles and, like some other scholars, appears to think that any one of them can mean most anything. It is true that sometimes a clause introduced by δέ contains an explanation or corroboration of the preceding clause, often of an emphatic word in it; though δέ in itself has no causal force, but merely sets off its sentence or clause as a different thought. But the δέ clause above is certainly not of that type, which would not be elliptical or introduced by οἱ δέ, which in lexicographers and commentators always means another group that has an opinion on the subject in hand.

Concerning a fragment of Heracleides (Mueller, *G. G. M.*, I, 107), ἀναβαίνοντι τῶν πολιτῶν οἱ ἐπιφανέστατοι . . . ἐπιλεχθέντες ἐπὶ τοῦ λερέως, she makes the statement, "Jünglinge sind vom opferweinenden Priester . . . ausgesucht." But the sentence must mean that the men, however selected (probably by the citizens), went up to the priest.

The authoress is inclined to recur to the language of German idealism, to such statements as "Jede Offenbarung ist der Einbruch zeitlosen Sinns in einen zeitlichen Ablauf, innerhalb dessen sich dies Sein expliziert (p. 62)." And there is much about the eternal and ideal, about entelechy, *Welttschau*, and the like. She also tends to use the terms "mythology" and "religion" interchangeably. Though her title is *Thessalische Mythologie*, she deals with cult as well. But though myth bears an obvious relation to religion, since both are concerned with the gods, it is a mistake to suppose that the myths embody beliefs about the gods or constitute a theology. Rather, myth's attitude toward the gods is very different from religion's; one can say that much mythology serves as an outlet for men's unconscious hostility toward the gods. We have two sets of phenomena before us that must not be confused.

The book contains a plate of coins and a map, but lacks an index.

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BERTIL AXELSON. Textkritisches zu Florus, Minucius Felix und Arnobius. Lund, Gleerup, 1944. Pp. 68. (*K. Humanistiska Vetenskapssamfundets I Lund Arsberättelse*, 1944-1945, no. I.)

Axelson is already well known as a careful Latinist of the school of Löfstedt and it is a pleasure to welcome his work again on the American scene.¹ The present fascicle contains what would once have been described as *conjectanea* but actually deserves the title it bears,

¹ During the war years he has published among others the following articles which are known to the reviewer: "Einschränkendes *tamquam*," *Branos*, XLII (1944), pp. 2-56; "Eine Ovidische Echtheitsfrage," *ibid.*, XLIII (1945), pp. 23-35.

and if it is something less than as brilliant as some of the productions bearing the former title that defect of virtuosity is more than compensated by a solid critical approach and a rational procedure. The emendation of Arnobius, III, 31 (p. 53) will serve as one example of Axelson's procedure. The text of Marchesi:²

quodsi accipit res fidem, nulla est ergo Metis filia, nulla Victoria est, nulla Iovis elata de cerebro, inventrix oleae,
nulla magisteriis artium et disciplinarum varietatibus
erudita

is made to read

nulla est ergo Metis filia, nulla Victoria est, nulla Iovis
enata de cerebro, inventrix oleae nulla, nulla magisteriis
artium et disciplinarum varietatibus erudita.

The emendation begins with a change of the MS *ellata* to *enata*, which is felt to be an improvement *palaeographically* and *linguistically*. The criterion of *style* is applied in a citation of the parallel *Capite Iovis enata* from II, 70. The *sense* of the passage is consulted in modifying the punctuation so that *Iovis enata de cerebro* is no longer a qualifier of *inventrix oleae*. Finally the *metrical* superiority of *enata de cerebro* over *inventrix oleae* is offered in support of all other considerations. Thus the forces of palaeography, linguistics, stylistics, and metrics are marshaled under the command of sense and it remains only to test the result by "critical judgment." The reviewer is of the opinion that the addition of *nulla* is somewhat arbitrary, *enata* is possible, and the punctuation is a definite improvement.

As an introduction to the seventeen passages of Florus which are subjected to criticism, a brief introduction to the MS tradition is sketched.³ The observation that the testimony of Iordanes (one member of the A class), when it is in agreement with the C class, should be considered as decisive in matters where B (the other member of the A class) is demonstrably subject to error (p. 14), is most just.

I should regard *hostibus suis morte sua commortui* (I, 13, 7) as a piece of preciousity to be expected of Florus and comparable to Gorgias' ἀθάραρος ἐν ἀσωμάτῳ σώμασι ζῆν οὐ κώντρων, and an emendation *morte s<e>va* (p. 3) as unnecessary and improbable since *saevus* is a word never used by Florus in the positive degree. On the other hand the supplement (p. 3) *orationis antiquae, <set> satis efficax ad concordiam fabula* (I, 17 [23] 1) not only improves the sense of the passage by making the first two words descriptive rather than possessive, but is supported by a third parallel (II, 13, 50 *cruenta [vox], sed docta et ad victoriam efficax*) in addition to the two already cited. Florus delights in the sound of his own phrases and seldom allows one to drop without repeating it. A prime example of this propensity is his use of *non* (or *nec*) *contentus*, which he repeats fourteen times. Thus the defense (p. 8) of Malcovati's reading *non* with C (II, 8, 3) is fully justified as a fifteenth example. Similarly,

² Turin, 1934.

³ Axelson had previously made a number of contributions to the criticism of the Florus text in his lengthy review of Malcovati's edition in *Gnomon*, XVII (1941), pp. 266-77.

the sense restored by reading *nisi ne <inultus> periret* (II, 18, 9) is recommended by *nec inultus occubuit* (I, 38, 18) in addition to the closer parallel cited (p. 12). Conversely the lack of any possible parallel for the MS reading *Romana vis* (I, 45, 14) recommended by Borneeque,⁴ adopted by Malcovati, and here (p. 6) defended, militates against the possibility of the correctness of this text. This striking phrase appears nowhere else in Florus and *vis* cannot be found in this sense (might? Axelson translates "Heer"). *Punici belii vis* (I, 22, 9) is something quite different.

The defense of *vitisque mortis* (MS E, I, 22, 35, p. 4) as genitive of quality and of *hoc, et sub oculis* (MS N, II, 17, 8, p. 11) so punctuated, should be accepted. A change of punctuation (*ludibundos, plerosque qui*, I, 26, 1) neatly corrects a misconception (p. 5).

Malcovati should have affixed the obel at II, 9, 3 but the slight change involved in *primum leve et modicum, tumultu maiore quam bello* (p. 9) gives us readable Latin. Another much vexed passage, *unde et nata Livio Druso aemulatio accesserat* (II, 5, 4) can hardly be regarded as healed by the acceptance of Mocamsen's deletion of the name and the change to *incesserat* (p. 6) even if the resulting pleonasm can be justified.

Axelson charges (pp. 13 f.) the editors of Florus with an excess of devotion to the principle of the *lectio difficilior* and convincingly defends the *quibusdam salmacidis fluvius infestior* (II, 20, 8) of class C. To substitute *quadam* in *quidam forte quasi docta* (II, 20, 6) is less convincing since *fors* is not so used by Florus.

Manifestusque voltu fuisse, quasi . . . vellet (II, 13, 83) is still somewhat strange Latin, but as explained (p. 10) it is intelligible, and rids us of an intolerable *ita*.

I see no justification whatsoever for emending (p. 6) *cum* to *ut* (I, 34, 4) since it can be understood as circumstantial rather than concessive. Forster⁵ translates: "When they offered to withdraw from all participation in the war" and thus meets all of Axelson's objections.

Four passages of the "Vergilius Orator an Poeta" are next taken under consideration. At 183, 14 f. (Rossbach's page and line)⁶ Axelson would insert Halm's *ille* as necessary to the sense but places it, *metri gratia*, behind *tunc*. Also at 183, 17 he rescues the MS *Africæ corona attingeret* on the basis of the equivalence of *attingeret* to *contingeret*. The defense of the MS *ille-gentium poxulus* is not at all convincing. I cannot see how it is in any way parallel to the phrase *rex regium*. Rossbach's conjecture of *ad quae* for *atque* at 184, 11 is defended on the basis of the infrequency of introductory *atque*, and *actus tibi* (184, 14) is suggested instead of *tui* to make it possible to understand *actus* as action rather than charge. I regard as especially clever the supplement *semper in templis otiosum <sem>per reginae deae sistra pulsantem* for *peregrinae deae* (185, 3).

⁴ *Les Clauses Métriques Latines* (Lille, 1907), p. 342.

⁵ E. S. Forster, *Lucius Annaeus Florus Epitome of Roman History* (Loeb Classical Library, 1924).

⁶ It would be well now to cite this work according to Malcovati's paragraphs. Also for the Epitome a citation on the basis of the four book division, regardless of the authenticity of this division, makes reference easier since the divisions are smaller and Arabic numerals are used for paragraphs.

Seventeen passages of Minucius Felix are subjected to criticism. In this case the fact that we must rely upon a unique MS throws the critic back upon the resources of style and subjective analysis.⁷ In five passages (13, 2; 17, 7; 19, 4; 31, 5; 37, 7) the sense is markedly improved by repunctuation, usually resulting also in an improved rhythm. The MS reading is defended in four passages (*sicut ostenderant* 7, 3; *order* 18, 10; *eo* 19, 4; *gaudere* 40, 4). It is difficult to see in 7, 3 how *ostenderant* can be made to bear the sense of *monerant*. New readings are offered as follows: *ut <non> ipsius* 4, 4; *is[d]em* 19, 4; *agnita* for *ignita* 23, 7; *vindice* for *iudice* 5, 8; *si* for *sed* 34, 10; *qui* for *quae* 36, 5; *intrepidus* for *irridens* 37, 1; *error* for *mors* 37, 7; and *nec* for *ut* 40, 1. These are for the most part felicitous and based on sound reasoning. In 29, 8 *pura mente* is explained as meaning *sola mente* and in 26, 8 *iam* is defended but transferred to precede *perditū*. Especially acute is the reading *quod nec <c>a<r>itas pati mollior &ec cognit seruitur durior* (28, 10) where *caritas* takes the place of *ar aetas*, the inappropriateness of which as the antithesis of *seruitus* no one seems previously to have felt.

The twenty-two passages from Arnobius which are here discussed represent suggestions already put forward by the author.⁸ These suggestions are here given a fuller justification than was possible in the original note. In six passages the MS tradition is defended: *satis clausis* 1, 62; *saltitare et cantare* 2, 42; *alitem, taurum* 4, 26; *et iacit* 5, 21; *omni festinatione* 7, 46; *erexit* 7, 51. One deletion is made (*se* 1, 15) and the punctuation is once changed (*forma, corporalis nulla* 1, 31). The other suggestions involve for the most part the modification of a single word (*faciat* for *faciamus* 1, 41; *novit* for *noluit* 1, 60; *petus* for *xrius* 2, 44; *inviolabili* for *memorabili* 2, 73; *nostris* for *vestris* 3, 2; *tam existimare* for *existimare* 3, 11; *absolvi* for *ablui* 4, 24; *proli&us* for *fluoribus* 5, 14; *accedit* for *accedens* 5, 21; *nobis* for *vcbis* 5, 24; *significari* for *significare* 5, 40; and *ita <ae>que* for *ita <quo>que* 5, 4. At 1, 51 in a discussion of Juppiter the tradition presents the text *dialelm, quod eius est, flamenem isto iure donavit?* To read *qui d^{omesticus}> eius* seems a bit bold, to say the least. *Quod Iovis* seems not to have been previously suggested but is surely safer, if rhythmically inferior.

To discuss the merits of all these emendations would obviously be beyond the scope of a review, and even the mention of all of them would be idle if European publications were not still so inaccessible.

In general one may say that Axelson's criticisms show a balanced judgment, a keen interpreter's eye, and an unusual mastery of his authors. The whole work is certainly well above the average for such compilations.

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⁷ Axelson has recently published another study dealing with this author: "Das Prioritätsproblem Tertullian-Minucius Felix," *Publ. of the New Soc. of Letters at Lund*, XXVII (1941).

⁸ *Eranos*, XL (1940), pp. 182 f.

HOLGER STEN. *Les particularités de la langue portugaise.* Copenhagen, Einar Munksgåard, 1944. Pp. 77. (*Travaux du Cercle Linguistique de Copenhague*, II.)

Holger Sten, the author of this monograph, belongs to a group of contemporary Danish linguists who have inaugurated *Acta Linguistica*, an international review devoted to structural linguistics and the *Bulletin du Cercle Linguistique de Copenhague*, of which some six numbers have already appeared. It is inspiring to see that the notable work of such famous scholars as Jespersen and Nyrop is being continued by an able group of their compatriots. The quality and variety of these works should serve as an inspiration to linguistic scholars in other countries, where scholarly activities have declined during the last years. Among the best known of these younger Danish scholars are Louis Hjelmslev, author of *Principes de grammaire générale* and one of the editors of *Acta Linguistica*, Louis Hammerich, who published *Indledning til tysk Grammatik* in 1935, and P. J. Jensen, whose *Det latinske Perfectsystem* appeared in 1941.

The present volume by Sten has been published through the aid of a subvention furnished by the Department of Labor of the Danish government. The subject of this book is particularly timely, since the interest in the study of the Portuguese language has been growing rapidly during the last years. This is due in no small part to the desire of many Americans to know more about Brazil and to learn the language of that country with which they hope to establish closer contacts. In fact it is only recently that many Americans realized that the language of Brazil was Portuguese and not Spanish. The title chosen by Sten for his monograph clearly indicates the aims of his study, which he summarizes on page 21, where he states that he desires merely to present the characteristics of the Portuguese language and discuss them without any prejudice.

It seems to me an excellent idea to construct an outline of the striking traits of a language comparatively little known and then to compare the language with other related languages much better known, such as the French and the Spanish.

Before beginning to treat specifically the particular characteristics of the Portuguese language, which serve to distinguish it from all the other Romance languages, the author devotes seventeen pages to what he calls "Remarques Générales." This introduction which comprises about one fifth of the entire work deals with diachronic linguistics as contrasted with synchronic linguistics or the theories of the "métaliste" and the "structuraliste." This part seems to be rather inappropriately prefixed to the body of the work, although the author refers to these opposing theories during the subsequent chapters. This introduction might well have been accorded less space and some of the later chapters could have then been developed, as I shall show later.

In his first chapter entitled "Phonétique (et Phonologie)" the author points out the richness and complexity of the Portuguese sounds and notes that they have until now received little study on the part of foreign scholars. It was the Portuguese savant Sá Nogueira who stated that the language has thirty-six vowels (not counting nasals and diphthongs), whereas Gonçalves Vianna in his

Essai has included only eleven vowels in his table. This shows that the Portuguese themselves are not always in agreement in such matters. Sten then proceeds to demonstrate that the contrast between open *e* and close *e*, open *o* and close *o* are quite clear, as in *Sé* cathedral and *Sé* be, *avó* grandmother and *avô* grandfather. He finds more difficulty in distinguishing two types of *a* and notes that in Brazil no distinction is observed. He shows that the nasality of the vowels is less marked than in French and concludes that it is on this account that the nasal quality of *i* and *u* has been preserved. He devotes two pages to the treatment of the diphthongs, remarking that the nasal diphthongs are one of the notable characteristics of the language. Very little space has been given to the consonants, where he might well have pointed out the loss of intervocalic *l*, which is certainly a distinctive trait and is conspicuous in the definite article and the contracted forms, such as *dor* (*dolore*), *sair* (*salire*), etc.

Chapter II on Morphology and Syntax is probably the most interesting part of the book. Under nine different headings the author has treated some of the outstanding characteristics of the language. While indicating the different traits he has frequently cited the explanations proposed by various scholars and then modestly added his own preference or at times he has suggested a new original interpretation. It should be stated that he has quoted many examples from the works of numerous Portuguese writers, such as Eça de Queiroz, Castello Branco, Julio Diniz, and Acuelino Ribeiro. These citations are well chosen and show wide reading and clear observation on the part of the author.

Under Metaphony he refers to the well known scholarly work of Edwin B. Williams, *From Latin to Portuguese*, in which the author states that "metaphony is not an independent phenomenon; it is indissolubly associated with inflection." He gives examples of this important trait of Portuguese inflection, where Latin *ō > o* in words ending in *-o*, whereas *ō > o* when the termination is in *-a*. This is true of adjectives as well as substantives. He admits that there are exceptions like *espôso*, *espôsc*, and *tôdo*, *tôda*, *tôdos*, *tôdas*, for which he finds no adequate explanations. As for the plural of words in *-ão*, Sten merely indicates that the singular has been generalized, while the regularly developed plural forms have remained. This is the generally accepted idea.

In Section 3 *Falei de si, falo consigo*, the *si* after a preposition is used for the tonic pronoun of the second person, which has been frequently replaced by *o senhor*. This well-known trait has been studied by Meyer-Lübke and recently by Spitzer. Sten does not agree with the latter's explanation, but prefers to think that *si* need not refer to the subject of the sentence any more than *seu*, which can be used without a reflexive meaning.

Sections 5, 6, 7, and 8 deal with tenses of the verb. The author shows that the preterite is used both as a simple past tense and as a perfect and includes many examples to prove his point. To distinguish the latter use he states that the Portuguese employ such adverbs as *agora*, *já*, *ainda* *não*. He does not fail to notice that the language has also a compound past tense, which has a meaning very similar to the simple past, when used as a perfect. Paiva Boléo and Vianna have said that this compound tense is used to indicate re-

peated action, which continues up to the present. Sten notes that the simple pluperfect of the Latin is still retained in Portuguese which also uses the compound form in order to avoid repetition, but without any difference of meaning.

All students of Portuguese know that one of the outstanding peculiarities of the language is the insertion of the personal object pronoun between the root and the ending in both the future and conditional of the verb. This is one of the conservative traits which have survived from the earlier language, in fact it is found in several of the mediaeval Romance tongues, such as Old Spanish, Old Provençal, and Catalan. If the verb is preceded by another word, however, such as a negative or personal subject pronoun, or if it is used in a dependent clause the object pronoun is usually placed before the verb and is not inserted before the ending. This is particularly true in the spoken language and is characteristic of the Portuguese spoken and written in Brazil, where the subject pronoun is commonly used. Sten does not fail to cite the origin of these forms in the phrases *far-lo-hei* (*facere illud habeo*) and shows how they are survivals of an old construction, which has long since disappeared from most of the Romance languages.

The personal infinitive with inflectional endings is probably the most curious trait of the Portuguese. To explain this phenomenon the author gives three different theories as follows: A) it is derived from the future subjunctive with which it is identical except in the case of strong verbs. In both the first and third singular the forms are exactly the same as the infinitive. This is the theory of Diez and Meyer-Lübke, but was contested by Carolina Michaëlis de Vasconcellos. B) This infinitive is merely a continuation of the imperfect subjunctive of the Latin. C) It is a product of spontaneous evolution of the infinitive to which endings have come to be added to indicate the subject. This is the theory once defended by Mrs. Vasconcellos. More recently the second theory has gained favor and is accepted by Williams and Gamillscheg and was adopted by Mrs. Vasconcellos. Sten does well to call attention to the fact that there is no complete study of the use of the infinitive in Portuguese. Carolina Michaëlis and Zellmer collected much material in Old Portuguese and Franz Sester published in 1929 a study of the infinitive in the works of *Eça de Queiroz*, but the whole field should be thoroughly covered and investigated. Sten himself cites numerous examples.

In Section 9 (*le "langage-écho"*) the writer shows how the Portuguese prefer to use not a simple adverb, but the repetition of the finite verb in replies to questions. He admits that this is a Latin heritage and that it is common in other languages.

In the third chapter which deals with derivation, the author has seen fit to limit his remarks to the single suffix *-inho*. His remarks on the significance of this suffix are interesting, since he shows how it has lost at times all sense of the diminutive and in the case of *sózinho* has created a word which has replaced the original *só*. One cannot help regretting that the author has not devoted more space to word derivation in general and particularly to the use of other suffixes.

The bibliography which he has appended will be useful; although he might well have omitted such works as Meyer-Lübke and Bourciez. American scholarship should be pleased that he has cited and used the excellent works of Josepí Dunn and Edwin B. Williams on the Portuguese language. He has done well to mention recent studies by Danish linguists, who have contributed to this field of investigation; and the work of Paiva Boléo on the Perfect and Preterite in Portuguese with comparisons with the use in other Romance languages.

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KARL KERÉNYI. *Die Geburt der Helena. Samt humanistischen Schriften aus den Jahren 1943-45.* Zurich, Rhein-Verlag, 1945.
Pp. 139. 8 fr. (*Albae Vigiliae*, N. F., Heft III.)

This volume is a collection of nine essays and articles which originally appeared in various periodicals. The subjects, ranging from strictly mythological problems to the question of the future of humanism, may appear somewhat diverse; but the author considers that their aspects are unified by a single basic aim, which is in the direction of a humanism at once wide and profound, the interpretation of the human spirit. Toward this end, classical philology is one means among many others (last essay, on the Concept and Future of Humanism), while mythology is one characteristic means of representing, through concrete images, the deep values of the spirit which cannot be described in explicit or analytical terms. Such a principle, which is most clearly stated in the essay on the spirit ("Geist," p. 36) is Professor Kerényi's main contribution to the study, and is the guiding thought through the essays entitled "Die Geburt der Helena," "Der Geist," "Mysterien der Kabiren," "Die Heiligkeit des Mahles im Altertum," and "Mnemosyne—Lesmosyne." In this light, for instance, the "mysteries" are interpreted as secret not so much because they were kept secure as because they were in their own nature secret, that is, inexpressible, and capable of communication only by being represented in cult (pp. 49-50). It may also be on this principle that Livy (*Praef.* 10), writing admittedly of the legendary and fabulous, is interpreted as one who addressed his work, parable-wise, to the generations of the future (pp. 109-110). Perhaps the same proposition is intended in the last essay, on the Future of Humanism (in terms of Existentialism?), but here the connection is not so evident.

Much that is said in this volume resembles or coincides with what has been said before by others (as, for example, that the nymphs and heroines beloved by gods are manifestations of a single form, the Maiden), but the general effect (aside from contributions in detail) is of originality because the author has evidently reached his conclusions by mulling over the material in his own mind, in his own way. He is not one to force his point by the impact of piled-up evidence, rather seizing and elaborating single clues. Because of this, we may sometimes feel that the argument is unnecessarily personal

and intuitive, and look in vain for expected corroborative passages. In connection with the woman-goddess, beloved of the god, who is represented as a water-fowl (pp. 1-3; 19), would it be superfluous to refer to the birth of Pan to Hermes and *Penelope* (Herodotus, II, 145, 4; cf. Pindar, frag., 90 Bowra)? If Pandora, like Eve, is the καλὸν κακόν who brings simultaneously beauty and suffering to mankind (p. 23), would not persuasion be increased through reference to the lovely Delusion formed by Zeus, herself καλὸν πῆμα, who bore the monstrous Centaurus to Ixion (Pindar, *Pyth.* II, 35-48)? Even if Pindar has merely transcribed for his temptress the attributes of Hesiod's Pandora, the myth is a variant and the moral is to the point. Perhaps it is now the fashion to cite too much, but more abundant evidence in these essays would take away the impression that we are being asked to consider, not the facts, but the personal beliefs of the author.

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ALFRED P. DORJAHN. Political Forgiveness in Old Athens. The Amnesty of 403 B. C. Evanston, Northwestern University, 1946. Pp. 56. (*Northwestern Univ. Studies in the Humanities*, XIII.)

The monograph under review is largely a refutation of Luebbert's dissertation published in 1881.¹ This refutation is successful but, since the evidence for it is taken for the most part from Aristotle's *Constitution of Athens* which was unknown to Luebbert, one cannot help feeling that Dorjahn has published his essay nearly sixty years too late.

The introduction contains an account of six known amnesties which took place in Athens. Dorjahn should have pointed out that five of these were based on the declaration τοὺς ἀτίμους ἐπιτίμους εἶναι, while the sixth (Dorjahn's no. 5), the "amnesty of 403 B. C.", is of an entirely different nature. For it simply forbade the victorious democrats to take undue vengeance on their opponents.

The first chapter deals with the date of this amnesty, which, as Dorjahn correctly stated, "is no longer a debatable question." Plato's passage of the *Menexenus* is mentioned but the equally significant testimony of the seventh letter is not taken into consideration.

The second chapter contains a discussion of the Institution and Ratification of the amnesty. Dorjahn makes here the surprising observations that the Latin equivalent of ψῆφισμα was *plebiscitum*, that an oath would have been an unnecessary precaution "if the amnesty had been elevated to the status of a decree or a law" and that the amnesty "never became a psephism." Only the last of these statements requires some comment. Solon's amnesty was a νόμος (the concept of ψῆφισμα probably did not exist at that time), and four of

¹ The name is misspelled on pp. 41 and 42. The many printed errors in the Greek should be embarrassing to the author, to the publisher, and to the printer.

the remaining five amnesties discussed by Dorjahn were undoubtedly contained in *ψηφίσματα*. The amnesty of 403 B. C. is called by some authors a *ψήφισμα*, by others ὅρκοι καὶ συνθήκαι or simply συνθήκαι. Anyone familiar with Attic inscriptions would have deduced that the amnesty of 403 B. C. was embodied in a *ψήφισμα*, were it not for the fact that there is some doubt whether a proper *ψήφισμα* could have been passed at that time. I have tried to show that *I. G.*, II², 10 belongs to this very period, and that this decree contains Thrasybulus' grant of citizenship to the loyal metics. It seems reasonable to assume that the so-called amnesty was also incorporated in a decree, for in no other way could later authors, among them Aristotle, know the precise provisions which it contained. Dorjahn's statement "oaths accompanied treaties or agreements, but not psephisms and laws" carries as little weight as his claim that the amnesty was "simply an agreement between political parties."

The third chapter is a discussion of the term *μὴ μνησικάκειν τῶν γεγενημένων*; in this connection, the epigraphical evidence should not have been completely ignored. Dorjahn is able to show that specific provisions were made for the recovery of confiscated property, but it may be doubted whether they should properly be called part of the amnesty. This chapter and chapters IV and V contain a well written analysis of the literary evidence. Students of the Early Attic Orators will do well to consult this careful and for the most part sound monograph.

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AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY

VOL. LXIX, 2

WHOLE No. 274

OVIDS KUNSTPRINZIP IN DEN *METAMORPHOSEN*.

Otwohl Epos und Elegie von der antiken Theorie als ein und dieselbe Gattung gezählt wurden und im Laufe ihrer Geschichte vielfach ineinander übergegangen sind, waren sie ursprünglich durch eine scharfe Grenzlinie voneinander geschieden. Der Epiker spricht nicht im eigenen Namen, sondern lässt sein Selbst hinter seinem Gesange verschwinden: der Elegiker dagegen äussert, was ihn bewegt, in persönlicher Form und tut es in ausdrücklicher Anrede einem grösseren Kreise oder einem einzelnen Adressaten kund. Diese Wendung des Ich zum Du ist schon für die Totenklage charakteristisch, von der man ja bereits im Altertum die Elegie hergeleitet hat: sie lässt der Äusserung des Schmerzes nicht ungeregelt ihren Lauf, sondern redet den Verstorbenen an; man beklagt und belobt ihn und stellt ihm die Schwere des Verlustes vor, den man durch sein Hinscheiden erlitten.¹ Der epischen Objektivität steht also von jeher eine ebenso ausgesprochene elegische Subjektivität gegenüber. Es ist das ein Unterschied, der weit über das Formale hinausgeht, sich aber auch schon in der Besonderheit der Versmasse ausprägt: die fortlauufende Erzählung des Epos sucht die Endlosigkeit der stichischen Wiederholung des Hexameters, aber die immer wechselnden Motive der Elegie bedürfen des engeren Rahmens des in sich geschlossenen Distichons.²

Es war sozusagen ein Stilfehler Hesiods, dass er seine Parä-

¹ E. Reiner, *Die rituelle Totenklage der Griechen* (Stuttg., 1938 [Tübinger Beiträge, Heft 30]). *Rh. Mus.*, XCII (1944), 298 f.

² Vgl. W. Schmid, *Gesch. d. griech. Lit.*, I, 1, 354 f., 362. Dank seiner Abrundung wurde das Distichon auch das adäquate Mass des Epigramms, s. H. Hommel, *Rh. Mus.*, LXXXVIII (1939), 193 ff.

nesen im epischen statt im elegischen Masse vortrug; andererseits ist die narrative Elegie strenggenommen ein Übergriff der andern Gattung über die ihr eigentlich gesteckten Grenzen. Allerdings schloss sich auch die elegische Reflexion an irgendwelche Fakta an und bediente sich mythischer und sonstiger Exempla, und so konnte sie leicht ein erzählendes Element in sich aufnehmen, wie es schon in der primitiven Totenklage angelegt ist; aber erst bei Mimnermos scheint diese Tendenz weiter ausgegriffen zu haben, und Panyassis war der erste, der ein ganzes Werk erzählender Art, die *Loviká*, in Distichen abfässte:³ damit gab er das Beispiel für Antimachos' *Lyde*, die selber wieder für die Folgezeit vorbildlich gewesen ist. Aber auch in dieser Abart des Genos ist die subjektive Haltung des Dichters bewahrt geblieben: er greift mit seinen Gedanken und Empfindungen in die Erzählung ein, und während er seinem Anteil an dem Geschick seiner Personen Ausdruck verleiht, betont er überhaupt das Gefühlsmässige und lässt natürgemäss das *έλευθόν* besonders stark hervortreten, um ein andermal sich doch auch wieder in leichtem Scherze auszulassen, und immer ist er geneigt, diejenigen Momente der Sage, die ihn besonders berühren, auf Kosten anderer ausziebiger zu behandeln. Man darf also sagen, dass er als Erzähler zwar den eigentlichen Bereich der Elegie verlässt, aber doch ihrem Charakter nicht ganz untreu wird. Der Epiker hingegen hält sich mit seiner Person zurück und lässt schon damit seine Helden in einer Distanz erscheinen, die es ihm erlaubt, mehr in der Richtung des *σεμνόν* und des *δεινόν* zu wirken; er tendiert daher weniger zu Asymmetrien und führt die Erzählung eher in gleichmässigem Ablauf und ausgewogener Vollständigkeit durch.

Man kann schwerlich in Abrede stellen, dass die Alexandriner wie wohl auch bereits Antimachos und Philitas diesen Stilunterschied eingehalten haben: ein *τεχνέος* wie Kallimachos wird die Subjektivität, die er den *Aitia* verlieh, in seinem epischen Mustergedicht, der *Hekale*, sicher zurückgedrängt haben. Aber es ist nicht wahrscheinlich, dass einer der hellenistischen Dichter die Differenzierung bereits so weit getrieben hätte wie Ovid in den *Metamorphosen* und *Fasti*,⁴ sieht es doch so aus, als ob der Römer

³ E. Martini, 'Επιτύμβιον Η. Swoboda dargebracht (Reichenberg, 1927), 172, Anm. 22.

⁴ *Burs. Jahresber.*, CCLV (1937), I, 73, 215. *Rh. Mus.*, XC (1941), 268. Vgl. U. v. Wilamowitz, *Hell. Dicht.*, I, 231 f.; II, 15.

die zwei Werke gerade deshalb zur gleichen Zeit in verschiedenem Versmasse bearbeitet hätte, um die beiden Arten umso schärfer gegeneinander kontrastieren zu können. Es ist kein Zufall, dass die Eigenheiten des epischen und des elegischen Genos erst am Vergleich der Musterstücke Ovids so deutlich beobachtet und bestimmt worden sind, wie es von R. Heinze geschehen ist.⁵ Und doch hat auch dieser Dichter manches elegische Stilmoment in die *Metamorphosen* einliessen lassen und nicht einmal die epische Objektivität konsequent gewahrt.⁶ Auch die Alexandiner hatten es nicht immer genau damit genommen, wenn wir nach den *Argonautika* des Apollonios von Rhodos urteilen dürfen,⁷ und sie werden sich dabei auf gewisse Ausnahmen von der Regel gestützt haben, die sich schon bei Homer aufzeigen liessen. Anrufungen der Musen und anderer Gottheiten der Poesie galten natürlich als legitim und sind ja auch wirklich im Geiste der Rhapsoden, die ihren Gesang der göttlichen Inspiration und nicht der eigenen Eingebung verdanken wollen; der Rekurs auf die alte Tradition hingegen, der sich bei Apollonios nicht selten findet (I, 24, 26, 172, usw.), schaltet stilwidrig eine menschliche Autorität vor der göttlichen ein und lässt damit die Möglichkeit eines Zweifels offen, der gelegentlich sogar direkt ausgesprochen wird (I, 154; III, 816, u. a.): aber Homer war immerhin II., II, 783 und Od., VI, 42 mit einem *φασί* vorangegangen, wenn auch nicht im Zusammenhange der Haupterzählung. Die vielen aithologischen Beziehungen auf die Gegenwart, die das hellenistische

⁵ "Ovids elegische Erzählung," *Ber. Verhandl. Sächs. Akad. Wiss.*, Philol.-hist. Klasse, LXXI (1919), 7. Vgl. noch H. Renz, *Mythologische Beispiele in Ovids erotischer Elegie* (Diss. Tüb., 1935); W. Kraus, *R.-E.*, XVIII, 1944 ff., 1958 ff. Für den epischen Stil förderlich A. Rohde, *De Ovidi arte epica* (Berl., 1929), vgl. *Gnom.*, IX (1933), 28 ff.

⁶ Heinze, 18, Anm. 1; 63 ff. K. Schnuchel, *Ovidius qua arte Metamorphoseon libros compaserit* (Diss. Greifsw., 1922 [Maschinenschriftexemplar]), 8. Martini, 187 f., Anm. 61. Vgl. Rohde, 21, Anm. 25; 29; Brooks Otis, *T. A. P. A.*, LXIX (1938), 191 f., 221 f., Anm. 108.

⁷ *Das Neue Bild der Antike*. I (Leipz., 1942), 345. Für Vergil s. R. Heinze, *Virgils epische Technik* (2. Ausg., 1908), 368 ff. (3. Ausg., 370 ff.). Vgl. ferner E. Föhde, *Griech. Romzn*, 97 (3. Ausg., 104), Anm. 3. Ed. Norden zu Verg., *Zen.*, VI, 14. W. Kroll, *Studien zum Verständnis der röm. Lit.* (Stuttgart, 1924), 27, 212 ff. Nach Vergils Vorbild und der Lehre der spätantiken Vergil-Interpretation geht die "interiectio ex persona poetae" in die mittelalterliche Epik über (E. R. Curtius, *Corona quernea, Festgabe K. Strecker* [Leipz., 1941], 11 ff.).

Epos durchziehen (I, 988, 1019, 1047 f., 1061 f., usw.), hatten eine gewisse Analogie in jenem *οἶοι νῦν βροτοί εἰστι*, womit Homer seine Generation von der Zeit der Heroen distanziert (*Il.*, V, 304; XII, 383, 449; XX, 287), und selbst die gelegentlichen Dispositionsbemerkungen (I, 23, 648 f., 919 ff., 1220; II, 844 f.; IV, 451) waren durch *Il.*, XIII, 176 gedeckt, eine Stelle, die allerdings schon Zenodot mit gutem Grund für unecht erklärt hatte. So konnten also mit dem homerischen Vorgange Freiheiten entschuldigt werden, die dem tieferen Blick eine ganz veränderte Einstellung des neuzeitlichen Dichters zu seinem Stoffe verraten, aber Apollonios trug kein Bedenken, auch ohne Autorisation manchmal eigene Reflexionen einfliessen zu lassen (I, 82, 616, 1035 f.; II, 541 ff., u. a.),⁸ und Ovid nahm sich ebensowenig in Acht, derartige Verstöße streng zu meiden, geschweige dass er sich hätte beikommen lassen, auf das aitiologische Element zu verzichten. Noch weniger Vorsicht war vonnöten, wo sich nicht nach so eindeutigen Kriterien bestimmten liess, was dem epischen Stil zuwiderlief, und dem individuellen Geschmack mehr Spielraum blieb. Lag es schon im Wesen des Alexandrinismus, Götter und Heroen nicht so sehr aus ehrfürchtiger Ferne zu betrachten, sondern dem Gefühl des modernen Menschen näher zu rücken, so hätte ein Ovid erst recht sich selbst verleugnen müssen, wenn er seinen Gestalten immer die Erhabenheit gewahrt hätte, die die grosse Form eigentlich erforderte, aber nicht einmal Homer selber durchweg beobachtet hatte,⁹ und was die Gleichmässigkeit der epischen Erzählung angeht, so würde er selbst, wenn er hätte korrekt sein wollen, bei der Überfülle des Stoffes kaum imstande gewesen sein, Asymmetrien ganz zu vermeiden.¹⁰

⁸ Fälle wie I, 78 f.; III, 837 sind schon eher altepisich (*Il.*, XVI, 46 f.; XVII, 197). Die Törheit des Glaukos (vgl. L. Radermacher, *Mythos und Sage* [Brünn, 1938], 126 f. [2. Ausg., 141]) bezeichnet Homer, *Il.*, VI, 234 ff. nicht etwa durch ein persönliches Urteil, sondern durch die erzählende Aussage, dass Zeus ihm die Besinnung nahm. Für Kallimachos vgl. E. Diehl, *Der Digressionsstil des Kallimachos* (Riga, 1937 [Abh. d. Herder-Gesellsch. u. des Herder-Inst. zu Riga, V, 9]), 23.

⁹ W. Kroll, *Studien*, 215 f.; Martini, a. O.

¹⁰ Martini, a. O.; A. Rohde, *De Ovidi arte epica*, 28, Anm. 36. Selbst Kallimachos zeigt in der *Hekale* nicht nur Aitiologie, sondern auch Asymmetrie (anders Heinze, *Ovids eleg. Erzählung*, 95, vgl. 93). Dies Kriterium ist also am wenigsten bezeichnend.

Und doch dürfen uns all diese Lässigkeiten nicht an seinem prinzipiellen Stilwillen irre machen: wórauf es ihm ankam, zeigt sich daran, dass er nicht rur einige Geschichten, die er früher schon im elegischen Masse behandelt hatte, nun in epischem Gewande wieder neu aufnahm (*A. A.*, II, 21 ff., 561 ff.; III, 687 ff. = *Met.*, VIII, 183 ff.; IV, 171 ff.; VII, 796 ff.¹¹), sondern auch mehrere Sagen in den beiden gleichzeitigen Werken nebeneinander gestaltete (*Met.*, II, 409 ff.; V, 341 ff.; XIV, 775 ff., 805 ff. = *Fast.*, II, 153 ff.; IV, 417 ff.; I, 257 ff.; II, 475 ff.) und so die Variation von vornehmerein auf die Differenzierung des Stils anlegte.¹² Hier, wo er gewissermassen am Exempel demonstrierte, hat er die Besonderheiten der epischen und der elegischen Erzählung stärker als anderwärts und bis zu sachlichen Abweichungen ausgeprägt und stilistische Unregelmässigkeiten möglichst strikte gemieden. Am ausgiebigsten ist die Dublette der Persephonegeschichte: in der einen Fassung legt er den Akzent auf die düstere Majestät Plutons und den Zorn der ihres Kindes beraubten Demeter, in der andern auf das idyllische Bild der Blumen sammelnden Mädchen und das Leid der göttlichen Mutter, die Erde und Himmel suchend durchstreift. Obwohl er nun dieses Mal in Kallimachos' *Aitia* und in Nikanders *Heterciumena* eine elegische und eine epische Quelle vor Augen hatte, sc ist er doch nicht etwa in den *Fasti* der einen und in den *Metamorphosen* der andern gefolgt, sondern hat die ihm gegebenen Elemente selbständig verteilt und dabei die Stilunterschiede schärfier betont, als es in den griechischen Originalen wahrscheinlich geschehen war.¹³

Wenn er seine Leser nun so offensichtlich zum Vergleiche herausforderte, darf man erwarten, dass die beiden Werke auch im ganzen als Gegenstücke wirken sollten. Allerdings sind sie

¹¹ Renz, 4 ff. Zur Prokriserzählung s. auch *Gnom.*, IX (1933), 30 ff.

¹² Damit ist die Fragestellung von F. Wickers, *Quaestiones Ovidianae* (Diss. Gött., 1917), 52 ff., erledigt, der die Priorität der einen oder der andern Version nachzuweisen sich bemühte.

¹³ *Rh. Mus.*, XC (1941), 236 ff. Dass Ovid in der Stilisierung manchmal zur Unzeit von seiner jeweiligen Quelle abhängig gewesen wäre, wie Martini, 187 f., Anm. 61 meint, ist nicht wahrscheinlich. Etwas anderes ist es, dass er gelegentlich einmal einen einzelnen Ausdruck aus dem Griechischen geradezu überetzt hat, wie wir es *Fast.*, VI, 176 nachweisen können (aus Kallimachos' Aitienprolog V. 14, s. R. Pfeiffer, *Herm.*, LXIII [1928], 315).

darin einander gleich, dass sie eine Kette von Einzelgeschichten aneinanderreihen und insofern einen Typ vertreten, der durch die hesiodeischen Kataloggedichte am charakteristischsten ausgebildet worden ist.¹⁴ Freilich war die Technik der Verknüpfung inzwischen viel kunstvoller geworden, als es in den *Eöen* der Fall gewesen war, und so hat Martini,¹⁵ um jedes Präjudiz auszuschalten, den Terminus "Kataloggedicht" durch die allgemeinere Bezeichnung "Kollektivgedicht" ersetzt. Er stellt also *Metamorphosen* und *Fasti* in dieselbe Linie und meint, Ovid habe mit dem einen Werke das epische und mit dem andern das elegische Kollektivgedicht in römischer Gewandung seinen Landsleuten vor Augen führen wollen. Bisher war diese Gattung von den Lateinern noch kaum angebaut worden: Properz war mit seinem Plane eines römischen Seitenstückes zu den *Aitia* des Kallimachos nicht zu Ende gekommen, und nur Ovids älterer Freund Aemilius Macer hatte die *Ornithogonie* des Boios lateinisch bearbeitet, war aber kompositionstechnisch schwerlich über sein Vorbild hinausgeschritten. Martini sieht also gerade in dieser Richtung Ovid als den Vollender der neoterischen Bestrebungen an.

Nun pflegt man freilich auch in den *Metamorphosen* auf den Fäden weniger zu achten als auf die Perlen, die daran aufgereiht sind. Man äussert sich geradezu dahin, dass manche längere Partieen den Charakter von Epylhien trügen,¹⁶ und

¹⁴ Über die Katalogform in weitem Sinne s. Radermacher, 123 ff., 146 2. Ausg., 137 ff., 162). Auch die *Metamorphosen* pflegen als Kataloggedicht betrachtet zu werden, z. B. von Teuffel-Kroll, *Gesch. d. röm. Lit.*, II, 1920, 100 f.; I. Kapp, *Philol.*, LXXXIV (1929), 176; A. Kappelmacher, *Die Literatur der Römer* (Potsd., 1934), 293. So auch M. de Cola, *Callimaco e Ovidio* (Palermo, 1937), 31 ff., obwohl sie nach Heinze auch die epische Stilisierung nicht verkennet (S. 35, 81 f.); vgl. D. L. Z., 1938, 874 f. Auch L. Castiglioni, *Studi intorno alle fonti e alla composizione delle Metamorfosi di Ovidio* (Pisa, 1906), 316 ff., stellt die *Metamorphosen* in die Geschichte des Kataloggedichtes. Vgl. auch G. Lafaye, *Les Métamorphoses d'Ovide et leurs modèles grecs* (Par., 1904), 76 ff., 94, 240 (dazu seine Ausgabe I [Par., 1928], S. VII f.); Brooks Otis, *T. A. P. A.*, LXIX (1938), 192 f., 218 ff. (s. i. Anm. 49). Nicht ganz klar F. Skutsch, *Aus Vergils Frühzeit* (Leipzig, 1901), 52.

¹⁵ S. 183 ff. Vgl. *Einleitung zu Ovid* (Brünn, 1933), 29 ff.

¹⁶ Lafaye, 94; Castiglioni, 10 f.; J. Stroux, *46. Jahrbuch d. Vereins Schweizerischer Gymnasiallehrer*, 1919, 174 ff.; Teuffel-Kroll, 101; K. Zarnewski, *Die Szenerieschilderungen in Ovids Metamorphosen* (Diss. Bresl., 1925), 33; Kraus, 1944.

M. M. Crump glaubte so viele davon in dem Werke zu finden, dass sie das Ganze als ein "catalogue poem based on epyllion construction" bezeichnete.¹⁷ In der Tat gehen nicht wenige solche Partieen auf epische und sonstige Kleingedichte der Griechen zurück, und es ist keine Frage, dass die Geschichten, die Ovid ausführlicher behançelt hat, so abgerundet sind, dass sie auch für sich wirken. Die kunstvolle Verknüpfung steht diesem Eindruck so wenig entgegen, dass das einzelne Gemälde sich in dem gewählteren Rahmen mehr abhebt als in dem gleichlaufenden Bilderstreifen der Katalogpoesie von der Art der *Eöen* bis in die alexandrinische Zeit hinein und bis zu Ovids eigenem Gedichte *Ibis*. Und doch sind die Erzählungen der *Metamorphosen* in Wirklichkeit ebensowenig Epyyllien wie die der *Fasti* Sonderelagieen. Neben den breiter ausgeführten Geschichten stehen ja andere, die zu kurz abgetan sind, als dass sie selbständig gedacht werden könnten, und das Ganze ist nun einmal auf zusammenhängende Lektüre berechnet. Während Properz an seine *Aitia* in der Weise herangegangen ist, dass er einzelne Themen vorausnahm, um sie später in das Gesamtgefüge einzubauen, hat Ovid seine Kollektivgedichte von vorneherein in dem geplanten Tenor Abschnitt für Abschnitt und Buch für Buch gefördert, wofür die unvollendet gebliebenen *Fasti* deutliches Zeugnis ablegen. Wenn er nun in den *Amores* wie die andern Augusteer sogar selbständige Gedichte solchermassen im Rahmen der Bücher anzuordnen bestrebt war, "dass erst das Ganze jedem einzelnen die volle Wirkung verleiht,"¹⁸

¹⁷ *The Epyllion from Théocritus to Ovid* (Oxf., 1931), 23, Anm. 1; 47 f., 195 ff. Des wesentliche Charakteristikum eines Epyllioms findet die Verfasserin in einer Digression (*Burs. Jahresber.*, CCLV [1937], I, 73 f.). Von den über 50 Epyyllien der *Metamorphosen* weist allerdings nach ihrer Zählung nur ein Drittel diese Digression wirklich auf, und manche entbehren auch einer langen Rede, die sie ersetzen könnte. Der Idealfall, wie ihn etwa die Io-Partie des I. Buches repräsentiert (S. 135, 236), ist selten; so nimmt Crump z. B. die Schöpfung und die Sintflut, die Gallus nach Verg., *Buc.* 3, 31 ff. in zwei Epyyllien behandelt haben soll, zu einem zusammen, um die Lykaongeschichte als Digression zu gewinnen (S. 204, 275). Manche Digressionen erklärt sie für gleichwertig mit Epyyllien, andererseits reduziert sie aber wieder ganze Epyyllien und Epyyllienkomplexe zu Digressionen innerhalb weitergreifender Zusammenhänge und kommt so schliesslich doch zur Anerkennung einer grossartigen Gesamtkomposition.

¹⁸ Wilamowitz, *Hell. Dicht.*, I, 240. Zuletzt von W. Port, *Philol.*, LXXXI (1926), 450 ff., einlässlicher behardelt.

so musste er umso mehr zu erreichen hoffen können, wo er nicht darauf angewiesen war, in der Hauptsache längst fertige Stücke nachträglich an einen passenden Platz zu stellen, sondern von Grund auf nach einer vorausbestimmten Disposition schaffen konnte. Ebenso wie in den *Amores* so ist auch in den beiden grossen Sagengedichten Variatio das Hauptprinzip der Anordnung, das er in den *Metamorphosen* noch freier durchführen konnte als in den immerhin an die Zeitfolge des Kalenders gebundenen *Fasti*. Wie hier Ähnliches zusammengestellt wird, um doch wieder durch unerwartete Unähnlichkeiten zu kontrastieren, wie ganz Verschiedenes in Gegensatz zueinander tritt, wie neben bekannten Sagen abgelegene und erlesene auftauchen, wie Ernstes von Heiterem, Erschütterndes von Komischem abgelöst wird, wie die bunten Farben, die dieser Dichter auf seiner Palette hatte, in schillerndem Wechsel sich drängen, das spürt man erst, wenn man sein Werk im Ganzen liest.

Kam es Ovid also auf die Wirkung an, die die verschiedenen Geschichten in ihrer Zusammenstellung taten, so waren ihm doch auch die Übergänge selbst keineswegs blosser Notbehelf. Allerdings hat ihm schon Quint., *Inst. Or.*, IV, 1, 77 vorgeworfen, dass er sich darin zu üppig ausgelassen habe, um ihn freilich im selben Atem mit der Schwierigkeit der Aufgabe zu entschuldigen: *illa vero frigida et puerilis est in scholis adfectatio, ut ipse transitus efficiat aliquam utique sententiam et huius velut prae-stigiae plausum petat, ut Ovidius lascivire in Metamorphosēs in solet, quem tamen excusare necessitas potest, res diversissimas in speciem unius corporis colligentem.* Gewiss liegt auch für uns der Hauptreiz der *Metamorphosen* nicht gerade in diesen Überleitungen,¹⁹ aber es war übertrieben, wenn M. Schenz urteilte, dass das Werk nur gewonnen hätte, wenn sie unterblieben wären.²⁰ Seitdem das begeisterte Urteil von V. Loers durch Liebau näher begründet worden war,²¹ haben sich viele Stimmen

¹⁹ E. Bickel, *Lehrbuch der Geschichte der röm. Lit.* (Heidelb. 1937), 175.

²⁰ *Geschichte der röm. Litt.*, II, 1^s (1911), 320, vgl. 326; E. Ripert, *Ovide* (Par., 1921), 112, 115 f. Kritisch auch Lafaye, 83 f.

²¹ V. Loers, *Einleitung der Ausgabe* (Leipz., 1843), XVIII. Liebau, *De consilio artificio quod in componendo Metamorphosium carmine securus sit P. Ovidius Naso* (*Progr. Elberf.*, 1846). Frühere Urteile s. J. Chr. Jahn, *Ovidii opera omnia*, II, 1 (Leipz., 1832), 16 ff.

des Lobes für die Kompositionskunst Ovids erhoben,²² und eine Reihe von Spezialarbeiten sind dem Thema gewidmet worden, ohne es zu erschöpfen.²³ Wir können an dieser Stelle nicht näher darauf eingehen: was Ovid erstrebt und was er erreicht hat, wäre ja im einzelnen aufzuweisen, und dabei käme es nicht nur auf eine systematische Typologie der Übergänge an, sondern es müsste auch in fortlaufender Interpretation gezeigt werden, wie alles im Zusammenhang seinen Sinn erhält. Zeichnet man so die Linien, die der Dichter geführt hat, getreulich nach, so gewinnt man immer tiefere Achtung vor einer Kunst, die so viele Beispiele einer besonders reichen Sagengattung dermassen geschickt und spannend mit einer bunten Fülle immer wieder überraschender Motive zusammenzuflechten gewusst hat. Die Verknüpfung bleibt manchmal so wenig äußerlich, dass sie die Gestaltung der Sagen selbst beeinflusst: so erfährt z. B. Demeter V, 489 ff. den Aufenthaltsort Persephones nicht wie in den *Fasti* von Helios, sondern von der Nymphe Arethusa, da deren Verwandlung im Anschluss erzählt werden sollte,²⁴ und die Exposition des Weltenbrandes durch den Streit Phaethons mit Epaphos, die am Ende des I. Buches die Überleitung von der voraufgehenden Iopartie bildet, hat einen starken Einfluss auf die Charakterzeichnung des Jünglings ausgeübt.²⁵ Auf alle Fälle

²² C. Pascal, *Atene e Roma*, XI (1908), 346 f.; L. Malten, *Herm.*, LIII (1918), 177; LXXIV (1939), 176; Ed. Norden, *Die German. Urgeschichte in Tacitus' Germania* (Leipz. und Berl., 1920), 465; Wilamowitz, *Hell. Dicht.*, I, 242 f.; Crump, 215 f.; H. Diller, *Hum. Gymn.*, XLV (1934), 35; M. de Cola, besonders S. 100. O. Regenbogen, *Antike*, VI (1930), 219, sieht in den *Metamorphosen* eine Analogie zu dem künstlerischen Organisationstalent Herodots. J. J. Hartman, *Mnem.*, XXXII (1904), 404 ff.; XXXIII (1905), 99 ff. (vgl. XVIII [1890], 168 ff.), betont, dass die Sorgfalt Ovids im letzten Teil (seit XIII, 399) auch in der Verknüpfungstechnik zurückgehe.

²³ Klassifikation der Übergänge von Frank J. Miller, *Class. Journ.*, XVI (1920/21), 464 ff.; Schruchel (s. Arm. 6); Reinh. Schmidt, *Die Übergangstechnik in den Metamorphosen des Ovid* (Diss. Bresl., 1938). Mir unzugänglich F. Mathy, "Wie Ovid in den Metamorphosen die Episoden in die Haupthandlung einföhrt" (*Jahressber. Staatsgymn. Reichenberg*, 1931). Eine fortlaufende Untersuchung der Komposition einer grösseren Partie bietet W. Klimner, *Die Anordnung des Stoffes in den ersten vier Büchern von Ovids Metamorphosen* (Diss. Erl., 1932). Wertvolle Gesichtspunkte Stroux, 171 ff.

²⁴ *Rh. Mus.*, XC (1941), 249 f.

²⁵ Vorläufig *Gnom.*, IX (1933), 29 f. Vgl. auch noch ebd. 34.

konnte sich Ovid auf den Vorgang der hellenistischen Kollektivgedichte berufen: es steht ja fest, dass er ihnen zu allen sonstigen Entlehnungen auch manche Übergangsmotive zu danken hat.²⁶ Wenn er sie durchschnittlich weniger ausgiebig ausführt, als es beispielsweise in den *Aitia* des Kallimachos der Fall war, so ist das nicht zu verwundern, da er bei der Stofffülle, die er zu bewältigen hatte, rascher vorwärtsdrängen musste.²⁷

Neben den einzelnen Übergängen beansprucht nun aber der chronologische Faden besondere Beachtung, der sich durch das ganze Werk hinzieht und die Reihe der Verwandlungen von der Entstehung der Welt bis zur Verstirnung Caesars hinabführt. Ich möchte nicht mit Crump, 198 ff. meinen, die zeitliche Ordnung sei so wenig klar und eindeutig eingehalten, dass sie für Ovid nur ein rein konventionelles Rahmenwerk bedeutet haben könne; wohl hat der Dichter, schon um den Eindruck der Einiformigkeit zu vermeiden, viele Geschichten mittels anderer Motive zwischengeschaltet, aber er hat die Hauptlinie dadurch nicht gestört: die von Crump konstituierten sachlichen Abteilungen (Götter bis VI, 420; Heroen und Heroinen bis XI, 193; Historisches von Laomedon bis Caesar) beruhen nicht auf einem Primärprinzip, sondern ergeben sich offenbar aus der chronologischen Gesamtanlage. Es lässt sich nichts davon abdingen, dass es die zeitliche Kontinuität ist, die die Disposition im ganzen bestimmt; trotz der durch die vielen Episoden verursachten Komplikation ist sie so lückenlos durchgeführt, dass Ovid ein besonderes Interesse daran gehabt haben muss. Wir haben keinen Grund zu der Annahme, dass je ein hellenistisches Kol-

²⁶ Motive der *Aitia* s. Malten, *Herm.*, LIII (1918), 174 ff.; Heinze, 96 ff.; R. Pfeiffer, *Herm.*, LXIII (1928), 303, Anm. 2; De Cola, 31 ff. (*Fasti*, 83 ff.). Motive der Kataloggedichte Castiglioni, 316 ff. Zum Stil der Kollektivpoesie gehört auch die Neigung zu Digressionen, die aber auch vom Epyllion (vgl. Anm. 17) und sogar vom grossen Epos nicht ferngehalten werden (vgl. E. Diehl, *Digressionsstil*, s. Anm. 8, dazu *D. L. Z.*, 1938, 873 f.). Es ist Crump natürlich zuzugeben, dass Ovid seine Verknüpfungstechnik auch an Digressionen von Epylien bilden konnte; hat er sich doch z. B. II, 534 ff. an Kallimachos' *Hekale* gehalten, aber ebensogut konnte er auch von grossen Epen lernen; das reichste Material bot jedoch sicher die Kollektivpoesie.

²⁷ Daran hätte Ovid also auch bei einer letzten Retraktation nichts geändert, wie E. Diehl, *Τηρήσιμα* (*Acta Univ. Latv.*, Philol. et Philos. Ser. IV, 2 [1937]), 431 mit Anm. 29, zu glauben scheint. Vgl. J. J. Hartman, *Mnem.*, XXXIII (1905), 106 ff.

lektivgedicht in gleicher Weise komponiert gewesen wäre. Für den vergilischen Silensang, *Buc.* 6, ist ja charakteristisch, dass er zwar chronologisch beginnt, aber von der Hylassage an diese Ordnung wieder aufgibt; mehr Konsequenz wird kein Alexandriner erstrebt haben. Dass Euphorions *Μοψονία* die Legenden Attikas in zeitlicher Reihenfolge gebracht hätte,²⁸ macht der Untertitel *Ἄτακτα* und die sonstige Epyllientechnik dieses Dichters sehr unwahrscheinlich.

Wieviel Ovid an seinem Prinzip lag, zeigt sich vor allem darin, dass er es ausdrücklich im Proömium angekündigt und *Trist.*, II, 559 f. in gleicher Formulierung noch einmal zur näheren Bezeichnung der *Metamorphosen* verwendet hat. In den an die Götter gerichteten Eingangsworten erhalten wir nun aber auch einen Fingerzeig dafür, was Ovid mit seinem Prinzip bezweckt hat: *primaque ab origine mundi ad mea perpetuum deducite tempora carmen*. Es ist nicht so sehr der Stolz auf seine selbständige Neuerung, der aus diesen Versen spricht; ihre eigentliche Bedeutung wird erst klar, wenn man das entscheidende Wort *perpetuum* ins Griechische übersetzt: es ist soviel wie διηγερές,²⁹ jenes Schlagwort in dem Streite um die Berechtigung

²⁸ So Crump, 202. Aus Hor., *Carm.*, I, 7, 5 ff. (vgl. R. Merkel, *Ausgabe von Ovids Tristia und Ibis* [Berl., 1837], 370 f.) lässt sich nichts für dies Gedicht schliessen (s. Anm. 29). Die *Atthis* des Hegesinus ist problematisch (*R.-E.*, Suppl. IV, 712).

²⁹ Das ist schon von Früheren (L. Adam, *Die aristotelische Theorie vom Epos* [Wiesb., 1889], 74 f., vgl. 115; Lafaye, 77, Anm. 1; Kiessling-Heinze zu Hor., *Carm.*, I, 7, 5; Schnuchel, 5) bemerkt und nach Auffindung des Kallimachospapyrus von Pfeiffer, *Herm.*, LXIII (1928), 310, Anm. 2, u. a. aufs neue betont, aber noch nicht genügend für Ovids Kunstprinzip ausgewertet worden (vorläufig *R.-E.*, Suppl. V, 410; *Burs. Jahresber.*, CCLV [1937], I, 113; *D. L. Z.*, 1938, 875). Bei Hor., *Carm.*, I, 7, 6 steht *carmen perpetuum* wohl nicht als t. t.: er will nur sagen, "manche Dichter hörten nie auf, Athen zu preisen" (H. Schütz); zu einer chronologischen Disposition passt ja auch wenig, dass der Olivenkranz, den diese Dichter sich mit ihren Poemen aufs Haupt setzen, *undique decerpta* ist' (vgl. allerdings Kroll, *Studien*, 38). Eher kommt Plin., *Epist.*, VII, 9, 9 mit dem Ausdruck *carmen continuum et longum* dem Terminus nahe; er steht übrigens auch V, 6, 4 (vgl. E. R. Curtius, *Röm. Forsch.*, LIV [1940], 124) ebenso wie Lukian, *Hist. Conser.*, 56 f. auf einem dem kallimacheischen entgegengesetzten Standpunkt. Bei Mart., VI, 64, 10 = VII, 63, 1 ist *perpetuus* nicht mit C. Dilthey, *De Callimachi Cydippa* (Leipz., 1863), 25, in unsern Zusammenhang zu ziehen.

des grossen Epos, der in der hellenistischen Zeit bis zu feindlicher Erbitterung geführt worden ist. Im Prolog seiner *Aitia* wendet sich Kallimachos³⁰ gegen seine Widersacher, die ihm vorrückten, dass er noch nicht ἐν ἀεισμα διηρεκές . . . ἐν πολλαῖς χιλιάσιν vollendet hatte, "einen einheitlichen Sang mit durchlaufender Handlung in vielen Tausenden von Versen." Was ihm seine Gegner als Unfähigkeit auslegten, war sein festes Stilprinzip, denn er empfand, dass die neue Zeit nur in der feinen Ausarbeitung des Einzelnen eine Möglichkeit habe, dem Fluche des Epigonentums zu entgehen. "Ελετε, Βασκανής ὀλοὸν γένος, αἴθι δὲ τέχνη. *[κρίνετε]*, μὴ σχοίνῳ Περσόδι τὴν σοφίην ruft er V. 17 f. den Neidlingen zu, die er im andern Lager zu finden glaubt. Der schlagende Vergleich des gegnerischen Massstabes mit der persischen Meile³¹ ist von Pindar angeregt, der in dem berühmten Eingang seines *Kέρβερος*, die langatmig hingezogene Weise der alten Dithyrambik *σχοινοτένεια* genannt hatte.³² Das stimmt gut zu dem Ausdruck διηρεκής, der eigentlich ununterbrochene Raumstrecken bezeichnet (z. B. ἀτραπιτοί Hom., *Od.*, XIII, 195) und so von Kallimachos *Aitia*, II, *Ox. Pap.*, 2080, V. 66 nach dem Vorbild von *Hom. Hymn. Apoll.* 255 und 295 als Terminus der Geodäsie gebraucht wird,³³ aber schon seit

³⁰ E. Lobel, *Herm.*, LXX (1935), 31 ff. Zu Kallimachos' Kunstprinzip s. zuletzt *Burs. Jahresser.*, CCLV (1937), I, besonders S. 75, 111 ff., 212 ff. und *Gnom.*, XII (1936), 449 ff. Über seine Stellung zum ἀεισμα διηρεκές im wesentlichen richtig bereits A. F. Naeke, *Opuscula*, II (Bonn, 1845), 29 f., 33 ff. Auf die Vorläufer der kallimacheischen Doktrin braucht hier nicht eingegangen zu werden.

³¹ Vgl. Pfeiffer, *Herm.*, LXIII (1928), 318 f.

³² Vielleicht spielt noch eine ferne Erinnerung an das Messverfahren des aristophanischen Euripides, *Ran.* 798 hinein, obgleich dessen Gesichtspunkte andere sind (B. Snell, *Die Entdeckung des Geistes* [Hamb., 1946], 112; vgl. *Antiz.*, XIII [1937], 253). Zu *σχοινοτένεια* vgl. P. Hanschke, *De accentuari Graecorum nominibus* (Diss. Bonn, 1914), 35.

³³ Vgl. *I. G.*, VII, 3073, 108. (Jhd. v. Chr.): πρὸς κανόνα διηρεκῆ. Zu der Stelle der *Aitia* s. W. Ehlers, *Die Gründung von Zankle in den Aitia des Kallimachos* (Diss. Berl., 1933), 37 f., Anm. 96, der die Inkonzinnität der Diktion in dem Satz καὶ γὰρ διασκαλεῖ πύργον ἔγειρόμενον γεωδαιταὶ καὶ σπάρτα διηρεκές εὗτε βάλωνται, στέλνει καὶ λευρᾶς δύφα τάμωσιν δδούς verkennt. Im zweiten Glied ist das Objekt zu βασκαλεῖ nicht mit τοὺς γεωδαιταὶ aus dem Nebensatz zu ergänzen, sondern durch diesen selbst vertreten: der Vogel ἄρπαστος behext nicht die Geodäten, sondern die Stadt, und zwar sowohl den Mauerturm, der schon im Entstehen begriffen ist, als auch das Stadtinnere, das die Geodäten eben vermessen.

Hom., *Od.*, IV, 836; VII, 241; XIII, 56 auch auf eine fortlaufende Rede übertragen ist. Mit diesem Worte war also die stetig durchgehende Erzählung des Epos treffend charakterisiert, die die Moderne nicht mehr zu homerischen Massen ausdehnen konnte; ein Missverständnis war umso weniger zu befürchten, als noch durch das Epitheton *ἐν* die Einheitlichkeit dieser Erzählung hervorgehoben war.³⁴

Der Verzicht des Kallimachos entsprang einem Originalitätsstrebēn, das nicht aus Opposition gegen das Alte um jeden Preis neu zu sein suchte, sondern von tiefer Bewunderung für das Unerreichbare getragen war: Homer ist als ἀοιδὸς ἔσχατος anerkannt (Kall., epigr. 27), und gerade in der hellenistischen Zeit hat sich ja der Gebrauch eingebürgert, ihn als ὁ ποιητής schlechthin zu bezeichnen.³⁵ Die Persönlichkeit des blinden Sängers war noch ungebrüchen; man hatte nicht den Trost, Homeride zu sein, auch nur als letzter, sei schön, und durfte also, wollte man doch in seinen Bahnen wandeln, nichts anderes erwarten, als zu der Stufe der Kyklierer hinabzusinken. So verlangte Kallimachos für die moderne Zeit den schmäleren Rahmen kleinerer Gedichte, der die Vorzüge der alexandrinischen Detailkunst zur Geltung brachte: ein *ἐν ἄεισμα δημηκές* war nicht mehr *ἐν πολλαῖς χιλιάσι* möglich, sondern nur noch in einem beschränkteren Umfang, und in diesem Sinne hatte der Meister selber ja sein Programmgedicht, die *Hekale*, geschrieben.³⁶

Zum Text von *Hom. Hymn.* 295 s. P. St. Breuning, *De hymnorum Homericorum memoria* (Diss. Utrecht, 1929), 73.

³⁴ "Ἄεισμα δημηκές = *Oermen perpetuum* bedeutet also mehr als "eine den Stoff in zusammenhängender Erzählung bietende Darstellung" (so Martini, *Einleitung*, 30) und kann nicht ein Kollektivgedicht nach Art der *Aitia* bezeichnen (sc I. Kapp, *Philol.*, LXXXIV [1929], 176): die Kontinuität die der Terminus meint, ist nicht durch eine beliebige Verknüpfungsmotivik, sondern durch die zeitliche Abfolge bestimmt. Freilich wird ein solches Gedicht erst dann homerisch, wenn es einen grösseren Umfang erreicht: das ist, wie bei Kallimachos durch *ἐν πολλαῖς χιλιάσι*, so bei Ovid durch *prima ab origine mundi ad mea tempora* ausgedrückt.

³⁵ A. M. Harmon, *Class. Phil.*, XVIII (1923), 35 ff. Weiter A. P. Dorjahn, ebd., XXV (1930), 284, mit Lit.

³⁶ Unzugänglich ist mir leider die Abhandlung von W. Allen, Jr., *T. A. P. A.*, LXXI (1940), 1 ff., über das *Epyllion*. Der Terminus *Epyllion* ist, wie auch Allen betont, modern; in der hellenistischen Zeit nannte man die Kleingedichte jeder Art u. a. *εἰδωλία* (Plin., *Epist.*, IV, 14, 9; vgl. Wilamowitz, *Hell. Dicht.*, I, 117; II, 15), doch ohne die

Trotzdem sollte ein Werk, das in die Tausende von Versen ging, nicht ausgeschlossen sein, aber es musste auf die Einheitlichkeit einer durchlaufenden Handlung verzichten und die Mannigfaltigkeit eines Kollektivgedichtes zeigen. Die *Aitia*, die vier Bücher umfassten, boten also eine bunte Reihe von Sagen, die sich in den überraschenden Wendungen des Gespräches des Dichters mit den Musen auf dem Helikon fortspann.³⁷ Wenn er im Rahmen dieses Werkes fr. 3 Pf. ἡμεκὲς ἀείδω sagt,³⁸ so gilt das nur von einer der vielen Geschichten, die sich in jedem Buche zusammenfanden. Ein solches Kollektivgedicht stand in der Nachfolge der *Lyde* des Antimachos, und so schloss sich Kallimachos seinem Vorgänger in der metrischen Form an, freilich nur, um ihn desto augenfälliger in seinem eigenen Genre auszustechen. Als er hingegen das Muster des modernen δημηκές aufstellen wollte, hatte es näher gelegen, das hexametrische Mass zu wählen, um das moderne Kleinepos möglichst scharf gegen das alte Grossepos abzusetzen. An sich machte seine Theorie zwischen Epos und Elegie keinen Unterschied,³⁹ denn beide Masse waren für die Erzählung sanktioniert, wenn sie auch eine gewisse Stildifferenzierung bedingten. Nur so war es ja möglich, dass er sich für seine Dichtungsart nicht auf einen Elegiker, sondern auf Hesiod als Autorität berief und gerade seine *Aitia* durch ihre Einkleidung und mit ausdrücklichen Worten als hesiodeisches Gedicht charakterisierte.⁴⁰

Kallimachos hat das Wesen seiner Dichtung vorwiegend unter

Vorstellung noch damit zu verbinden, dass jedes Gedicht sein besonderes εἶδος ("Ton") habe (E. Bickel, *Glotta*, XXIX [1941], 29 ff.).

³⁷ Ich neige zu der Annahme, dass das Gespräch durch das ganze Werk hindurchging, s. *Burs. Jahresber.*, a. O., besonders S. 116, 129 f., 139 f. Vgl. auch Diehl, *Τπόρημα*, 429 ff. P. Maas, *Papiri della r. Univ. di Milano*, I (Fir., 1937), 165, hält auch für möglich, dass das IV. Buch aus Einzelgedichten bestand. Die einzelnen Bücher der *Aitia* umfassten etwa 1000 Verse (Maas, 169 f.; vgl. schon A. S. Hunt, *Ox. Pap.*, XVII, 1927, S. 46; E. Cahen, *Rev. ét. gr.*, XLVIII [1935], 320).

³⁸ Vgl. Wilamowitz, *Sitzb. Berl.*, 1925, 232 = *Kleine Schriften*, V, 2, 111. Früher Dilthey, *Call. Cyd.*, 25 f.

³⁹ Wilamowitz, *Hell. Dicht.*, I, 117, Anm. 2; 231; II, 96. *Burs. Jahresber.*, a. O., 73, 91, 111, 114, Anm. 2. Vgl. F. Jacoby, *Rh. Mus.*, LXV (1910), 71, Anm. 1.

⁴⁰ Über Hesiod als Vorbild der modernen Epik s. E. Reitzenstein, *Festschr. R. Reitzenstein* (Leipz. und Berl., 1931), 41 ff. Vgl. *Burs. Jahresber.*, a. O., 214 f.

dem Gesichtspunkt der $\tauέχνη$ angesehen, die sich nur dann entfalten konnte, wenn sie ein Thema bloss über eine kleine Strecke zu führen hatte. Dass die Reduktion der Form aber noch tiefer begründet war und mit der Herabstimmung des Tons und der Verringerung der göttlichen und heroischen Distanz organisch zusammenhing, hat er nicht deutlich ausgesprochen und sich vielleicht auch nicht klar zum Bewusstsein gebracht.⁴¹ Obwohl nun sein künstlerisches Gefühl einer starken Zeitströmung entsprach, hat sich die Richtung, deren Wortführer er war, nicht voll durchgesetzt, umso weniger, als die Gegner in seinem eigenen Schüler Apollonios von Rhodos einen prominenten Repräsentanten erhielten,⁴² ganz zu schweigen von andern Dichtern, die nicht wie Apollonios neuen Wein in den alten Schlauch gossen, sondern in ihrer ganzen Art Geist und Charakter der alten Epop zu wahren suchten.⁴³ Bei den Römern schrieben jedoch die Neoteriker das kallimacheische Stilprinzip auf ihr Panier, aber als sich die augusteische Zeit von dem grundsätzlichen Alexandrinismus loslöste, verlangte sie als Ausdruck ihres neuen Wollens wieder die Form des homerischen Epos, und der Erfolg der *Aeneis* liess die Nachahmungen üppig ins Kraut schießen.⁴⁴ Doch fehlte es auch nicht an Dichtern, die sich diesem Strom entzogen und bescheidenere Gattungen kultivierten, wie Horaz (*Carm.*, I, 6; II, 12; IV, 15; vgl. *Sat.*, I, 10, 36 ff.; II, 1, 10 ff.; *Epist.*, II, 1, 250 ff.)⁴⁵ und ursprünglich auch Vergil selber (*Buc.* 6, vgl. *Georg.*, II, 176); aber eine prinzipielle Ablehnung der grossen Form war nun nicht mehr möglich, und damit ver-

⁴¹ Es ist nur ein Nebenklang, wenn er den Stoffkreis des grossen Epos nach dem Musterbild der *Ilias* mit den Taten von Königen und Heroen bestimmt, worin ihm Hor., *A.P.*, 73 und andere Römer (W. Kroll, *Sokrates*, IV [1916], 1 f.) gefolgt sind.

⁴² Zum Streit des Kallimachos und Apollonios s. zuletzt *Rh. Mus.*, XCI (1942), 310 ff.

⁴³ K. Ziegler, *Das hellenistische Epos* (Leipz. und Berl., 1934), vgl. *Burs. Jahresber.*, a. O., 76 f.

⁴⁴ Wilamowitz, *Hell. Dicht.*, I, 241; Martini, *'Επιτύμβιον*, 178, Anm. 33; 183. Kyklicher der neoterischen Zeit s. W. Kroll, *Sokrates*, IV (1916), 7, Anm. 2.

⁴⁵ Der Gegensatz von epischer und lyrischer Dichtung liegt jedoch nicht in *Carm.*, IV, 2 vor, wie Ed. Fraenkel, *Sitzs. Heidelb.*, 1932/3, Abh. 2, gezeigt hat. Zu I, 6 und II, 12 s. Fraenkel, 20 ff.; zu IV, 15 ebd. 26 f. Vgl. noch G. Pasquali, *Orazio lirico* (Fir., 1920), 301 ff. Der Topos auch *Culex*, 26 ff.; *Paeleg. in Mess.*, 177 ff.

lagerte sich das Dilemma in den Bereich der persönlichen Neigung oder Eignung des Einzelnen. In diesem Sinne wurde die Frage denn auch für die Elegiker akut, und hier schied sich nun diese Gattung, die jetzt vorzugsweise zum Gefäss subjektiv—erotischer Ergiessung geworden war, von der, erzählenden Epik.⁴⁶ Gallus musste nach Verg., *Buc.* 6, 64 ff.; der wohl dessen eigenes Motiv benutzt, vom Tal des Permessos zum Helikon steigen, um dort die Syrinx des Askräers zu erhalten: er erhob sich also von der Elegie zum Epos, erreichte aber nur die Höhenlage Hesiods, ohne den von Kallimachos offen gelassenen Bereich zu überschreiten. Für Tibull hat Domitius Marsus in seinem Grabepigramm den heroischen Sang im starken Versmasse als eine Zukunftsperspektive betrachtet, die der Dichter schwerlich gerechtfertigt haben würde, auch wenn er nicht eines frühen Todes gestorben wäre. Properz hat ebenso wie Horaz der Versuchung widerstanden, ein nationales Epos zu dichten; er beschränkte ausdrücklich den Spielraum seiner Kleinkunst auf die Elegie und spielte Philitas und Kallimachos als Autoritäten dieser Gattung gegen die Epik überhaupt aus, ohne die Möglichkeit des Epyllions zu diskutieren (s. I, 7; II, 1, 10, 13, 34; III, 1/2, 3, 9; IV, 1). Schliesslich übernahm auch Ovid⁴⁷ das Motiv des Gegensatzes des Elegikers zum Epiker (*Am.*, I, 1; II, 1, 18; III, 12, 15 f.; *Rem.* 371 ff.; vgl. noch *Ex Ponto*; III, 3, 29 ff.) und dichtete sich in seiner spielerischen Manier sogar den Versuch einer Gigantomachie an, den die Geliebte zunichte gemacht habe (*Am.*, II, 1, 11 ff.);⁴⁸ später hat er stattdessen *Trist.*, II, 317 ff. davon gesprochen, er habe die Taten des Augustus besingen wollen, sich dieser grossen Aufgabe aber nicht gewachsen gefühlt.

Nichtsdestoweniger hat ihn die erotische Poesie, so mannigfach er sie zu variieren wusste, auf die Dauer nicht ausgefüllt, und als er es daher unternahm, die Überlieferungen der griechischen und römischen Vorzeit dichterisch zu behandeln, stand er wirklich am Scheidewege zwischen Epos und Elegie. Es ist

⁴⁶ Dilthey, 1; Heinze, 2, Anm. 2; E. Reitzenstein, *Festschr. R. Reitzenstein*, 52 ff. (vgl. *Burs. Jahresber.*, a. O., 115 f.).

⁴⁷ E. Reitzenstein, *Rh. Mus.*, LXXXIV (1935), 62 ff.

⁴⁸ Dass er wirklich ein schlechtes Epos gedichtet hätte, ist unwahrscheinlich (F. Pfister, *Rh. Mus.*, LXX [1915], 472 ff.; Reitzenstein, a. O., 77, 81 f., Anm. 2, 87 f.; Brooks Otis, 201; Kraus, 1972).

bezeichnend für sein leichtes Talent, dass er sich zutraute, auf beiden Sätteln gerecht zu sein: er nahm die Elegie in ihrer erzählenden Spezies wieder auf und griff gleichzeitig zur epischen Form. So schaffte er sich nicht nur die Gelegenheit, den Stil der beiden Gattungen zum äussersten zu präzisieren, sondern ging sogar so weit, den Agon, in dem Kallimachos und seine Gegner sich gemessen hatten, in der eigenen Produktior aufs neue zu entfesseln. Dass er sich auf der niederen Stufe den Dichter, der damals als der *princeps elegiae* galt, zum Führer erkor, ist nur natürlich: seine *Fasti* zeigen tatsächlich im Sinne des Kallimachos den hesiodeischen *χαρακτήρ*, indem sie ein Dispositionsschema anwenden, das die einzelnen Geschichten aneinanderreih't, ohne sie in einer fortschreitenden Linie der Entwicklung zu einer Einheit zu verschmelzen. Repräsentierte dieses Werk also auch in seiner Anlage das elegische Genos in reinster Ausprägung, so sollte das epische Gegenstück nicht weniger der Inbegriff seiner Gattung werden: hier konnte er sich also nicht im Rahmen des kallimacheischen Programms halten, sondern musste ein *εἰς ἀεισμα δημοκές* gestalten, ohne den Höchstumfang zu respektieren, den der alexandrinische Koryphaios zugelassen hatte. Wollte er die epische Dichtung auf ihre strengste Form bringe, so musste er die Bahn Homers beschreiten, und diesem Stilwillen hat er gleich im Proemium Ausdruck gegeben, indem er das Werk aufgrund der alexandrinischen Schulterminologie als *carmen perpetuum* bezeichnet.⁴⁹ Nun hätte es allerdings seinem leicht vom Einen zum Andern schweifenden Geiste sicher nicht gelegen, die Nachahmungen

⁴⁹ Brooks Otis (s. Anm. 14) betont richtig, dass sich die *Metamorphosen* durch ihre historische Kontinuität aus der Reihe der Kollektivgedichte herausheben, stellt sie aber doch in die hesiodeische Tradition: das ist vom heutigen Standpunkt aus nicht unberechtigt, aber nicht im Sinne des Schöpfers des Werkes selbst, der hier ausgesprochenemassen der homerischen Devise folgte. Die Hesioditzitate des Ps.-Lactant., I, 1, Z. 4 und 10 Slater, gehen nicht auf die Kunstform, sondern auf den Inhalt. Auch Stroux, 172 (vgl. Schnuchel, 6; Kraus, 1938) urteilt als moderner Beobachter, wenn er sagt, dass die *Metamorphosen* zwei innerlich verschiedene Formen vereinigen, "ein auf weitem Plan ruhendes Epos nach Art der griechischen Klassiker und die elegante, bewegliche, aufs Einzelne gerichtete Erzählungskunst der modischen Alexandriner." Ähnlich Lafaye (s. Anm. 14), der die *Metamorphosen* zugleich an die kyklische Epik und die hesiodeische Katalogpoesie anknüpft.

der *Aeneis* um eine weitere zu vermehren: eine Gigantomachie würde er auch jetzt nicht ernstlich in Angriff genommen haben. So blieb er auch im Felde des Epos bei einem Kollektivthema, aber er verknüpfte seine Verwandlungsgeschichten nicht wie Nikander mit wechselnden Motiven, sondern suchte sie, so disparate sie auch waren, doch in eine kontinuierliche Linie zu bringen, indem er sie zeitlich aufeinander folgen liess und so gleichsam eine Weltgeschichte in Verwandlungen schuf. Damit hatte er einen Handlungsablauf erzielt, wie er ihm für das grosse Epos gefordert schien, und die stilistische Absicht durchgeführt, die er im Eingang des Werkes programmatisch angekündigt hatte.⁵⁰

Es bedeutete freilich ein Äusserstes an $\xi\gamma\lambda\sigma\tau\alpha\mu\eta\rho\kappa\sigma$, wenn er das Gesetz des epischen Genos einem Stoffe aufdrängte, der ihm so wenig entgegenkam. Aristoteles' Anforderungen erfüllt Ovids Gedicht nicht;⁵¹ denn auch in historischer Abfolge gewinnen die vielen Handlungen der *Metamorphosen* nicht die Einheitlichkeit einer einzigen, aus der man kein Glied wegnehmen könnte, ohne den Zusammenhang des Ganzen zu stören; die *Metamorphosen* erreichen nicht die innere Geschlossenheit und Zielstrebigkeit der *Ilias* und der *Odyssee* oder auch der *Aeneis*, ja noch nicht einmal die äussere Abrundung einer *Herakleis* oder *Theseis*, die doch wenigstens durch die Person ihres Helden zusammengehalten wird und nicht einen so unübersehbar langen Zeitraum durchmisst. Ovid band sich allerdings recht streng an sein Thema;⁵² aber damit war zwar eine Gleichförmigkeit, aber nicht eine Zusammengehörigkeit der vielen Variationen dieses Themas gegeben. Bei Ovid finden wir nicht die in breitem Strome vorwärtsfliessende und sich Zeit

⁵⁰ "Ovidium felicissime heroici carminis unitatem aemulari" urteilte schon Liebau (s. Anm. 21), 8. Hingegen meint E. Norden bei Gericke-Norden, *Einleitung in die Altertumswiss.*, I (1910), 509 (I, 4^a, 1927, 63): "Aber einem Griechen musste doch das *carmen perpetuum*, eine Metamorphosen-Enzyklopädie $\pi\alpha\pi\alpha\tau\delta\epsilon\pi\sigma$, als eine poetische Unmöglichkeit erscheinen."

⁵¹ J. Heumann, *De epyllio Alexandrino* (Diss. Leipz., 1904), 60 ff., über das Verhältnis des Epyllions zu den aristotelischen Forderungen.

⁵² Einzig die Achaemenidesgeschichte enthebt einer Verwandlung, doch ist sie nur eine Übergangspartie (*Gnom.*, IX [1933], 35 f., Anm. 3). Richtig ist allerdings, dass die Verwandlung in manchen Sagen nur eine akzidentelle Rolle spielt (Crump, 197 ff.).

lässende Erzählung des echten Epos, die selbst die *Argonautika* des Apollónios noch nicht ganz eingebüsst haben, sondern ein unstetes Drängen von einem zum andern Bild, das sich selten Musse zu längrem Verweilen gönnt. Dieser unruhige Wechsel ist eben der Art des Kallimachos viel näher verwandt, als es der Autor selber hätte wahrhaben wollen. Bei aller Organisationskunst ist Ovids Epos kein wirkliches *ev* geworden,⁵³ aber dafür hat es sich die bunte Fracht und reizvolle Mannigfaltigkeit seines Mythenstrausses unverblasst erhalten. Es ist in der Tat das einzige Dichtwerk, das uns die antike Sagenwelt in ihrer verschwenderischen Fülle vor die Augen zu zaubern vermag, und sicher ist ihm vorzugsweise zu danken, dass diese Sagen auch wirklich durch die Jahrhunderte lebendig geblieben sind. Ovid bewegt sich hier in den Bahnen des hohen Stils und bildet die Epik Vergils weiter,⁵⁴ aber in seiner ganzen Haltung verleugnet sein Gedicht doch ebensowenig wie Apollonios' *Argonautika* den Alexandrinismus und ist nicht zuletzt Geist vom Geist seines Schöpfers.⁵⁵ Man spürt, dass dem Ovid sein Thema zuerst und vor allem ein Spiel seines Esprits ist, wenn er es auch besonders durch die Pythagorasrede des XV. Buches in naturphilosophischer Sicht sehr vertieft hat.⁵⁶ Wir werden also auch nicht erwarten, dass ihm sein Kunstprinzip eine Sache heiliger Überzeugung gewesen wäre: die Idee, den epischen Stil mit dem elegischen zu kontrastieren, ermöglichte ihm eine Komplikation seiner Aufgabe, die seine *ars* in ihrer unerhörten

⁵³ Lafaye, 117 u. s. (Ausgabe I, S. VI f.); Schanz, *Gesch. d. röm. Litt.*, II, 1^a (1911), 326; Martini, *Ἐπιτύμπων*, 171; A. Rohde, *De Ovidi arte epica*, 39, 54. Anders Stroux, 176; R. Schmidt, 7.

⁵⁴ H. Diller, *Hum. Gym.*, XLV (1934), 25 ff.

⁵⁵ "Ceterum in omnibus operis maximi partibus poeta proprius ac sibi tantum similis apparebit," Loers, *XIX*.

⁵⁶ *Gnom.*, IX (1933), 40 f. So auch—mir leider unzugänglich—Slater, *Occasional Publications of the Classical Association*, No. 1 (Crump, 211, Anm. 1). Vgl. auch Kraus, 1940. Brooks Otis, 220 ff., betont ebenfalls mit vollem Recht die philosophische Unterbauung der *Metamorphosen* und zudem das patriotische Finale, aber er scheint mir zu weit zu gehen, wenn er zwischen *Metamorphosen* und *Fasti* einen über die Stilverschiedenheit hinausreichenden Gegensatz in dem Sinne konstituiert, dass in den *Metamorphosen* sich ein ernstes Interesse am Mythos geltend mache, in den *Fasti* jedoch der waterländische Gegenstand zumeist von der scherhaftigen Behandlung verdunkelt sei.

Wendigkeit umso glänzender zu entfalten erlaubte;⁵⁷ ein wahres *ἀπροσδόκητον* aber bedeutete das Unternehmen, die Verwandlungs geschichten zu einer fortlaufenden epischen Handlung zu verketten, und so entsprach der überraschenden Ankündigung des Proömiums der zukunftssichere Triumph über die grosse Leistung, dem er nach vollbrachtem Werk im Epilog stolzen Ausdruck gibt.⁵⁸ Die Römer trösteten sich zuweilen über ihre Abhängigkeit von den Griechen damit hinweg, dass sie die griechischen Originale übertroffen zu haben glaubten:⁵⁹ in seiner Weise könnte Ovid das auch für seine beiden Sagengedichte in Anspruch genommen haben, und in gewisser Hinsicht stellen sie wirklich einen Abschluss dar, über den nicht mehr hinauszukommen war.

HANS HERTER.

BONN.

⁵⁷ Vgl. Kraus, 1976.

⁵⁸ Stroux, 172 f.

⁵⁹ Cic., *Tusc.*, I, 1, und *Rep.* II, 30, vgl. *De Or.*, I, 15 (Kroll, *Studien*, 4; G. Liebers, *Virtus bei Cicero* [Diss. Leipzig, 1942], 153). Kein ganz originaler Gedanke, denn schon Plat., *Epinom.* 987 DE röhmt von den Griechen, dass sie alles, was sie von den Barbaren übernommen hätten, schöner und vollendet gemacht hätten (vgl. Phot., *Bibl.*, cod. 249, p. 441 a, 22 ff.). Unzugänglich blieben mir leider bis jetzt u. a. auch die Werke von F. A. Wright, *Three Roman Poets, Plautus, Catullus, Ovid* (Lond., 1938), und H. Fraenkel, *Ovid, A Poet Between Two Worlds* (Univ. of California Press, 1945). S. Lauffer verdanke ich mehrere Auskünfte.

THE FOUNDATION OF THURII.

H. T. Wade-Gery
sexagenario.

The foundation of Thurii.¹ was undoubtedly one of the most remarkable events of Athenian policy in the time of Pericles' leadership. Unfortunately, it is also one of the many events not mentioned—for whatever reason—by Thucydides.² Diodorus alone gives a fairly coherent story, and thus is our main source: everybody knows what this fact involves. There are other sources which to some extent confirm Diodorus' story. But important questions remain disputed, such as the chronology of the events, which is more than a mere question of dates. And even the policy behind the whole enterprise has gained quite a new aspect since Professor Wade-Gery, in a brilliant and provocative article,³ expressed the view that Thucydides, son of Melesias, the oligarchic opponent of Pericles, was responsible for an important part of the policy which determined the foundation of Thurii. It was, according to Wade-Gery (p. 219), "a project conceived

¹ As Wade-Gery has seen (*J. H. S.*, LII [1932], p. 217, n. 48), Thucydides uses the form Θούρια for the city, and Θούριοι for the people and therefore also for the State. The original Latin form was undoubtedly Thurii, and that leads back to Θούριοι. We find Θούριοι as the name of the city as early as Ps.-Andocides, IV, 121, and Plato, *Euthyd.*, 271 B; later, e. g., in Strabo, VI, 263 and Plutarch, *Praec. Ger. Reip.*, 812 d. I think we may retain the more familiar forms, either Thourioi or Thurii. Θούριον and Thurium are used by some of the later writers, in particular by geographers and, e. g., Diodorus, XII, 10, 6, where he actually speaks of the naming of the new city. Still, this seems no sufficient reason for insisting on the form Thurium, as the numismatists do.

² A. W. Gomme, *Historical Commentary on Thucydides*, I, p. 369, considers the omission of Thurii the most serious among the many omissions in Thucydides' summary of the Pentacontaetia. His explanation that probably "he had only written down some notes on the period . . . (and) intended to make it later a full summary," hardly does justice to the work as we have it.

³ *Loc. cit.*, pp. 205 ff. This article is quoted henceforth by the author's name only. P. Cloché's verdict on Wade-Gery's theory is: "hypothèse intéressante, mais rien n'en prouve l'exactitude" (*L'Ant. Cl.*, XIV [1945], p. 100, n. 1)..

by imperialists, but its execution marred by men who disliked it." It seems worth while to discuss the matter once more.

Sybaris had been destroyed by Croton for the second time within half a century. Diodorus, XI, 90, 2 puts this event in the year 448/7, and there is no reason to doubt the date: The city had then been in existence for five years only (*ibid.*, XII, 10, 2). We have coins of this "second" Sybaris which show the emblem of the "first" Sybaris, a bull turning his head and biting his back.⁴ Shortly after 448/7, the surviving Sybarites, eager to rebuild their city, sought help in Sparta and Athens.

The outcome of the request, after Sparta's refusal, was the foundation of a colony under the guidance of Athens. The chronology of the events connected with this act of colonisation and, in consequence, the facts themselves, are uncertain. Diodorus (XII, 7; 10, 3) puts the whole affair under the archonship of Callimachus, that is to say, in the year 446/5; another tradition mentions the archon Praxiteles of the year 444/3 (Ps.-Plutarch, *Vita decem Orat.*, 835c).⁵ The later date was also the basis for the ancient chronologers who placed in 444/3 the *akmé* of Herodotus, Protagoras, and even Empedocles.⁶ The

⁴ *B. M. C. Italy*, pp. 284 i., nos. 15-17; the coins of the period down to 510 B. C. are nos. 1-14. Another surprisingly large group (nos. 18-30) of the period before 448 shows Poseidon on the obverse and the Sybarite bull (or in a few cases a bird) on the reverse. Although the legend on all these coins is ΣΤ or ΣΤΒΑ, it seems likely that they as well as a corresponding coin of Peisidonia with Poseidon and bull (Head, *H. N.*, 81) refer to a close connection between the two cities. The same is clearly expressed in one other coin (*B. M. C.*, p. 287, no. 1); here we read ΣΤ beside the figure of Poseidon and ΠΟΣ beside the bull—a chiasm particularly significant for the close relations between the two States. The large number of Peisidion coins, compared with the few coins of Sybaris proper, if not merely adventitious, suggests that the second Sybaris contained a high percentage of non-Sybarites, a fact only natural after the Sybarites had been homeless for more than fifty years. Was Peisidonia their refuge during that time?

⁵ Although Dionysius of Halicarnassus, *Lys.*, 1, p. 453, works out as 443/2 (cf. Gomme, *op. cit.*, p. 386, n. 1), he does confirm 444/3 rather than the earlier date. For, 443/2 obviously being impossible, it is easier to assume a mistake of one year than of three, since Dionysius does not give an absolute date; he speaks of "the twelfth year before the Peloponnesian War."

⁶ Gellius, *N. A.*, XV, 23. Diogenes Laertius, IX, 50; VIII, 52. Cf. F. Jacoby, *Apollodorus Chronik*, p. 268. J. S. Morrison, *O. Q.*, XXXV (1941), p. 2.

decision which year to choose would be easy if Diodorus' date were only another example of his habit of putting the story of several years under the heading of one year. But he stresses that date by mentioning the event a second time and adding again the name of the archon. Thus it is safe to assume that both dates represent reliable traditions and that both played a part in the story of Sybaris and Thurii as told by the Atticographi.

Modern scholars agree that the real act of colonisation belongs to the later year, but they disagree about the significance of the earlier date. Since for various reasons 446/5 is an impossible date for the great Panhellenic expedition, some historians thought it best to ignore the earlier year altogether.⁷ This is clearly against all sound method, and provides no solution. It seems now the more or less accepted view that some sort of expedition did take place in 446/5.⁸ Even Diodorus, who in general does not distinguish two different events, provides perhaps an indication of an earlier expedition. He tells us (XII, 10, 4) that the Athenians sent first a squadron of ten ships and mentions as their commanders Lampon and Xenocritus, the men who actually led the main expedition. This small force of ten ships can hardly belong to the final action. It may have been a first gesture of help for the Sybarites, and it is possible that the ten ships of Diodorus brought the colonists who joined with the Sybarites in the foundation of the "third" Sybaris, of which I shall speak presently.⁹ The doubts, on the other hand, of Busolt¹⁰ seem well justified; the number of ten may have derived from the fact that the final expedition was led by ten men among whom Lampon was the outstanding figure (Schol. Aristophanes, *Nub.* 332).

⁷ It is surprising to find among them such great names as those of Eduard Meyer, Eeloch, and Glotz. It is, on the other hand, equally surprising to find J. Perret (see note 23) without any hesitation fixing the foundation of Thurii in 416.

⁸ Apart from Wade-Gery, cf., e.g., F. E. Adcock, *C. A. H.*, V, p. 169; E. Ciaceri, *Storia di Magna Grecia*, II, pp. 435 ff.; P. Cloché, *L'Ant. Cl.*, XIV (1945), p. 98.

⁹ Cf. Ciaceri, p. 347, n. 5. But his comparison with the sending of ten ships to Corcyra (Thucydides, I, 45) is off the point. The aims of the two expeditions were completely different.

¹⁰ *Griech. Geschichte*, III, 1, p. 530, n. 3.

Be that as it may, any reconstruction of the course of events will have to start from the facts; and not from the dates. The tradition of a double event has rightly been combined with the clear evidence that the foundation of Thurii was preceded by the foundation of a new, the "third," Sybaris. Thurii was founded in a different place after the expulsion of the Sybarites by the other colonists (Strabo, VI, 263). We have to distinguish two phases of one general event. This story is confirmed again by numismatic evidence. There is a group of coins all of which have the legend ΣΥΒΑ or ΣΥΒΑΠΙ and show on the obverse the head of Athena.¹¹ This makes it clear that Athens had a special share in the foundation of the third Sybaris. On the reverse of the coins, there appeared at first the old Sybarite emblem of the bull biting his back (or flank).¹² Soon, however, it was changed into a bull with lowered head.¹³ This could perhaps be explained as simply an artistic alteration. But the new type prevailed later in Thurii, though with slight variations, and the earlier type was never used again. It seems obvious that the change had a real significance and probably reflected a political change. The connection with the Sybaris of the past, as was only natural, grew less close in the new foundation.¹⁴ It seems almost a symbol that the bull no longer looked back. The coins of Thurii retained both the head of Athena and the bull with lowered head; they are, in fact, in their style as well as their types, the closest possible continuation of the last Sybaris coins.¹⁵

¹¹ *B. M. C.*, p. 286, nos. 31-36; cf. Head, *H. N.*, 85.

¹² Nos. 31, 33, 34; cf. C. T. Seltman, *Greek Coins*, pl. XVIII, 4.

¹³ No. 32. For this new type cf. *C. A. H.*, Plates, II, 4b. There are also coins with only a bull's head (nos. 35-36).

¹⁴ Cf. also K. von Fritz, *Pythagorean Politics in Southern Italy*, p. 70.

¹⁵ *B. M. C.*, pp. 287 ff.; cf. Seltman, *loc. cit.*, nos. 5 and 6; G. F. Hill, *Select Greek Coins* (1927), pl. LV, 1 and 3. Since the new type first appeared in Sybaris and not in Thurii, it is hardly justifiable to explain the bull with the lowered head as a *θούριος βοῦς* (R. Pappritz, *Thurii* [1891], p. 17), although it is true that he was depicted in a more and more "offensive" attitude. The head of Athena on the Thurii coins (nos. 1 ff.) is very similar indeed to that of the Sybaris coins (nos. 31 ff.). Even if this Athena was Athena Scyletria, a sea-goddess worshipped on the shores of Bruttium (Head, 87), it is most unlikely that when she was first introduced on the coins, this should not have been under Athenian influence. Seltman (in *C. A. H.*) simply states: "The obverse type . . . is Athenian."

The bull certainly maintained a Sybarite tradition, probably just because there was now a new, if unimportant, "fourth" Sybaris, the foundation of the expelled Sybarites. The Thurians naturally did their best to keep it down, and retained the bull coins which were a popular currency.

Athens in 446 was certainly not able to do much, and even in the immediately following years, when peace in Greece was restored and building activity came into full swing, there was hardly ever the wish or the opportunity to send a large body of Athenian citizens to Italy. Yet this negative position was turned by Pericles into a positive and fertile idea. Athens—so much was clear from the very beginning of the whole action—was to lead the new colony. The head of Athena on the coins of the third Sybaris is full proof for this fundamental aspect. The new colony was to be a re-settlement of Sybaris, and that implied, at any rate, that elements of different origin were to join in the colonisation. Even the old city of Sybaris had been a combined foundation of Achaeans and Troezenians.¹⁶ Now Athens was to give the lead in a new foundation that could hardly be based on anything but a new and more extensive mixture of population.

Diodorus tells us (XII, 10, 4) that an invitation to join the colony went out to the Peloponnesians. In the final settlement at Thurii colonists of the most varied parts of the Greek world participated.¹⁷ It seems only natural to assume that, since Diodorus' narrative certainly contains a confusion of events belonging to either 446/5 or 444/3, the specific point of the Athenian invitation to the Peloponnesians belongs to the earlier year.¹⁸ Was it, as is frequently suggested, "a gesture of reconciliation," directly to Corinth and indirectly to Sparta?¹⁹ Who were the Peloponnesians who accepted the invitation? Neither Sparta nor Corinth nor Megara nor, in fact, any of Sparta's

¹⁶ Aristotle, *Pol.*, 1303a. 29 ff. Strabo, VI, 263. Cf. also note 4, above, on the second Sybaris.

¹⁷ We shall deal with this later in full detail.

¹⁸ This is, of course, not certain. But if the invitation belongs to the events of 444/3, the essential parts of the interpretation given in the text hold equally good.

¹⁹ Wade-Gery, p. 217, accepts at least to some extent Mr. O'Neill's "sop to Corinth." He realises that Corinth was not represented in the ethnical tribes of Thurii, but does not draw the necessary conclusions. See below.

Peloponnesian allies appear among the names of the *phylae* of Thurii, our only evidence for the composition of the colony. The Peloponnesian League was not represented in Thurii, unless we assume that, e. g., Tegea could be hidden in the *Arkas* and Corinth in the *Doris*. We shall see that this was exactly what happened. But it does not mean that any members of the Peloponnesian League were ever asked by Athens to join.

It is altogether doubtful whether any State as such joined in the enterprise. The Athenian envoys were probably allowed by the various governments to address the people. But we never hear of an official assignment of colonists, and no leader from any of these States is mentioned in the story of the act of colonisation. As is the case of earlier colonies, only individuals joined in, and Diodorus' *τῷ βουλομένῳ μετέχειν τῆς ἀποικίας* is true in a literary sense. The novel feature in this case was that the plan of sending out the colony was proclaimed far and wide, and not only among some neighboring or related cities. This combination of general scope and individual share was essential if the Athenian leadership of the whole scheme was to be achieved. If Diodorus means to say that Athens sent envoys to the Peloponnesians only, this is obvious nonsense if applied to the final expedition. His words may, however, indicate that the scheme at first did not cover the whole of Greece. Perhaps Pericles wished to make certain that men from some of the Peloponnesian States were willing to join; it was both courtesy and sensible policy to ask those places from which the original colonists of Sybaris had come.²⁰ At the same time, however, Athens herself and probably part of her empire were included from the beginning,²¹ while it seems incredible that when asking "the Peloponnesians" Pericles should actually have asked States belonging to Sparta's League, or even Sparta herself who had just refused the request of the Sybarites.²² What he did was the natural consequence of his

²⁰ Cf. Busolt, *op. cit.*, p. 527, n. 4.

²¹ This is clear from the breaking-up of the third Sybaris. Strabo, VI, 263, says that the Sylarites were either killed or expelled "by the Athenians and the other Greeks." If some Peloponnesians joined in this action, they did so because they stood under the sway of Athenian leadership. Most of the "other Greeks" must have been Athenian allies.

²² It is not necessary to understand (with Cloché, *loc. cit.*, p. 96) Diodorus', *ἐκήρυξαν κατὰ τὰς ἐν Πελοποννησῷ πόλεις* as "informer toutes les villes du Péloponnèse."

decision to undertake the foundation of a new Sybaris. It seems by far the simplest interpretation of the diverging traditions to assume that the expedition of 446/5, naturally on a small scale and covering only part of the Greek world, was to prepare the way for the Panhellenic colony under Athenian leadership, which even then was being planned by Pericles. It goes without saying that it took some time to prepare the extensive final scheme, but it was launched as early as circumstances allowed—only two years after the first expedition had gone out.

It is a well-known fact that this policy of Pericles' had its forerunners. For some time past, Athens had taken an interest in the West. This is usually explained on economic grounds; but essentially it was political. Democratic Athens, keen on some sort of leadership of the Ionian cities and acting as a successor to Miletus which had been in very close connection with Sybaris, felt herself strongly bound to the fate of this city, the victim of Dorian and aristocratic Croton. When Themistocles called two of his daughters Italia and Sybaris (Plutarch, *Them.*, 32, 2), whatever the special reasons for this surprising choice of names may have been, his own imperialistic ideas were revealed by them, and probably met with a certain popular feeling. Herodotus (VIII, 62) tells the story of Themistocles threatening the allies with the emigration of the Athenians to the site of Siris, a former neighbour town of Sybaris, alleged to have been in close connection with Athens from early times. There is probably very little, if any, historical truth in this last allegation,²³ but Siris was an Ionian city, and before it was destroyed in the second half of the sixth century it seems to have been, at least for some time, dependent on Sybaris, though nominally free.²⁴ Whatever Themistocles may have said, what Herodotus

²³ Cf. Beloch, I, 2, pp. 238 ff. Ciaceri, II, p. 341. Some time after sending off my MS, I was able to read the elaborate study of J. Perret, *Siris* (1941). I am glad to see that in some essential points Perret comes to the same conclusions as I do, but in much of his argument he heaps one ingenious and doubtful hypothesis upon another.

²⁴ This, and not the "formidable commercial rivalry" with Sybaris, seems to be confirmed by the common coins of Siris and Pyxos (Head, 83). Among the twenty-five cities subject to Sybaris (Strabo, *loc. cit.*) were probably also Siris and Pyxos—an extension which made Sybaris mistress of the whole area between sea and sea. Perret speaks fittingly of a Sybarite empire. But his assumption that Siris had been for

wrote is significant. He, who went to Thurii and was one of Pericles' most ardent admirers, reflects in this perhaps tendentious fabrication of early traditions the policy of Pericles.

Some years previously Pericles had begun to find for Athens a foothold in the West when a treaty was concluded between Athens and Egesta.²⁵ A few years later, though the exact date cannot be stated and it may have been as late as 443/2, alliances were concluded with Rhegium and Leontinoi.²⁶ In the request of the Sybarites Pericles saw a new and different opportunity which could lead much further.²⁷ His aims of Panhellenic leadership for Athens, disclosed for the first time in his plan of a Panhellenic congress some years earlier, could be easily imposed on a scheme in which Athens neither could, nor was invited to, found a purely Athenian colony. The new task gave Pericles the idea of sending out a colony which was to be Athenian in its leadership and Panhellenic in its composition, and which might develop into a political and cultural centre establishing and extending Athenian influence far more efficiently than could be hoped for by any treaty of alliance.

Preparations for the final expedition must have gone on throughout the years 445 and 444. It was then that the propaganda for a common Greek policy under the leadership of Athens reached its peak. The Athenian efforts must even have been intensified by the report that the colony at Sybaris had broken up. The date of this event, it is true, is not certain, since our sources are divided on whether it happened before the expedition of 444/3 or after. The coins naturally do not provide exact dates. While all other evidence seems to show that the expedition

centuries a Sybarite colony (and became Ionian only in the fifth century) is equally bold and questionable.

²⁵ Tod, *Greek Hist. Inscr.*, no. 31; he ascribed it to 454/3, the very year of the Egyptian disaster. A. E. Raubitschek, *T. A. P. A.*, LXXV (1944), pp. 10 ff., puts the date back to 458/7.

²⁶ Cf. Gomme, *op. cit.*, I, p. 198. B. D. Meritt, *C. Q.*, LX (1943), pp. 85 ff.: 448 B.C. or later. Meritt makes it likely that these treaties were concluded *ἐς δίδος*, a form uncommon in spite of Thucydides, IV, 63, 1. If Meritt's assumption is right, it would testify to the intensity of Pericles' western policy.

²⁷ It seems no longer necessary to refute the view that those alliances were the work of Pericles' radical opponents, and that Thurii was his own, much more moderate and statesmanlike, achievement (H. Droysen, *Athen und der Westen vor d. sizil. Expedition* [1882], pp. 17 ff.).

of 444/3 immediately led to the foundation of Thurii, and not to a re-founding of Sybaris, the well-informed source of Strabo, VI, 263 (probably Antiochus of Syracuse) maintains that the change of name and place from Sybaris to Thurii occurred later.²⁸ If this were true the tradition about Thurii, including the Οὐρανούπαρτες (see below), would appear to have completely superseded the true story of what actually happened in 444/3. There was always a certain danger of confusing the two names and the two events.²⁹ Probably only two facts stood out in later times; that the main act of colonisation took place in 444/3, and that the new colony was later famous under the name of Thurii. It seems difficult to imagine that the whole apparatus of the final expedition, which under the guidance of Lampon and an oracle of the Delphic god went in search of a new and healthier site than that of Sybaris, meant no more than a refounding, in fact only a reinforcement, of Sybaris.³⁰ Common sense seems in favour of the assumption that the third Sybaris was founded in 446/5, that some time afterwards the Sybarites were expelled, and that in 444/3 Thurii came into being.³¹ Full proof for this theory cannot be found, and anyway it does not make any decisive difference. We saw that the expedition of 446/5, though of a mixed character, was—by sheer force of circumstances—not yet truly Panhellenic. Thurii certainly was, although some of the Greek countries did not take part. The phylae of Thurii, rightly understood, make the nature of this Panhellenism abundantly clear.

We owe our knowledge of the ten Thurian tribes to Diodorus (XII, 11, 3); but his own interpretation has no historical value, although it has been more or less accepted by many modern historians.³² Diodorus divides the ten phylae into three groups, one "Peloponnesian" comprising the *Arkas*, *Achais*, and *Eleia*,

²⁸ The same is clearly stated in Plutarch, *Vita decem Orat.*, 835c.

²⁹ Cf., e.g., Aristotle, *Pol.*, 1303 a 31. Scylax, *Periplus*, 12.

³⁰ Cf. Busolt, p. 526. The opposite view is held, e.g., by Ciaceri, p. 349.

³¹ This is also accepted by Wade-Gery, p. 217, n. 49.

³² Cf. e.g., Busolt, p. 533; Ciaceri, p. 350. A partial attempt at a better understanding was made as early as in Pappritz's dissertation (*op. cit.*, pp. 38 ff.). Wade-Gery does not analyse this fundamental evidence, and simply accepts it as a proof of a full and unrestricted, that is to say un-Periclean, Panhellenism.

another "Dorian outside the Peloponnesus" formed by the *Boiotia*, *Amphiktyonis*, and *Doris*, and a third "from other tribes" covering the *Ias*, *Athenais*, *Euboii*, and *Nesiotis*. Diodorus believes among other things that the phyle *Doris* derived from the tiny and poor district of that name in Central Greece, although the analogy of another phyle, the *Ias*, makes the true explanation obvious. The predominance of the Dorian element in Diodorus' description is, of course, misleading and completely wrong. Actually, the distribution among the main tribes of the Greek people was very fair: Dorians (with the Boeotians) and Ionians were substantially equal to each other, and in addition there were two phylae of Achaean stock. Ten names could not cover every aspect, but the choice was representative and truly Panhellenic—as even Pericles had to make it, if he did not want to spoil his own scheme from the beginning.

There is, however, something more in this. The *Athenais* was more than merely "from other tribes," and more than just one of the Ionian phylae. It has, I believe, never been noticed that only one of the ten names derives from a city, and that is the *Athenais*. The other nine are collective names.³³ Perhaps only the Athenian contingent was large enough to form a phyle by itself; but this argument would only point to the same result: the outstanding position of the Athenians. Moreover, there were, apart from the *Athenais*, three phylae representing the Athenian empire, each of them covering a certain region containing a number of different cities: *Euboii*, *Nesiotis*, *Ias*—the last standing for the remaining States of Ionian origin.³⁴ The *Boiotia*, *Arkas*, *Achais*, and *Eleia* represented men from various cities of these independent countries of Achaean and Dorian stock. The *Amphiktyonis*, apart from its Panhellenic significance, contained

³³ The only exception is the *Eleia*. For Elis had been united by synoecism since the 'seventies. And yet, it was at the same time a sort of one-State Olympic Amphictyony, and as such of particular importance in a Panhellenic scheme. It was, I believe, as the guardians of Olympia that the Eleans received a phyle of their own in Thurii, very much as another phyle, the *Amphiktyonis*, centred on Delphi.

³⁴ At first sight, one might think of identifying two of the tribes, *Nesiotis* and *Ias*, with two of the new "provinces" of the Athenian empire. But the *Euboii* is incompatible with such an explanation, and the analogy with the *Doris* makes it clear that the *Ias* was not confined to the district of the Ταυρικὸς φόρος. Cf. also, e. g., Thucydides, IV, 61, 2.

men of the members of the Delphic Amphictyony in Central and Northern Greece, so far as they were not included in one of the other phylae. The *Doris* contained persons from the rest of the Dorian cities. Places like Corinth and even Sparta were included in this last phyle, though (to say it once again) not as States, but as individual colonists coming from these States; the exiled Spartan Cleandridas is one example.

From this distribution among the phylae there emerges the idea of a Panhellenic leadership of Athens, guaranteed not so much by numbers but by the fact that the men from Athens, together with their allies, formed rather a united and homogeneous body,³⁵ while the other phylae represented a mixed crowd which partly was even pro-Athenian or at least anti-Spartan.³⁶ Thus we can trace a considered and intelligent policy in the political building-up of the new colony, even though this policy failed in the end. In the upheaval of 434/3 the Athenians claimed to be the true *oikostῆρες* because they had sent most of the colonists, that is to say, as a single city, while their opponents relied on the number of cities from which they came (Diodorus, XII, 35, 1 f.). The original pattern can still be discerned. Even as late as 414, after Athenian influence had declined decisively, there was still a powerful pro-Athenian party.³⁷ Apart from the Sicilian disaster it was through the great personality of the Spartan Cleandridas, who had soon become the military leader of Thurii, that the anti-Athenian party was eventually victorious.

The foundation of Thurii was, after all, the outcome of a constant policy of "Athenian" Panhellenism. I am unable to trace anywhere in our evidence of the two expeditions that aristocratic and agonistic Panhellenism which Wade-Gery discovered in the family traditions of Pericles' opponent Thucydides. "To Pericles, Panhellenism was a thing which could be made to serve

³⁵ This is true although the allied States were treated officially as independent, just as they had been treated when Pericles sent out his envoys with the invitation for the Panhellenic congress (cf. Gommé, pp. 366 f.).

³⁶ The Achaeans had joined Athens several years earlier (Thucydides, I, 111, 3), Elis had been democratic and anti-Spartan since her synoecism. Some of the Arcadian cities were always on bad terms with Sparta, while allies of Sparta such as the Boeotians would have been represented—as it seems, in fairly large numbers—by exiled democrats.

³⁷ Thucydides, VI, 104, 2; VII, 33, 5 f.; 35, 1; 57, 11.

Athens; to Thucydides, it meant equality of all Greek States, the renouncement of Athenian domination.”⁵⁸ Even if this contrast were completely true to the facts, it cannot be maintained that the new colony conformed to the second rather than the first kind of Panhellenism. To found a colony with the greatest possible variety of colonists, to appoint leaders who were all Athenians and adherents of Pericles (cf. Plutarch, *Per.*, 6, 2, and below), to make the new State a democracy based on ten phylae like Athens and on a well-founded expectation of Athenian leadership—the “Periclean,” that is to say, democratic and imperialistic, character of the policy which led to the foundation of Thurii could scarcely be made more obvious.

There is, however one piece of evidence, if evidence it is, that seems to support Wade-Gery’s theory. In the *Vita anonyma Thucydidis* two paragraphs (6-7) refer, as Wade-Gery has seen, to the son of Melesias and not to the historian, although the anonymous biographer did not realise this. There it is reported that Thucydides, before he was condemned and ostracised, paid a visit to Sybaris. This must have been in 445/4 or early in 444/3, since there is not the slightest reason to assume that Thucydides went out with the first expedition. It goes without saying that he did not join the second. We may expect he opposed Pericles’ plan and general ideas; but this he could do more effectively at home. Moreover, as Wade-Gery points out himself, the story that Thucydides had to face a trial and was condemned (on what charge and to what, we are not told) just before he was ostracised, would imply an unheard-of course of events and sounds completely false. It becomes hardly more plausible by the fact that Xenocritus, one of the leaders of the final expedition, is mentioned as the prosecutor. There is probably some confusion with the trial which Thucydides apparently

⁵⁸ Wade-Gery, p. 219. He largely relies on the one point that “the co-operation of the Peloponnesus was invited.” In this he revives a theory of Bury’s (*Hist. of Greece*, p. 379) who connected the invitation to the Peloponnesians with the first expedition, but explained it in the same way as Wade-Gery does, thus distinguishing two phases of Periclean policy, of which only the second was deliberately Panhellenic. I have tried to show that the facts about the invitation make all such conclusions unfounded. Some objections to Wade-Gery’s ingenious theory are also raised by Gomme, *op. cit.*, p. 386; I share his doubts about the “factious leader” Thucydides being such a Panhellenic idealist.

had to face in his old age (Aristophanes, *Ach.*, 702 ff.). The whole story is incoherent and mistaken.³⁹ I believe it could be neglected even if it did not derive from such a scanty and utterly unreliable source as the concoction called *Vita Thucydidis*.⁴⁰ If, however, we were to trust this evidence, and Thucydides actually did pay a visit to Thurii—certainly with the intention of causing trouble and of interfering with Pericles' plans—he remained on the whole unsuccessful. The constitution of Thurii was not his work.

Wade-Gery (*lcc. cit.*, pp. 205 f., 219) actually finds confirmation for his theory in a particular hypothesis of his own which is based on a statement of Plutarch's (*Per.*, 16, 3): "After the overthrow and ostracism of Thucydides, Pericles for no less than fifteen years acquired a position of authority and domination that was continuous and one by his yearly strategies." Wade-Gery believes that the fifteen years of Pericles' "Principate" of which Plutarch speaks make sense only if we assume that

³⁹ I doubt whether Schol. *Vesp.* 947 really supports it. It is true that there we read: οὐτω κατεδικάσθη, εἰτα ἐξωστρακίσθη. But that οὐτω refers to another peculiar tale of Thucydides being unable to speak for himself in court. Is it likely that the oligarchs had such a dull and inefficient leader? This, too, seems rather an allusion to the trial of the old man whom Aristophanes describes as senile and doddering, a poor relict of a glorious past.

⁴⁰ Cf. also Gomme, p. 386. My argument would lose some of its stringency if J. S. Morrison's sharp distinction between a Cleisthenic and a Periclean (= Protagorean) theory of democracy were right, the former being "an indiscriminate selection of the equal people ruling in turn," the latter a leadership of those "most suited for leadership by talent and position" (*C. Q.*, XXXV [1941], pp. 11 ff.). No doubt, the strategia was the outstanding new element in the post-Cleisthenian State; but it was no innovation of the 'fifties. It had similar importance in the times of Themistocles, Aristides, and Cimon. The Cleisthenic archonship, on the other hand, though it did not allow re-election, gave the leading politicians the necessary position and power. It led, we may say, to a leadership of rivalling heads of clans rather than to individual leadership, but there was no fundamental and theoretical difference. I also disagree with Morrison's interpretation of Herodotus' constitutional debate (III, 80 ff.). Would Herodotus really, in speaking in favor of monarchy, be thinking of the ascendancy of Pericles? He certainly could not wish to support the comic caricature that Pericles' position made democracy a fake, and its leader a tyrant. It was different more than a generation later when Thucydides spoke of the πρώτον ἀνδρὸς ἀρχή.

there was a break in his yearly strategies before that period. Thucydides was ostracised in spring 443; according to Wade-Gery, he had then "almost equal authority with Pericles," and in 444/3, the very year of the expedition, Pericles very probably was not a strategos at all. This theory is in the last resort based on two considerations. One is that Pericles' "Principate" rested on his annual re-election as strategos *εξ ἀπάντων*. In an earlier paper⁴¹ I have tried to show that at least in 440/39 and 430/29, though Pericles was among the strategoi, it was Phormion who was elected *εξ ἀπάντων*. Pericles' "special position among the strategoi" therefore rested on his general authority rather than any legal form, and cannot be described in strict and legal terms.⁴² This is even more true with regard to the second consideration—the significance of Plutarch's statement. I do not think that Thucydides, even for a short time only, was ever in a position similar to that of Pericles. Passages such as Aristotle, *Aθ. πολ.*, 28, 2 and 4, or Plutarch, *Per.*, 6, 2 and 11, 1, do not show that he was *προστάτης τοῦ δήμου*,⁴³ but only that he headed the oligarchic opposition. A generation earlier, when Themistocles was ostracised, the oligarchs had been powerful indeed and well prepared.⁴⁴ Thucydides put up a good fight against Pericles, but it was a rearguard action. This last stand of a legal opposition—the next step was the revolution of 411—acquired real importance only by the position which Pericles gained from the oligarchic defeat. The mere fact that Thucydides was ostracised and that until then Pericles had to fight against an important opponent is explanation enough for thinking that his full rule began only after that event. Pericles had probably been strategos in most years since 461, but even if he

⁴¹ *A. J. P.*, LXVI (1945), pp. 130 f.

⁴² Since Wade-Gery speaks of Pericles' Principate—and there is, in fact, no fixed term describing his position more closely, although his State was a democracy and Augustus' was not—it seems right to remember Augustus' *auctoritate praestiti omnibus* (*Res gestae*, 34), especially in view of Cicero, *De Rep.*, I, 26: *Pericles ille, et auctoritate et eloquentia et consilio princeps civitatis suae.*

⁴³ As Wade-Gery assumes; even he, however, does not believe that Thucydides was strategos, and this office, after all, was at that period the only basis for a *prostasia*.

⁴⁴ This is strikingly illustrated by the prefabricated ostraca, published by O. Broneer, *Hesperia*, VII (1938), pp. 228 ff.

was in office for a continuous period of many years it would not have been ἀρχὴ καὶ δυναστεία. Until 443 his position, though of growing authority, remained to some extent precarious, and only during the succeeding years was his "office" essentially unopposed and untroubled, διηγεγκῆς καὶ μία indeed. Only after 443 was he the ruler of the State, and that is what Plutarch wants to stress more than anything else. Besides, his phrase is a piece of rhetorical writing rather than a factual statement. There is, so far as I can see, no real reason for assuming that Thucydides was in full authority in 444/3, and our investigation into the evidence for Sybaris and Thurii has, I hope, excluded the possibility of confirming Thucydides' powerful position by the kind of Panhellenism displayed in the expedition, or *vice versa*.

The foundation of Thurii was the outcome of the same kind of political thought and political aims, in other words, of the same Athenian imperialism as that which had led to the proposal of a Panhellenic congress a few years previously (Plutarch, *Per.*, 17). It had implied political imperialism upheld by religious leadership, "an Amphictyony greater than Delphi's,"⁴⁵ based at the same time on the freedom of the seas safeguarded by the Athenian fleet. The aims now were both more modest and more realistic. But the spirit was the same. Pericles founded a colony on a Panhellenic basis, a colony led by an Athenian *οἰκιστής*,⁴⁶ and intended as a stronghold of Athenian influence in the West.

If, then, the Thurian enterprise was Periclean in conception and execution, it can tell us much about the politician Pericles during the 'forties. Plutarch in one of his treatises⁴⁷ stresses the point that Pericles generally used to employ a great variety of men. Hardly in any of his actions is this quite so manifest as in the foundation of Thurii. Not only were the colonists taken from a large number of Greek States many of which were anything but friendly to one another—the Athenians also who were leading in the enterprise were representatives of very

⁴⁵ Wade-Gery, p. 217.

⁴⁶ See below. Although Lampon to some extent represented Delphic influence on Athens, practically the Delphic god had been robbed of his traditional position of *οἰκιστής*. He regained it later (Diodorus, XII, 35, 3).

⁴⁷ *Praec. Ger. Reip.*, 812d.

different, in fact of completely opposite, ways and philosophies of life.

The comic poets used, and probably coined, the word Θουριομάντεις (Aristophanes, *Nub.*, 332 and schol.), and the explanation of some scholiasts found its way into late lexica.⁴⁸ The word was to indicate the soothsayers connected with the foundation of Thurii, and it reveals the prominent part they played in the affair. Various names are mentioned, but the chief man was Lampon the well-known partisan of Pericles.⁴⁹ He sometimes appears even as the only οἰκιστής of Thurii.⁵⁰ Lampon was known as an ἔγγυτης,⁵¹ but not ἐξ Εὐπολπιδῶν; he was not even an initiate of Eleusis (Aristotle, *Rhet.*, 1419 a 2). He was what the Athenians called Πινθόχρηστος, that is to say, he got his office and dignity from Delphi. At the same time, however, he was an active politician. There is a story according to which he foresaw the outcome of the conflict between Pericles and Thucydides (Plutarch, *Per.*, 5, 2)—a clear proof that even forty years before Socrates' trial religious conservatism went hand in hand with democratic policy.⁵² It is evident that the activities of prophets such as Lampon were essential for the whole enterprise.⁵³ This is not surprising, for our sources give us many

⁴⁸ See Photius and Eusebius s. v. Cf. the reconstruction of Photius' text by Wade-Gery, p. 225.

⁴⁹ In the Lexica various kinds of men, connected with Thurii in one way or another, are joined under the same heading of Θουριομάντεις. Neither the poet and rhetor Dionysius Chalceus (*Prosop. Att.*, no. 4084), nor the banished Spartan Cleandridas, nor Lysias who was then still a boy, ever were μάντεις, and the two last mentioned were not among the founders. Cicero's attempt (p. 347) to regard Cleandridas as the military leader of the expedition of 444/3 does not carry conviction. If he had really gone to Athens after being banished from Sparta, his guilt with regard to the charge of being bribed by Pericles in 446 would have been beyond doubt, and our tradition would have been much more definite about it. The *argumentum ex silentio* seems clearly to indicate that he did not go to Thurii by way of Athens.

⁵⁰ Plutarch, *loc. cit.* (see note 47).

⁵¹ Eupolis, frag. 297; cf. schol. Aristophanes, *Av.* 521. Busolt-Swoboda, *Griech. Staatskunde*, II. p. 1106.

⁵² Cf. K. von Fritz, *T.A.P.A.*, LXXI (1940), pp. 93, 124.

⁵³ Cf. A. W. Parke, *Hist. of the Delphic Oracle*, p. 201. Lampon was strongly attacked by Cratinus in his *Drapetides* (frags. 57-8, 62), probably as a supporter of Pericles. Perhaps Pericles himself was attacked in that play (frag. 56; cf. F. Leo, *Rh. Mus.*, XXXIII [1878],

examples of the genuine and fervent belief of the Greeks, the Athenians as well as others, in oracles, prophecies, and mantic evidence. Nearly thirty years later another much larger expedition to the West was preceded by a veritable storm of soothsaying and prophesying. Every leading politician, whether he himself believed in these things or not, had to make use of them, and so had Pericles.

It was no doubt of considerable importance to have the "orthodox" on one's side; but there was more in it in the case of Lampon. He was responsible for the share which Delphi had in the act of colonisation, and it is not surprising that Apollo had some say in an enterprise which claimed to be Panhellenic—quite apart from the general and ancient rôle of the Delphic god as the protector of all colonising people. Lampon, however, was independent and patriotic enough to prevent Apollo from becoming the official *οὐκετής*. Thurii was to be founded by Athenian men, not by a non-Athenian god. It was this principle which was to be reversed later when Thurii revolted against Athenian supremacy. Lampon, apart from being a genuine adherent to Pericles' policy, was probably delighted to bring his city as well as his own person into the limelight of a great enterprise blessed by the gods. His general support of Pericles must have been based on similar considerations. Pericles' temples and statues of the gods, although they might not satisfy the more old-fashioned among the pious, were a tribute to the greatness of the gods of Athens, and a man like Lampon was bound to appreciate that. There was a clear line of official and patriotic religiosity in Pericles' policy, but it was only one side of his policy, and any conclusions as to Pericles' own religious attitude would be off the point and misleading.

Fortunately the same enterprise provides ample evidence also for this. For if the plan was made popular largely by favourable portents and oracles and by Lampon's leadership, an entirely different spirit lived in some of those men who accompanied the expedition and were given important commissions. The famous architect Hippodamus of Miletus, for example, who had previously re-planned the Piraeus, now designed the plan of the

pp. 403 f.). But everything is uncertain, and to connect the title *The Runaway Women* either with Athenian colonists or the expelled Sybarites is equally fantastic and arbitrary.

new city, which was based on four parallel streets crossed at right angles by three others (Diodorus, XII, 10, 7). The idea of planning the lay-out of a town beforehand, and planning it like this, was comparatively new. Hippodamus was probably not its inventor, but certainly the man who developed the scheme to a very high perfection and practical adaptability.⁵⁴ It was an attempt to master the influences of the ground, of tradition, and of mere chance, by a purely rational pattern. It was at the same time, despite the more aristocratic features of Hippodamus' own theory of an ideal State (Aristotle, *Pol.*, 126^a b 22 ff.), an expression of democracy; for it aimed at giving all private houses equal standards and situation.⁵⁵

The constitution of Thurii, though of course democratic, seems to have been different from the Athenian model. One of its chief characteristics was the rule that nobody was allowed to become strategos for a second time within a period of five years (Aristotle, *Pol.*, 1307 b 7). This, as far as I know, is a unique regulation within the normal constitutional life of Greek States.⁵⁶ It looks like a definite and deliberate departure from that order on which Pericles' position was based. If this is so—and I do not doubt it—the reasons must be found in the particular situation of Thurii both in domestic and foreign affairs.⁵⁷ Internal political life was dominated by the fact that the population was composed of the most heterogeneous elements. There was always the danger that one of the ethnical groups might fall under the leadership of an ambitious general and become a political faction which could serve its leader as a platform for becoming a tyrant. Italy and Sicily were an excellent soil for tyrannies and factious oligarchies, and in Thurii the danger of upheaval was probably more threatening than anywhere else. In later years—mainly in the 'twenties, I believe—the situation

⁵⁴ Cf. A. v. Gerkan, *Gr.-ech. Städteanlagen*, pp. 45 f.

⁵⁵ Cf. F. Tritsch, *Klio*, XXII (1929), p. 71. Giaceri, p. 350 ff.

⁵⁶ It was much more radical than, e. g., the law of Tarentum by which it was forbidden to hold the highest office for two years continuously (Diogenes Laertius, VIII, 79).

⁵⁷ It seems certain that there was no other (civil) office in Thurii which could be held for more than one year. No Athenian oligarch, at any rate, would have dreamt of supporting a democracy as radical as that law implies.

deteriorated decisively because of the influx of many exiles from the allied cities (Ps. Andocides, IV, 12) and other enemies of Athens (Thucydides, VIII, 35; Pausanias, VI, 7, 4). It is, however, likely that the intended remedy did actually hasten the outbreak of the disease. Such a radical measure, which would prevent anybody not only from becoming a tyrant but also from being a successful and efficient political leader, was impracticable in an age in which individual leadership had become an outstanding sign of the times, and in a State which from its very beginnings was threatened by hostile neighbours both Greek and barbarian. Thus it is not surprising that, as Aristotle tells us (*loc. cit.*), a military rising first destroyed that particular law and later the whole democratic constitution.⁵⁸

Did Pericles not realise the danger of such a form of democracy? His chief thought must have been to give Thurii a constitution which could not interfere with the supremacy of Athens. Naturally the new colony had to be a democracy. But to give it a chance of putting a military and political leader into a position similar to that of Pericles himself might create a spirit of independence too strong not to endanger its relations with Athens. There was nobody at hand to whom Pericles could entrust a leading position in Thurii, and he probably did not even wish to find such a man. He himself was to remain, whether at home or abroad, the only man who as a strategos was the ruler of the State.

We do not know enough of the constitution of Thurii to judge its details. There was perhaps some analogy between Thurii and Amphipolis which was founded six years later. Both were colonies with a strongly mixed population,⁵⁹ both almost immediately after their foundation grew into large cities, both were creations of the same imperialistic policy. Unfortunately we know about the constitution of Amphipolis even less than about

⁵⁸ The date of the revolt is disputed. But whether it was in 434/3 (Ed. Meyer) or in 413 (Menzel and others), the democratic constitution, in which alone the law about the strategia could have originated, dated back to 443. It is more doubtful whether the measures by which the privileges of a landed oligarchy were destroyed and which are mentioned by Aristotle a few lines earlier (1307 a 27 ff.) have anything to do with the original democracy. They belong probably to a later period than the law on the strategia (cf. also Plato, *Laws*, 636 B).

⁵⁹ For Amphipolis cf. Thucydides, IV, 103, 1; Diodorus, XII, 32, 3.

that of Thurii. In an inscription of the fourth century B. C. (*Syll.*³, 194) προστίται are mentioned as responsible for setting up a stele; but we do not know whether they were permanent officials or only a changing committee. Similarly Aristotle speaks of σύμβουλοι in Thurii, charged, so it seems, with the duty of guarding the laws, and therefore of course a permanent office. Although we ought not to think in this context of Cleandridas who had been a σύμβουλος to king Pleistoanax in the campaign of 446 (Plutarch, *Per.*, 22, 2), and may exclude any Spartan influence, the name of the office and its function of νόμους φυλάττειν have a clearly anti-democratic flavour. All this is not very helpful, though we may assume that the similar fate of Thurii and Amphipolis, both cities turning away early from Athens, was at least partially reflected in similar constitutional developments.

There is, however, one more fact which is of outstanding importance. We are told that Protagoras was engaged in "writing the laws of Thurii" (Diogenes Laertius, IX, 50). This piece of evidence goes back to Heracleides Ponticus, and there is no reason why we should doubt it; it was so well-known a fact that it provided the basis for dating Protagoras' *akmé* to the year 444/3.⁶⁰ It is very likely that he was responsible for the constitution of Thurii.⁶¹ But there our knowledge, and even our guessing, ends. If the law about the strategia was due to Protagoras, this fact would disprove any attempt to attribute to him an elaborate theory of political leadership.⁶² But we can be sure,

⁶⁰ See above p. 150. It is possible that the attacks against Pericles' friends were "one of the reasons for Protagoras' mission" (Morrison, *loc. cit.*, p. 6, note).

⁶¹ Cf. A. Menzel, *Protagoras als Gesetzgeber von Thurii* (Berichte Sächs. Ges. d. Wiss., LXII [1910]), pp. 191 ff. Menzel tries to prove too much from our scanty evidence, but even though his arguments are frequently weak, I believe that the facts in general agree with his conclusions. Cf. also Ciaceri, pp. 353 ff. A different picture of Protagoras' political philosophy is drawn by L. Loenen, *Protagoras and the Greek Community* (Amsterdam, 1940). But he does not refer either to Thurii or to Pericles. This is not the place to discuss Protagoras' part in the general development of Political Theory.

⁶² This is one of several reasons which seem to disprove the theory of Morrison's already mentioned article, an ingenious *tour de force* in favour of Protagoras as the man who developed a theory of political leadership which Pericles put into practice.

from our knowledge of the friendly and close relations between Pericles and Protagoras, that the latter's work of legislation was not at variance with Pericles' Thurian policy.

Probably the great Sophist was even more concerned with the νόμοι than with the πολυτεία of Thurii. As regards Civil Law, we are told by Diodorus (XII, 12 ff.) that Thurii used the laws of Charondas; other sources mention Zaleucus.⁶³ We cannot prove that Protagoras used one of these famous bodies of laws, or even both, but it is quite possible. He would have built his own legislation on the foundations of earlier, and in particular Italic, traditions. Ephorus speaks of the more exact and elaborate character of the Thurian laws as compared with those of Zaleucus.⁶⁴ This, of course, is what we should expect. Protagoras adapted and accommodated earlier laws to the needs of a fifth century democracy and its advanced economy. I cannot say whether the attempt to find laws of Protagoras in some fragments of Theophrastus is justified.⁶⁵ They are about some special questions of the right of sale, and anyway display a fairly "modern" spirit of economic legislation. "It would be interesting to have the Criminal Law of Thurii";⁶⁶ but nothing is known about it.

Hippodamus and Protagoras are outstanding exponents of the modern, essentially rationalist, spirit. They as well as the orthodox "founders" Lampon and Xenocritus probably left Thurii after the final settlement, and this must have weakened the position of the Athenians there. Others, however, remained —the two brothers Euthydemus and Diōnysodorus, for example, sophists of a minor kind, who went out with the expedition and lived in Thurii for many years (Plato, *Euthyd.*, 217 B-C). A much more prominent colonist was Herodotus. With his enthusiasm for Pericles and Periclean Athens, he was the right man to influence others, and this may have been one of the reasons why he went. We do not know for certain whether he

⁶³ Athenaeus, XI, 508. Suidas, s. v. Ζάλευκος. Cf. Ephorus, *F. Gr. H.*, 70, F 139.

⁶⁴ Cf. in general F. E. Adcock, *Cambr. Hist. Journ.*, II (1927), pp. 104 f. M. Mühl, *Klio*, XXII (1929), pp. 114, 459 ff.

⁶⁵ Menzel, *op. cit.*, pp. 216 ff. Mühl, *loc. cit.*, pp. 116 f., and *Klio*, Beiheft XXIX (1933), p. 64.

⁶⁶ J. B. Bury, *C. A. H.*, V, p. 384, n. 2.

left with the main expedition or later, though the former is more likely. He had no official duties, but he became a citizen of Thurii⁶⁷ and lived there at least for some years. It is possible, though not certain, that he left when the anti-Athenian tendencies grew too strong.⁶⁸ He stood in a sense between the Θουριούπατρες and the Sophists, another striking witness for the wide scope and clear forethought that were displayed in the selection of the leading colonists. The whole enterprise is, in fact, an outstanding example of the union of political and cultural forces in Pericles' mind.

Here ends the story of the foundation of Thurii. The later history of the city, its decline and fall, though not bare of interesting moments, is of little general significance. But in its foundation many features are displayed, typical of Periclean policy. It was he who pursued a determined, if sometimes unrealistic, policy of powerful expansion and imperialism, he who made use of religious beliefs and superstitions for his political aims, he who was deeply interested in the modern teaching and in a philosophical approach to the problems of life and nature, he who ruled Athens and aimed at an extension of her power, and at the same time could not think of politics without realising and indeed fostering its cultural implications and possibilities. The foundation of Thurii reflects and confirms the greatness of his mind and the failure of his policy.

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⁶⁷ F. Jacoby, *R.-E.*, Suppl. II, cols. 205 ff., 224 ff., has put it beyond doubt that the evidence for this fact derives only from the first words of Herodotus' work: 'Ηροδότου Θουριού περὶ ἀπόδεξις ήξε. But there could be no clearer proof for the fact itself. Cf. also J. E. Powell, *The History of Herodotus*, pp. 63 f.

⁶⁸ Jacoby, *loc. cit.*, cols. 242 ff., contests this view and regards it as probable that he died in Thurii; cf. also P. E. Legrand, *Introduction (Coll. Budé)* (1932). Powell's opposite opinion (pp. 72 ff.) is part of his general attempt to reconstruct the development of Herodotus' life and work. I am very much inclined to follow him in this point. I see that Jacoby is now prepared ("though not very confidently") to admit that Herodotus returned to Athens (*J. H. S.*, LXIV [1944], p. 45, n. 33).

ENVY AND PITY IN GREEK PHILOSOPHY.

In an earlier paper I referred in passing to the three types of emotion which Aristotle says are obstructive of pity: *phthonos*, *nemesis*, and *epichairekakia*.¹ The first of these is the general term and may be used to designate either of the other two. The fundamental emotion is that of begrudging someone something, whether the prize is one which we ourselves do not have but should like to have (*phthonos*), or one the unmerited possession of which raises our indignation (*nemesis*), or one which we are maliciously or, it may be, justly, pleased to see another person lose or fail to acquire (*epichairekakia*). In the present paper I mean to elicit and set forth Greek philosophic theory concerning these varieties of envy and their relation to pity. My scheme will be partly chronological and partly topical.

Space will not permit a full treatment of the numerous non-philosophical references to envy,² such as Pindar's saying that envy is better than pity, meaning that it is better to be prosperous and enviable than unfortunate and pitiable; and the remarks which Herodotus assigns to various speakers, to the effect that man is naturally envious (III, 80), or that it is characteristic of the Greeks to envy success and hate superiority (VII, 236); and Thucydides' designation of envy as the emotion whereby in the period preceding the Peloponnesian war the extreme parties were impelled to draw the moderates into their mutual destruction (III, 82, 8), and again as the blighting force without which people would not have preferred vengeance to religion and greed to restraint (III, 84, 2).

A few passages of Euripides demand closer scrutiny. In the *Phoenissae* (541-5) Jocasta personifies and praises *ἰσότης* as that which binds friends to friends, cities to cities, and allies to allies, and, drawing an analogy from nature, in which day and night are found to enjoy parity with each other, she adds: *κοιδέτερον αὐτῶν φθόνον ἔχει νικάμενον*. In the same play (476-80) Polynices pleads for the principle of parity in sharing the government of

¹ Stevens, "Some Attic Commonplaces of Pity," *A. J. P.*, LXV (1944), pp. 1-25, especially pp. 10 ff.; Aristotle, *Rhet.* 1386 b 9 ff.

² A partial list of such passages appears at R. Hirzel, *Themis, Dike und Verwandtes*, pp. 299-308.

Thebes with his brother as a means of eschewing enmity and envy. In the *Supplices* (238-45) Theseus says that there are three classes of citizens, the rich who are useless and greedy, the poor who are envious and dangerous inasmuch as they may be swayed by depraved leaders; and the middle class which is to be credited with whatever safety and order a state may have. In the *Orestes* (917-30) the fickle citizenry to whom political assemblies are an everyday affair is contrasted with the sober farmer who seldom comes to the city at all. I find in these passages the suggestion of a political theory to the effect that a society which managed to dispense with the greedy rich and the envious poor and contrived to be largely agrarian in character would presumably be free from the disturbances caused by the dangerous emotion, envy. A fragment of Agathon (24) seems to glance cynically at such a theory with the observation that there would be no envy if we were all born equal.

Among the fragments of Democritus which are concerned with problems of government and good citizenship is one in which envy is said to be the source of dissension in a city,³ and another which I translate as follows (frag. 255): "Whenever the upper classes can bring themselves to make loans to poor people and to help them and show them kindness, in such action there are already operative pity, the breaking-down of class barriers, fraternization, coöperation, civil concord (*τοὺς πολιήτας ὁμονόουσεῖν*), and other good things, so many none could count them." Wilhelm Nestle⁴ considered this passage to be but one of the evidences of an *ὁμόνωια*-literature much more extensive than the fragments we have would indicate. The evidence for such a literature is slender. There is the *περὶ ὁμονοίας* of the sophist Antiphon in which anarchy is declared to be the greatest evil,⁵ there is a bare mention of *ὁμόνοια* in a fragment from Thrasy-machus' *Republic*, there is the possibility that Gorgias uses the

³ Frag. 245 (Diels⁴). Cf. Shakespeare, I *Henry VI*, iv, 1, 193 f.: ". . . when envy breeds unkind division: There comes the ruin, there begins confusion." Envy and discord are paired in a painting by Poussin (described in Larousse, s. v. "envie"). For the relationships of a quasi-mythological Envy see Hyginus, *Fa*., *praef.*, p. 97 Sch., and *R.-E.*, s. v. "Eris."

⁴ *Der Friedensgedanke in der Antiken Welt* (*Philol.*, Suppl., XXXI [1938]), pp. 15 f.

⁵ Frag. 61, Diels⁴.

word in orations urging Panhellenism,⁶ but there is no assurance that in these instances and others ὄμονοια was the key-word of the sophistic approach to the therapeusis of Greek civic factionalism. Probably Antiphon's πεπὶ ὄμονότας did treat of envy in an account of the customs of some fabulous people. (frags. 45, 46, 47), just as Herodotus remarked on the absence of envy among the Agathyrsi (IV, 104). The idea that envy is a deterrent to civic harmony appears again in Xenophon's *Memorabilia* (III, 5, 16) in a speech ascribed to the young Pericles, who lists envy with the passions which make him despair of Athenians ever attaining to ὄμονοια. Another section of the *Memorabilia* (II, 6, 20 ff.) works around to Democritus' notion of conciliation, though on a more exclusive scale. Socrates sees opposing tendencies at work, the one towards affection and the other towards hostility. Men need one another, and have compassion on one another, but at the same time they envy and consequently hate one another.⁷ Yet the barrier of envy can be overcome if men will place their property at the disposal of their friends and regard their friends' property as their own.

That Xenophon—or Socrates—should regard envy in its narrow meaning as the grudging emotion that mars the relations of friends and associates is in keeping with the definition of envy given at *Memorabilia*, III, 9, 8. This kind of envy, unlike that regarded as the root of class strife, is similar to the envy which Aristotle limits to relations between men who are near to one another in time, locality, age, and reputation, or who are rivals (*Rhet.* 1388 a 5-7). This milder envy is distinguished from rivalry or emulation by the latter's lack of a grudging quality. The emulous man does not begrudge another man his success, but is grieved by his own lack of such success and tries to qualify himself for a like success. His emotion is good, whereas envy is bad (*Rhet.* 1388 a 35). Plato had been less precise in distinguishing the emotions. He attributes the disturbance in Greece after the Persian wars to the envy that grew out of the rivalry of states (*Menex.* 242 A), and in the *Laws* (679 B) he says that insolence, injustice, rivalry, and envy are not engendered in a state free from wealth and poverty. Yet elsewhere in the *Laws* (730 E-731 A) he contrasts the man who vies with

⁶ Philostratus, *V. S.*, I, 9, 5.

⁷ *Mem.*, II, 6, 21. For envy and hatred see *infra*, note 40.

others in excellence, in a generous spirit free from envy, with the envious man who tries to make his own superior position secure by slandering his rivals.⁸

Plato does not make a point of the absence of envy in his ideal state, but he does designate it a characteristic emotion of the tyrannical nature (*Rep.* 579 C, 580 A, 536 C) and one for which the philosophic soul will not have leisure (500 C). But Aristotle discusses the problem of the elimination of envy from a state in terms which strongly suggest that he was conscious of a literature on the subject, perhaps a sophistic treatise such as might be the source of Euripides' random observations on the subject. Aristotle deprecates the state composed of slaves and masters instead of free men, with the one class envious, the other scornful (*Pol.* 1295 b 21-3), and he looks to a strong middle class as a means of preserving balance in a state and thwarting the factionalism that arises from the envy of a populace or the insolence of a ruling class (*Pol.* 1304 a 33-b 5). Again, Aristotle says (*Pol.* 1318 b 10-35), with reference to his four types of democracy, that the agricultural democracy is the best because farmers are too busy to meet in assembly except when it is necessary, and are too engrossed in their work to have time to covet other people's property.⁹ In this best form of government, says Aristotle, the best men will govern with the consent of the governed and without the latter's being envious of the upper class. W. Nestle¹⁰

⁸ For envy and emulation cf. Plautus, *Miles Gloriosus* 829-40: *quoniam aemulari non licet, nunc incidet*; and Phaedrus' protest that his imitation of Aesop is not *invidic* but *aemulatic* (II, 9, 7). La Bruyère seems to agree with Aristotle in making the distinction between jealousy and emulation that between vice and virtue (*De l'homme*, 85). For envy and slander cf. Plutarch's statement that Themistocles aroused envy of Aristides by slander (Plutarch, *Arist.*, 7, 1) and Herodotus' ascription to envy and malice of Demaretus' slander of Cleomenes (VI, 61, 1). A fragment of Theophrastus reads as follows (frag. 153): ἐκ διαβολῆς καὶ φθόνου ψεῦδος ἐτ' ὀλγην τσχύσαν ἀπεμάραθη. Cf. also Isocrates, XII, 21, and Plutarch, *Mor.*, 167 E. In a painting by Apelles Slander was flanked by Ignorance and Suspicion and guided by Envy: Lucian, *Cal.*, 5; Roscher, *Lew.*, s. v. "Pēthonos." Plutarch probably compared envy with slander in his lost essay *De Calumnia* (frag. 23 Didoz).

⁹ At *Ath. Pol.*, 16, 3, Aristotle supposes that the agrarian policy of Pisistratus was motivated by just the objectives mentioned here as desirable. See Sandys *ad loc.* and cf. Heitland, *Agricola*, pp. 89 f.

¹⁰ "Die Horen des Prodigcs," *Hermes*, LXXI (1936), p. 156.

traces these ideas to Prodicus' *Ωραι*. I should not wish to be so specific, but I agree that some treatment of envy and its operation in the state appeared in one or more sophistic treatises, perhaps in Thrasymachus' *Republic*. The *Republic* of Zeno had for its special deity Eros the bringer of *δημόσια*. In this world-state wealth, currency, temples, courts of law, and gymnasia were to be absent. Community of women would prevail. It is obvious that the envy that a lower class feels with respect to a higher would not exist in such a state. Zeno's *Republic* was written "on the tail of the dog," an expression which is interpreted as meaning that Zeno had only progressed in his thinking a little way beyond Cynicism. The question arises: Was the Stoic interdiction of pity and envy from the emotional habits of the sage an idea arising at first from Zeno's picture of a state in which none envied or pitied?¹¹

To return from the political to the psychological and theological aspects of envy, we note that in both the *Phaedrus* and the *Timaeus* Plato excludes envy from the divine nature, in passages which, though of quite different context, alike reinforce Plato's general doctrine that the deity is not answerable for evil (*θεὸς ἀνάτολος*, *Rep.* 617 E), and that there is no prescribed limitation to man's becoming like to God (*δημοίωρος θεῷ*, *Theaet.* 176 B). In the *Phaedrus* the soul is compared to a charioteer driving two horses, disciplined passion and undisciplined passion. The soul of a god is such a driver too, with the difference that his horses are good and of good descent whereas in human beings they are of mixed and imperfect nature. The gods drive their chariots in splendid formations up to the region of transcendental reality, but whether a human soul can attain this region and how much of it he can see if he does attain it depend on the soul's ability to control the horses it is driving. Anyone who chooses to do so and is able to do so may follow the gyrations of the divine chorus, inasmuch as envy is excluded (*φθόνος γὰρ οὐκ εἴσω θείου χόρου ἴσταται*, 247 A): that is, the deity does not begrudge the sight

¹¹ For the interpretation of the phrase "on the tail of the dog," see A. Döring, "Zeno der Gründer der Stoa," *Preussische Jahrbücher*, CVII (1902), p. 217. The idea of a state or more especially an agrarian community in which there is no occasion for either pity or envy appears in Vergil's *Georgics*, II, 498 f.

of the things that really are to anyone: the failure is in the person.

In the *Timaeus* (29 D) Plato proposes to tell why the Builder built coming-into-being and this All. The answer given is that He was good and being good could not begrudge His own goodness, but wished all things to be like to Himself as nearly as possible. His task involved imposing order on that which had been without order, but we must infer that in some way the disorderly substratum of the world was not entirely amenable to His efforts, and that in consequence evil could not be excluded from the world thus assembled. In the *Theaetetus* (176 A) Plato suggests the metaphysical necessity of evil: evil exists because there must be something opposed to the good. There too it is said that evil cannot have a place among the gods, but must of necessity wander about among mortals. The main point of the *Timaeus* passage must also be that God is not to blame for the evil in the world, that He does not begrudge His goodness, and that the possibilities of moral progress are therefore unlimited. This passage has, however, been quoted as an illustration of the idea of creation passing into that of manifestation, or of creation on the "principle of metaphysical bounty."¹² One can only object that to read such an idea into the *Timaeus* passage is to rethink it in terms of a dogmatism foreign to Plato. Plato is not interested in the psychology of God in this passage. He did not ask the question why God was not content with eternal self-communion. And the reason given for the creation does not convey any implication as to a necessity of deity or of goodness or of love to overflow and reveal itself in creation or to impose itself on a preexisting disorder.

In the *Epinomis* (988 B) it is said that the Greeks should never have any qualms about concerning themselves with divine matters because they are mortal. For, as a matter of fact, deity itself instructs us and could not be so ignorant of itself or so out of sorts with that which is able to learn that it would not ungrudgingly rejoice with him who becomes good through the help of God. In the first book of the *Metaphysics* (982 b 24–983 a 11) Aristotle compares philosophy to other kinds of knowledge and

¹² Pringle-Pattison, *The Idea of God*, pp. 308 f. Cf. J. Laird, *Theism and Cosmology*, p. 144, and *id.*, "The Philosophy of Incarnation," *H. Th. R.*, XL (1940), pp. 135, 140.

finds it is the only one pursued for its own sake and is therefore the most worthy and divine science and the one which deity would be most likely to possess. Then if there were any truth to the statement of poets that deity is naturally jealous, it would seem probable that all who excelled in this kind of knowledge would be ill-fated. But the deity is not jealous. It has been plausibly conjectured that this passage derives from Aristotle's *Protrepticus*.¹³ In any case it goes back to the *Timaeus* and *Phaedrus* passages, and if we bear in mind that for Aristotle the highest virtue and the highest happiness consist in contemplative activity, and that such activity is the only kind of action assignable to the gods (*E.N.* 1177 a 12-18, 1178 b 7-23), and if we also recall that for Plato too progress in virtue is becoming like to God, and that for Plato too this assimilation to God is a topic of the protreptic to philosophic activity (*Theaet.* 176 A-B), we must confine ourselves to saying that the topic of the *Metaphysics* passage was eminently adapted to the protreptic to philosophy and may well have appeared in Aristotle's *Protrepticus*.

Thus far we have given our attention almost exclusively to the emotion of envy, though we have had a hint of the reciprocal relation of pity and envy in the suggestion of Democritus that the pity of the upper classes might heal the envy of the lower classes. Now we come to a passage in the *Philebus* in which Plato suggests that all of life is a tragedy and a comedy by which we are moved to pity and envy and kindred emotions (50 B). These emotions are a mixture of pain and pleasure and belong to the soul only. Plato does not actually name pity in the list, but, as I have pointed out elsewhere,¹⁴ his reference to the enjoyment which the spectators of tragedy take in weeping (48 A) shows that he has in mind the emotion pity. And just as the spectator of tragedy enjoys weeping and therefore is both pained and pleased, so the spectator of comedy enjoys the emotion of envy under circumstances which make it a kind of unrighteous pain, and thus experiences a mixture of pleasure and pain, i. e., he takes pleasure in a feeling which is painful. Plato was aware of the complications of this analysis (*ὅσῳ σκοτεινότερόν ἔστιν*,

¹³ See W. Jaeger, *Aristoteles*, p. 73, note 1, and B. Einarson, "Aristotle's *Protrepticus* and the Structure of the *Epinomis*," *T.A.P.A.*, LXVII (1936), p. 267, note 19.

¹⁴ "Pity in Plato's Dialogues," *C.W.*, XXXV (1942), pp. 245 f.

48 B). The type of envy meant is obviously *epichairekakia*: hence the pleasure. We are pleased to see others lacking the special insight which we as spectators enjoy, and our pleasure in their lack implies perhaps that we begrudge them such insight. Those who do not have self-knowledge have false conceits concerning their wealth, appearance, virtue, or wisdom (48 C-49 A). These false conceits constitute ignorance and are therefore a misfortune, as Plato's equation of knowledge and virtue does not allow the possibility that "ignorance is bliss." Dividing mankind into the powerful and the weak we see that the possession of such conceits by the former is hateful and shameful, inasmuch as it is harmful to those exposed to its operation, whereas the strengthless type of conceit takes on the rank and aspect of the ridiculous. Yet when those to whom we are amiably disposed, those who do not by virtue of their position or resources have the power to avenge themselves on us for our laughing at them—when such friends suffer this misfortune, it is wrong to rejoice instead of grieving (49 D). Plato may have in mind a comedy in which the characters are persons of moderate social status whose conceits are set forth in a ridiculous light. Grote in a note on the passage asks "how the laugher can be said to experience a mixture of pain and pleasure here?" The answer must be that if the pleasure is malignant—and it is, since it involves pleasurable feelings at the spectacle of misfortune—it partakes of wrongdoing. Wrongdoing of any kind is in the nature of a disease of the soul and may therefore be regarded as painful, however little the wrongdoer is conscious of pain. The spectator of comedy need be no more aware that his amusement at the ridiculous is sharpened by an admixture of pain than the indulger in physical pleasures need be aware that it is the admixture of pain that titillates him and mildly irritates him (*Philebus* 47 A).

Shorey illustrates Plato's use of *phthonos* here by citing Shakespeare's "The abject people gazing on thy face | With envious looks, laughing at thy shame,"¹⁵ in which the envious looks are those of the *epichairekakiz* of one who gloats viciously over the downfall of his enemy, a passion regarded with extreme dread by the characters of Greek tragedy,¹⁶ whereas the *phthonos* of the

¹⁵ Shorey, *What Plato Said*, p. 610.

¹⁶ Cf., e.g., Euripides, *Medea*, 765 ff. Cf. also Ovid, *Ibis*, 116, and Schopenhauer, *Grundlage der Moral*, 19, 6.

Philebus is so mild a form of *epichairekakia* that even Plato does not seem to condemn it save from a technical point of view and with a view to accomplishing the transition from the discussion of the mixed pleasures to that of the unmixed. And if, following Plato's suggestion, we understand the emotion to be amusement afforded by the whole comedy of life, it then presents a striking parallel to the consolation which Democritus recommends to his followers. The fragments of Democritus do not permit us to arrive at his full thought on the matter, but we may be sure that he did not mean to recommend *epichairekakia*, in any form, for in one fragment (107a) he says, "One who is himself a human being ought not to laugh at other human beings' misfortunes, but rather to grieve," and in another (293) he says, "Those who derive pleasure from their neighbors' misfortune do not understand that the changes of fortune are common to all, and moreover they are at a loss for something of their own to be happy about." Evidently Democritus did not see any inconsistency between the purport of these fragments and that of another (191) in which he counsels the reinforcement of *εὐθυμία* by the consolation to be derived from comparing one's own life with the more unfortunate lives of others. If we do this and refrain from admiring those who are rich and are counted blessed in men's eyes we shall have hit upon a way of thinking that will make us live more cheerfully and will oust those not slight bane of existence, envy and rivalry and ill-will. It has been argued that it is the spectacle of the folly rather than of the misery of mankind that Democritus recommends for its consolatory efficacy, and that it was his own amusement over this, spectacle that gave him the reputation of being the "laughing philosopher."¹⁷ The opening lines of the second book of Lucretius' *De Rerum Natura* are the *locus classicus* for this kind of consolation. Carneades thought it adapted to the uses of the malevolent.¹⁸ Seneca (*De Tranquillitate*, 12, 4) speaks of pitying people who are, as it were, running to a fire. It seems then that

¹⁷ See Hirzel at *Hermes*, XIV (1879), pp. 395-407; Philippson at *Hermes*, LIX (1924), pp. 414 f.; Kiessling-Heinze on Horace, *Epist.*, II, 1, 194; and Mayor on Juvenal, X, 28-53.

¹⁸ See Stevens, "A Lucretian Topic of Consolation," *C. W.*, XXXVII (1944), pp. 139 f. Cf. also the opinion of Plutarch that curiosity about the troubles of others is a disease involving envy and malignity: *De Curiositate*, 515 D.

pity and *epichairesekaïc* may in certain degrees be experienced as one emotion. Rousseau remarks on the pleasure of pity: "La pitié est douce, parce qu'en se mettant à la place de celui qui souffre, on sent pourtant le plaisir de ne pas souffrir comme lui."¹⁹ And Hume observes that just as our estimate of our own happiness or misery is formed by a comparison with the happiness or misery which we observe in others or recall in our own experience, so it is true that we feel a "reverst sensation": another person's pain is painful to us in itself, but pleasurable in that it enhances the idea of our own happiness.²⁰ In "The Stoic" Hume brings the two emotions together in his picture of the sage surveying the follies of mankind with mixed feelings of pleasure and compassion. Finally, and not to mention the Ironies and Pities of Thomas Hardy's *The Dynasts*, we have Anatole France's two good counselors, irony and pity: "l'une, en souriant, nous rend la vie aimable; l'autre, qui pleure, nous la rend sacrée. L'Ircnie que j'invoque n'est point cruelle. . . . Elle est douce et bienveillante. Son rire calme le colère, et c'est elle qui nous enseigne à nous moquer des méchants et des sots, que nous pouvions, sans elle, avoir la faiblesse de haïr."²¹

Of course, France's irony has a kind of factitious serenity which sets it apart from the evangelical earnestness of Lucretius and the unconscious malice of Plato's spectator of comedy. Moreover Plato would forbid us to laugh at the wicked. For he says in the *Laws* (731 E) that we ought to let loose our anger on the incorrigibly wicked. May he not have in mind the real wrongdoing of the wicked when he says in the *Philebus* (49 D) that it is neither unrighteous nor envious to rejoice in the misfortunes of enemies? It is supposed that Plato has unaccountably lapsed into the manner of normal Greek ethics. Perhaps so, and in any case the whole discussion of the mixed pleasures could be clearer, and would be if Plato had more than a passing interest in it. I wish to suggest, however, that just as the "friends" at whose conceits we laugh when we see a comedy are simply people

¹⁹ Rousseau, *Emile*, iv. *init.* (= p. 250 Garnier).

²⁰ Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature*, Book II, Part II, § 8. The passage referred to from "The Stoic" is quoted by Merrill on Lucretius, II, 9.

²¹ A. France, *Le Jardin d'Épicure*, p. 122. Cf. *id.*, *Aveille*, xvi, and Paul Gsell, *Propos d'Anatole France*, p. 146.

of whom we do not disapprove on moral grounds, so the "enemies" referred to are people of whom we do disapprove because they are powerful and hateful and shameless (49 C, *ἄγνοια γὰρ οὐ μὲν τῶν ισχυρῶν ἐχθρά τε καὶ αἰσχρά . . .*). Then if our "enemies" are the wicked, we ought to rejoice in the misfortune or punishment consequent upon their sin. This emotion would be akin to that form of envy which Hippias called just because it begrudged wicked men the honor they receive.²² This just envy is then a kind of righteous indignation, and is in part the emotion *nemesis* as defined by Aristotle. It is neither necessary nor fitting to enter into a discussion of *nemesis* here.²³ The root meaning of the word is "apportion." The recipient of such regular favor as life, health, wealth, and the like, is prone to rivet his attention upon the point where the distribution breaks off and to wonder whether he will be cheated of his due share, or whether he has already received too much and is due for a fall. And since envy is the emotion of one who begrudges someone something, he may ascribe his victimization to the envy of a god or of time, as Horace speaks of *invida aetas*. It is easy to see how *nemesis*, from having meant the apportioner or apportionment of favor, should come to signify the principle of apportionment or justice itself, and then should come to mean, or be made by Aristotle to mean, the emotion felt at the spectacle of unmerited favor. In the more primitive ethics against which Aeschylus protests (*Ag.* 750-81), the prosperous man as such might incur the *nemesis* of the gods. For Aristotle it is not prosperity but unmerited prosperity that arouses *nemesis*.

Nemesis is the first of three emotions opposed to and counteracting pity (*Rhet.* 1386 b 9), but it is like pity in that both emotions are characteristic of the good man, the one being aroused by the spectacle of unmerited prosperity, the other by that of unmerited misfortune. It is obvious that these emotions do not imply objective judgments if they are to be used as forensic devices. But Aristotle does not clarify the point, and when he says that *nemesis* may be aroused by the rise to political power of the *nouveaux riches*, or by the spectacle of another's getting a position to which we think we have a prior or better

²² Hippias, frag. 16, Diels⁴.

²³ See Tournier, *Némésis et la Jalousie des Dieux*, and Herter at R.-E., s. v. "Nemesis."

claim, we are left to conjecture whether he meant these instances as illustrations of real or supposed injustice. *Nemesis* is not felt by the slavish or the bad or the unambitious, says Aristotle, for such people do not rate their deserts so high that they will feel indignation at another's advancement (1387 b 13-15).

Phthonos is evidently envy in the ordinary meaning of the word. Unlike *nemesis*, it involves no judgment as to merit. We envy people who are equal to us or like us, i. e., whose circumstances or social status resemble ours (1387 b 25-27). Evidently if I begrudge a rival his greater success, I feel *nemesis* or *phthonos* in accordance with my judgment of his deserts. The man who envies will also feel the third emotion, *epichairekakia*, since he who is pained by another's good fortune will rejoice in its loss (1386 b 34-1387 a 3). Elsewhere Aristotle distinguishes between envy and *nemesis* (*Top.* 109 b 35-110 a 4).

The treatment in the Aristotelian ethical treatises of those three types of envious emotion and of pity offers a curious example of the difficulties encountered in Aristotle's theory of mean and excess and deficiency, especially when this theory is made to embrace the emotions. In the *Nicomachean Ethics* *nemesis* is said to be the mean between *epichairekakia*, a deficiency, and *phthonos*, an excess (1108 b 1-6). The three emotions have in common the fact that they involve feelings of pleasure or pain at the spectacle of other people's circumstances. Let us imagine a vertical scale graduated in degrees of emotion aroused by the spectacle of other people's circumstances, and let us make the positive half pain and the negative half pleasure. Apart from the fact that zero would be indifference to others' circumstances, not painful reaction to the sight of unmerited prosperity, our scale would not take account of the nature of the circumstances stimulating the emotion. If we intersect the vertical scale with a horizontal scale whose positive half is graduated in degrees of prosperity and its negative half in degrees of distress, we should then have a means of graphing all degrees of sympathy—envy, pity, *epichairekakia*, and gratulation (reading from first to fourth quadrant), but our graph would not account for differences in merit in the good and bad circumstances on the horizontal axis. We see then that Aristotle is undertaking to measure on one scale data which require three scales.

Even if, on a more charitable view, we infer that Aristotle's

scale is graduated in degrees of pain aroused by the sight of good fortune, and admit that *nemesis* would have a lower reading than *phthonos* because unmerited prosperity appears less frequently than prosperity, we should still be at a loss to locate *epichairekakia* on the scale. Its reading might be zero because it is by definition joy and not pain, but it could not properly be on a scale of emotion aroused by prosperity, since it is aroused by distress. It is idle to try to clarify a system which is both forced and vague, but merely to see wherein the confusion exists may help us to untangle the further complications in the corresponding passages of the *Eudemian Ethics* and the *Magna Moralia*. The writer of the *Eudemian Ethics* seems not to know a word ἐπιχαιρέκακια, for he says the emotion of the ἐπιχαιρέκακος is without a name (1233 b 20-22). This writer enlarges the province of *nemesis* to include pain aroused by the spectacle of either unmerited prosperity or unmerited misfortune, and to include also joy inspired by the spectacle of either merited prosperity or merited misfortune. Thus *nemesis* comprises righteous indignation, pity, gratulation, and a kind of vindictive satisfaction in the sight of merited punishment, a kind of *epichairekakia* which might be thought to support the cause of justice. Reverting to the subject later (1234 a 24-33) the writer observes that whereas means may be praiseworthy without being virtues, and extremes need not be vices, yet means and extremes tend to virtue or vice, and so envy tends to injustice, and *nemesis* to justice. I suggest that the writer defined *nemesis* to fit its tendency, and thus has made it comprise all the emotional attitudes towards good or ill fortune which may be thought of as tending to support the idea of justice.

The author of the *Magna Moralia* (1192 b 18-29) makes *nemesis* only half as extensive, confining its meaning to a painful reaction to the sight of both prosperity and distress that are unmerited. At the same time his *phthonos* and *epichairekakia* operate without regard to merit, and so shade off into *nemesis*, since *phthonos* of unmerited success would be *nemesis*, as would also *epichairekakia* of merited misfortune. *Epichairekakia* as here defined is probably identical in scope with that of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, where it is not defined with reference to the merit of its occasion. But *nemesis* has been assigned the province of pity in addition to its own.

In our study of the treatment of pity and envy in Plato's

Philebus we might have included a reference to Aristotle's definition of tragedy (*Poet.* 1449 b 27 f.), in which, however, Aristotle is answering Plato's objection in the tenth book of the *Republic* (606 B) that tragic poetry by stimulating the emotions, and especially pity, tends to unfit a man for meeting his share of misfortune courageously. It is also to be observed that Aristotle rather pointedly denies the operation of envy or *epichairekakia* in the amusement afforded by comedy (*Poet.* 1449 a 34-37).

In our discussion of Plato's exclusion of envy from the divine nature we referred in passing to Aristotle's statement in the tenth book of the *Nicomachean Ethics* that the highest virtue and the highest happiness consist in contemplative activity, and that such activity is the only kind of action assignable to the gods. Aristotle mentions justice specifically as one of the virtues which the gods would have no occasion to exercise, inasmuch as they would have no contracts to make or observe (*E.N.* 1178 b 10 f.). It is to be inferred that, if they do not practice the virtue of justice, they do not experience the emotions that tend to justice. And if they are without the practical virtues altogether, they will be without mildness, which is a virtue in Aristotle (*E.N.* 1105 b 21 ff.), and they will lack the emotion of pity which is auxiliary to mildness. Thus Aristotle's gods or disembodied souls would never feel pity or envy. For the virtues to which these emotions are auxiliary are practical: they are not ends in themselves, but means to the achievement of power, honor, or happiness, whereas the virtue of contemplative reason is its own end (*E.N.* 1177 b 15-25). A life spent in this highest virtuous activity would be impossible for man (1177 b 26 ff.), but man will strive to live so and will succeed in so far as he has aught that is divine in him.

It is not apparent that the Stoic conception of a wise man who, being devoid of all but the most rational emotions, feels neither pity nor envy, is indebted to Aristotle's adumbration of an ideal man. The Stoics, proceeding in the main from the Socratic doctrine that virtue is knowledge, confounded intellect and will with emotion and thus made emotion a kind of judgment, a judgment which might be rational and correct and therefore worthy to be entertained by the sage; or might be irrational, erroneous, and perhaps vicious. For an emotion to be rational, it must be in accordance with nature, which is always rational.

If nature holds up to our eyes a spectacle of misfortune and we are pained and feel pity, we, by the very fact of the emotion, pass an adverse judgment upon a circumstance which nature has brought to pass and which must therefore be right and rational. The sage may experience emotions which the Stoics distinguish as being rational, such as affection for a friend.

As for envy, the subject of a book by Cleanthes,²⁴ the Stoics have hardly innovated. And in the light of Plato's and Aristotle's treatment of pity and envy, we might expect the Stoics to regard pity and envy as reciprocal emotions which must be admitted or rejected together.²⁵ But we could not anticipate the device by which the Stoics were enabled to admit by another door and under another name the rejected pity.²⁶ This device consists of Chrysippus' development of the distinction between the three classes of things, those to be preferred, those to be rejected, and those that are morally indifferent. The third category afforded a means of sidestepping the question whether a thing or a condition was unalterably good or bad. Here the Stoics placed leniency or clemency, and so the Stoic who could not pity or forgive could be merciful.²⁷ No doubt this modification of Stoic doctrine—if it may be so termed—was made under pressure of criticism. So too the Stoics seem to have opposed criticism by calling attention to the invidious character of pity, which gives its alms not without an admixture of scorn and fastidious contempt for the beneficiary,²⁸ a criticism repeated by Spinoza and by Nietzsche.²⁹ However paradoxical or unreasonable the Stoic psychology may seem, we have to bear in mind that much of our information derives from sources hostile to it. Plutarch reports the Stoics as denying that there is such an emotion as *epichai-*

²⁴ Diogenes Laertius, VII, 175 = von Arnim, *Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta*, I, p. 107, 17.

²⁵ Cicero, *Tusc. Disp.*, III, 20-21.

²⁶ See Plutarch, *Virt. Mor.*, 9, and Hicks, *Stoic and Epicurean*, pp. 109 f.

²⁷ Seneca, *Clem.*, II, 7 (von Arnim 453 = III, p. 110, 11-19).

²⁸ Seneca, *Clem.*, II, 6, 2: *dabit manum . . . egenti stipem, non hanc contumeliosam, quam pars maior horum, qui misericordes videri volunt, abicit et fastidit quos adiuvit, contingue ab iis timet, sed ut homo homini ea communi dabit.*

²⁹ Cf. Spinoza, *Eth.*, IV, 50; W. M. Salter, *Nietzsche the Thinker*, pp. 301-13; and also Pascal, *Pensées*, 452.

rekakia, and is amused by the inconsistency they show when they go to the trouble of defining it.³⁰ This is captious criticism. *Epichairekakia* is a word admitting of definition whether the emotion exists or not. And of course it could not exist according to Stoic doctrine, for to rejoice in other people's apparent misfortunes would be to ratify the work of nature by an act of judgment. Evidently Chrysippus gave his approval to the kind of consolation afforded by other people's troubles.³¹

Apparently it was only the Stoics who condemned pity. The Cynics (Diogenes Laertius, VI, 5) and the Cyrenaics (*id.*, II, 91) condemned envy, and Epicurus said, "We should envy none: for the good do not deserve our envy and the bad only do injury to themselves the more they prosper."³² In a passage which is believed to have been attached to the *Letter to Pythocles* by a later Epicurean who wished to provide an authoritative text combatting Stoic views, hatred, envy, and contempt—the emotions we might feel towards superiors, equals, and inferiors, respectively—are said to be the cause of injurious action. The wise man will overcome them by reasoning. Yet the wise man will be more subject to emotion without thereby being hindered on his way to wisdom. He will not punish his slaves, but will pity them and forgive the deserving ones.³³ It is envy of the powerful and honored, according to Lucretius, that eats men's hearts until they are convinced that they themselves live in foul and loathsome circumstances (*De Rerum Natura*, III, 74-77). When the animal hide was first found to be a useful clothing, men probably tore it off the wearer and rendered it useless in their envy. Thus envy has always been that which prompted men to crime and to boundless lust (V, 1412-25). It was pity for the weak that prompted men to form covenants for mutual security. And so to pity is due such humanity as men enjoy (V, 1019-27).

The Stoic conception of Providence excludes the possibility that deity might feel pity or envy. Carneades attacked the Stoic ascription of virtue to deity and by as it were antinomic arguments demonstrated the difficulty of conceiving of deity

³⁰ Plutarch, *De Stoicorum Repugnantiis*, 25, 1-3.

³¹ Cicero, *Tuso. Disp.*, III, 59 f.

³² Frag. 53, *Vatican Collection* (Bailey).

³³ Diogenes Laertius, X, 117 f. (Bailey, *Epicurus*, p. 161).

either with or without virtue, and thus made the task of the future theologian so much the greater.³⁴ The gods of the Epicureans, however obscure their nature and reason for existing may be in other respects, cannot show favor or mercy.³⁵ Christian thinkers seek to circumvent the Sceptic quibbles concerning the virtues and emotions of God by the device known as the Pickwickian sense. Thus Lactantius affirms that God feels both wrath and pity, but not in a temporal sense.³⁶ Similarly, St. Augustine writes: "... absit autem ut impassibilem Dei naturam perpeti ullam molestiam suspicemur. Sicut autem zelat sine aliquo livore, irascitur sine aliqua perturbatione, miseretur sine aliquo dolore, poenitet eum sine alicuius suae pravitatis correctione: ita est patiens sine ulla passione."³⁷ Probably such a line of reasoning was designed not only to satisfy the demands of philosophy but also to combat such heresies as that according to which God expelled Adam from Paradise because of envy.³⁸ Milton, whether because he was acquainted with this opinion or because he was interested in envy,³⁹ represents Satan as being convinced of God's envious character (*P. L.*, I, 258 and IV, 514-27) and at the same time as using the improbability that envy should "dwell in heavenly breasts" as a means of convincing Eve that there is no danger involved in tasting the forbidden fruit (IX, 729 f.). Satan himself is almost an embodiment of envy (IV, 114 f.), whereas God is said explicitly to give precedence-to mercy over justice (III, 132-4; cf. III, 140 f.).

Of later philosophic treatments of envy or pity, Plutarch's *Moral Essays* gather a number of minor commonplaces on envy and contribute a few apparently original observations on the psychology of envy and pity.⁴⁰ But the main lines of the ancient

³⁴ See Stevens, "Divinity and Deliberation," *A. J. P.*, LIV (1933), pp. 236 f.

³⁵ Usener, *Epicurea*, p. 107, 10-12 (from Philodemus, π. εὐσεβίς): εὐσεβής δὲ περὶ θεόν, δι' ἐκάπερον ἔξορίκει μὲν νοῶν αὐτὸν χωρὶς δργῆς καὶ χάριτος ἀσθενούσης τὰς ἐξ αὐτοῦ παρασκευὰς τῶν ἀγαθῶν καὶ τῶν κακῶν. . . . Cf. M. Guyau, *La Morale d'Épicure*, p. 175.

³⁶ Lactantius, *De Ira Dei*, 21, 8 ff.

³⁷ Augustine, *De Patientia*, 1, 1 (Migne, XL, p. 613).

³⁸ See Filastrius, 115.

³⁹ "Envy" was to have been one of the "mutes" in Milton's projected tragedy, *Paradise Lost*: see Milton's *Works* in the Columbia U. Press edition, XVIII, p. 230.

⁴⁰ Anger, says Plutarch in the *De Cohibenda Ira*, is less discriminating

philosophic opinions on pity and envy have been set forth, and our task, with such oversights and errors of interpretation as will be revealed, is finished. Much has been omitted in order to keep the study within bounds. No attempt has been made to find a ruling idea, as was made by Hirzel whose treatment of envy as a symptom of Greek equalitarianism is useful and suggestive,⁴¹ or as was made by Svend Ranulf, whose discursive and sociological treatment is mainly concerned with the question to what extent Athenian law was founded on the emotions of envy and indignation.⁴²

Bertrand Russell says that envy is the most unfortunate of all the characteristics of ordinary human nature,⁴³ and that a deficiency of pity is the cause of some of the greatest of social abuses.⁴⁴ Whether these statements are true and in what sense it may be true that "pity ever healeth envy,"⁴⁵ are questions

than love, envy, and fear. We do not envy, but may be angry at, underlings (§§ 5 and 11). Anger, even when one is jesting, turns good will to hatred. A prosperous person's anger increases the envy aroused in others, and an unfortunate person's anger abolishes the pity others may feel for him. Anger is compounded of the seeds of all the passions: from envy it has drawn *epioikairzakia*, and it has an appetite for harming others (15). (Cf. Cicero, *Tusc. Disp.*, III, 19 f., and Seneca, *Dial.*, V, 5, 5.) In the *De Invidia et Odio* Plutarch observes that envy and hatred are often taken to be the same emotion. The prosperous man is a source of pain to both the envious and the hateful. Hatred discriminates, whereas envy is simply of the prosperous (2). We may hate, but not envy, animals (3). Animals may hate one another but are incapable of envy (4). (Contra: Aristotle, *H. A.*, 488 b 23-6; Theophrastus at Diogenes Laertius, V, 45, and Apuleius, *Apol.*, 51, 15; Aelian, *N. A.*, III, 17, 19, IV, 17.) Envy is never, hated sometimes, just. Men conceal envy and acknowledge hatred (5). Hatred battens on its object's degradation, envy on its object's moral progress (6). Hatred's intent is to harm, envy's to humble.

⁴¹ Cited *supra*, note 2.

⁴² Svend Ranulf, *The Jealousy of the Gods and Criminal Law at Athens*.

⁴³ B. Russell, *The Conquest of Happiness*, p. 85.

⁴⁴ *Id.*, *What I Believe*, p. 43.

⁴⁵ Bacon, *Essays*, "Of Envy." Bacon is referring to the fact that men in high office may "abate the edge of envy" if their experiences or deportment are such as sometimes to inspire pity. For concrete illustrations of the principle involved see Clytemnestra's endeavour to persuade Agamemnon that there is no need to fear envy inasmuch as the prosperity of the present is offset by the sufferings of the past (Aeschylus).

outside the scope of this paper, the purpose of which is not to prove anything but to assemble material which seemed to the writer to form a separable chapter in the history of the psychology of emotion.

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lus, *Ag.*, 904 f.), and Nicias' attempt to cheer the Athenian army with the thought that since the Athenians had suffered severely it was reasonable to suppose that their condition would now inspire the gods with pity rather than with envy (Thucydides, VII, 77, 3), and Antony's effort to make so pitiable a spectacle of himself that his soldiers would be convinced that there need be no fear of any *nemesis* caused by his former good fortune (Plutarch, *Ant.*, 44).

THE IDENTITY AND ORIGIN OF EURYCHUS IN THE SHIPS' CATALOGUE OF HYGINUS.

The somewhat careless work of the first editor of Hyginus' *Fabulae*, combined with the disappearance of the unique MS shortly after the publication of the first edition, left many inaccuracies in the text, some of which still await correction. One which is wrongly emended in even the best and latest edition, that of Herbert Jennings Rose (Leyden, 1934), is the name Eurychus in the Catalogue of the Ships. Where Micyllus in the first edition¹ had as one of the leaders "Eurychus Pallantis et Diomedae filius Argis," Rose has "Euryalus. . . ."² I think that a re-examination of this question will show that Eurychus is a mistake, not for Euryalus, but for Eurytus, and, further, that from the correct identification of this particular leader can be deduced some information about the version of the Homeric Catalogue used by the Greek author who was Hyginus' source.

Not another one of the many extant Ships' Catalogues includes a leader named Eurykus; the name is an evident mistake. Johann Scheffer in his edition of 1674 offered the conjecture *Euryalus* adopted into the text by Rose, an emendation apparently very reasonable because it seems to restore to this Catalogue one of the regular ships' leaders who ought not be missing from it. No editor since Scheffer has suggested any other emendation.³

But whoever Eurychus is, he is almost certainly not Euryalus.

¹ I depend on Rose's apparatus criticus for the reading of the first edition.

² Cap. XCVII, "Qui ad Troiam expugnatum ierunt et quot naues," p. 72.

³ Since Scheffer the *Fabulae* has been edited by Muncker (1681), Van Staveren (1742), Bunte (1856), Schmidt (1872), and Rose. The first two mention the Euryalus conjecture, apparently with approval. Bunte ignored it; he simply compared the text of Hyginus with Homer's in the conviction that Hyginus' information ought to agree with Homer's. Schmidt more or less rewrote Hyginus' Catalogue; he adopted the conjecture but shifted *Euryalus Pall.* to the point in the text from which Homer's Euryalus the son of Mecisteus is missing. Bunte and Schmidt (and of course Rose) knew well what leaders Homer named in the passage where Hyginus named Eurychus, but that knowledge led none of them to a realization of the identity of Eurychus.

Although Hyginus does not indicate grouping for those leaders who in Homer held joint commands, nevertheless he does not anywhere break up and scatter the Homeric groups. Homer begins his Catalogue, for instance, with the five leaders of the Boeotians. Hyginus does not begin with them and does not say they held a joint command, but he does name them consecutively, as the twenty-fourth to twenty-eighth leaders in his Catalogue. Euryalus, then, according to Homer a co-leader with Sthenelus under Diomedes, ought to be named in Hyginus along with those two leaders and would be simply inexplicable in the position of Eurychus.

The positive evidence that Eurychus is really Eurytus lies in the immediate context of the name, and his identity becomes clear if one compares Hyginus' Catalogue with its obvious source, the Homeric Catalogue. The portion of Hyginus' Catalogue containing the name Eurychus read in its unemended state in the first edition as follows: *Amphimachus Cteati filius Elea, nauibus x. Eurychus Pallantis et Diomedae filius Argis, nauibus xv. Amarunceus Onesimachi filius Mycenis, nauibus xix. Polysenes Astionis et Pelorides filius Aetolia, nauibus xl.* This passage is a reflection, however distorted, of Homer's account of the leadership of the Eleans, or as Homer usually calls them, the Epeians,⁴ from Elis:

τῶν [of the Epeians] μὲν ἄρ' Ἀμφίμαχος καὶ Θάλπιος ἡγεσάσθην, νῦν δὲ μὲν Κτεάτου, δέ δὲ Εὐρύτου, Ἀκτορίωνε.
τῶν δὲ Ἀμαρυγκεῖδης ἦρχε κρατερὸς Διώρης.
τῶν δὲ τετάρτων ἦρχε Παλύξεινος θεοειδῆς,
νὺν δὲ Ἀγασθένεος Αὐγητάδος ἀνακτος (B 620-4).

I list in parallel columns these leaders in the order in which they occur in each Catalogue, together with the names just preceding and just following the group in each Catalogue:

Homer	Hyginus
Ἀγαπήνωρ	Agapenor
Ἀμφίμαχος	Amphimachus
Θάλπιος (son of Eurytus)	Eurychus
Διώρης (son of Amarunceus)	Amarunceus
Παλύξεινος	Polysenès
Μέγης	Meges

⁴ Strabo, 340, discusses the terms *Epeians* and *Eleans*. Cf. also Euripides' *Iph. in Aul.*, 280-1.

Comparison of recovered fragments of the MS with Micyllus' text shows that he was sometimes confused by the Lombard form of the letter *t* of the MS,⁵ and his misreading of Eurytus is perhaps due to the *t* in it.

The identification of Eurychus as Eurytus⁶ has the incidental advantage over Schaeffer's conjecture of Euryalus that in the substitution of Eurytus for his son Thalpius we have an explanation of the strange absence of Thalpius from this Catalogue.

One possible objection to my identification of Eurychus is that Hyginus names as his parents an unknown Pallas and Diomeda,⁷ whereas Homer seems to call Eurytus the son of Actor, or Poseidon, and of Moliona.⁸ But since Hyginus' remarkably abundant genealogical data are quite frequently peculiar to him and his treatment of this leader is therefore not unique in this respect,⁹ the parents' names ought not constitute an objection to this identification.

Another possible objection is that Hyginus' Eurychus is not, like Homer's Eurytus, an Epeian.¹⁰ But Hyginus' geographical

⁵ See Karl Meuli, "Unser Text der *Fabulae Hygins*," ANTIΔΩΡΟΝ: *Festschrift Jacob Wackenagel* (Göttingen, 1923), pp. 252-3.

⁶ The Eurytus of B 820, not to be confused with other heroes of the same name, at least one of whom is much more famous, the Eurytus of Oechalia who was a famous archer and who is also mentioned in the Homeric Catalogue, in B 596.

⁷ The author of the articles *s. v.* "Diomedes" in Pauly-Wissowa presents as the only facts about the last of four ladies called Diomedes that she was "Gattin des Palas, Mutter des Euryalos, in Argos, Hygin. fab. 97. Die Lesung ist unsicher." As we have seen, the "Lesung" is indeed "unsicher."

⁸ Cf., with B 621, A 709 and 750-1. The use of the two apparent patronymics together in A 750 is against precedent in Homer and their meaning is therefore doubtful. For a recent discussion of Eurytus and his twin brother see *The Iliad of Homer Book XI*, ed. E. S. Forster (London, 1939), Note III, pp. 66-7 of the Appendix.

⁹ Cf. in the Ships' Catalogues alone the parentage he gives to Ascalaphus and Ialmenus, to Leitus, to Amarynceus. The Greek author who was Hyginus' source had a predilection for unusual versions of stories (H. J. Rose, *Modern Methods in Classical Mythology* [St. Andrews, 1930], p. 43) and so perhaps for unusual genealogies.

¹⁰ This was the point which stopped Andreas Dederich, the editor of Dictys, from identifying Hyginus' Eurychus with the Eurytus of Euripides. He observed: "Nōmini Eurychi cum Euripiōis (Iph. Aul. 282.) Euryto magna similitudo; sed Eurychus Hygini est Argivus,

information is too inaccurate to be made the basis of a valid objection. His Eurychus is one of a whole dozen leaders, scattered here and there throughout the Catalogue, who he says come from Argos. Of the leaders mentioned in this passage, who ought all to be from Elis, Amphimachus is from Elis, Eurychus from Argos, Amarynceus from Mycenae, and Polysenes from Aetolia.

If the point may be considered established that the correct emendation of the difficult *Eurychus* is not *Euryalus* but *Eurytus*, there remains the question of how Eurytus happens to be substituted in this Catalogue for the regular Catalogue leader, his son Thalpius. We may suppose, first, that this substitution is independent of the Catalogue's sources; or, second, that it is derived from the Catalogue of Euripides' *Iphigeneia in Aulis*, which is the only other Catalogue to name Eurytus as a leader; or, third, that it is derived, together with the substitution in the Euripidean Catalogue, from some still earlier instance of the same thing. I think an examination of the possibilities shows that the last is the most probable, and that we should suppose the earlier instance to have been in a version of the Homeric Catalogue differing from our vulgate.

The first explanation, that the substitution is independent of the Catalogue's sources, cannot be wholly ruled out of consideration. Since the *Fabulae* was derived from a Greek work and is not preserved in its original Latin form,¹¹ the possibility of error in translation, adaptation, and revision must be added to the ordinary risks and hazards of manuscript transmission. Some mistake in the history of the *Fabulae* may account for the substitution of Amarynceus for his son Diores in this same passage. But one explanation will not do for both Amarynceus and Eurytus, because Hyginus' Catalogue is the first (and only) one to substitute Amarynceus, but not the first to substitute Eurytus. It is not impossible that the authors of the Catalogues in the *Iphigeneia* and the *Fabulae* should have each independently introduced the same variation from Homer, but it seems most

Euripidis Eurytus Elius" (*Dic̄is Cretensis sive Lucii Septimii Ephemeridos Belli Troiani Libri Sex* [Bonn, 1833], p. 395). Dederich should have investigated the problem further, for the two are certainly the same, though Hyginus' Eurychus is, I am sure, not derived from Euripides.

¹¹ Rose's ed., "De Hygini Auctore Graeco," and "Num Pristina Fabularum Forma Hedio Conservata Sit," pp. viii ff. and xi ff.

unlikely; such an accidental coincidence must necessarily be suspect. Hyginus' work is a compilation from previous authors, and what is to be found both in it and in earlier works is almost certainly not original with it.

But the second possibility, that Hyginus' Eurytus is derived from Euripides' Eurytus, also seems improbable. Despite this divergence from Homer which it shares with the Catalogue of the play, Hyginus' Catalogue is definitely based on Homer and not on Euripides,¹² both in general and in this passage. Hyginus' Catalogue is basically Homer's, with additions; Euripides' is a brief selection from Homer. Homer names four leaders of the Epeians, and we have seen that Hyginus names a corresponding four leaders; but Euripides names Eurytus alone as the sole leader of the Epeians (*Iph. in Aul.*, 279-82). So Hyginus' Catalogue is not based on Euripides instead of Homer.

Neither, I think, is it based on Euripides and Homer. Hyginus, or his source, did not derive Eurytus from Euripides and add him to Homer, for Eurytus is already in Homer, named as we have seen in B 621 of the Catalogue.¹³ And it would be unlike the author of this Catalogue to imitate Euripides by eliminating Thalpius in favor of Eurytus (or anyone else). He was an eclectic Cataloguer and might have just added Eurytus from Euripides, if he had known Euripides, for this is the most inclusive Ships' Catalogue extant, with more leaders than any other. But Eurytus is not added. He is substituted, and substitution involves elimination. It is probable that the Catalogue's author did not know Euripides anyway, except in summaries of the plots of the plays, and so perhaps did not even know that there was a Euripidean Catalogue.¹⁴

¹² For convenience I refer to the authors of the three Catalogues as Homer, Euripides, and Hyginus; the question of the true authorship of each does not concern my point.

¹³ Even if the author of the Hyginian Catalogue worked not directly from Homer but only from a list of Homer's leaders which did not name their parents and so did not mention Eurytus, he could not have combined such a list with Euripides to produce the result we have. Since neither that list nor Euripides would have told him of the relationship of Thalpius and Eurytus, it is beyond belief that he would have hit upon Thalpius as the leader for whom he would substitute Eurytus, even if he had wanted to substitute him instead of just adding him.

¹⁴ Rose says in the preface to his edition, p. x, "unde non iniuria mihi

There is, fortunately, a much better way than the influence of Euripides to explain Hyginus' Eurytus. I suggested as the third and most likely explanation that Hyginus' Eurytas is derived, together with Euripides', from the substitution of Eurytus for his son Thalpius in some earlier Catalogue. But of course Homer is the source. I think this Eurytus is best explained in the same way as that suggested by T. W. Allen for Euripides' Eurytus, that is, that he is derived from Homer, but Homer in a reading different from our vulgate, Homer with Eurytus named as one of the leaders of the Epeians.

Allen considered the Euripidean Catalogue in an article published in 1901¹⁵ and in his book, *The Homeric Catalogue of Ships*,¹⁶ published in 1921. In the article he suggests that the author of the Catalogue of *Iphigeneia in Aulis* made use of the so-called Euripidean edition of Homer, supposed to have been made by a younger Euripides, nephew of the poet, an edition with a version of the Catalogue differing somewhat from the one we know. In his book Allen suggests specifically what the reading of the Euripidean Homer might have been at this point: "Lastly, in the Elean section Euripides may have read Εὐρύτος for Θάλπιος, and in the next line Εὐρύτος 'Ακτορίωνος."¹⁷

If Euripides did have such a text of Homer, in it lines B 620-1 must have run, not as I have quoted them above from the vulgate, but as follows:

τῶν μὲν ἄρ' Ἀμφίμαχος καὶ Εὐρύτος ἡγησάσθην,
νῦν δὲ μὲν Κτεάτου, τὸ δέ τοι Εὐρύτος 'Ακτορίωνος.

It is worth noting that 'Ακτορίωνος rather than 'Ακτορίωνε actually is the reading of most of the extant MSS.

This reading of B 620 hypothesized by Allen as a result of his study of Euripides' Catalogue is precisely what is needed to explain Eurytus in Hyginus' Catalogue and consequently lends support to Allen's case. Hyginus' Eurytus, when recovered

videor arbitrari Hyginum uel auctorem eius non ipsos scaenicos adisse. . ." Cf. Rose's *Modern Methods*, p. 42.

¹⁵ "The Euripidean Catalogue of Ships," *Class. Rev.*, XV (1901), pp. 346-50.

¹⁶ *The Homeric Catalogue of Ships*, ed. Thomas W. Allen (Oxford Univ. Press, 1921).

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 25.

from the misreading Eurychus and the misinterpretation of that as Euryalus, is I think evidence that there did really once exist a version of the Homeric Catalogue in which Eurytus was named as a leader in B 620. That version seems to have been used by the author of the Euripidean Catalogue probably early in the fourth century B. C. and then about four centuries later by the author of the Hyginian Catalogue.¹⁸

The three earliest extant Catalogues are those of Homer, Euripides, and Hyginus: Eurytus was a ship's leader in Euripides, and if he was in Homer, too, at least as Homer was known to our author, it would be a matter for some surprise if Eurytus were not a leader in the third extant Catalogue. Eurytus, a name which fits into the immediate context of Hyginus' Eurychus so much better than the conjectured Euryalus, is just as much as Euryalus a name to be looked for and expected in Hyginus.

The history of the Catalogue of the Ships in its transmission from work to work through various languages and many centuries is a complicated one. No given Catalogue can be thoroughly understood without a detailed comparative study of antecedent Catalogues, and yet such a study would be, and apparently has been, too expensive a project for any editor to undertake merely as a supplement to the editing of his own particular author and Catalogue; there is, therefore, need of investigation devoted just to the Catalogues. The further possible evidence in Hyginus' Catalogue for the Euripidean Homer I hope to take up later in a study of the post-Homeric Ships' Catalogues.

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¹⁸ Rose dates Hyginus' Greek author at about the beginning of our era, pp. vii-viii of his edition, p. 36 of *Modern Methods*.

SAPPHO IN "LONGINUS" (X, 2, LINE 13).¹

P has ἔκαδε μ' ἰδρῶς ψυχρὸς κ' ακχέεται: ψυχρὸς makes the line too long by two syllables. Editors simply cut it out—presumably as a gloss, but on what? What does it explain? It is not a gloss but an emendation. The verse is quoted in Cramer's *Anecdota* thus: ἀδεμ' ἰδρῶς κακός χέεται. κακός, being manifestly absurd, was lightheartedly changed by some copyist (or perhaps simply owner of a copy) into ψυχρός. An editor of Sappho will, of course, excise it. But an editor of Longinus should keep it, as it is clearly what L. wrote. J.-V. quote no less than four paraphrases of the ode, none of which refers to it.² But L. does, in the next section—ἄμα ψύχεται κάτεται (*sic* J.-V.). Where κακός comes from is pretty clear: it is due to a misreading of κακχέεται. But the person who wrote κακός could not have had ἀ δέ: what he had is seen from P's ἔκαδε—namely καδ δὲ.

The original reading was καδ δε μ' ἰδρως κακχεεται: καδ δε, being unintelligible,³ before the time of Cramer's grammarian (or his source) became ἀ δέ: κακχεεται likewise became κακ(ος) χέεται: κακός before L.'s time was emended into ψυχρός. Considering that this was probably the most famous of all Sappho's poems, it is disturbing to think what sort of texts even scholars like L. and Cramer's grammarian had to use. Even the first line is quoted by Apollonius, *De Pron.* once with φαίνεται μοι, and once, expressly, φαίνεται οι.⁴

Not much use writing on the Aeolic dialect with texts like those! The evidence for ἰδρως feminine at once disappears. But to return to L. He apparently found in his copy ἰδρως { ψυχρος } κακ'⁵ χεεται. He knew all about καδ δὲ, and κακχέεται, but the conclusion seems inescapable that he was incapable of scanning a plain Sapphic verse—which leads to some interesting speculations. Is

¹ Fuller references can be found in the critical notes and *testimonia* of Jahn-Vahlen.

² But Theocritus, 2, 106, not quoted by J.-V. has it (not a close imitation of Sappho), and Aeditus *ap.* A. Gellius, XIX, 9, 11 possibly.

³ In line 9, for καμ μὲν, P has κὰν μὲν.

⁴ f for μ. Could μ' in line 13 be for f, i. e. φιδρός?

⁵ Unless he is quoting from memory, which would make it still worse.

it certain that even the hexameter meant very much to him? (I am not suggesting, of course, that he could not *scan* a hexameter.) I do not know if it is unparalleled, it is certainly most unusual, to quote hexameters with gaps, as he does—at 26, 1 and 27, 4; there seems no point in such small omissions (Vahlen's reference to his edition of the *Poetics* does not throw any light).

The fact is that L.'s attitude is not only unique, but almost the antithesis of all other ancient literary criticism. When we compare Dionysius of Halicarnassus on Sappho and Simonides, we see a typical example of the best Greek criticism—minute attention to detail, careful technical analysis, an ear susceptible to the subtlest nuances of verbal harmony, sensitive to every refinement of rhythm—prose and verse. There is nothing of this in L. His merits are of a completely different order—feeling for the sublime, rugged and grand, for passion and moral nobility, and a comparative indifference to art. Again, throughout L. there is little interest in rhetoric and dramatic art; he shows no real knowledge or appreciation of visual art or scenery; he had no ear for rhythm in verse or prose.⁶

This is partly of course due to his professed aim in writing the book, and we must not forget the lacunae. But there are other peculiarities, his extraordinary style, for instance. He writes long periods which he cannot manage; he uses abstract nouns in profusion, but in an un-Greek way; he uses extraordinary and unusual words and metaphors; he employs unskillfully typical Greek constructions (e. g. articular infinitive, article with neut. adj.). One notices all this in reading; but if we ask, "Where have I seen all this before?" there is only one answer—in Philo, Justin, Clemens Alex., Origen, Eusebius, products of Alexandrian Judaism. (It does not much remind me of St. Paul, but it does of *Hebrews*, usually connected with Alexandria.)

⁶ What he means by saying of the quotation in 39, 4, δλον . . . ἐπιτῶν δακτυλικῶν εἵρηται βούθμᾶς I cannot imagine. I can read cretics, trochaics, or epitrites, but not dactyls. [I wonder if L. already spoke with the Byzantine accent. Dionysius of Halicarnassus describes the tonic accent, but I suspect it was already a learned affectation (like Roman talk about grave and acute, etc., in Latin), comparable to "Atticism." One scrap of evidence I have not seen noted. The *Orestes* music ignores acute accent in the melody, but *Hellenistic music never does*. (Music of the Roman period does—this time because it was now Byzantine, stress, not pitch.)]

If we assume that L. was a Jew, long familiar with the Bible before approaching Greek literature, all these peculiarities are accounted for. A highly-developed syntax, a language rich in abstractions, elaborately constructed periods, were all foreign to him. Literary criticism as represented by Dionysius of Hali-carnassus and Demetrius left him cold. What he admired and looked for was what he found in Hebrew literature (rather like the attitude of many English critics to French poetry).

What is the external evidence that L. was a Jew? There is the famous quotation from *Genesis*, in itself unconvincing, but not without weight if we put L. in the first century A. D.⁷ Then Caecilius of Calacte, of whom the book is professedly a criticism and supplement, was a Jew and associated with Timagenes, an Alexandrian—*ως δέ τυρε, Αἰγύπτιος* (Suidas). That Longinus took the *Genesis* quotation from him is pure assumption, and not borne out by the manner of quotation (especially “right at the beginning of the laws”). Again the adjective *παρέθυπας*, with which L. makes such play, was from Theodorus (Greek for John?) a Gadarene, *ἀπὸ δούλων* (like Caecilius), and therefore, like Meleager, probably a Semitic. Lastly not only in style but in vocabulary, L. has very many similarities to Philo (a long list in Roberts, p. 192; cf. p. 236).

Having written so far (apart from details) away from books, except Vahlen, it occurred to me that it would unexpectedly confirm my argument—an “undesigned coincidence”—if it were possible to connect L.’s patron Terentianus with Egypt, or with Jews. On consulting a library I found a Terentianus (the only T. I could find) in Martial, *qui nunc Niliacam regit Syenen* (I, 87, 6). There is some probability this may be the man. 1) Terentianus seems an uncommon name. 2) The remarks about the decline of eloquence fit in well with a contemporary of Tacitus’ *Dialogue* (cf. too Seneca and Petronius)—Roberts gives the parallels. 3) Terentianus was apparently a patron of literature. 4) The command of the three cohorts at Syene

⁷ Joh. Siceliota says it was quoted by Demetrius of Phalerum—not impossible, considering Demetrius’ connection with Alexandria just at the time of the beginning of the LXX—but how did John know? (quoted by J.-V. on 9, 10). That it is *inexact* may be due to the writer’s familiarity with the Bible (I should not have noticed it myself: I did not look it up, nor did L.), and in any case many of L.’s quotations are *inexact*.

THREE NEW MORTGAGE INSCRIPTIONS FROM ATTICA.

During a trip of exploration through Attica in July 1947, I found three more unpublished Greek mortgages. They are small markers (*horoi*) in the form of a sale subject to redemption and were set up on mortgaged lands and houses as public records. I have discussed the subject at length with bibliography in *Hesperia*, XIII (1944), pp. 16-21. With Mr. W. H. Buckler I have published the only long specimen of a *πρᾶσις ἐπὶ λύσει*.¹ None survives in literature or papyri. So the stone *horoi* are important for the study of Greek law and mortgages. The smaller ones often take the form of *ἀποτυμήματα*, security for the property of minors or for dowries, such as No. 2. Most, however, take the form of sales subject to redemption.

1. (Fig. 1). A rough stone seen near Sunium, broken on all sides and rough on the back. Greatest height, 0.30 m.; width at top, 0.21 m.; at bottom 0.245 m.; thickness, from 0.05 m. to 0.055 m. Inscribed part 0.13 m. high. Letters badly cut; 0.015 m. to 0.02 m. high. I cleaned the stone, which had a heavy incrustation, looked at the stone in different kinds of light, made a copy, two squeezes, and took a photograph.

OPOΞΧΩΡΙΟ	ὅρος χωρίο
ΚΑΙΟΚΙΑΞΠΕΠΡ	καὶ οἰκίας πεπρ-
ΑΜΕΝΩΝΕΡΓΙΑ	αμένων ἐπὶ λ-
ΥΞΕΙΦΙΛΟΘΕ	ύσει Φιλόθε-
5 ΩΙΦΡΕΑΡΡΙ	5 οι Φρεαρρί-
ΩΙΧΜ	οι ΧΜ

The name *Φιλόθεος* is already known as that of a Phrearrian.²

¹ *A.J.A.*, XVI (1912), pp. 11-82; *Sardis*, VII, 1, pp. 1-7. Two smaller specimens have been published since the Sardis example, one from Mesopotamia and one from Sicily; cf. *Zeitschr. d. Savigny-Stiftung*, XLVI (1928), p. 339; XLVII (1927), p. 494. For the division of the word (lines 3-4) *λύσει*, cf. for example *I.G.*, II², 2690, 2702, 2708, 2720, 2736, 2746.

² Cf. Kirchner, *Prosopographia Attica*, no. 14499 (*I.G.*, II², 791, frag. d 33), dated 246/5 B.C. by Dinsmoor, *The Athenian Archon List in the Light of Recent Discoveries* (New York, 1930), p. 163, and 247/6 by W. K. Pritchett and B. D. Meritt, *The Chronology of Hellenistic Athens* (Harvard University Press, 1940), p. 99.

Perhaps the Philotheus in our inscription was a grandfather or greatgrandfather of that one. The inscription, as do most of such *horoi*, dates from the fourth century before *ou* is used for *o* (*χωρίο*), i. e., about the middle of the century. The inscription has the same formula as many others,³ but there is only one mortgagee. There can be as many as five (cf. No. 3). Generally there are two or three, but rarely is there only one. However, the mortgage was for the small amount of 1500 drachmas.⁴ Philotheus was from the *clēme* of Phrearroi,⁵ of the tribe Leontis, to which Sunium belonged.

2. (Fig. 2). Rough stele of white marble, found at Anavyso, given by me to the Agora Museum. Height, 0.23 m. Width, from 0.12 to 0.29 m. Thickness, 0.06 m. The letters are 0.01 (omicron) to 0.015 m. high. They are rudely cut. The lower part of the stone and the back are left rough.

OPOΣ	<i>έρος</i>
ΧΩΡΙΟ : ΑΠΟ	<i>χωρίο : ἀπο-</i>
ΤΙΜΗΜΑΤΟ	<i>τιμήματο-</i>
Σ : ΙΠΠΟΣΤΡ	<i>σ : Ἰπποστρ-</i>
5 ΑΤΕΙ : ΓΡΟ	5 <i>άτει : προ-</i>
ΙΚΟΣΡΗ	<i>ικός ρη</i>

This is a mortgage pillar set up to register the security given for the dowry of Hippocrate. For this type of inscription cf. *I. G.*, II², 2659-2683; *Hesperia*, III (1934), p. 65, no. 57; *Hesperia*, Suppl., VII (1943), p. 1. On the subject of dowry in general cf. the new book of Joannes M. Sontes, *Προξ κατὰ κλασ-σικὸν καὶ βυζαντινοφωματικὸν χρόνον*.

Generally we have *ἀποτιμημα*, but in *I. G.*, II², 2669 and 2678, *ἀποτιμήματος* (in 2679 *ἀποτιμημάτων*). Sometimes the participle occurs, *ἀποτιμημένης* (2675) or *ἀποτιμημένου* (2674) or *ἀποτι- μημένον* (2675, 2676). I know of only one larger mortgage, 1 talent, 2000 drachmas (*I. G.*, II², 2659). *I. G.*, II², 2680 has 5100; 2662 has 4500. The reading in this inscription is difficult, but after long study of the stone, squeezes, and photographs, I feel sure that the correct number is 5200. There are several

³ Cf. Robinson, *Hesperia*, XIII (1944), p. 19; *I. G.*, II², 2685, 2638 (1500 drachmas).

⁴ *I. G.*, II², 2671 is another Phrearrian mortgage for 1500 drachmas.

⁵ Cf. *A. M.*, XVII (1892), Pl. XII; *R.-E.*, s. v. *Δῆμοι*, cols. 115-118.



FIG. 1.



FIG. 2.



FIG. 3.

misleading vertical lines, but they are part of the stone itself. In such inscriptions the demotic is often omitted so that we are unable to identify the mortgagee. The name Hippostrate is found in Kirchner, *Prosopographia Attica*, no. 7667, which is a contemporary inscription of the fourth century, as that of the daughter of Aristides, of the deme Anaphlystus.⁶ Since our inscription comes from Anavyso, the site of Anaphlystus,⁷ it may be the same person. The inscription dates from the middle of the fourth century. Omicron is still used instead of *ον* in the genitive,⁸ but *ει* for *ηι* as in *Ιπποστράται* does not occur before 378 B.C.⁹

3. (Fig. 3). Long stele of blue Hymettian marble found at Vari. Given by me to the Agora Museum. The upper right edge and lower left corner were broken in antiquity. Height, 0.59 m.; width, 0.24 m.; thickness, 0.06 m. Letters 0.008 m. to 0.02 m. high. Red paint remains in almost all the letters.

ΕΡΙΠΡΑ	ἐπὶ Πρα-
ΞΙΒΟΥΛΟΥ	ξιβούλου
ΑΡΧΟΝΤΟΣ	ἀρχοντος
ΟΡCΞΟΙΚΙΑ	ὅρος οἰκία-
5 ΣΚΑΙΧΩΡΙΟΥ	5 σ καὶ χωρίου
ΚΑΙΟΙΚΙΑΣΤΗΣ	καὶ οἰκίας τῆς
ΕΝΑΣΤΕΙΡΕΡ	ἐν ἀστει πεπ-
ΡΑΜΕΝΩΝΕΡΙ	ραμένων ἐπὶ
ΛΥΞΕΙXXX	λύσει XXX
10 ΜΝΗΣΩΝΙΑΛ	10 Μνήσωνι Ἀλ-
ΑΕΙΜΝΗΣΙΒΟ	αῖ, Μνησιβο-
ΥΛΩΙΑΛΑΙ	ύλω Ἀλαῖ,
ΧΑΡΙΝΟΙΑΛ	Χαρίνοι Ἀλ-
ΑΙΕ!	αιεῖ

This inscription is the fifth boundary stone dated by the archon's name to the year 315/14 B.C.¹⁰ Omicron upsilon and not ο

⁶ Hippostrate is also the name of the foster-child of Melitta on an Athenian gravestone in England, Marshall, *Ancient Greek Inscriptions in the British Museum*, IV, ii, 1916, no. 942.

⁷ Cf. R.-E., s.v. Anaphlystos.

⁸ Cf. Larfeld, *Handbuch*, pp. 462 f.

⁹ Cf. Meisterhans-Schwyzer, *Grammatik der attischen Inschriften*, p. 39.

¹⁰ Cf. I. G., II², 2725, 2726, 2744, 2745.

is used in the genitive. Unique in such inscriptions is the mention of an *oikia* ἡ ἐν ἀστει. I know of no parallel for a combined mortgage being given on a house and land and including a house in the city.¹¹ Also unique is the number of three mortgagees of the same deme taking one mortgage. In *I. G.*, II², 2654, 2693, 2705, 2727, 2735, 2692 (5 mortgages), and in the *horos* inscription which I published in *Hesperia*, XII² (1944), p. 19, we have two mortgagees from the same deme. The name Μνεσον occurs as that of the father of the *prytanis*, Mnesagoras of the same deme of Halae, who lived much later about 260-254 B. C., but who may have been a relative of the Mneson of our inscription.¹² Charinus of Halae is unknown.¹³ The use of *οι* for *αι* in line 13 is peculiar in view of the form in the preceding line Μνησιβούλωι. The spelling in this inscription, however, is careless, as is shown by the three ways in which the demotic is written, Ἀλαεῖ, Ἀλαι, Ἀλαιεῖ. In *I. G.*, II², 2686, we have the usual Ἀλαιεῖ, but in 2701 we have Ἀλαι. It is interesting, however, to have such itacism as in Ἀλαι as early as 315 B. C.

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¹¹ ἀστει and not πόλει is used for the city even after 395 B. C., when ἀκροπόλει supplants ἐν πόλει. There is only one other case where the property involved is geographically identified, *I. G.*², 2718, ἐν Ἀνθρειαι, but that is not comparable. Mr. Moses Finley, who has completed under Professor Westermann of Columbia a dissertation on *Business Practices in the Greek City-States with emphasis on real property problems*, in the chapter on *Horoi*, calls attention to a late fifth century B. C. inscription from Halicarnassus, which gives a list of mortgaged properties seized by the temple in cases of default and then sold. Here the location of each item is given and *oikirv τὴν ἐν πόλει* occurs several times. Cf. Dittenberger, *Syllöge*³, 46, lines 34, 36, 45.

¹² Cf. Kirchner, *op. cit.*, nos. 10239, 10392; *I. G.*, II², 678, line 24 (dated 255/4 B. C. by Dinsmoor and 256/5 by Pritchett and Meritt).

¹³ The deme Halae is supposed to be the first deme on the coast on the west side of Hymettus. The deme is Ἀλαι Αἰγανίδες, not Ἀλαι Ἀπαφηνίδες. It was situated near the modern Véri, where this inscription was found. Cf. *R.-E.*, s. v. Halai; Löper, *A. M.*, XVII (1892), pp. 342, 410, Pl. XII.

REVIEWS.

RHYS CARPENTER. Folk Tale, Fiction, and Saga in the Homeric Epics. Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1946. Pp. x + 193. \$2.50. (*Sather Classical Lectures*, XX.).

The Sather Lectures are "intended for a general public of intelligent, sympathetically interested, but not necessarily highly specialized listeners." In such lectures much may be said which would be stated differently in a treatise; but when lectures are printed, almost without alteration, they present opportunities for the writer, and problems for the reviewer. Dr. Carpenter is well aware of the "dangers of discoursing easily on difficult matters, and offering concise conclusions from inadvertent evidence"; but he has not been deterred from almost untrodden ground, believing that "to explore the background and ancestry of Homeric epic, we must travel north, not east or south," a complete reversal of the trend of Homeric study due to Mediterranean archaeologists. "The poetical speech of the Greek," he contends, "was European not Aegean," and for this view he finds support in folklore survivals.

As a *terminus ad quem* for "literature without letters" he rehabilitates the Pisistratid recension, with the congruous background of an "Old Attic" text, and the leaden archetype of Hesiod's poems seen by Pausanias, "scratches" (*γράμματα*) older than the introduction of papyrus from Egypt, newly rediscovered in the seventh century. The present writer has given archaeological arguments for dating the *Shield of Heracles* between 650 and 575 B. C. (*J. H. S.*, LXI [1941]). Above this zero, Carpenter clearly distinguishes three categories of tradition. Saga "purports to be true facts and happenings held fast in folk memory." Fiction is "the persuasive decking-out of circumstance with trappings borrowed from contemporary actuality." It includes the mere imagining of persons, characters, and situations. Folk tale is "utterly unreal, but by no means utterly irrational"; and all these can be "sewn together in the rhapsode's glittering fabric."

II.

Modern criticism approaches all three across the romantic episode of archaeological discovery "from Schliemann to Blegen." One might compare the plight of a modern historian, approaching early Europe across the mirage of the Gothic Revival. But though archaeological discoveries revealed a long perspective of events to which the Poems are related as "saga," nothing (Carpenter thinks) is thereby proved about the relative date of our version of that "saga," on which there has been wide difference of opinion. Carpenter contends that Mycenaean culture has left little trace in the poems. But he overstates his case. Did Homeric warriors "normally" wear breast-plates? Is Homer "silent" about inlaid designs in silver and gold? Was the reference to *σήματα λυρά* (not *γράμματα*) felt by the poet to be

"anachronistic and out of tradition"? Does not the "early classical" apparel of Homeric men appear in fresco at Mycenae? What of the ἐνώπια παρφαγῶντα of Menelaus' palace, which astonished Telemachus? Were Ionian houses frescoed in the seventh century? The resemblance of Homeric and Hellenic (though not Cretan) *megara* cannot be merely denied. The "Nestor Cup" from Mycenae has four handles, though not in two pairs, as on the enormous cup in Sen-mut's fresco of the fifteenth century. Was the θρύκος of Alcinous' hall external? What difference would that make to its material? And was there not dark-blue *kynos* as well as sky-blue? What needs to be explained is the occasional vivid description of objects and craftsmanship which had gone out of use in the poet's own time; not merely the general perspective of genealogy and political history. Carpenter overlooks the fact that rich Mycenaean tombs were looted in early Hellenic times: this would bring metal-inlay and queer-handled cups into his other category of fiction—"direct borrowing from the facts of experience," like the helmet of Mérionès,—alongside that "oral tradition three or four hundred years old" which he calls "saga" (p. 30), with "here and there some poignant detail still adhering," which gives away his whole case.

There were also survivals. Carpenter overlooks the use of the Homeric chariot as a fighting platform; but surely this use was persistent. It goes back to the shaft-grave stela at Mycenae, and comes down, in Cyprus, to the Ionian Revolt.

The vivid illusion of reality in the Poems, which Carpenter ascribes mainly to "fiction" is powerfully enhanced by the familiarity of Aegean topography. Circe's home may have been in European backwoods, but Cyclops-land is pure Mediterranean coast scenery. He notes that Poseidon's look-out on Samothrace is confirmed by observation, whereas where "saga" (or "fiction") prescribed an Achaean Wall, no longer there, the poet was at pains to demolish it (p. 37). He compares the Icelandic topography of the *Grettir Saga*, where not only the places but the characters are real, though described two centuries after the events. Looser relation of fact both to "saga" and to "fiction" is illustrated by the *Song of Roland*; the lapse of chronological perspective, by the *Nibelungenlied*; and the interpolation of "fiction" or "folk tale" into "saga," by the figure of Siegfried among Burgundians and Huns; and he takes the same view of Achilles among Agamemnon's vassals. From such diverse elements has the "fiction"-skill of the story-teller created the "World of Homer" in Aegean lands.

III.

Thus far there may be general agreement with Carpenter's reformulation of the "Ionian Homer" of Wilamowitz' generation. But he has yet not proved a late date. "Fiction" and "folklore" coexisted with "saga" in the banquet-halls of the Migration Period, if not (as Evans thought) in Mycenaean *megara*. But now comes "Trouble over Troy,"—the precise location of Priam's city. Carpenter starts from the Bunar-bashi springs and the Bali-dagh, and follows Charles Vellay in rejecting Hissarlik. But it is mere guess-work that Hissarlik was "bramble-grown and probably deserted" in early

Hellenic times. Certainly it was at New Ilion that Xerxes sacrificed and Hellanicus—for whatever motive—located Homer's Troy. Nor could New Ilion dig a cess-pit without involuntarily “digging up Troy.” Carpenter is content to recognize in Hissarlik the “high wall of Heracles”; he identifies Simois with the Kemer-su; and gives too little weight to Strabo's topography.

Deserting, then, both Strabo and Schliemann, Carpenter relies on the alternative story of the War in the *Cypria*, which he thinks pre-Homerie and related to the Aeolic colonization. Homer, during the later Ionic exploitation of the Hellespont, discovered the Bali-dagh and the Scamander; as he discovered the home of Odysseus in the western navigators' Ithaca. Though there was in Greek “saga” a Trojan War, “for want of written records . . . we shall never know what or where was Troy.” It was an episode historical and momentous in the Ramessid “Sea Raids” and in the Aeolic colonisation; the name *Troia* may be related to *Etruria*—a conjecture philologically unobjectionable, “though rather startling in its implications.” Carpenter speaks of the “flat screen of an almost timeless past”; but is no account to be taken of the chronological “grid” drawn by Greek genealogies over the sagas? His devastating conclusion is that “history is history, and oral epic is oral epic; we shall gain nothing by mistaking the one for the other.” But we still need to know which is which; and is it not the essence of “saga” that it has an historical basis?

IV.

While “fiction,” then, created a Homeric Age and Homeric World, with the slightest assistance from “saga,” the relations between “fiction” and “folk tale” are very different. Folk talk, inspired by “deep-seated human delight in overcoming in the imagination the frustration and physical barriers of ordinary earthly existence,” and the fears, as well as the desires, of dreamland, meant little to the Greeks who desired, not to ignore or overstep, but to control them (p. 70). Olympus was no “beanstalk country,” but more like our “heaven.” Yet *Märchen* there were, for Lucian, Plato, Herodotus, and they may be detected in Homer, most clearly in the presentation of Achilles. Nineteenth century etymologies and Aryan nature-myth theories rest on elements of reality; and it is from northern *Märchen* too that Carpenter draws his illustrations. But the *Iliad* is not mere folk tale; it is a dramatic “novella,” a character-study, developed under emotional stress: in this respect the *Niebelungenlied* must be compared with the Volsungasaga (p. 77). Yet for Carpenter, “folk tale” has little more influence on the Poems than saga. Here too, he seems to lose faith in his own criticism. Surely, from first to last, the “Wrath of Achilles” is folk tale in structure, however overwrought with fictional adornment and narrated, like the *Song of Roland*, in a context of saga. That Achilles' heel is not wounded within the poem, does not affect the part played by Thetis, and by Zeus.

This is the answer to Carpenter's question: “Is the *Iliad* then all sheer invention?” The attempt to find in Attic tragedy the key to its structure is not quite untried—Aristotle tried it, long ago—but it is curious that he does not accept the “argument from design”

(p. 84) as conclusive for single authorship; for what makes the unity of the *Iliad*, laquacious and discursive as it has become, is an "all embracing dramatic pattern"; and this implies power of invention—of "fiction" in a quite different sense—to combine and transmute saga and folk tale alike, so that Achilles for all his attributes becomes a human being with emotions, temptations, and a will that prevails.

This brings us back to the period of culture to which the actual poem is to be assigned. The arguments of the separatists, for Carpenter, stultify one another. Bronze and iron, body-shield and hoplite-shield, do not help him; and the suggestion of archaism seems to him superficial. For him the only "strata" are those of saga—remote hearsay—and of fiction, the poet's own surroundings. It is good to have this wholesome but not novel doctrine restated. But it only sets the lists for the fighting over the "Time and Place of Homer."

V.

The "Setting of the *Odyssey*," on the other hand, amplifies the argument for the *Iliad*, starting from the references to Phoenician traders which "fit perfectly our archaeological concept of their activities in Greek waters throughout the seventh century"—but surely also of the eighth and ninth? In the absence of any "Egyptian component," they are earlier than the opening of Egypt to Greek adventurers by the Twenty-sixth Dynasty:—but how much earlier? Herodotus' description of "Carian" armour is referred to those adventurers about 698 B. C. (p. 93) and marks the disuse of the "shelter shield," which Carpenter can (after all) detect in the *Iliad*: but the "shelter-shield" disappears from the monuments very much earlier than this. As Odysseus is to be one of these seventh century raiders, Herodotus' account of them may contain "conscious or unconscious memories of Homer." But did Herodotus think that Homer was describing seventh century armour?

This late date, for Homer's invention of Odysseus, Carpenter supports by ingenious examination of the topography of the Delta: "Menelaus had therefore been in Sais" (p. 100) after the establishment of Psammetichus. A third (and rather obscure) argument from the "gates of horn and of ivory" turns on an interruption of the ivory-trade in the eighth century, and Greek reversion to local horn or bone. All this ignores the much earlier uses of ivory, as the topographical argument ignores the thirteenth century Sea Raids, which Carpenter has already made the context of the Trojan War. The same wide-spread adventures undercut also his presentation of westward voyages in the eighth and seventh centuries; his geographical locations for some of Odysseus' adventures—Tripoli, Jerba, Pantelleria, Bonifacio—are probable enough, but prove nothing as to their date, so long as the Sea Raids are not somehow excluded. The Sirens, Charybdis, and Circe's home are not (he thinks) Mediterranean at all, but European saga "deftly localized" in waters unfamiliar to Greeks till the seventh century: Carpenter has not seen the Messina whirlpool at its best. These "latest-possible" dates are as much later than the traditional "date for Homer" as the Mycenaean and Achaeans dates are earlier. Neither series is conclusive in any argument about the relations of saga, folklore, and fiction.

But lest saga should be admitted to such a place in the *Odyssey* as is conceded for it, even by Carpenter, in the *Iliad*, the folk tale ancestry, claimed already there for Achilles, is asserted in an ingenious and even fanciful way for Odysseus. This second half of the book (VI-VIII) is the *τριτὸν κῦμα* by which some readers will be inclined to estimate the whole.

VI.

All over Europe, and further afield, the winter sleep, and other habits, of the bear have suggested that he dies, and comes to life again; and entitle him to respect and worship. Such a bear-daemon Carpenter finds in human form in Salmoxis, in Euripides' Rhesus, in Trophonius, in Lycaon, Arcas, and Callisto in Arcadia, and so westward to Arceisios the head of Odysseus' clan (p. 128). Nothing of this appears in Homer's story, of which the opening lines define the plot and the character of the hero, eliminating irrelevant matters. Though Carpenter thinks it "unwise to obscure the issue with etymological uncertainties" (p. 131) he brings us back by way of *Ulixes* to *Salmoxis*, and to a Thracian immigration into the Aeolid region of Middle Greece. The long disappearance of Odysseus, and his return, must originate somehow: "the parallel is there; but what does it prove?" (p. 152). We may ask the same question.

VII.

An even more ingenious study of a folk tale, *The Bear-Son*, by criteria with which classical scholars are "not conversant," is thought to show "how accurately" the *Odyssey* "parallels the leading narrative of the Old English epic of *Beowulf*" (p. 136). Accepting Panzer's much-disputed "master pattern"—"whether or not it fits Beowulf"—Carpenter applies it to the *Odyssey*, eliciting fifteen points of resemblance, some not very significant, some highly original, such as the explanation given by Photius of the name *Oīts* by the bear's ears of the "Bear-Son"; even the Underworld visit of Odysseus "fits uncomfortably, even illogically into place," with "gaping seams in the composition" which are obvious enough. "Are such stories really old?" Against "the one supreme unlikelihood" that the Bear-Son story was current in pre-classical Greece, Carpenter has only the general consideration that it is the perennial tragedy of "death in the midst of life" that gives vitality to such a myth, and to the rituals which illustrate it. No doubt the conditions for a Bear-Son story were present in early Greece, as elsewhere. But what has this to do with a Thracian inroad into Greece? And why this particular story?

Another wide-spread tale is that of the *Man Who Disappeared*. Herodotus tells of Aristeas; Hittite archives, of Telebinu (p. 160); the town clerk of Lucerne in 1572, of Hans Buochmann. In the *Odyssey* Carpenter finds another such, "if we excise . . . all that is borrowed from the heroic happenings of the Tale of Troy," the saga-element, as in the *Iliad*. Beyond this remnant of folk tale he is left with "a final residue of pure fiction, the poet's own formative contribution to his poem," such as the minor characters, Penelope and (as Woodhouse indicated) Telemachus; though surely, these too have their independent origin in folk tale. He does not discuss the question,

recently revived by Lord Rennell and Mr. Heurtley, *why* the story was located on the west coast of Greece, except to note the "sacred sheep of the sun" in Herodotus (IX, 93) and the geographers' Cocytus river. He plays with the notion that the home of Odysseus was Corfu, not Ithaca, but abides by the tradition, and does not worry over Dörpfeld's Leueas at all.

With this incorporation of folk tales in a framework of fiction—but are either the Wanderings or the Return "pure fiction"?—is contrasted the "carefully humanized drama" of the *Iliad* (p. 170): exceptions are the stories of Phoenix and of Bellerophon. But in the *στήματα λύγρα* (pp. 173-4, but see p. 15) Carpenter now sees an Ionic allusion to letter-writing, in a "literate environment" contemporary with the Cimmerian raids (676-646 B. C.), with which is also identified Priam's allusion to "Amazons" in *Iliad*, III. Note that this allusion to Priam's young days would date the aged speaker two generations later, about 616 B. C., a little late even for an "Ionic Homer." Moreover, contrasts between the outlook of *Iliad* and of *Odyssey* are used to date the latter fifty years after the former, i. e. about 576 B. C. (p. 181) and to commend the view that the authors were distinct but single, masters of fiction in different modes, with a background mainly of saga in the earlier poem, of folk tale in the later.

This is Carpenter's "final verdict," and the hypothesis on which his whole exploration of the pre-Ionian past is based. But it must be noted that it leaves unsolved the riddle hitherto regarded as a central Homeric problem, of the transmission of the prehistoric materials into the "Ionic world." Fortunately, his valuable criticism of those materials and of their contributions to the Poems, and even his rather speculative illustrations of them, are not dependent for validity upon his extreme view of the "time and place of Homer."

Dr. Carpenter writes easily, as is his wont. His book is full of happy phrase, and vigorous comment, provocative and stimulating. It needs, and deserves, some revision; but it must have been as good fun to write as it is to read.

JOHN L. MYRES.

Homeri *Odyssea*. Recognovit P. VON DER MÜHL. Basle, Helbing & Lichtenhahn, 1946. (*Editiones Helveticae, Series Graeca* 4.)

This edition of the *Odyssey* is far more interesting and important than its modest format might lead one to expect. Its editor, a pupil of Eduard Schwartz and Jacob Wackernagel—and justly proud of the fact—is a scholar of distinction. Thirty years ago Wackernagel could pay the highest tribute to his views about metrics;¹ and recently he has contributed to Pauly-Wissowa² an article "Die Lieder der Odyssee" which obviously deserves the most careful study.³ The present edition testifies repeatedly to his deep and

¹ *Sprachliche Untersuchungen zu Homer*, p. 162.

² Suppl. VII, cols. 396 ff. (1940).

³ But a single copy has reached Princeton, and is kept in a place not easily accessible for me. Hence the indefiniteness of my remark.

broad knowledge of the Homeric language; and while so doing shows how much Homeric studies can profit from the progress of linguistics and the papyrus discoveries of the last half-century. His procedure in matters of text-criticism seems, however, to be open at times to question.

On p. vii we are told: "eas formas, quae grammaticorum regulis respondent, tum tantum dedi, cum traditione quadam inniti potui." Precedent for this rule can be found in an edition justly ranked as one of the greatest—Leaf's *Iliad*, I, p. xxv. How strictly Leaf applied the principle and how he was hampered by it may be seen from his reading Πανθόον in O 522—"both the metre and epic use require" this—but Πάνθον, Πάνθω in P 9, 23, 40, 59. In P there is no variant; in O one 15th century manuscript reads Πανθόον—probably a mere accident. Our editor does not adhere so rigorously to the principle. For instance in τ 538 he reads ἀγκυλοχήλης, though there is no variant; in χ 302 ἀγκυλοχῆλαι, with some support from the manuscripts taken as sufficient warrant for both passages. Whether -χηλ- (not -χελ-) is read by U² (Ludwich), or by "pauci," matters little; in either case it is a late bit of itacism.⁴ Support that is even more remote will serve: ν 293 δᾶτ' Ω, sed in Iliade vestigia formae non contr. extant. Sometimes an ancient grammarian will be sufficient: in ε 470 κλειτύν with Herodian: κλιτύν Ω; or the indirect tradition: a 241, δ 727, ξ 371, ν 77 ἀνηρέψαντο, cf. Hesiod, *Theog.* 990: ἀνηρέψυαντο Ω. Is it the total lack of support that stops him from reading Ἀρέπιναι in these passages?

Leaf (*loc. cit.*): "endured ἔως [also τέως] as a trochee rather than go to pure conjecture and write εῖος or ἥος." Our editor may have thought that he was free from that dilemma; if so, he was probably unduly influenced by Meister, *Hom. Kunstspr.*, p. 157. In eleven passages where the metre requires a trochee he writes εῖος; also in eight other passages in which a following consonant conceals the quantity of the final syllable, and in the same circumstances he writes τέως three times. Furthermore he follows emendations of Nauck or of Lachmann where the manuscripts treat these words as if they were monosyllables. Thus he writes εῖος ε 386, ρ 358, τ 530; τέως κ 348, ο 231, π 370, ω 162, though the consequent changes of the context are unattested. I agree that emendation is needed,⁵ and would follow Nauck also at β 148, ε 123. Iambic ἔως β 78, τέως σ 190 are wisely allowed to stand: problems of Higher Criticism may be involved.

Now on what tradition can εῖος and τέως—preferred to Nauck's ἥος, τῆος—rest? Meister (*loc. cit.*) stars ἥος, τῆος, and τέως, but not εῖος. The last form is excepted, apparently because, though it never occurs in the manuscripts,⁶ it turns up at Υ 41 in *P. Fayoum*, 160 (1/2 p.).⁷ As Meister cites no other instance, I cannot under-

⁴ Contrasting Leaf's note on ἀγκυλοχήλης II 428 with Bechtel, *Lexilogus*, p. 7 will bring out sharply one instance of progress.

⁵ Chartraine, *Grec. Hom.*, p. 12 is of the opposite opinion.

⁶ This was stated explicitly by La Roche, *Hom. Untersuch.*, I, p. 233. Leaf knew no example, nor is one given by Ludwich at any of the Odyssean passages.

⁷ No. 243 in Collart's list, *Introduction à l'Iliade* (1942), pp. 39-57. It is the only papyrus (except Σ) that contains this line.

stand his speaking of papyri in the plural. At all events he points out (p. 166) that the evidence is insufficient to establish the form,⁸ because of the frequent interchange of *ω* and *ο* in the papyri.

Whether applied laxly or rigorously the rule does not commend itself to me. I agree on the contrary with Pasquali (*Storia della traduzione e critica del testo*, p. 245): "Qual mai editore si fermerebbe per altri classici alla *recensio* ricusando d'inserire nel testo censure evidenti?"

Both Leaf and our editor believe that there is a way out through the bottom of the page. Von der Mühl says: "ne verum taceretur, in apparatu saepe annotavi, quae integrae Homericæ dictionis essent." Leaf says that "in many cases" the readings given in the text are "described in the notes as clearly wrong." There is, however, a difference. Von der Mühl's notes are in his critical apparatus, Leaf's in his exegetical commentary, and it is only in the latter place that such annotations belong.

Our editor continues: "sic et cautoribus et audacioribus una satisfacere studui." That shows, in my opinion, a serious misapprehension. The question is not one of boldness or timidity; but of determining just what the text is to represent. The poets used *ηος*; the Athenian editor, through whom alone the poem has reached us, wrote *ηΕΟC*; the *μεταγραψάμενοι* made of this probably *είος*; the Vulgate had *ēos / είος*. One has no right to speak of "sanas illas atque bonas *ηος τηος*," unless he intends to present the poets' text; any form is "right" for one period, and "wrong" for another. An editor must make up his mind as to what his text is to be.

Leaf chose as his target (I, p. xxiii): "the Attic text as transliterated into the new alphabet from the official Athenian original." What I miss most in this edition—and it could be said of others—is a similar selection of some one target.

The results of such indecision can be seen most clearly in the bracketing of lines. Speaking by and large⁹ the manuscripts of the *Odyssey* contain with substantial unanimity nearly¹⁰ 12,000 lines. There are also about 215 lines that are found only in some of the manuscripts. Of these about 140 lines got into Wolf's edition—an accident dependent partly on his eclecticism, partly on just which manuscripts he knew. Until the papyri were discovered this seemed a matter of importance. But when it is noticed that these and only these¹¹ extra lines do not appear in papyri written after ca. 150 B. C., the situation appears in a new light. All the extra lines are intruders in the Vulgate, and in an edition of the Vulgate all must be treated alike.¹² All must stand somewhere outside the text—

⁸ "Empfohlen, aber nicht sicher beglaubigt."

⁹ I can see no gain from reiterating what has long been available. The literature of the question is given in my *The Athetized Lines of the Iliad* (Special Publication of the Linguistic Society of America [Baltimore, 1944]), pp. 10-1.

¹⁰ I give only round numbers, because I am aware of the existence of doubtful cases.

¹¹ Again speaking by and large.

¹² The difference in the numbers to be assigned to them— β 191 but β 107a—is sufficient recognition of Wolf's treatment.

at the bottom of the page or in an appendix—with a statement of their attestation. No other line must be touched, unless one is trying to go behind the Vulgate, say to the text of the sixth century B.C. or earlier. To put it briefly, this is no place for eclecticism; it is purely a problem of recension.

Now our editor brackets only something less than 70% of the lines read by Wolf, and includes in his apparatus only about 50% of those that Wolf did not print. I mention in particular the lines of this class bracketed by him, but not noticed by me. For ρ 402 he is clearly right; perhaps also for χ 174, though the temptation to haplography is strong; but the misplacement of δ 458 in manuscripts is more (?) than balanced by Heraclitus' quotation. He should have bracketed also ι 55, because of the evidence adduced very cleverly by Miss McCarthy, *Class. Phil.*, XXVII (1932), p. 154.

It was pointed out in my *External Evidence for Interpolation in Homer* (Oxford, 1925), pp. 13-14, 205-216, that some lines against which we can bring no evidence from the manuscripts must nevertheless have been absent from the Vulgate. It is probable that γ [131] falls in this class.¹³ Two other passages, θ 142, κ 243, not read by Aristarchus, are left unbracketed, and I cannot regard the notes as containing the best possible solutions.

The editor refuses to bracket ϕ 308, saying: "sed non solus hic vs. ab ultimo poeta ortus est." The remark is probably true, but irrelevant. The manuscripts and a papyrus unite to show that the line was not in the Vulgate; how the Vulgate compares with the text of the last poet is another question that shculd be held separate.

Some lines are bracketed, though they are well attested for the Vulgate. An editor of the Vulgate should leave them alone; the editor of an earlier form of text should mark them and many others. The list of those von der Mühl brackets is not long: δ 553, ϵ 84, π 104 because athetized¹⁴ by the Alexandrians (but in contrast the interpolations of the Vulgate are not known to the Alexandrians); κ 75 because omitted in a papyrus (but a pre-Vulgate papyrus); λ 428, 454-6, σ 74 because known not to have been in various pre-Vulgate texts (all treated in my *External Evidence*); finally ψ 157-62 as a *rhapsodomus additamentum*, an observation certainly of good taste and most probably correct.

There seems to be room still for a critical edition of the *Odyssey* avowedly limited to a reconstruction of the Vulgate, even if one does not give full credence to Molhuysen's assertion:¹⁵ "At talia menda inveni ut libere dicere audeam, Ludwichium non ea esse in legendis libris manuscriptis peritia ut scriptorem ad fidem codicum edere possit." I shall not see it; but I hope it will be written, and that von der Mühl will write an exegetical commentary on its language.

GEORGE M. BOLLING.

¹³ That it is interpolated is practically certain on grounds of intrinsic probability, but there is no evidence as to when the interpolation was made.

¹⁴ I hope someone will write on the athetized lines of the *Odyssey*. Because of the different quality and quantity of the scholia the results may not parallel precisely those obtained for the *Iliad*.

¹⁵ *De tribus Homeri Odysseae codicibus antiquissimis* (1896), p. 30.

Pindari Epinicia edidit ALEXANDER TURYN. New York, Herald Square Press, 1941. Pp. xvi + 224. (*Polish Institute of Arts and Sciences in America*, Polish Institute Series, no. 5.)

It may not be inappropriate, before beginning the review proper, to do some thinking about critical editions in general. When I was young our noses were sometimes rather more in the critical apparatus than in the text of our author, and the critical edition was still considered the masterpiece of classical scholarship. Today Gilbert Norwood, in his impressive book on Pindar, urges us to "resent it as an outrage if we open a copy of Theocritus only to find a horrible apparatus criticus lurking at the bottom of the page" and maintains, in his review of the present edition of Pindar (*Class. Phil.*, XLI [1946], pp. 172 ff.), that "the age of textual criticism—at least as regards Greek poetry—has now ended." Whether one agrees with the first point is a question of taste and of practice. (I, for my part, should not attempt to discuss the art of an Aeschylean chorus or the meaning of a difficult passage in the *Philebus* without an accurate textual basis for my aesthetic or philosophical judgment.) The exaggeration of Norwood's second statement is apparent if, for example, one adds in the margin of the Oxford *Eucolici Graeci* the new readings from the papyri of Theocritus' *AIoniazosae*. To be sure, I am inclined to agree with Norwood as concerns Pindar: in Pindar's case it indeed seems as if the age of textual criticism has practically come to an end. But not simply "because of the diligence and skill shown by scholars for more than three centuries." The decisive fact was that Boeckh and later Tycho Mommsen singled out the interpolated manuscripts and concentrated on the pure ones. For the quality of the Pindaric text handed down in the uninterpolated tradition is astonishingly good, whereas the tradition of Aeschylus, for example, is relatively poor. May it suffice to gather the "emendations" in Pindar's *Olymp.* VI:

ἀγροία	cod.:	Αγησία	Schroeder
δύσερις	cod.:	δύστηρις	quidam Byzantinus
φιλόνευκος	cod.:	φιλόνικος	Bergk
σάρερον ἐλθεῖν	cod.:	σάμερον <μ> ἐλθεῖτ	Boeckh
μιχθέσα	cod.:	μειχθείσα	Schroeder
παθα ἰοπλόκαμον	cod.:	παΐδ̄ ἰόπλοκον	Bergk
εἰλ̄ ίθιαν	cod.:	ἐλείθιαν	quidam Byzantinus
γεγεν(ν)αμένον	cod.:	γεγενημένον	Ahrens
ἀλλ̄ ἐγκέρυπτο	cod.:	ἀλλ̄ ἐγ / κέκρυπτο	Boeckh
		ἀλλὰ κέκρυπτο	Hermann
		fort. ἀλλ̄ ἦν / κέκρυπτο	Turyn.

And thus it continues. In other words, almost all that philology in the last centuries has achieved in Pindar as far as emendation is concerned has been—with some remarkable exceptions, of course—the dusting off of many tiny specks. What future generations can do in the same direction must be negligible. Even new papyri or "the appearance of someone with downright genius for emendation" (Norwood) cannot alter the basic fact that in the *Epinicia* there is very little to emend because, first, good manuscripts reached Alexandria, secondly, Aristophanes of Byzantium and the other philolo-

gists fulfilled their task admirably, and, finally, the later centuries kept up this standard. There is in the *Epinicia* one famous interpolation (*Olymp.* II, 28-9), and there are *cruces*—how could it be otherwise in a difficult author? But is it not significant that critical notes which are quite appropriate in Aeschylus, such as: *intercidit versus—trimeter insanabilis admixto scholio—foede corrupta omnia nec est ubi tute consistas—huc revocavi, alii aliter disponunt—deest verbum finitum*—etc., would be unthinkable in Pindar? Is it not equally impressive that even in the *Isthmians* and *Nemeans*, where the number of available uninterpolated manuscripts shrinks to two and in some places to one, things do not seem to be basically different? A glance at Aeschylus' *Suppliants* would show the contrast.

This is the reason why Turyn's painstaking work on the manuscripts has yielded a text which does not really differ from Bowra's or Schroeder's or Mommsen's or even Boeckh's. Of Turyn's new readings Paul Maas, in his review in *C. R.*, 1946, p. 24, recommends one κ' instead of κν, one ξμεν instead of ξμεν, one ησαν instead of ζσαν, in short, minutiae. Norwood's review (*loc. cit.*) contains the statement that, "apart from unimportant alterations of punctuation and spelling, his emendations number eight." To the present reviewer a similar search has seemed superfluous. He has not even thoroughly undertaken the task of checking the results of Turyn's studies on the manuscripts and their affiliation, the painstaking work of many years, published previously in Polish and German periodicals and presented in concentrated form in the *Prolegomena* of the present edition. "A new edition of Pindar's *Epinicia* is unnecessary," was Wilamowitz' well-considered judgment (*Pindaros*, p. 10). All the same, let us be grateful that Turyn has undertaken the work and accomplished it in a masterly manner. Yet more labor in this line would hardly be worth while. The task in Pindar's *Epinicia*, as regards the constitution of the text and the critical apparatus, and also, to a high degree, the purely metrical schematization, is indeed complete.

The tradition of the *Epinicia* is of such excellence that it should be followed still more closely than Turyn sometimes does, even in matters of detail. To give a few small examples from *Olymp.* I: line 3, Pindar wrote ΓΑΡΥΕΝ. This lettering may be interpreted as γαρύεν or as γαρύειν, but γαρύειν is probably not only what Pindar wrote but also what he pronounced (cf. Schroeder, Ed. maior, p. 39). Line 5, μηκέτ' ἀελίον the ancient tradition, μηκέθ' ἀλίον the Byzantines. There is no reason to attribute the θ to Pindar's original (cf. Schroeder, *loc. cit.*, pp. 15 ff.); he probably taught his chorus to sing the *tenuis*, not the *aspirata*, and I should print μηκέτ' ἀελίον as Mommsen does, against Schroeder, Bowra, Turyn. Is it really advisable to replace προσέμεξ by προσέμεεξ ("corr." Schroeder), or is the spelling with ει rather a modern fad, and can it really be maintained that Pindar had his chorus sing the diphthong and not the short iota, the syllable lengthened through the double consonant? But these are, of course, trifles. It is more than a trifle, however, that in line 73 Moschopulos' figment Εὐτρίαναν instead of the powerful Εὐρυτρίαναν still holds the field. (Cf., but with due criticism, Schroeder, Ed. maior, Proleg. II, § 55.)

To add a few more critical remarks, the technique of the Apparatus criticus is not without blemish.

<i>Olymp. I.</i>	3	γαρύεν	codd.:	γαρύεν	Christ
	23	προσέμεξε	codd.:	προσέμεξε	corr. Schroeder
	63	οῖς <ν> ₃ ν	Bergk:	οῖσιν	codd.
	71	ἐγγὺς	Mommsen:	ἐγγὺς δ'	codd.

These are four different ways to express the same fact. Consistency would demand:

3	γαρύεν	Christ:	γαρύεν	codd.
23	προσέμεξε	Schroeder:	προσέμεξε	codd.
63	οῖς νν	Bergk:	οῖσιν	codd.
71	ἐγγὺς	Mommsen:	ἐγγὺς δ'	codd.

or the reverse. A critical apparatus is, in some measure, a thing of pedants: let us at least be consistent in our necessary pendency.

The apparatus criticus, moreover, perpetuates an abundance of errors of individual scribes. It may be difficult to draw boundary lines between the important, the not quite unimportant, and the negligible. Yet it is clear that in *Olymp. I* such readings as ήμέρα U (instead of ἀμέρα), ἐρήμης Hⁱ (instead of ἐρήμας), ἔστιαν ἀνθεμιστέον U (with the erroneously doubled αν), μουσικῆς U (instead of μουσικᾶς), φίλ' ἄνδρες Athenaeus (instead of φίλαν ἄνδρες of the MSS), and scores of others have no importance whatsoever and will have to be omitted in the final critical edition of Pindar—even in an *Editio maior*—because they merely obliterate the basic facts of the tradition.

I hope I may not be prejudiced in insisting that one misses in a complete apparatus to Pindar's *Epinicia* any mention that we may possess the notes of an antique musical composition for the beginning of *Pythian I* and, if so, in all likelihood Pindar's composition. The notes, then, are an integral part of the text.

The metrical analyses fulfill a need, and the technical names of the metres are helpful. But neither the analyses nor the nomenclature can be taken as more than initial clarification. Turyn schematizes the beginning of the short and simple (non-Pindaric) *Olymp. V* in the following manner:

----- Maecen(as) chor(iambus)
do(chmius).

Yet, if the first six syllables belong together and are identical with the first half of the Asclepiadeus, the member *Maecen(s) atavis*, it is only consistent to comprehend the next six syllables as the second half of the same Asclepiadeus, the member *edit(e) regibus* (which Turyn and other metricians call a dochmius). Thus the first line

‘Υψηλᾶν ἀρετᾶν καὶ στεφάνων ἀντον γλυκύν

is the Asclepiadeus + - - -, the last creticus echoing, as it were, the end of the Asclepiadeus. Moreover, what is the reason for interpreting in two different ways the six syllables which four times in this short poem conclude a line, twice as *ithyp(h)allicus* - - - - = and twice as *er(etic)s + ba(ccheus)* - - - - - ? There is no reason, and Schroeder, in his *Editio maior* saw the facts clearly.

But this is not the place to venture on the *immensum aequor* of Greek lyric metrics.

Turyn's edition of Pindar's *Epinicia*, which stands as a monument of sincere devotion to a great poet, bears the marks of the times. It is uncertain whether the Polish compositors who at Cracow set the type have survived the deluge. Their work has. Turyn brought one copy of the printed sheets to this country and had it reproduced in photolithography. This is the present volume. May Turyn's contemplated edition of Pindar's precious fragments follow in a not too distant future.

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ARTHUR STEIN. Die Legaten von Moesien. Budapest, Institut für
Münzkunde und Archäologie der P. Pázmány-Universität, 1940.
Pp. 139. (*Dissertationes Pannonicæ*. Ser. I. No. 11.)

With a compliment to S. E. Stout, *The Governors of Moesia* (Dissertation, Princeton, 1911), A. Stein, the great master of Roman prosopography and author of *Römische Reichsbeamte der Provinz Thracia* (Sarajevo, 1920), has now presented a masterly study of the officials of Moesia, which also was largely Thracian territory before its organization as a province in the time of Tiberius. So much new information from inscriptions and from recent studies in Roman military history had accumulated that a fresh survey and collection of evidence were badly needed, and the need has been filled in an exemplary manner such as one would expect from the distinguished author. It is of course inevitable that details of the interpretation present difficulties.

In the chapter on the prehistory of the province Stein refers to the inscription at Callatis, *I. G. R.*, I, 654, dedicated Ποπλίω Οὐνικ[ίω
--- ν]παταγῷ τῷ πάτρ[οντ]. E. Bormann, *A. E. M.*, XIX
(1896), p. 108, proposed the extraordinary word [í]παταγός on the basis of Tocilescu's reading. What was the command? Since II is an easy misreading for TP and A for H, the reviewer weighed the possibility of restoring some version of the formula πρεσβευτῇ καὶ ἀντιστρατήγῳ. Upon the reviewer's request that the possibility of reading [Σ]TPATEHΓΩ at the beginning of line 3 be tested against the stone, Professor Theophil Sauciu-Săveanu, the new director of the Muzeul National de Antichitati, where the stone is deposited (Lapidarium, No. 413), kindly reported that the first letter can be read and is sigma, that the supposed II actually is TP, but that the second alpha is not an eta. The disturbing word [í]παταγός, accordingly, which has made its way even into the Greek-English Lexicon, disappears. The word, then, must be στραταγῷ or [ἀντι] στρατάγῳ. Whether the form is a Doricism or an error either for [ἀντι] στρατῆγῷ or for στρατηγῷ, the possibilities are clear. If στρατ<η>γῷ, the word might be taken as indicating a proconsul on the analogy of ^{o²} *S. E. G.*, IX, 8, line 33 (Cyrene, 7/6 B. C.); it would be the proconsul of Macedonia. If [ἀντι]στρατ<η>γῷ, the word would indicate a legate.

Between these two possibilities the second is much more likely, because ἀνθύπατος was already the customary designation of a proconsul. The reader may compare the Greek inscription from Callatis with a Latin inscription from Amphipolis, the only other contemporary reference to the exact title of a Roman military commander who operated in Moesia before Moesia was organized as a Roman province:

A. E., 1936, 18 from Amphipolis	I. G. R., I, 654 from Callatis
Imp. Caesare	Ο δ[ῆμος]
Divi f. Aug.,	Ποπλίψ Οὐνικί[ῳ ----- ἀντι]
L. Tario Ruf(o) p-<o>	στρατάγῳ τῷ πάτ[ρων -----]
pr.,	[-----]τη[-----]
5 leg(io) X Fret(ensis)	[vacat] vacat
pontem fecit	

The title of L. Tarius Rufus, to whose command the *legio X Fretensis* belonged, was *pro praetore*, as Groag, *P. I. E.*², II, p. 64 and Stein, p. 13, note 2, interpret it. (For the inscription as a whole see A. Stein, *Klio*, Beheft XXXVII [1936], pp. 94-95). Also the title of P. Vinicius would seem to have been *pro praetore*, but the full restoration of the stone from Callatis cannot be made with certainty. It is very probable that line 1 was centered over the inscription and therefore can be used in an estimate of the lacunae in lines 2-4. Did line 1 read Ο δ[ῆμος] or Ο δ[ῆμος ὁ Καλλατιανῶν]? With the former restoration in line 1 the extent of the still unexplained lacuna in line 2 is reduced to about nine letters, for example Μάρκου νιῷ, or, less likely, either πρεσβευτῷ or πρεσβευτῇ without καὶ. With the longer restoration in line 1, the lacuna in line 2 might have read πρεσβευτῇ Σεβαστοῦ καὶ ἀντι] | στρατάγῳ. In line 4 traces remain of a formula such as ἀρετῇ[ι] [ἐνέκα or ἐνόιας] τῇ[ι] εἰς ἑατόν.

Stein discusses also the command held in 6 A. D. by Caecina Severus, whom Dio, L^{IV}, 29, 3 describes as ὁ τῆς πλησιοχώρου Μυρίας ἄρχων. With Ritterling, Premerstein, and Syme, he believes that Severus, who cannot have been a governor of a province not yet created, was a *legatus Augusti pro praetore exercitus*.

The problem concerning all these early commanders has been more clearly formulated by R. Syme, *J. R. S.*, XXXV (1945), p. 109, as follows: "At what date was the army of the Balkans taken from the proconsul of Macedonia and put under the charge of an imperial legate?" The case of L. Tarius Rufus soon after 16 B. C. seems to the reviewer to be the earliest, because L. Tarius Rufus was not a proconsul, for even the letters *prc* could not be an abbreviation of *proconsul*. P. Vinicius and P. Silius (noted by Syme) must also have been *legati Augusti pro praetore exercitus*. P. Vinicius could hardly have been simultaneously proconsul and legate as Stein suggests.

When Moesia began paying taxes and formally entered the empire, it constituted part of the great Balkan command exercised by a legate to whose province belonged also Macedonia and Achaea. As a province with its own *legatus Augusti pro praetore*, Moesia was separated out of the provincial complex in 44 A. D., and its first governor in the new status was, according to Stein, *Aulus Didius Gallus*.

Vasile Pârvan, *Analele Academiei Române*, XXXVIII (1915-1916), *Memoriile Secțiunii Istorice*, p. 571, finding himself apparently with too many legates, has argued that Didius Gallus never had been governor of Moesia. Fewer legates than Pârvan thought seem to have been concentrated in this period, but the fact remains that we have no direct reference to Didius Gallus as governor of Moesia. Evidence one way or another might have been expected from the inscription at Olympia, for which I here present a text different from that in *I. L. S.* 970.

A· Didips G[allus leg]atus [Ti·]
 Claud· Caes[aris] Aug· Ger[mani]
 ei tr[i]umphal[ibus o]rname[ntis],
 [XV] vir s· f· pro· co[s· Asiae et Sicilia[e]]
 5 [.....]siae, pr[aefectu]s equitat.
 [comes et legatus impe]ratoris i[n]
 [Britannia]

The text should be based on Pürgold's drawing published in *Röm. Mitt.*, VI (1891), p. 163, but Mommsen, the first editor, had even previously established the restoration of the crucial lines 1-3 and the identity of A. Didius Gallus with the man who led the Roman forces against Mithradates VII and installed Cotys as King of the Bosporus or Crimean peninsula. A coin of Cotys from the year 45/46 A. D., and the reference in Tacitus, *Ann.*, XII, 15, as background for events of 49 establish a *terminus ante quem*: The expedition was under way in 46 A. D. at the latest.

The number of letters missing at the end of line 2, where spatial considerations obliged the stonemason to break the word *Germani* | *ci*, establishes the maximum lacunae at the end of the other lines. Hence, all lacunae are measurable, and require supplements of the lengths indicated above. We know, for example, that the abbreviation *cos* cannot be accommodated at the end of line 3, and we can ignore as confusing the long restorations suggested by Domaszewski with a fine disregard of spatial limits.

In the first three lines the restorations (by Mommsen) have met with universal approval; and there is no room for anything more. In line 4 Mommsen restored *Africa[e]* or *Asiae*, but the latter seems to fit the space while the other does not. So far, suggestions of Mommsen may be retained in all lacunae of lines 1-4. Likewise Mommsen's restorations *pr[aefectu]s* in 5 and *impe]ratoris* in 6 have met with approval everywhere.

As to the content of lines 6 and 7, however, Mommsen declared that he was at a loss. Very hesitantly he suggested the restoration *i[ussu dedit]*. Groag (*R.-E.*, V, 410) accepted this as one possibility, but he suggested as another the restoration [--- *comes impe]ratoris i[n] -----*. An acephalus inscription which was subsequently found in the Agora excavations at Athens and appears to contain a later *cursus honorum* of A. Didius Gallus (*Hesperia*, X [1941], pp. 238-241), devotes a whole line to each honor listed, and the record of one honor reads [...] or [...] ^{7 or 8} *le]ga[to i]n Britt[ania]*. The supplements [*comes et legatus impe]ratoris i[n] Britt[ania]*] at Olympia

and [comiti et le]ga[to i]n Brittan[nia] at Athens exactly fill the space available and support each other.

That leaves only one uncertainty, the five or six letters at the beginning of line 5. Mommsen, who connected Didius Gallus with the Didius who conducted the Crimean campaign, presumed that Didius Gallus must have conducted the campaign from the eastern part of the Balkan peninsula, hence from the province of Moesia and the vassal states under the protection of the legate of Moesia. Surely the *cursus honorum* contained the record of his command, and Mommsen accordingly restored the title at the end of line 4 and the beginning of line 5, *leg. | pr. pr. Moe]siae*.

In *I. L. S.* 970, however, Dessau pointed out that the remaining letters could just as easily be read *A]siae*, which suggested a position as quaestor or legate of the province of Asia, i. e. lieutenant of the proconsul at some time long before the Crimean campaign.

Dessau, who believed that Gallus when he launched the campaign had indeed been legate of Moesia, suggested that in line 1 the entry *legatus* without any qualification meant the legate of the province where the inscription was erected. In Greek inscriptions of Achaia the proconsul is customarily called *ἀρθύταρος* without the addition *'Αχαλας*; so Dessau's argument is a strong one. If correct, it would date the campaign and the recognition implied in the grant of *ornamenta triumphalia* to the year 44, because Achaia and Macedonia were reconstituted as separate provinces some time in 44 A. D. The inscription accordingly would have to be dated while Olympia still belonged to the territory administered by the legate of Moesia. This argument appealed to J. G. C. Anderson (*C. A. H.*, X, p. 753). It did not appeal to Grosg, who omitted the name of Didius Gallus from the list of those who had governed Achaia as legates of Moesia (*Die römischen Rechtsbeamten von Achaia bis zu Diokletian*, col. 30).

The real objection to Mommsen's attractive restoration *leg. | pr. pr. Moe]siae* is that it exceeds the available space. The abbreviation *leg* cannot be accommodated at the end of line 4.

But Dessau's alternatives are equally unacceptable. Dessau did not say whether he intended *leg. | prov. A]siae* or *leg. pr. A]siae*. The first version may be discarded at once for the same reason as Mommsen's restoration; there is no room for the abbreviation *leg* at the end of line 4. The second version meets with an objection of another sort: in view of the unabbreviated or almost unabbreviated forms [*leg*]atus, *triumphalibus o]rname[n]tis*, *pr[aefectu]s equitat* and [*comes et legatus impe]ratoris*, it is hard to accept so complete an abbreviation as [*leg. pr. A]siae*. For this office one would expect at least *leg. provinc. Asiae*, which overflows the available space. Again the restoration [*q. prov. A]siae* does not conform with the unabbreviated style of this inscription.

We can approach it from another standpoint. Didius Gallus was detached from the emperor's staff in Britain to handle an emergency that had arisen in the East during the invasion of Britain. Didius Gallus hastened out to the Black Sea and assumed command of the nearest Roman troops and whatever extra levies he could arrange from the neighboring Roman vassals.

When an inscription at Pergamum (*Sitzb. München*, 1934, Heft 3, pp. 15 f.) relates that Trajan's officer Quadratus assumed special powers in an emergency and successfully exercised a wider military command, it uses the phrase *στρατηλάτης γενόμενος*, which means "as dux."

With a similar phrase a document of 170 A.D., *C.I.L.*, VIII, 20994 at Caesarea in Mauretania honors a man who during a war successfully exercised an emergency command: *Sex. Cornelio Sex. f. Pal. Clementi co(n)s(u)lari et duci trium Daciарum*. The same word *dux* is applied to wartime commanders in *I.L.S.* 1354 (at Italica Baetica from the time of Marcus Aurelius) and in *I.L.S.* 1140 (at Tarraco from the Severan period). Just as Cornelius Clemens was epigraphically designated *dux trium Daciарum*, and, in *I.L.S.* 1140, Claudius Candidus in *Hispania Citeriore dux terra marique adversus rebeiles . . . , item Asiae, item Noricae, dux exercitus Ilyrici expeditio Asiana, item Parthica, item Gallica*, all at a time before the common expression *dux* became the technical term for the holder of a regular office, so Didius Gallus can have been hailed at Olympia as [*dux Moe]siae* (cf. the only literary allusion to his command, Tacitus, *Ann.*, XII, 15: *At Mithridates Bosporanus amissis opibus vagus, postquam Didium ducem Romanum roburque exercitus abisse cognoverat, . . .*). Seeck (*R.-E.*, V, 1869) remarks that the term *dux* in the case of a man with an official title of command indicates a military victory with more than the province's ordinary garrison.

Obviously Didius Gallus had no time for the routine administration even of Moesia. During his brief command, for which he received merely leave of absence from other duties, he was completely absorbed by military affairs outside the province. Of course the campaign had to be based on Moesia, but his connection with the province was a position as *legatus Augusti pro praetore exercitus Moesiaci* rather than as *legatus Augusti pro praetore Moesiae*, even if the latter title already existed officially.

The first three lines of the inscription at Olympia convey that it honors, on the occasion of his *ornamenta triumphalia*, A. Didius Gallus legate of the emperor Claudius. The *cursus honorum* begins in line 4. At the head of the list stands the priesthood, *XV vir s(acris) f(aciundis)*. Then follow his proconsulships in descending order. Then follow his purely military commands in descending order.

Before the unraveling of lines 6 and 7 it was possible to think, as Mommsen did, that some minor early office was recorded in the entry *pr[ae]fectu]s equitat(us)*, but now it appears for still another reason that Domaszewski, *Röm. Mitt.*, VI (1891), pp. 163-167, was right in arguing that Gallus had been the commander of the cavalry during the invasion of Britain. Didius Gallus, of course, had held minor offices, but no minor offices are recorded in the list at Olympia. Also the offices associated with the city of Rome are unrecorded. The inscription, omitting these, effectively presents the services of the man in the public life of the empire itself, 1) as a religious official, 2) in the sphere of administration, 3) on the battlefield.

The possibility of restoring [*dux Moe]siae* in line 5 robs of special significance the silence in lines 1-3, where, Dessau thought, the

absence of the province's name suggested the governorship of the province in which the inscription was erected. The war was already over, and, though technically still a legate, Didius Galus no longer held any command.

On page 114 Stein dates L. Titinius Clodianus, procurator of Lower Moesia, to ca. 210 A. D. on the basis of the reading *proc. Aug[g.] n[n.]* in line 6, of *Année Épigraphique*, 1912, No. 132 (from Cuicul), a text which has recently benefited through discovery of an early copy (E. Albertini, *Mélanges en hommage à la mémoire de Fr. Martroye* [Paris, 1941], pp. 107-109 = *Année Épigraphique*, 1941, No. 175). The item in line 6 now reads *partes praes(idis) agenti [pr]ov(inciae) Numidiae*, and the supposed reference to the co-emperors Septimius Severus and Caracalla disappears.

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AUTHUR STEIN. *Die Reichsbeamten von Dazien.* Budapest, ex Instituto Numismatico et Archaeologico Universitatis de Pietro Pázmány nominatae, 1944. Pp. 131. (*Dissertationes Pannonicae*, Ser. I, No. 12.)

Having already given the profession standard works on the officials of Thrace and Moesia, Arthur Stein contributes in this fascicle another masterly study of a Balkan province, and by its publication Andreas Alföldi, editor of the *Dissertationes Pannonicae*, has increased still further the reputation of the brilliant series in which this study appears.

As we know from an inscription discovered fifteen years ago in the American excavations at Corinth, the conquest of Dacia was not gradual but completed in the Second Dacian War. From 106 to 108 A. D. consular legates ruled an undivided province. Because of the imminent war with the Iazyges and Roxolani Julius Quadratus Bassus, whom Stein identifies with the consul suffectus of 105 but distinguishes both from C. Antius A. Julius Quadratus and from the proconsul of Bithynia Julius Bassus, was sent to Dacia to command an army. In 118 (or 117) Quadratus Bassus met his death, and the new emperor Hadrian, whose position had not yet been consolidated, entrusted the command to his equestrian friend Q. Marcius Turbo, who soon after became pretorian prefect. This unusual appointment and indeed the figure of Q. Marcius Turbo became somewhat more distinct in 1945.

L. Leschi, in "La carrière de Q. Marcius Turbo," *C. R. Acad. Inscr.*, 1945, pp. 144-152, has now published a *cursus honorum* from Cherchel. Checked against Leschi's facsimile, it would seem to read somewhat as follows:

T. Fl. T. fil. Palatin. [Prisco Gallo]nio Frontoni Q. M[ar]cio Turboni pr[ae². praef., pr]oc. pro leg. provinc[iae]
Mauretan. Caes. [Et Ting., praef. A]leg. et praef. prov. Dae[iae]
inferioris, pro[---¹²---], proc. XX heredi[tat.]
5 provinciae [Syriae Palaest]inae, proc. ad cen[sus].

The restorations are those of Leschi with a slight alteration of the supplement *Caes[.] et Tingit.* (line 3), which seemed crowded, especially when reckoned with dots after the abbreviations. Among other things the first praenomen, nomen, and filiation are new. Leschi, furthermore, was able to identify as the future pretorian prefect the T. Flavius Priseus Gallonius Fronto Marcius Turbo *proc. Aug. (Mauretaniae Caesariensis)* in an inscription at Rapidum. Leschi was unwilling to equate the office recorded at Rapidum with the office recorded in lines 2-3 of the Cherchel *cursus*, and, arguing that Marcius Turbo was financial procurator of Mauretania Caesariensis just after the suppression of the Jewish revolt in the Cyrenaica and before the command in Dacia and that he returned again to Mauretania as *procurator pro legato* after the Dacian command, Leschi restored the phrase *proc[c. prov. Maur. Caes.]* in the Cherchel *cursus*, line 4. But since the *Vita Hadriani* 4-6 represents the military command in Mauretania as following immediately upon the campaign in Egypt and the Cyrenaica and preceding the command in Dacia, it seems preferable to conclude that Marcius Turbo had only one term in Mauretania: *pōst Mauretaniam praefecturae infulis ornatum Pannoniae Daciaeque ad tempus praefecit.* The Cherchel *cursus*, drawn up in the descending order of importance rather than in inverse chronological order, places the Mauretanian command above the Dacian because the Dacian command during hasty peace negotiations seemed less important than a campaign which not only required fighting but relieved those who set up the inscription of a real menace very near home. Line 4 may have contained a reference to the lesser command in Egypt and the Cyrenaica, by which also the man achieved wide fame. Nothing at Cherchel is said about Pannonia, so the above cited reference in the *Vita Hadriani*, 6, 7, probably refers to the command of legionary troops which Quadratus Bassus, whose place Marcius Turbo temporarily filled, had received for the war from the Pannonian garrison.

Of particular interest is the exact title of his command in Dacia, *praef. A]eg. et praef. prov. Dac[iae] inferioris*, as Leschi convincingly restored it. The above cited reference *praefecturae infulis ornatum* is further clarified in the *Vita Hadriani* 7, 3: *titulo Aegyptiacae praefecturae quo plus auctoritatis haberet.* Stein's conjecture (p. 17) that the division of Dacia into an upper and lower province may have occurred under Marcius Turbo finds confirmation in the Cherchel *cursus*, which, as Leschi said, constitutes our earliest evidence for the division of the province, where from 119 until 158 A. D. a legate of praetorian rank governed Upper Dacia while a presidial procurator under the legate's general supervision governed Lower Dacia. The Three Dacias came into being in 158 A. D., and the consular legate of the Three Dacias appears from 167 A. D.

Two points in Stein's discussion (p. 15) of Marcius Turbo's earlier career seem erroneous in view of the new evidence. In 113 Marcius Turbo was scarcely prefect of an Italian fleet but probably, as Passerini (*Le Coorti Pretorie* [Rome, 1939], p. 298) and Leschi suggest, in command of ships detached from that fleet for service in connection with the military activity in the East. The prefecture of an Italian fleet was too high an office for a man who in 107 was still a centurion, to reach by 113 A. D., and it is not mentioned

in the Cherchel *cursus*, which had room for two regional civil procuratorships. The second point is the command held by Marcus Turbo when Trajan sent him to Egypt and the Cyrenaica with infantry, cavalry, and naval units. Stein suggested that he went as prefect of Egypt. The *Vita Hadriani* gives the impression that Marcus Turbo received the latter title only when he went to Dacia, and the conjunction *et* in the Cherchel *cursus* bears out this impression. If line 4 did contain the record of his Cyrenaic assignment, it was either a procuratorship or a vice-command of some sort.

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HARTVIG FRISCH. *Cicero's Fight for the Republic. The Historical Background of the Philippiques.* København, Gyldendal, 1946. Pp. 311; 9 pls. Kr. 25.00. (*Humanitas*, I.)

The author of this book is a Danish politician as well as a professor of Classical Philology, and he has written books on subjects which range from the Constitution of the Athenians to the most modern problems of Europe. It is natural therefore to compare Frisch's book with Haskell's.¹ Frisch has a much better control of the bibliography, plus a thorough knowledge of the languages, both ancient and modern. There is a world of difference in approach, since Frisch's study is predominantly political in the European manner, while Haskell, ever alert to socio logical and economic considerations,² gives ample evidence of a lifetime of journalistic experience in close contact with the rough-and-tumble of American politics on every level, perhaps the best training for a student of the conflicting idealism and corruption of the late Roman Republic. Frisch was sent as a delegate of the Rigsdag to the San Francisco Conference in 1945; it is a source of comfort to find someone in politics who comprehends that intelligence and retrospect may be as important as the physical sciences in solving the world's problems.

This book is the first in a series called *Humanitas*, to be composed of translations of classical studies from the Danish which will appear at irregular intervals. The book is handsomely published on heavy paper whose quality we can envy, in clear type, with good plates of portrait busts, appropriate coins, etc. The book, in a paper binding, is too expensive, and it is to be hoped that the publishers will find some way of reducing the price of later volumes in the series. While it is pleasant not to have to struggle with the Danish, the foreign origin of the translation, as will appear in the passages quoted below, sometimes betrays itself in sentence structure or choice of words, and the occasional errors which escaped the proofreaders are distracting.

No new or startling thesis is propounded in this book. Frisch admits that another book to appear in the series will be of more

¹ H. J. Haskell, *This Was Cicero; Modern Politics in a Roman Toga* (New York, 1942).

² As in his *The New Deal in Old Rome* (New York, 1947).

general significance,³ but he goes on to say (p. 7) : " Yet I have not wished to keep back the results which in the meantime I have obtained, the reason being that my work aims exclusively at the political aspect of Cicero's activity within the last two years of his life, for which period I as far as possible try to set forth the historical raw material before the reader for his verdict. Therefore I have also made up my mind to add the whole evidence and the discussion with previous scholars in notes at the foot of the text, by which the reader will himself be able to value the correctness of the hypotheses advanced. Still I have at the same time endeavoured to present the contents as a connected account that may be read independently of the footnotes." Not every passage in the body of the text, however, is translated, and the quotations from German authorities are regularly left in the original language; the passages cited in the footnotes are usually left in the original Latin, Greek, French, German, or Italian, although the quotations from Danish studies are carefully put into English.

While Frisch rejects the views of the extreme detractors of Cicero like Drumann and Mommsen, one also misses in his book the sensitive subtlety and perceptive acuteness which have characterized the recent British writings on Roman history, the apparently innate comprehension of the hidden processes of popular government. It is a shock to read blunt statements such as that the principate was a "disguised monarchy" (p. 12), or to find the pervasive influence of force detailed in this paragraph (p. 21) : " In a nobility-republic of this kind, in which friendships and family interests played the principal part in politics, we therefore cannot find anything of a 'political conviction,' i. e. a political opinion supported on a judgment of facts. Therefore it is interesting how the young generation make up their minds during the stormy political conflicts. What attracts youth is power, real or supposed power, at best the most ruthless power. Thus we find in the wake of Sulla nearly all the politicians known later, who at that time were in their twenties, a Pompey, a Crassus, a Catiline." The reader wonders whether this is really the truth. Have we been in error in adopting so many delicate shadings of meanings? Or are we in a quandary resulting from everyone's finding in Cicero what he brings to him?

Such a book, written by a man experienced in the practical politics of Europe for the past two decades, has a salutary effect, just as has Haskell's book, written from the editor's point of view, for it suggests that possibly we who teach have been enchanted by our own siren-song. This book is not an elaborate piece of academic scholarship, but it is a studious and thoughtful attempt to discuss just one aspect of Cicero in a very limited period; and it is worth reading, if only to observe Cicero from an unacademic angle. It is not, on the other hand, a popular book, for it presupposes a reasonable command of the languages and a quite thorough knowledge of the Roman Republic, nor is it a book appropriate for a beginning student of Cicero.

Sometimes Frisch's statements are erratic. On p. 15, for example, he produces a description of Cicero which is provocative, but safe to read only if one knows Cicero well: " As his temperamental type—to use the term of characterology—was markedly manio-depressive,

³ Carsten Høeg, *Introduktion til Cicero* (København, 1942), of which the English translation is now in preparation.

it cannot be wondered at that we find him both jubilant and depressed. . . . If he had only been connected with a university his mind would have been sacrosanct at all times. . . . He was a weak character, not cowardly, but a typical civilian, with a fatal urge to be 'sincere' in the various situations into which he was led." Frisch always acknowledges that Cicero was honestly devoted to conservatism and constitutionalism, but at the beginning of his book (p. 8) he remarks on a point which becomes perfectly clear in the course of his narrative, that he grew in the course of his study to be particularly interested by the rôle Antony played.

The author had the advantage of using books which were published at such times that they have not been generally known and used in the United States.⁴ It is strange, however, to find anyone still using the first edition of Tyrrell and Purser; and apparently Frisch has only a small acquaintance with studies published by scholars in the United States, which might have been of assistance to him, especially in the question of the honors accorded to Caesar while alive.⁵

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⁴ It may not be impertinent to name some of these books dealing with politics at the close of the Roman Republic. In Denmark not only is there Carsten Höeg's *Introduktion til Cicero* (København, 1942), but also another book by Hartwig Frisch, *Cicero og Caesar* (1946). Some libraries in the United States are fortunate enough to have the volume of Pauly-Wissowa containing the article on "M. Tullius Cicero," in which Matthias Gelzer wrote the section on "M. Tullius Cicero als Politiker." Gelzer also published an enlarged and elaborate revision of his study of 1921, *Caesar, der Politiker und Staatsmann* (München, G. D. W. Callwey, 1940, pp. 345), of which the edition of 1941 (pp. 360) is reviewed in detail by Ronald Syme in *J. R. S.*, XXXIV (1944), pp. 92-103. Frisch also used J. Klass, *Cicero und Caesar; ein Beitrag zur Aufhellung ihrer gegenseitigen Beziehungen* (Berlin, Ebering, 1939); A. Piganol, *Histoire de Rome* (Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1939), of which there is apparently an edition of 1946; E. Remy, *Trois Philosophiques de Cicéron*, I^e, VIII^e, XIV^e, ouvrage posthume, publié par C. Hanoteau et S. Patris, I. E. J., Tome I: Texte et Traduction, Tome II: Commentaire (Louvain, Bibliothèque de l'Université, 1941); and A. Afzelius, *Die politische Bedeutung des jüngeren Cato*, which is apparently a whole volume or a large part of one (IV, 1941) in the periodical *Classica et Mediaevalia*. Since the Danish edition of Frisch's book appeared in 1942, he did not use Hugo Willrich, *Cicero und Caesar; zwischen Senats herrschaft und Gottkönigtum* (Göttingen, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1944), or M. Gelzer, *Vom römischen Staat; zur Politik und Gesellschaftsgeschichte der römischen Republik* (Leipzig, Kochler & Amelang, 1944, 2 v.), which the Library of Congress card describes as a "collection of essays and papers, all published previously." Of these books there are cards in the Library of Congress Depository Catalogue, by authors' names, for the 1940 edition of Gelzer's *Caesar* and for his *Vom römischen Staat*, and for the books by Klass, Piganol (1939), and Willrich. Of more specialized interest is another book by Frisch, *Büthrotier-Affären* (København, 1942).

⁵ He mentions Professor Rostovtzeff's ideas with qualified praise (p. 36), quoting from his *A History of the Ancient World* with approval; but he is severe with the British scholars, for he says (p. 35), in discussing their work on monarchy and deification: "It may be said about Adcock's sober argument, which is matter-of-fact and avoids all constructive hypotheses, that it is characteristic of modern English research into ancient history."

P. CHANTRAIN. *Morphologie historique du grec*. Paris, Librairie C. Klincksieck, 1945. Pages ix + 442.

This book is designed as a companion to Ernout's *Morphologie historique du latin*. The period covered extends from Homer through the New Testament, with some additional information given on the reconstructed forms of Primitive Greek and Indo-European speech and on the losses and innovations of Modern Greek. Since a detailed treatment of the history of sounds is outside the scope of a work devoted to morphology, the user of the book must depend on other sources for phonological data. The author has made an exception, however, in devoting a few pages to an outline of the vowel alternations and their grammatical function in such pairs as ἔλειπον : ἔλιπον, where endings are not distinctive. The present morphology does not include word-formation and composition.

Etymological equations involving cognate languages are given sparingly, but for this Chantraine may be commended. Some of the most important related forms in Sanskrit, Latin, etc., are shown in the appropriate places, and the student who wants more may consult Boisacq or Brugmann's *Grundriss*. In Greek dialect material, on the other hand, the book is very rich. The Gortynian Law-Code and the Heraclean Tables have received special attention, but citations from the Aeolic, Arcado-Cyprian, and Northwest dialects are also moderately frequent. Among literary sources Homer, the Lesbian poets, Pindar, and Herodotus have been used liberally, but Attic usage has of course been taken as the norm, especially for the paradigms. Some of the late forms quoted from fourth-century authors or from the New Testament will not be found in standard modern editions of these authors. A glance at the apparatus criticus often shows that the form in question has manuscript authority but was removed by editors in favor of some form regarded as more classical (examples: p. 129, the dual forms τā, τai, where modern editions have τώ, τoīv in the passages cited; p. 315, δοκοῖσαν in Aeschines 2, 102, where modern editions read δοκοίεν; many of the questionable New Testament verb forms may be found, with their manuscript authority, in Blass-Debrunner).¹

The organization is the conventional one beginning with the noun and ending with the verb. The final portion deals with two special features of Greek conjugation, the spread of -η- as a connecting vowel, and the spread of -σ- before endings from forms where it had etymological justification to those where it did not. The customary distinction of thematic and athematic forms in verbs is extended to nouns, and indeed the resemblance of o-stem nouns to thematic verbs is evident enough. Only in § 104 does the terminology become somewhat confusing, since participles may belong to thematic or athematic verbs and may at the same time follow the o-declension (middle) or the consonant declension (active). The paragraph begins by mentioning athematic adjectives, but in speaking of the "athematic participle δοδούς" and the "thematic participle iών" the author must be making reference to the verbal stems, since all active participles have consonantal or "athematic" masculine and neuter stems before their case-endings.

¹ *Grammatik des neutestamentlichen Griechisch* (Göttingen, 1913).

Whenever a work on historical grammar is used for reference or review, the reader's curiosity is directed toward those numerous small problems for which no wholly satisfactory solution has been found. One need not always look for new explanations, since often the choice is narrowed down to two or three theories of which one must be correct. A comparison of the present work with several other standard works² shows strongly the influence of Meillet-Vendryes. Thus the nominative plural ending -*ai* of *ā*-stems is derived from the IE dual ending -*ei*, with the analogy of the *o*-stem ending -*oi* assisting (pp. 34 f. and Meillet-Vendryes, p. 418); verbs of the type δηλῶ are regarded as back-formations from the non-present tense-stems or from the verbal adjectives in -ωτός (pp. 232, 284 f. and Meillet-Vendryes, pp. 233 f.; cf. also Schwyzer, I, 727); the intervocalic *σ* in the aorists ἐτίμησα, etc., is explained not by the usual theory of analogical restitution but by the supposition that many denominative verbs only made their aorist forms subsequent to the period when intervocalic *σ* disappeared (p. 196 and Meillet-Vendryes, pp. 196 f.); the short-vowel aorist subjunctive as a starting-point for the future tense is rejected in favor of prehistoric desiderative forms (pp. 290 ff. and Meillet-Vendryes, pp. 199 f.). In disagreement with Meillet-Vendryes, p. 416, and in accordance with the usual view, the genitive singular ending -*ou* in Attic masculine *ā*-stems is taken as an analogical extension from *o*-stems rather than as a contraction of -*eo* from -*ew* or from -*yo* (p. 42). On p. 65 the accusative singular Απόλλω is taken as evidence for a stem in -*oo-* concurrent with the usual nasal stem, but in the absence of direct evidence it appears safer to assume that Απόλλω is merely an analogical form after the pattern ἀμείνων: ἀμείνω. In the treatment of participles (pp. 336 f.) it is said that ὄμινών is the older form for verbs of the *vv*-class, with ὄμινός made after analogy with *ιοτάς*, *τιθέις*, etc. I should prefer to regard ὄμινός as older, following the usual historical sequence whereby athematic forms precede thematic forms and viewing the Herodotean usage of participles in -*vivōν* as an illustration of the fact that Ionic is sometimes less conservative than Attic. An occasional objection might be raised against some other minor detail, but actually there is very little that does not agree with the approved results of modern investigation in Greek historical grammar. At times one feels the lack of bibliographical data of the sort contained, for example, in the appendix of Buck's *Comparative Grammar of Greek and Latin*, but on the other hand the copious citations of actual linguistic material from Homer through the later Aeolic, Ionic, and Attic authors to the New Testament are a distinct advantage, to which a parallel could be found perhaps only in Kühner-Blass.

Attention may be directed to a few errors of reference and typography. A 238, cited on p. 57 as an instance of θέμιστες, actually has accusative θέμιστας, though θέμιστες may be found in π 403. On p. 79 κάρη should be cited from B 259 rather than from B 250. On p. 229 ξύρασαν does not occur in B 177 but does occur in Δ 334. On

² Hirt, *Handbuch der griechischen Laut- und Formenlehre* (Heidelberg, 1912). Meillet-Vendryes, *Traité de Grammaire comparée des Langues classiques* (Paris, 1924). Buck, *Comparative Grammar of Greek and Latin* (Chicago, 1934). Schwyzer, *Griechische Grammatik* (München, 1934-1939).

p. 240 the imperfect forms *ἴστην*, *ἴην*, etc., should appear with a macron over the *ι*. On p. 254 the reference for *ζεύγνον* should be T 393, in place of T 293, and on p. 262 the reference for *πωλέσκετο* should be A 490 in place of A 590. In the paradigm on p. 32 *ἥμεραι* should be *ἥμέραι* (see Kühner-Blass, I, 389 f.), and on p. 185 *ἔχνθην* should be *ἔχνθην*. On p. 197 (eight lines from the bottom) read *l'ionien-attique présente*, since *ἔφθηρα*, etc., developed in Attic as in Ionic. On p. 280 (seven lines from the top) read *la valeur rythmique des formes non contractes* for *la valeur rythmique des formes contractes*.

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ANNA SPITZBARTH. Untersuchungen zur Spieltechnik der griechischen Tragödie. Zürich, Rhein-Verlag, 1946. Pp. 109.

The aim of this monograph is to describe and catalog what can be known of acting in Greek tragedy by the use of textual indications in the thirty-two tragedies and two satyr plays (not the fragments). Since the author has done what she set out to do, by means of much careful work in the collection and constant citation of incidents from the plays (an index of which is conveniently placed at the end), the monograph is therefore valuable for its assemblage of material on Greek tragic acting. Still, much of the interesting material in the thirteen chapters closely corresponds to work already done. The second to seventh chapters (on veiling and unveiling, invocatory gestures, listening and looking, gestures of greeting and farewell, actions of grief, and those of violence), parts of the first (on pointing gestures) and eighth (exit and entrance), and the last chapter (on the presentation of emotional incidents) parallel an article by this reviewer in which stage business in all its aspects was discussed with reference to its use for the portrayal of emotion.¹ The comparatively long discussion of the *éccylema* and *mechane* in the eighth chapter might have cited the discussion of Flickinger² in his chapter on the influence of theatrical machinery and dramatic conventions. Some good references are cited in the footnotes, but no bibliography is given. A general, and possibly understandable, neglect of publications other than those in the German language is evidenced.

Of the remaining four chapters, the ninth, on action of supernumeraries, collects examples of these in their chief function as attendants in the retinue of an important character or of the whole chorus, and discusses also their occasional use to form independent crowds or processions. The tenth chapter discusses action arising from the use of certain properties. These actions, though highly individual, admit of some grouping (e.g. handing something to someone; putting on or taking off clothes, wreath, fetters; sacrificial actions) and are discussed according to whether essential to the

¹ *A. J. P.*, LXVI (1945), pp. 377-397.

² *The Greek Theater and its Drama*, pp. 284-317.

play's action, or emotional (throwing an object away, etc.). Sometimes the essential or emotional use of properties is mingled with a decorative element (cited for this are *Aj.* 908; *Ion* 102-183; Euripides, *El.* 112-166; *Anär.* 830).

The twelfth chapter notes certain fixed types of rôle and their characterization by definite action-motifs: the blind man (sketched simply, as Teiresias in *Antigone*, or developed in detail, even to the point where the action of the whole play centers around him); the old man (letting himself be led, hesitating, toilsomely climbing, etc.); the sufferer from sickness or insanity; the soul-sick person (cf. *Tro.* 98-121; *Hipp.* 198 ff.); the barbarian; the person of rank, and those semi-comic characters which are his opposite,—nurse, guard, etc.; the rather romantic unheroic young hero (*I. A.*, Achilles) or young girl (*I. A.*, Iphigenia; *Phoen.*, *Antigone*). The chapter on "Doppelvorgänge," treating of the apparent (though actually rare) use of two simultaneous incidents, discusses the case of a silent actor with nothing to do while another actor or the chorus speaks. In this connection the author cites the behavior of a soloist on our concert stage during choral parts, inclining toward the view that the Greek actor felt his rôle as an artist or artistic technician, not exclusively as a real personification of a character.

Comments are made at intervals on the usage of the three dramatists. The author states (p. 17) that incidents of emotional veiling and unveiling are exclusively Euripidean; might *Cho.* 81 be adduced as an Aeschylean example? In discussing invocation of the dead, she says (p. 24) one might conjecture the accompaniment of gestures for the supplication in the scene. *Cho.* 306-509, though none were indicated. Yet Aeschylus does seem to have made some indication of action in the phrase (428) *κρυπτῶν . . . κάρα*. For this discussion in general, too, *Pers.* 683 could be cited in support of the gesture of beating the ground. In view of the realism of the modern theater it would be more appropriate to include the kiss, which is set down among real actions on page 30, rather among "suggested" actions (page 90) indicated but impossible to carry out because of the mask.

The author believes that psychological development of character as we understand the term was unknown to the Greek dramatist (p. 86) and of little interest to his public (p. 94). She asserts that Euripides worked only from the dramatic point of view and not from the psychological, thus opposing much Euripidean criticism (not cited) and upholding (though no references are given) such work as Eugen Petersen's *Die Attische Tragödie als Bild- und Bühnenkunst* (Bonn, 1915).

She concludes (p. 95) that action-motifs were purposefully used, and their presentation generally stylized; therefore, that much action was not inherent in the tragedian's purpose. This statement is decidedly uncertain when one recalls individual actions which do not admit of classification into motifs, and when one realizes that the tragedians surely went as far as they could to indicate action without turning the play's text into a vehicle for detailed stage directions. One need only note the comparative bareness of a modern play's text in contrast to its presentation, a fact which of course does not justify us in jumping to any conclusion concerning the playwright's views.

about action. The thrilling English presentation of *Oedipus Tyrannus* by the London Old Vic Theatre Company in the 1946 Broadway season might certainly serve to remind those who were fortunate enough to see it that at least a normal amount of action, sufficient to present character and incident or to portray emotion, necessarily was inherent in the purpose of even Sophocles, admittedly the least demonstrative of the three tragedians.

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Excidium Troiae. Edited by E. BAGBY ATWOOD and VIRGIL K. WHITAKER. Cambridge, Mass., Mediaeval Academy of America, 1944. Pp. xci + 83. (*Mediaeval Academy of America Publications*, No. 44.)

Excidium Troiae is an anonymous, early mediaeval compendium which in continuous narrative chronicles the Trojan war, the wanderings of Aeneas, and the early story of Rome. It is shown to be a rewritten version, by an unlearned redactor, of a considerably older Latin work, itself anonymous and unknown to us.

The narrative in *E.T.* dealing with Troy has many elements in common with other mediaeval accounts which, like it, are in significant details independent of the Dares-Dictys tradition, and the editors with acumen and clarity study the interrelationship between *E.T.* and many of these kindred works, Latin and vernacular. They reach the conclusion that the original Latin work was extant in the Middle Ages in forms akin to *E.T.*, and that we can thereby explain the origin of many details in the mediaeval narratives.

The author of the ancient work, it seems, may have drawn upon some Greek epitome, now unknown, for his Trojan story. The middle part of *E.T.* is a reworking of what in the original was a rather learned, but not elaborate, summary of Virgil. And for the compressed Roman story, the authors are not yet ready to say whether a number of sources were used by the original author, or whether the account was based on some one earlier Latin or Greek history. The treatment of sources is at all points judicious and sound.

E.T. in its present form is itself interesting for any number of details in its plot, and not the least notable aspect is its failure to reflect an attitude of worship towards the heroes that move in its pages. For one example, Helen declares her love to Paris, and only then asks him: "Quisnam es tu?" (8, 13).

The text is interesting also for its Latinity. One hopes that the editors may yet provide us with a detailed study of the language and the spelling. Vulgar forms abound; I list for illustration merely *absortus* at page 25, line 15, and *serpuit* at 13, 3 (*serpivit* at 32, 24, *serpita* at 7, 27 and 8, 7; see Stolz-Schmalz-Leumann, p. 322). As for the spelling, one finds *iuclo* for *iugulo*, *calca* often for *ealiga*, or *tumultatio* followed closely by *tumultuarentur* (51, 15 and 19), and a glance at the Index of Proper Names will reveal many of the corruptions resulting from the ignorance of redactor and scribes (for example, *Iacolens* for *Ianiculum*, *Numa Popilius*). *Admediato* (*itinere*) at 39, 2 and 22 deserved a note; I have thus far not found

this word anywhere else. There is surely no need to translate the above-mentioned *serpita* (*amore*) as "stung," and to assume as the editors do, in the note on page 62, that the word as used at 7, 27 and 8, 7 has a different meaning from that at 13, 3 (*venenum per membra serpuit*) and at 32, 24 (*Cupido . . . eam amore Enee per medullam serpivit*). The most common gloss for *serpit* (appearing in at least five different lists) in the *Glossaria Latina* and the *Corpus Glossar. Lat.* is *penetrat* (*possidet* and *percutit* can also be found). A study of the language would have supplemented nicely the observations in Chapter VII on the literary qualities of the work. Here the editors contrast with the mediaeval Latinity the complete absence, in the treatment of the plot, of an allegorical or tropological point of view such as one might well expect in a work characteristically mediaeval. The "classical" nature of the tale remained unaffected in the reworking.

The three MSS on which the present text is based all inherit corruptions from earlier exemplars. The editors are to be praised for adhering closely to the MSS, with all the shortcomings these reveal, and for resisting the impulse to correct as if with the restoration of the classical original in mind. Emendation has been limited to several of the places where the readings are utterly unintelligible. I here offer suggestions on a few additional points. In the gloss on *monile* (32, 11) the editors, with understandable diffidence—they add a question-mark—record the word *adflotitario*. *Iti* has *affrodisarium*, which, I venture to think, points to *aphrodisiacum*. Pliny, *Nat. Hist.*, XXXVII, 10, 54, 148, writes: *aphrodisiaca* (*gemma*) *ex candido rufa est*. Again, I do not believe that the phrase used with reference to Sinon at 14, 12, *cingite ante pendacem*, and at 14, 16, *ante pendacem* (*L pendice*) *cincti-m.* has any connection with "slope of a hill" (see p. lxvii, and note, p. 67). The editors' second guess, that the phrase may mean "blindfold," is doubtless correct, for *ante pendacem* must be a corruption of *antependium*. See in Du Cange, *antependium: velum quod ante pendet*. At 22, 3, where a word corresponding to Virgil's *Sidonias* (*Aeneid*, IV, 75) is indicated, I should, in place of the (to me) unknown adjective *Tunicas* (*opes*) read either *Tirias* with *Ra* (cf. 35, 23) or *Punicas*. Despite the note on 27, 14, I should follow *Ra* and *Ri* in using the genitive (*comam*) *capitis* instead of the dative; 35, 1 supplies an analogue. At 47, 8 and 9 I take both *cecidit* and *cecidisso* to be forms of *cado*; see also 48, 2 and 3. The comma now after *cecidit* should then be placed after *percussit*. Finally, I should write *atheria* rather than *atheria* at 27, 24.

The testimonia from Virgil, set down by the editors at pertinent places in the text, prove very helpful for studying correspondences, perversions, additions, and omissions, and the deviation from the *Aeneid* in the order of the narrative.

Careful workmanship is apparent throughout, and even in the proof-reading. Misprints are very few: *streptitum* (15, 13), *reade-*
amus (57, 27), *Pomper Trogi* (p. lxxxviii), a transplaced *r* in the last two sentences of p. xix, note 22; *capita ecrum* wrongly divided at 44, 3; at 4, 10-11 a missing hyphen which would make *et iam* one word.

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J. J. VAN DEN BESSELAAR. Cassiodorus Senator en zijn Variae. De Hoveling. De diplomatieke Oorkonden der Variae. De Rhetor. Nijmegen, N. V. Uitgeversmaatschappij De Gelderlander, 1943. Pp. xvi + 230. (Diss. of the Roman Catholic Univ. of Nijmegen.)

This dissertation had already been printed in 1943, but, as the Germans demanded a declaration of loyalty from every new graduate, the author had to wait for his official graduation until 1945, when the Netherlands were free again. van den Besselaar's dissertation is more than a study of the person and the work of Cassiodorus, for light is also thrown on his literary and political surroundings. The book is accordingly divided into three chapters, which give us various aspects of Cassiodorus and his times.

The first chapter (pp. 1-65) is a biography of the courtier (Cassiodorus' monastic life is not considered). In this chapter the author gives a good résumé of what can be learned—especially from the *Variae* themselves—about Cassiodorus' activity under Theodoric and his successors, and in the light of this evidence the author evaluates Cassiodorus as a politician and as a man.

The second chapter, the diplomatic documents of the *Variae* (pp. 69-124), is an historical study of the relations of the Gothic empire with foreign countries. It is clearly shown that the tone of the *Variae* reflects the changing power of the empire: the letters of Theodoric give evidence of independence and of purposeful policy, whereas those of Theodahad indicate that he was no match for the intrigues of Byzantium. This chapter is also important because of the new datings offered for several letters. As a result we now know that Cassiodorus was quaestor not in 507, as Mommsen thought, but in 505-6.

In his Preface the author says that he took the greatest pleasure in the third chapter, the Rhetor (pp. 127-201), and this we can understand, for the literary aspect of the *Variae* is a theme which has hardly been examined. Without doubt this is the most interesting chapter in the book. The ideal of culture, rhetoric, is here characterized and in accordance with this standard a judgment of the *Variae* is given. The author has not neglected to examine the *Variae* in the light of ancient epistolography, which is a literary genre in itself. The results of this examination are not definitive, not even always satisfactory, as the author himself admits.

The dissertation begins with an extensive list of sources and bibliography and ends with the testimonia on Cassiodorus (including the *Anecdoton Holderi*) and with a very careful index, conforming to the well-known indices of our 17th and 18th century editions. The table of contents is written in Latin for those who *in sermone Batavo parum versati sunt*, which is certainly an improvement on the "Summary in English" which many Dutch dissertations append.

Of the first two chapters I can comment on only one subject: the family relations between Cassiodorus and Boethius and Symmachus. Mommsen (*Variae*, p. ix) denies any relationship between them, but van den Besselaar thinks the contrary can be proved. His point of departure (pp. 13 f.) is the *Anecdoton Holderi*, which says: *Ordo*

generis Cassiodororum; qui scriptores exsisterint ex eorum progenie vel ex quibus eruditis. There is also the passage of Cassiodorus (*Inst.*, I, 23, 1) in which the nun Proba is called a relative of Cassiodorus. This seems to be the same Proba who, according to Fulgentius (LXV, p. 320 C Migne), was a *soror* of Symmachus' daughter Galla. Now we may ask whether *soror* really means any relationship, for they were certainly not sisters, as van den Besselaar also admits. In my opinion Fulgentius did not intend to indicate any earthly relationship at all, but even if that had been the case we could not speak of an *ordo generis Cassiodororum* and make Boethius and Symmachus descendants (*progenies!*) of Cassiodorus. Moreover, how should we conceive this relationship? The father of Cassiodorus Senator, Cassiodorus, was the first of the family to hold a position at the court of Ravenna. It is almost impossible to think that this provincial *homo novus* could marry a girl of the Anicians, a family both distinguished and opposed to the court. And even then we could not speak of *progenies*. Another point is that I cannot see how Cassiodorus would ever dare to send a *libellus* to Cethegus (an Anician) in which he would claim the Anician Boethius as one of his *genus*. Hence we can safely say that Cassiodorus never wrote an *Ordo generis Cassiodororum*; as van den Besselaar (p. 40) thinks he did; rather these are the words of the epitomator of the *Anecdoton Holderi*. He begins his excerpt with the words: *Excerpta ex libello Cassiodori Senatoris . . . quem scripsit ad Rufum Petronium Nicomachum* (= Cethegus); after that he says *Ordo generis Cassiodororum*, etc. to indicate what kind of excerpts he is presenting.

There still remains, of course, the difficulty of explaining how the epitomator could make Boethius and Symmachus descendants of Cassiodorus. The *Anecdoton* is too fragmentary to permit a certain answer. Perhaps he found prosopographical data in Cassiodorus' *libellus* and added to them from other sources, e. g., material about Cassiodorus' quaestorship and the edition of the *Variae* (according to Usener).

The third chapter of van den Besselaar's dissertation begins with a review of the literary aspects of the *Variae*, based on Deissmann's well-known theory of "Letter" and "Epistle." This theory may be alluring in certain cases, but generally it is incorrect and therefore not acceptable.¹ Cassiodorus' letters are literary and as van den Besselaar rightly observes, they were considered literary works before they were gathered together in the *Variae*. But this does not alter the fact that they probably underwent more changes when they were edited than van den Besselaar thinks (pp. 71 f.). In the first place, Cassiodorus omitted the things which gave his letters a momentary and matter-of-fact (that is non-literary) character: the *lates* and the *breves* (appendices). Further—and this van den Besselaar omits from consideration altogether—we can see from the prescript of the letters and the absence of a final salutation that the letters were

¹ A good critique of Deissmann's theory is given by V. Hepp, "De Vorm der Nieuw-Testamentische Brieven volgens Deissmann en zijn school," *Gereformeerd Theologisch Tijdschrift*, XVI (1915-16), pp. 481-502; 537-554.

certainly not sent off in the form in which we have them now.² In order to determine the literary character of a collection of letters, we must not neglect the prescript, the initial and final formulas, and other external indicia; for the Latin letter we have the necessary studies in these respects.³ When persons and numbers in the letters are indicated as *ille* and *tot*, this too must be regarded as a caution of the editor, for we cannot agree with Lechler (cf. p. 72) that drafts of Cassiodorus' letters in which names and numbers had not yet been filled in could serve as documents of the royal archives; for such archives the real contents are the important thing, not the rhetorical talents of the writer. These indications make it rather certain that Cassiodorus altered much before he published his letters. Whether we can go as far as Peter,⁴ who assumes that Cassiodorus deleted all that was strictly pertinent to the facts, is another question. As others have done, van den Besselaar points to the fact (p. 73) that the letters of the *Variae* hardly touch the matter in question, but exhaust themselves in vague generalities. Now he has discovered (pp. 112 f.) that the letter of Theodahad in Cassiodorus' *Variae* (X, 19) is quite different from the same letter in Procopius (*B. G.*, I, 6, 15-21): in Cassiodorus we have "generalities" and a "non-committal flow of language," in Procopius an exact indication of the conditions and a very different tone. van den Besselaar blames Procopius and his rhetorical process for this; but why not blame Cassiodorus? When Theodahad wanted to surrender to Justinian, he undoubtedly fixed his price for it. If all this is true, many letters of the *Variae* must be purely rhetorical ornaments, based on real letters of the chancellery of Ravenna. Anyway, there is reason enough to doubt the honesty of Cassiodorus' words in the *Praefatio* of the *Variae* (I, 13): *et ideo quod . . . a me dictatum in diversis publicis actibus potui reperire . . . composui* (cf. p. 72). This too is a *captatio benevolentiae* and not the only one in the *Praefatio*!

Into one very important subject van den Besselaar could not go: the relation between the *Variae* and the secular and clerical chancelleries, since preparatory studies are wanting (cf. pp. 196 ff.). Not only a study in epistolography of the ancient chancelleries is a desideratum; we do not know much about the relationship of the mediaeval letter to the ancient letter either, in spite of the works of Rockinger, Wattenbach, Valois, and others. It is clear that the letters of the *Variae* will be very important for the *trait-d'union* between Antiquity and the Middle Ages. These and other studies are still necessary before we can come to a history of Latin epistolography, for Peter's book is far from exhaustive.⁵

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² For ancient epistolography, cf. the important work of O. Roller, *Das Formular der Paulinischen Briefe. Ein Beitrag zur Lehre von antiken Briefen* (Stuttgart, 1933), pp. 405 f.

³ J. Babel, *De epistularum Latinarum formulis* (Diss. Erlangen, Bamberg, 1893); A. Engelbrecht, *Das Titelwesen bei den spätlateinischen Epistolographen* (Wien, 1893); M. B. O'Brien, *Titles of Address in Christian Latin Epistolography* (Diss. Washington, 1930).

⁴ *Der Brief in der römischen Literatur* (Leipzig, 1901), p. 205.

⁵ Cf. F. Leo, *Gött. gel. Anz.*, CLXIII (1901), p. 325.

DORO LEVI. Early Hellenic Pottery of Crete. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1945. Pp. ii + 32; 32 plates. \$4.00.

In this excellently written monograph Dr. Levi has proved definitely that Crete in the Geometric Period was not a backward country, as it is generally assumed, but rather an active center where many elements of the historic Greek art were molded. The excavations conducted by the author in 1924 at Arcades, near the slope of the Lasithi range, as well as those conducted by Hogarth (1899), by Sir Arthur Evans (1907), and Payne (1927) in the necropolis of Zapher Papoura, almost a mile to the north of the Palace at Knossos, have brought to light an immense amount of pottery which establishes the rôle played by Crete in the Geometric Period. This material, some of which is described and discussed in a masterly fashion in the present monograph, makes it possible to trace the development of the Geometric pottery from the latest Mycenaean style, which in Crete perhaps lasted to the beginning of the first millennium B. C., through a Sub-Mycenaean or Proto-Geometric stage.

The development can be seen in the deterioration of the quality of the varnish, the dropping of some shapes, the progressive impoverishment of an old and decaying ornamentation, and in the gradual adoption of a more linear and disintegrated ornamental syntax. Out of this, and rather belatedly, perhaps about the middle of the eighth century B. C., was crystallized the Geometric style. This delay in the formation of a well organized Geometric style was the result of the insistence of Minoan-Mycenaean traditions which were diametrically opposed to the orderly, architectural spirit underlying the later style.

At about the same time that the Geometric style had reached its developed stage, Oriental elements made their appearance and in a short time they dominated the decoration which was led toward an "Orientalizing" style. The remains of this Orientalizing art are so numerous that they led the author to conclude that "Crete, far from being during the creation of this art a secondary and remote province, in comparison to the great influence exerted by Ionia upon the Hellenic continent, was together with Cyprus and Rhodes the natural and traditional bridge of transition." These Oriental elements, however, were enriched with elements recalling Mycenaean motives and the latter seem to indicate that many a divergent source of inspiration was responsible for the development of the Orientalizing style of Crete. Furthermore, the Oriental elements were re-elaborated in a fanciful and almost capricious manner which was responsible for the individual quality that characterizes the Cretan local style.

Vases from all parts of Crete and even its bronzes have enabled the author to follow easily and step by step the development of this Orientalizing art. But its transmission to the rest of the Greek world cannot be demonstrated so easily. The general conclusion that Crete as well as Cyprus and Rhodes served as a natural cultural bridge is not so clearly demonstrated and the statement that "the first expression of Hellenic Art took consistency and from Crete spread throughout the surrounding islands as far as the Hellenic continent" has

yet to be proved. Nor is the influence of Cretan on Proto-Corinthian pottery entirely definite. Perhaps more excavations and additional studies of the excellent quality of the present monograph will help solve the problem in the near future. The Orientalizing art of Crete seems to have lasted until about the middle of the seventh century B.C., when the island "settled into the darkness of its exhausted, lethargic sleep."

The monograph is naturally divided into three parts: the discussion (pages 1-18), the catalogue of illustrations (pages 19-32), and a series of 32 plates. The typography and the quality of the plates are excellent. We have noted only that on page 13 reference is made to Plate IX, 2 instead of Plate IX, 1. The volume will form a welcome addition and a distinct contribution to our knowledge of the early historic years of Crete, whose brilliant Minoan achievement until recently had absorbed completely the interest of the scholar.

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TH. H. SLUITER. L. Annaei Senecae Oedipus. Specimen Editionis Criticæ. Groningen, M. de Waal, 1941. Pp. 126. (Liss.)

In 1914 Theodor Duering, with the assistance of C. E. Stuart and Wilhelm Hoffer, had made considerable progress toward an edition of Seneca's tragedies. All three were killed in the first world war. They had consulted to some extent over three hundred manuscripts of the tragedies. All scholars are agreed that the eleventh century Etruscus, in the Laurentian Library in Florence, represents alone one line of descent and the only one without interpolations. The rest present an interpolated text presumably from a common source distinct from E. Early editions of the tragedies were based on one or another of the interpolated manuscripts. Gronovius discovered and first used E. Leo was the first to compare the two traditions and make a really critical text.

Theodor H. Sluiter has used the material left by Duering and, believing that the editions of Leo, Peiper, Richter, and Hoffmann are not based on proper evaluation of the interpolated tradition, proposes a new text edition of all the tragedies. He has published the *Oedipus* as the first volume of this edition, selecting this play because less had been done on it by Duering and his colleagues than on the rest.

Sluiter presents clearly the important manuscripts (less than a dozen deserve individual consideration) and selects with judgment those of the interpolated tradition which are most nearly free from contamination with E. He shows also that the two traditions have equal value in restoring the Senecan readings when once the interpolations have been distinguished from true readings. He eliminates from the text numerous arbitrary changes made by previous editors. This is particularly valuable in the cases of violent transposition of lines made by Peiper and Richter and, in some instances, accepted by Leo. (Note in particular lines 635 ff.) He confirms Carlsson's reading in line 45 (*novo* against the *die* of E), Richter's *sua motam*

ripa for *suam mutat cipam* (E) in line 162, and Gronovius' reading in line 557, *retro* for the *antro* of E. Both in the elimination of conjectures and in the confirmation of others, Sluiter has brought the text nearer to Seneca's probable reading.

It is, however, a serious flaw in such a text that the editor has not only allowed certain readings to remain which his own method should have changed (e. g. line 878: Heinse's conjecture of *pares* is retained against the *parens* of the interpolated tradition) but has added new conjectures of his own. In line 436, to save Seneca from a geographical error, he reads *Thessalio* for *Threicio*. For the same reason he accepts the tempting but unproven conjecture of Wilamowitz in line 285, *Hylaethi* for *Elidis*, and that of Enk in line 472, *Zaratum* for *Zalacum* or *Zedacum*. He accepts *iusta* for *iussa* in line 976 on the ground that no one gives orders to a king. But Oedipus is referring to the demonstrated power of the gods. In line 404 his own manuscripts should have led him to read *armati* and not change (with the comment *correxi*) to *arma tua*.

It is probably safe to say that Sluiter's text is the best that we have. The format is attractive, the printing and the paper excellent. The bibliography is well selected and adequate. It is hard to believe, however, that enough improvement is made over the text as it stood to warrant a new edition of the tragedies.

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AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY

VOL. LXIX, 3

WHOLE No. 275

STOIC VIEWS OF POETRY.

Of all ancient philosophies Stoicism was the most favorably disposed toward poetry. The Stoics maintained that the great poets, such as Homer, were the first philosophers, they made extensive use of quotations from the poets in their philosophical arguments, and they even turned on occasion to the writing of poetry as the most adequate medium of philosophical expression. The interpretation of poetry, therefore, must in all likelihood have occupied an important place in Stoic thought.¹

Yet in spite of the many allusions to the poets found in extant Stoic literature, we have no Stoic "Poetics," no general discussion of the nature of poetry, its first principles, and the standards by which it should be judged. There are, to be sure, certain well known Stoic views about poems, for example, that Homer's myths are allegorical expressions of the truths of physical and ethical philosophy. Yet seldom has anyone attempted to determine on what grounds the Stoics accepted such a doctrine, or in general how they approached the study and the writing of poetry, and how they related poetry to their philosophy as a whole. It is the aim of this paper to propose a tentative answer to these questions.

A Stoic poetics will not contain any startling departure from the traditional ancient doctrines about poems. Widely current views, for example that poetry is imitation, that it makes a

¹ The interest of the Stoics in poets and poetry is evident from the titles of works (now lost) of the first three leaders of the school. Zeno wrote *προβλήματα Ὀμηρικά* (five books) and *περὶ ποιητικῆς ἀρροάσεως* (Diog. Laer., VII, 4); Cleanthes, *περὶ τοῦ ποεητοῦ* (*ibid.*, 175); Chrysippus, *περὶ ποιημάτων πρὸς Φλομαθῆ*, *περὶ τοῦ πᾶς δεῖ τῶν ποιημάτων ἀκεύειν* (two books), *πρὸς τὸν κριτικὸν πρὸς Διόδωρον* (*ibid.*, 200).

contribution to the pleasure and instruction of the auditor, that it is metrical and is characterized by an extensive use of figures, are all accepted by the Stoics. Here, as elsewhere, the Stoics endeavored to assimilate traditional beliefs as far as possible to their own philosophy. But the process of assimilation meant that traditional views were made systematic and consistent with the Stoic philosophy as a whole. As a result old doctrines often took on a new meaning or a new emphasis. This mixture of old and new in Stoicism obscures the line that divides the Stoic from the non-Stoic; and since my concern in this paper is with the formulation of certain attitudes toward poetry rather than with the problem of their sources, I have included material that is not demonstrably Stoic. I have tried, however, to differentiate either in the text or in the notes between those views that are authentically Stoic and those which are introduced only because they resemble or are in harmony with known Stoic doctrine.

In the absence of a systematic treatise on poetry, the Stoic views must be reconstructed from widely scattered sources, many of doubtful value. The comments of Seneca and Epictetus on poetry, though very limited in scope, are at least authentically Stoic. Strabo has much to say about Homer, and Strabo considered himself a Stoic, though in modern times he has been accused of superficiality.² Cicero and Diogenes Laertius give accounts of Stoicism that appear to be taken from good sources and presented without undue prejudice. Philodemus and Sextus Empiricus, on the other hand, engaged in an active polemic against the school. In addition to the authors mentioned, who are the major sources, must be considered the widely scattered allusions to Stoicism in Plutarch, Galen, the Homeric commentators, and a multitude of other writers. These allusions, sometimes containing quotations, give us isolated statements out of context, and it is often difficult to find their proper place in the Stoic system. Finally, there are the writers who were probably influenced by the Stoic theory of poetry, but who provide no sure indication of the nature and extent of that influence. Lucan's *Civil War*, for instance, and Cleanthes' *Hymn to Zeus* may well conform to Stoic poetics as closely as they conform to Stoic ethics and physics; yet they contribute little to the theoretical formulation of the doctrines in any of these fields. Again, Horace's

² Cf. R.-E., IV A 1, cols. 80-81, s. v. "Strabo."

Ars Poetica may contain Stoic doctrines; but the identity of those doctrines is not apparent from the work itself.

It is obvious that a "poetics" reconstructed from such sources as these will necessarily be tentative. Its probability will depend largely on its success in organizing the fragmentary evidence into a system that is consistent with itself and in conformity with the Stoic philosophy as a whole. Perhaps the highly systematic character of Stoicism gives a certain measure of justification to the attempt to fill in the missing parts of their poetic theory.³

The starting point of the Stoic theory of poetry was the recognition that poems involve the use of language, and the problems dealt with in poetics follow the pattern of the problems of language. In the Stoic system language or speech is closely linked with the study of meaning, the word being the "sign" and the meaning the "thing signified." These two topics constitute dialectic, which in its turn falls under the general heading of logic.⁴ The study of language or speech includes, besides poetry, such topics as grammar, ambiguity, song, and music.⁵

The term *phone* (speech) is used by the Stoics in a broad sense, including animal sounds as well as human. Speech that can be written (*ἔγγραμματος*)⁶ is called *lexis* (diction). Speech that has a meaning and has its source in thought is called *logos* (discourse).⁷ A poem can be considered as both *lexis* and *logos*. As

³ Doctrinal differences within the school must have led to divergent views on poetry. There is not sufficient evidence to permit an exact determination of all these divergences, yet there is evidence that they existed (cf. below, note 8 and pp. 253, 266, 270); and for that reason this paper is entitled "Stoic Views of Poetry" rather than "The Stoic View of Poetry."

⁴ Diog. Laer., VII, 43 f.

⁵ Diog. Laer., VII, 44. The Stoics regarded these topics as closely related; cf. Philodemus, *De musica*, pp. 90-91 Kemke = 188-190 Van Krevelen = von Arnim, *Stoicorum veterum fragmenta* (hereafter designated as *SVF*, with references to volume, pagé, and line), III, 233, 38-234, 4 (relation of music to poetry and grammar); Strabo, I, 2, 6 (relation of poetry to rhetoric). Triple references must be given to Philodemus, *De musica*, since each edition contains many textual variants, and the recent edition of Van Krevelen (Hilversum, 1939) fails to record the earlier restorations with completeness.

⁶ Diog. Laer., VII, 56; cf. 57: ἔγγραφον (εο. ἥχος).

⁷ Diog. Laer., VII, 56: φωνὴ σημαντικὴ ἀπὸ διανοῶν ἐκπεμπομένη. Cf. 57: λόγος δὲ σημαντικός ἐστι.

lexis, it is a pattern of sounds and words; as *logos* it signifies a certain meaning. This distinction is very clearly stated, though with slightly different terms, in the definitions of *poema* and *poiesis* ascribed to Posidonius by Diogenes Laertius: ποίητα δέ ἔστιν, ὡς ὁ Ποσειδώνιός φησιν ἐν τῇ περὶ λέξεως εἰσαγωγῇ, λέξις ἔμμετρος ἡ ἔνρυθμος μετὰ σκευῆς τὸ λογοειδὲς ἐκβεβηκνῖα . . . ποίηται δέ ἔστι σημαντικὸν ποίημα, μύμησις περιέχον θείων καὶ ἀνθρωπέων.⁸ "Poema, as Posidonius says in his introductory treatise or diction, is diction that is metrical or rhythmical with elaboration, going beyond prose. . . . poiesis is significant poetic diction, containing an imitation of things divine and human." It seems evident, then, that Stoic poetics was divided into these two parts: the study of the poem as a form of language or speech, and the study of the poem as the expression of a meaning.⁹ Each of these parts

⁸ Diog. Laer., VII, 6. For other definitions of *poema* in terms of metre cf. G. Amsel, "De vi atque indole rhythmorum quid veteres iudicaverint," *Breslauer Philologische Abhandlungen*, I, 3 (Breslau, 1887), p. 23 and Aristides Quintilianus, *De musica*, I, 29, p. 57, 6-7 Jahn: τὸ δὲ ἐκ τῶν μέτρων εὐπρεπὲς σύστημα καλεῖται ποίημα. R. Reitzenstein, *M. Terentius Varro uad Johannes Mauropus von Buchcita* (Leipzig, 1901), p. 92 would extend σκευῆς to κατασκευῆς; cf. Strabo, I, 2, 6: ποιητικὴ κατασκευὴ; but cf. also *ibid.*, 2, 11: λαβὴν ἀληθῆ ταῦτην τὴν ὑπόθεσιν ποιητικῶς διεσκεύασε. Posidonius' terminological distinction between *poema* and *poiesis* was not followed by all Stoics; cf. HV² IX, 28 (C. Jensen, *Philodemus über die Gedichte fünftes Buch* [Berlin, 1923], p. 132): ὡς ἐνίouς ἥκουται καὶ τὸν πάνιν Στωικῶν, οἱ φήσαντες πόλημα καλοῦνται τὸ σοφὴν διάνοιαν περιέχον . . . Posidonius' usage is rather similar to that attributed by Philodemus to Neoptolemus in *Poems V*, cols. 11-12 (Jensen, pp. 29, 31), according to which *poema* is concerned with *synthesis*, *poiesis* with *hypothesis*. On the latter passage cf. O. Immisch, "Horazens Epistel über die Dichtkunst," *Philologus*, Suppl. XXIV, 3 (Leipzig, 1932), pp. 8-21. On Lucilius and Varro's distinction between *poiesis* and *poema* see M. Consbruch, "De veterum περὶ ποιημάτος doctrina," *Bresl. Philol. Abb.*, V, 3 (Breslau, 1890), p. 93 and F. Striller, "De Stoicorum studiis rhetoriciis," *Bresl. Philol. Abb.*, I, 2 (Breslau, 1886), p. 47.

⁹ Jensen, *op. cit.*, pp. 170-71, correlates the threefold scheme of Tauriscus' κριτικὴ τέχνη (Sextus, *A. M.*, I, 243 f.) with Posidonius' distinction between *poiesis* and *poema* as follows: 1. τριβικὸν μέρος, dealing with the sound of words and syllables; 2. λογικὸν μέρος, corresponding to Posidonius' *poema*, dealing with figures and virtues of style; 3. ἰστορικὸν μέρος, corresponding to Posidonius' *poiesis*, dealing with the thought. Tauriscus' κριτικὴ τέχνη, however, includes grammar and clearly refers to both prose and verse, whereas Posidonius' scheme is concerned only with poetry. It is therefore doubtful whether a correlation is warranted.

has its own distinctive problems, and each received varying emphasis at the hands of different Stoic theorists. Some Stoics, like Crates, were very much interested in linguistic aspects; others limited themselves entirely to the examination of the meaning of poems, though meaning or thought as such constitutes for the Stoics a distinct branch of logic, and there is no such thing as an exclusively poetic meaning. In order to account for the whole range of the Stoic treatment of poems it will be necessary to arrange the discussion under three heads: 1. The linguistic form of poems; 2. The meaning or thought of poems; and 3. The poetic elaboration of thought.

1. THE LINGUISTIC FORM OF POEMS.

The most systematic Stoic treatment of *phone* known to us is that of Diogenes of Babylon, as summarized by Diogenes Laertius.¹⁰ First in the summary is a definition of *phone*, with a statement of its properties and its species; next a discussion of *lexis*, with a definition of dialect and a classification of the letters of the alphabet; third, a treatment of *logos*, including the parts of discourse and the virtues and vices of discourse.¹¹ Each of these divisions has a bearing on poetic theory, inasmuch as poems are examples of *phone*, analyzable both as *lexis* and as *logos*.

a. *Phone* is defined by Diogenes as "air that has been struck, or the peculiar object of auditory sensation."¹² It is a "body," which "does something" in passing from speaker to hearer.¹³ Hence a poem, considered as *phone* or *echos*, is in the first instance an object of auditory perception.¹⁴ A Stoic poetics, then, must determine how the auditory perception of a poem differs from that of other forms of *phone*. The difference is twofold: the perception is of a special kind, and it produces a distinct effect on the hearer.

¹⁰ Diog. Laer., VII, 55-59 = SVF, III, 212-214.

¹¹ For a discussion of this work and its influence on the ancient grammarians see K. Barwick, "Remmius Palaemon und die römische ars grammatica," *Philol.*, Suppl. XV, 2 (Leipzig, 1922), pp. 91-94.

¹² Diog. Laer., VII, 55: ἀὴρ πεπληγμένος ή τὸ ἔδιον αἰσθητὸν ἀκοῆς.

¹³ Diog. Laer., VII, 55-56.

¹⁴ The importance of the hearer is clearly indicated in the titles of the works of Zeno and Chrysippus listed in note 1.

The peculiar character of the perception may best be seen in the remarks of Diogenes of Babylon on music (as reported by Philodemus in his work *On Music*) and of Panaetius, a pupil of Diogenes and Crates¹⁵ on beauty or the *kalon* (as reported by Cicero in the *De Officiis*).¹⁶ Diogenes drew a distinction between natural (*αὐτοφύῆς*) and scientific (*ἐπιστημονική*) sense-perception.¹⁷ The former is adequate for the perception of simple qualities, such as warm and cold, but the latter perceives the *ηρμοστένον* and *ἀνάρμοστον*,¹⁸ that is, the *disposition* of the qualities of perceptions (*αἱ ποιὰ τῶν αἰσθήσεων πῶς διατεθῆσονται*), which is the proper study of the musician.¹⁹ In other words, the musician is concerned with certain dispositions of sounds, which are apprehended by a kind of perception distinct from that by which the simple qualities of sound are perceived. These dispositions include, presumably, the various forms of musical rhythm and harmony.

Diogenes' treatment of music is closely parallel to Panaetius' remarks on the beauty of objects of sight. Panaetius states that the beauty of an object lies in the composition of its parts. If this composition is *apta*, that is, if the parts are in harmony with each other (*inter se . . . consentiunt*), then the object is beautiful.²⁰ Furthermore, the perception of beauty and of the

¹⁵ Cf. Strabo, XIV, 5, 16; A. Schmekel, *Die Philosophie der mittleren Stoa* (Berlin, 1892), p. 207; M. Van Straaten, *Panétius* (Amsterdam, 1946), pp. 7 f.

¹⁶ For the analysis of this topic I am greatly indebted to M. Pohlenz, "τὸ πρέπον," *Gött. Nachrichten* (1933), pp. 53-82, especially pp. 78-84. Cf. also M. Schäfer, "Diogenes als Mittelstoiker," *Philol.*, XCI (1936), pp. 174-196.

¹⁷ Philod., *Mus.*, pp. 11; 63 Kemke = 22; 138 Van Krevelen = *SVF*, III, 222, 34 ff. Cf. Arrian, *Epict.*, III, 6, 8, where *κοινὴ ἀκοή* is contrasted with *τεχνικὴ ἀκοή*. Cf. Pohlenz, p. 78.

¹⁸ Philod., *Mus.*, p. 21 Kemke = 22 Van Krevelen = *SVF*, III, 222, 36.

¹⁹ Philod., *Mus.*, p. 65 Kemke = 142 Van Krevelen = *SVF*, III, 223, 32 f. Cf. Pohlenz, p. 78. The terms *quality* (*ποια*) and *disposition* (*πῶς διατεθῆσονται*) indicate that Diogenes discussed this topic in terms of the Stoic categories; see my article, "The Stoic Categories as Methodological Principles," *J. A. P. A.*, LXXVI (1945), pp. 243-263. For the importance of training the perceptions cf. Philod., *Mus.*, p. 8 Kemke = 18 Van Krevelen = *SVF*, III, 222, 6 ff.; Sextus, *A. M.*, VI, 29.

²⁰ Cicero, *Off.*, I, 92; cf. R. Philippson, "Das Sittlichschöne bei Panaetius," *Philol.*, LXV (1930), p. 383. Cf. also Dicynsius of Halicarnassus, *Demosth.*, 48. Arist. Quint., I, 4, p. 4 Jahn says that music

convenientia partium is peculiar to man. It is on a higher level than the perception shared by men and animals.²¹

If these analyses of music and the visual arts are applied to poetry, it would seem that the distinctive quality of a poem as an auditory perception must lie in the disposition of the sounds from which it is constituted; and Posidonius' definition of poetic diction as metrical and rhythmical *lexis* naturally suggests that the Stoics regarded metre as the disposition of sounds peculiar to poems. In adopting such a view the Stoics were only expressing in their own terms a doctrine that must have been commonplace;²² yet it is possible that they in turn exerted some influence on the formulation of subsequent metrical theory. At any rate the Platonist Aristides Quintilianus, who, like Posidonius, defined *poema* in terms of metre,²³ was familiar with the Stoic definitions of *techne* and of *phone*, and was in agreement with the Stoics on a number of points.²⁴

The disposition of speech sounds in a poem affects the disposition of the person who hears it.²⁵ To return to music, Diogenes of Babylon maintains that music brings with it dispositions of a particular description,²⁶ and that musical harmony produces a harmonious state in the auditor.²⁷ Indeed, music produces not

involves the γνῶσις τοῦ πρέποτος, and that the πρέπον is, in one of its senses, ἡ πρὸς δλληλα συμφωνία.

²¹ Cicero, *Off.*, I, 14. Cicero does not speak of "scientific" perception, but in limiting it to man he clearly implies that it is somehow rational.

²² Cf. for example Aristotle, *Poetics*, 1447 b 13-16; Gorgias, *Encomium of Helen*, 9.

²³ See above, note 8.

²⁴ For various points of agreement between Aristides and the Stoics see notes 20, 26, 27, 51, 86, 118, 175.

²⁵ This view is of course in Plato and many others; cf. Amsel, *op. cit.* (see note 8), pp. 39-40.

²⁶ Philod., *Mus.*, p. 6 Kemke = 10 Van Krevelen = SVF, III, 221, 25 f.: (*τῆς μουσικῆς*) συρεπιφερόντης τὰς τοιαύτας διαθέσεις; p. 51 Kemke = 70 Van Krevelen: (*τὰς ἀρωνίας*) αὐταῖς συνοικεῖον τὰς γε ἐν ἡμῖν διαθέσεις; cf. p. 32 Kemke = 74 Van Krevelen. Cf. also Arist. *Quint.*, II, 6, p. 46, 16 f. Jahn: ἐκ μὲν καλῆς φύσης ἀγαθοὶ λόγοι, φύσεις τε καὶ ἔξεις, καλαὶ δὲ ὁρέεις, ἀρισται δὲ συμβιβλούστι πράξεις. The sequence λόγοι—ἔξεις—ὁρέεις—πράξεις is Stoic; cf. Seneca, *Epist. Mor.*, 95, 57 = SVF, III, 139, 27 ff. The same sequence may lie behind the series of topics in Philod., *Mus.*, pp. 67-71 Kemke = 146-152 Van Krevelen: *ταιδελα*—*ἡθος*—*πρᾶξις*.

²⁷ Philod., *Mus.*, p. 14 Van Krevelen = SVF, III, 221, 32: τὴν ἔξιν πολὺσσιν ἀρμονικωτάτην; pp. 33 f., Kemke = 76 Van Krevelen: τὴν μουσικὴν

only a certain disposition of the soul, but of the body as well.²⁸ Clearly it is this conception of disposition which provides the explanation of the peculiar effect of music on the hearer.²⁹

Panaetius' statement of the effect of painting on the observer is too brief to be of much assistance here, but so far as it goes it conforms to Diogenes' statement about music. The beauty of visible objects, which lies in the disposition of their parts, is analogous to the beauty, that is, the order, of the soul: *quam similitudinem natura ratioque ab oculis ad cimum transferens multo etiam magis pulchritudinem, constantiam, ordinem in consiliis factisque conservanda putat.* . . .³⁰ The perception of the beauty of bodies "moves" and "delights" the spectator, just as an orderly life wins his approval.³¹ Poets too observe "quid conveniat,"³² and no doubt the perception of the disposition of the parts of a poem has its appropriate effect on the disposition of the auditor.³³

The harmony of elements in a poem is closely bound up with the doctrine of *decorum* (*πρέπον*). Panaetius describes *decorum* as that which is *consentaneum*.³⁴ This concept is applied not merely to *phone*, but also to meaning, and to the relation of *phone* to meaning. Panaetius mentions appropriateness of speech and action to character,³⁵ and Diogenes speaks in a single sen-

ήρμοσμένας καὶ προσηκόντως κεκραμένας ψυχὰς ἐν θυμῖν κατασκευάζειν καὶ ῥυθμίζειν καὶ πλάττειν. Cf. Arist. Quint., II, 17, p. 63, 1-4 Jahn.

²⁸ Philod., *Mus.*, pp. 15; 72 Kemke = 34; 156 Van Krevelen = SVF, III, 227, 6 ff. Cf. also *ibid.*, p. 19 Kemke = 44 Van Krevelen = SVF, III, 234, 21 f.: *οἰκεῖως ἡμᾶς διατίθεναι πρὸς πλεῖον ἀπέτας*, and pp. 12; 65 Kemke = 24; 142 Van Krevelen = SVF, III, 223, 35 ff.

²⁹ For the Stoic analysis of the soul in terms of disposition cf. "The Stoic Categories," T. A. P. A., LXXVI (1945), pp. 261 f.

³⁰ Cicero, *Off.*, I, 14.

³¹ *Ibid.*, I, 98.

³² *Ibid.*, I, 98.

³³ The Stoic acceptance of a similarity of effects of music, the plastic arts, and poetry is indicated by the analogies made between them and the use of identical terms (especially *τέρψις*, *κινητικός*) of each. Cf. Philod., *Mus.*, p. 74 Kemke = 158 Van Krevelen = SVF, III, 227, 29 ff. for an example. Diogenes of Babylon had explicitly stated (*ibid.*, p. 90 Kemke = 188 Van Krevelen = SVF, III, 233, 39) that music was analogous to poetry "in imitation and in the rest of invention" (*κατὰ τὴν μίμησιν καὶ κατὰ τὴν ἀλληγορίην εἴρεσιν*). Cf. below, p. 253.

³⁴ Cicero, *Off.*, I, 96.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, I, 97.

tence of appropriate *μέλος*, masculine and effeminate character, and actions in harmony with the *ὑποκείμενα πρόσωπα*.³⁶ It is generally accepted that the Panaetian conception of *decorum* underlies much of Horace's *Ars Poetica*.³⁷

The effect of poems on the emotions or passions of the hearer deserves special mention. Of the four basic passions recognized by the Stoics—pleasure, pain, desire, and fear—pleasure and fear are most often mentioned as legitimate effects of poems; and of these two pleasure is the more important, as the fear a poem inspires serves to intensify the pleasure.³⁸ Strabo, our informant here, gives no further explanation of this statement. The fear aroused by poems is designated by the terms *ekplexis* and *kataplexis*.³⁹ These emotions are in themselves evil, since they involve an irrational movement of the soul.⁴⁰ But to the extent that they provide a means for the betterment of the auditor they may be justified.⁴¹

The pleasure evoked in the auditor appears to have a good and a bad form. In general pleasure (*hedone*), like fear, is condemned by the Stoics as an irrational movement of the soul.⁴² Pleasure is defined as an irrational elevation of the soul caused by a sudden opinion that some good is present.⁴³ If received

³⁶ Philod., *Mus.*, pp. 19; 92 Kemke = 44; 192 Van Krevelen = *SVF*, III, 234, 5 ff. (with Kemke's restoration); cf. pp. 19; 89 Kemke = 42; 186 Van Krevelen = *SVF*, III, 233, 3 ff. (music appropriate to the gods). The phrase *πρέπον τοῖς ὑποκειμένοις προσώποις τε καὶ πρήγμασι* is commonplace. It occurs with variations in Plutarch, *Aud. Poet.*, 18B, 22F; Dionys. Halic., *Comp. Verb.*, 20, *Demosth.*, 13; 48. Cf. also Philod., *Mus.*, p. 31 Kemke = 70 Van Krevelen: *τόνον οἰτείον ἔχειν ἐκάστην (so. τὴν ἀρμονίαν) τοῖς ὑποκειμένοις πάθεσι.* For a further discussion of the "appropriate" in Stoic poetics see below, pp. 257; 269 ff.

³⁷ Cf. Pohlenz, *op. cit.* (see note 16), pp. 85-88; Lotte Labowsky, *Die Ethik des Panaetios* (Leipzig, 1934), pp. 74-102.

³⁸ Strabo, I, 2, 8: *ὅταν δὲ προσῆ καὶ τὸ θαυμαστὸν καὶ τὸ τερατῶδες, ἐπιτείνει τὴν ἡδονήν.*

³⁹ Cf. the use of *ekplexis* in Pa.-Longinus, *De Sublim.*, 1, ε. *Deisidaimonia* also occurs in Strabo, I, 2, 8. These terms are defined as species of fear in *SVF*, III, 98-99. See also below, p. 270.

⁴⁰ Cf. Philod., *Mus.*, pp. 22 Kemke = 50 Van Krevelen: *ὅτι μεγέθη μὲν ἥχωρ ὑπερβάλλοντα καὶ τόνοι καὶ ῥυθμοὶ συνδεδιωγμένοι ταράττουσιν καὶ παρέχουσιν ἐκπληξιν, τότε μὲν καὶ ἔλκοντα τὴν διάνοιαν ἀλόγως. . . . Cf. also *SVF*, III, 23, 3.*

⁴¹ See below, pp. 269 f.

⁴² *SVF*, III, 95, 14 ff.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, 95, 21, 32, and 43; 98, 15.

through sight or hearing it is called *terpeis*;⁴⁴ if received from words and music or through deceit it is called *kelesis*;⁴⁵ and if received through sight deceitfully it is called *goeteia*.⁴⁶ The references here to opinion and to deceit rest on the Stoic view that all perception is accompanied by opinion or judgment, and that all forms of evil are in some way or other reducible to incorrect judgments.⁴⁷ The philosopher, then, will be on his guard against any pleasure from poems that brings with it deceit and false opinion; though among non-philosophers, that is, among those who have not yet freed themselves of false opinions, it may serve a useful end.

It is possible, however, for the philosopher to derive from a poem an enjoyment that does not rest on mistaken judgments. Such an auditor is in a state of *eupatheia*, rather than *pathos*; instead of *hedone* he experiences *chara*, or "rational" elevation.⁴⁸ Specifically his feeling is termed *terpsis*, which is defined as "delight befitting the benefit he receives."⁴⁹ Thus the term *terpsis* is ambiguous, though in extant Stoic literature it usually carries the favorable connotation. The term *hedone* is also used in a favorable sense, even in contexts where strict usage would have required *chara*.⁵⁰

The fact that the proper pleasure to be derived from a poem is defined in terms of what is rational and beneficial suggests that the pleasure is not itself the ultimate end of poetry. It is

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 97, 44.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 98, 1-2. The disjunctive here probably indicates alternate ways of defining the term rather than two distinct meanings of the term.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 98, 6. These terms are not peculiarly Stoic; they occur repeatedly in ancient discussions of music and poetry. The precise definitions are not always observed, even by the Stoics themselves.

⁴⁷ The danger that ητονή δι' ἀκοῆς will deceive the hearer and give rise to false opinion is very clearly expressed in Plutarch, *Ad. Poet.*, 14F-15E. It is possible that Plutarch is here following Chrysippus, from whom he took the title of his essay, and whom he cites with approval in 34B. Cf. Georg von Reutern, *Plutarchs Etattheorie zur Dichtkunst* (Kiel, 1933), pp. 80-88. For other seemingly Stoic elements in the essay see especially notes 88, 97, 117, 153, 155, 157, 167, 174, 181. Cf. also Plut., *De Audiendo*, 37F-38A, 40E-42B.

⁴⁸ SVF, III, 105, 16 f.; cf. Seneca's distinction between *voluptas* and *gaudium*, *Epist. Mor.*, 59, 2.

⁴⁹ SVF, III, 105, 36: χαρὰ πρέπουσα ταῖς περὶ εὐτὸν ὀφελεῖσις.

⁵⁰ Cf. Seneca, *Epist. Mor.*, 59, 1; Sextus, *A. M.*, XI, 73; Van Straaten, *op. cit.*, pp. 188 f.

rather a means available to the poet for the accomplishment of his proper end, which is to exert a beneficial influence on the disposition of the auditor.⁵¹ The influence of a poem may be either good or bad. The poet who arouses the passions or the impulses of the audience in the sense that Horace indicates in *Ars Poetica*, 100 ff., would no doubt be condemned by the philosopher (unless some compensating benefit were thereby imparted to the hearer);⁵² but a poet who allays the passions, as Horace suggests in *Epistle*, I, 1, 34, would be approved.⁵³ The ultimate criterion of a poem must inevitably be its contribution to the good life.⁵⁴

The basic principles from which the Stoics derived their analysis of poetry have now been determined. Most important are the two propositions that the distinctive character of any poem lies in the peculiar disposition of its parts, as apprehended by perception, and that the excellence of a poem is judged ultimately in terms of the effect that the disposition of its parts has on the disposition of the auditor. The next step in the inquiry will be to examine further the Stoic analysis of poems as composed of words.

b. *Lexis*. A poem as *lexis* is a disposition or arrangement

⁵¹ Though the end of *mythos* is *hedone*, the ultimate end of poetry is the same as that of history, i. e., truth; cf. Strabo, I, 2, 9. Cf. also Arist. Quint., II, 6, pp. 43, 38-44, 2 Jahn: οὐτε γὰρ ἀπασα τέρψις μεμπτὸν οὐτε τῆς μονοικῆς αὐτῇ τέλος, ἀλλ' ἡ μὲν ψυχαγωγία κατὰ συμβεβηκός, σκοπὸς δὲ ὁ προκείμενος ἡ τρὸς ἀρέτὴν ὀφέλεια.

⁵² The term *psychagogia* is sometimes used by the Stoics of this influence, but apparently not in any precise sense. It is not, of course, a peculiarly Stoic term. Strabo, I, 2, 3 contrasts *psychagogia* with *didaskealia* and *sophronismos*; Arrian, *Epictetus*, IV, 4, 4 with *eurhoia*; Dionys. Halic., *Epist. ad Pomp.*, 6 with *opheleia* (cf. *id.*, *Demosth.*, 44, Ps.-Dionys., *Ars Rhet.*, 7, 4). In Philod., *Mus.*, pp. 17; 83 Kemke = 40; 176 Van Krevelen = *SVF*, III, 231, 20; 25, and pp. 76, 19; 86, 33 Kemke = 162; 182 Van Krevelen (not in *SVF*) the term is applied to music. Cf. also Pohlenz, p. 78; Ps.-Plut., *Vit. Hom.*, II, 92; and Arist. Quint., II, 6 (quoted in note 51).

⁵³ Cf. Philod., *Mus.*, pp. 18; 85 ff. Kemke = 40 f.; 180 f. Van Krevelen = *SVF*, III, 232, 20 ff.

⁵⁴ Cf. Plut., *De Audiendo*, 42A: δθεν δὴ καὶ ποιητέον ἐπισκεψιν καὶ κρίσιν τῆς ἀκροάσεως ἐξ αὐτοῦ καὶ τῆς τερὶ αὐτὸν διαθέσεως and the quotation from Aristo in 42B: οὐτε γὰρ βαλανεῖον, φησὶν δὲ Ἀρίστων, οὐτε λόγου μὴ καθαιρούστος διφελός ἔστιν." Note the allusion to *catharsis*.

(*synthesis*) of words. This part of literary theory is thought to have been neglected by the Stoics, for Dionysius of Halicarnassus says that he found in Stoic writings no comment great or small dealing with the rhetorical arrangement of words.⁵⁵ Yet in the fifth book of his work *On Poems* Philodemus included an account of the literary theories of Aristo and Crates; and though neither of these men can be considered a central figure in the Stoic school, both were closely allied to it.⁵⁶ Their views, therefore, in combination with a small amount of information available from other sources, indicate the major emphases of the Stoic treatment of poems as *lexis*.

In its initial phase (the combination of letters and syllables into words) the Stoic doctrine of *lexis* was probably common to grammar, rhetoric, and poetics. Accounts of dialects⁵⁷ and figures of speech are normally included in works on poets, and as Strabo says, the difference between rhetoric and poetics is one of species only.⁵⁸

Aristo and Crates, according to Philodemus' account, discussed *lexis* and *synthesis* in terms of the criterion for good poems. Both recognized a fundamental distinction between *synthesis* and *dianoya*—the arrangement of words, and the meaning or thought. Aristo held that good (*asteia*) poems must have a good arrangement of words (*synthesis asteia*) and a serious meaning (*dianoia spoudaia*).⁵⁹ If a poem has a bad synthesis it is a bad poem,⁶⁰ but good synthesis is not a sufficient guarantee that a poem is good, for there is need also of *euphonía* and *dianoia* and much else besides.⁶¹ This doctrine of *euphonía*, Philodemus believes, was borrowed by Aristo from a group of Hellenistic literary

⁵⁵ *Comp. Verb.*, 4.

⁵⁶ Aristo was a pupil of Zeno who inclined toward cynicism; Crates was a grammarian, identified as a Stoic by Suidas. On Crates see C. Wachsmuth, *De Cratete Mallota* (Leipzig, 1860), pp. 4 f.; H. J. Mette, *Sphairopoia: Untersuchungen zur Kosmologie des Krates von Pergamon* (Munich, 1936), p. 103.

⁵⁷ On Crates' interest in dialect cf. Wachsmuth, pp. 21; 32 f.

⁵⁸ Strabo, I, 2, 6. The Stoic rhetorical doctrine of *lexis* is discussed by F. Striller, *op. cit.* (see note 8), pp. 5-6; 47-55.

⁵⁹ Philod., *Poems* V, col. 14, 11-14. The best account of Aristo's poetical theory is Jensen, *op. cit.* (see note 8), pp. 128-145.

⁶⁰ Philod., *Poems* V, col. 18, 1-7.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 7-12. The text here is rather uncertain.

theorists known as the *kritikoi*,⁶² who placed the criterion of good poetry in the ear, and considered further analysis impossible.⁶³ Aristo says that a good (*spoudaia*) synthesis cannot be apprehended by reason (*οὐκ ἔναι λόγῳ καταληπτήν*), but through training of the ear (*ἐκ τῆς κατὰ τὴν ἀκοὴν τριβῆς*).⁶⁴ *Euphonia* is introduced as attendant on the arrangement of words, and the judgment of it is placed in the training of the ear.⁶⁵ Aristo further identifies the synthesis of a song (*μέλος*) with that of a painting, making this synthesis correspond to the natural training of the ear and the eye.⁶⁶

Aristo's emphasis on the trained ear is consistent with the Stoic conception of a poem as *phone*, the disposition of which is apprehended by auditory perception.⁶⁷ Yet the irrationality of Aristo's criterion, as Philodemus presents it, seems to be out of keeping with the general character of Stoicism, and in particular to conflict with Diogenes' characterization of the perception of music as "scientific." In this connection Aristo's rejection of much of the speculative and theoretical element in Stoicism, with the attendant suspicion of reason, may have played a part.⁶⁸

Crates, unlike Aristo, formulates the criterion of good poetry in rational terms. That is, he restates the views of Aristo and the *kritikoi* in terms of Stoic epistemology and dialectic.⁶⁹ He agrees

⁶² *Ibid.*, 12-17.

⁶³ Philodemus (*ibid.*, 24, 9-11) says of the *kritikoi*: δμολογούντων ἄτεχνον εἶναι λόγον, τετριμμένη δ' ἀκοῇ γνωστόν. Cf. H. Gomoll, "Herakleodorus und die *kritikoi* bei Philodemus," *Philol.*, XCI (1936), pp. 373-384; Pohlenz, p. 82.

⁶⁴ Philod., *Poems* V, cols. 20, 21-28; 21, 7-11. Dionysius of Halicarnassus considers the criterion of style to be irrational; cf. *Lys.*, 11; *Thucyd.*, 4 (cf. 27); *Demosth.*, 24; 50.

⁶⁵ Philod., *Poems* V, col. 20, 27-33: τὴν ἐπιφαινομένην τῇ συνθέσει τῶν λέξεων εὐφωνίαν εἰσάγειν καὶ ταύτης ἀνατιθέται τὴν κρίσιν τῇ τριβῇ τῆς ἀκοῆς . . .

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 21, 16-22: οὐδὲ τὰ μέλη λέγομεν γραφὰς ὥσπερ οὗτος, φυσικῇ τριβῇ τῆς ἀκοῆς καὶ τῆς δράσεως δμοιῶν τὴν σύνθεσιν ἐναντίως ἔχουσαν. Cf. Plut., *Aud. Poet.*, 17F; Horace, *Ars Poet.*, 361: *ut pictura poesis*; Pohlenz, p. 31. Analogies and comparisons between ear and eye, and between poetry and painting, are commonplace in ancient writings on poetry.

⁶⁷ See above, pp. 245 f.

⁶⁸ Cf. *SVF*, I, 79, 6 ff.

⁶⁹ Cf. Jensen, *op. cit.* (see note 8), pp. 149; 160. Jensen (pp. 146-174) gives an excellent discussion of the poetics of Crates.

with them in praising a poem, not for its synthesis, but for the *phone* attendant upon the synthesis.⁷⁰ Yet this position leads Crates to the problem whether there is more than one standard (*thema*) for judging a poem. He rejects the view of certain unnamed opponents who maintain that there are many standards, different with different persons, and that there is no natural good ($\phi\mu\sigma\kappa\delta\nu \acute{\alpha}\gamma\alpha\theta\delta\nu$) in a poem.⁷¹ In opposition to them Crates maintains that the ear itself gives no evidence in support of a multiplicity of standards,⁷² for there is a natural difference between poems which is distinguished by the ear.⁷³ The poem is good not because it pleases the ear, but because it is composed according to the principles of the art;⁷⁴ yet a poem that is written according to the rules of the art will please the ear. Hence auditory pleasure, though not as such the end of the poem, is a kind of measure of the poem's excellence.⁷⁵ That which gives pleasure cannot be judged apart from the thought, for the perception of a poem goes beyond pleasure to judge "the rational speculations that are naturally present" in the poem ($\tau\alpha \lambda\omega\gamma\kappa\alpha \theta\epsilon\omega\rho\mu\alpha\tau\alpha \tau\alpha \phi\mu\sigma\epsilon\iota\eta\pi\acute{\alpha}\rho\chi\omega\nu\tau\alpha$).⁷⁶ Here the "rational speculations" must be the philosophical ideas expressed by a poem; and their "natural" presence, as well as the "natural" difference between poems mentioned earlier, implies that Crates must have set up a correlation between the "art" of poetry and

⁷⁰ Philod., *Poems* V, col. 21, 30-32. According to 21, 33-22, 1 Crates (mistakenly) considers himself to be in agreement with Andromenides, one of the *kritikoi*. Cf. Philodemus' remarks about the relation of Diogenes of Babylon's musical theory to that of the *kritikoi*: Philod., *Mus.*, p. 90 Kemke = 188 Van Krevelen = *SVF*, III, 233, 31 ff.

⁷¹ Philod., *Poems* V, col. 22, 2 ff. Philodemus, suspecting that Crates is here alluding to the Epicureans, protests that while they grant that there is no "natural good" in a poem, they do not accept a multiplicity of standards.

⁷² *Ibid.*, 23, 32-34.

⁷³ *Ibid.*, 24, 17-21: εὐηθές ἔστιν καὶ διὰ τὸ φάσκειν διαγινώσκεσθαι τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν ἐν τοῖς ποιῆμασιν φυσικὴν διαφορὰν τῇ ἀκοῇ. Cf. *HV*² VIII, 165, as restored by Jensen, pp. 154 f.

⁷⁴ Philod., *Poems* V, cols. 24, 35-25, 4: πῶς οὐ διέπιπτε κρίνεσθαι λέγων οὐχ ὅταν εὐαρεστήσῃ τεύτη (sc. τῇ ἀκοῇ) πόημα στοῦδαιον, ἀλλ' ὅταν κατὰ τὸν τῆς τέχνης λόγον ἐτεργηθῇ; The text of these lines is very doubtful.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, 25, 4-14, especially 10-14: διὸ τῇ τέχνῃ καὶ τὰ τῆς κρίσεως παραδοθῆσεσθαι, καίπερ ἡδονῇ κανονιζόμενον.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, 25, 19-20; cf. Ps.-Plut., *Hom.*, II, 92. It follows that a critic must be a philosopher; cf. below, p. 264.

the "nature," of poems. It should be recalled that for the Stoics perception is not merely sensation, but sensation subjected to and tested by reason.⁷⁷ Hence the use of perception as a criterion is consistent with the view that the criterion is based on the rules of the art.

It is clear that for Crates the poetic art rests on rational principles, and presumably these principles provide the basis for specific precepts. The Stoics believed that every art should have a useful end and a method for attaining that end.⁷⁸ The end of poetry is to have a beneficial effect on the disposition of the hearer; and its method, in part at least, must be stated in terms of rules for the combining of words.⁷⁹ Crates may even have discussed the values of individual letters, as Philodemus states that he put the *krisis* of good poems in the *stoicheia*.⁸⁰ Yet in view of their emphasis on arrangement and disposition it is probable that the Stoics were more concerned with the qualities of letters and words in combination than in isolation.⁸¹ In any case, the Stoic rules for writing poetry must have followed the ancient poetic traditions, recognizing the usual genres and the metrical and linguistic conventions appropriate to each.⁸² Here

⁷⁷ Cf. Diog. Laer., VII, 52. Perception is one of the Stoic criteria of truth: Diog. Laer., VII, 54.

⁷⁸ Cf. the Stoic definitions of art: *SVF*, I, 20, 31 ff.; 110, 9 f.; II, 30, 28 ff.

⁷⁹ It is interesting that, if Jensen's interpretation of *HV²* IV, 121 (*op. cit.*, p. 162) is correct, a Stoic censured the *kritikoi* for the inadequacy of their μεθοδικὴ παραγγελτα. Jensen compares Ps.-Longinus' criticism of Cecilius (*De Subl.*, 1, 1).

⁸⁰ Philod., *Poems* V, col. 26, 7-10; cf. Jensen, p. 159.

⁸¹ The doctrine that the material is indifferent, and that excellence or the opposite is to be found only in the use of the material, is of course central to Stoic ethics. This doctrine, if transferred to poetry, would mean that it is not the words themselves, but the way they are used (i. e. combined with other words) that is important. Such a view appears to underlie Horace's famous line (*Ars Poet.*, 23): *Denzique sit quodvis, simplex dumtaxat et unum*; cf. his *callida . . . iunctura*, *ibid.*, 47 f.; also Quint., VIII, 3, 38: (*singula verta*) *per se nullam virtutem habent*.

⁸² I have not as yet found a Stoic passage differentiating *genres* in terms of *lexis*. Such differentiations were made by ancient theorists (cf. for example J. Heidmann, *Der Papyrus 1676 der Herculaneischen Bibliothek* [Bonn, 1937], pp. 21 f.); but it is likely that the Stoics regarded the differentiation of *genres* as relatively unimportant, viewing

as elsewhere in their philosophy they were more interested in explaining the nature of what already existed than in making innovations.

c. *Logos*. As already indicated, the language of a poem is important not only as a pattern of sound, but also as a sign of the meaning of the poem. As in the case of *lexis* and *phone*, the Stoic treatment of words as significant symbols is not peculiar to poetry. The classification of the parts of discourse, for instance, belongs to grammar. Of special importance for poetry is the analysis of the relation of a word to its meaning. Posidonius' definition of *poiesis* indicates that the meaning of poetry is to be explained in terms of imitation: "Poiesis is significant poetic diction, containing an imitation of things divine and human."⁸³ Not merely in poems, but in all discourse words "imitate" their meanings; and there is at the same time a "natural" relation between words and their meanings, for Origen records that according to the Stoics names (*onomata*) exist by nature, the first speech sounds imitating things.⁸⁴ This is the view that the Neo-Platonist Proclus attributes to Cratylus and Socrates: that words are *φύσαι* in the sense in which artificial images which resemble their models are said to be natural.⁸⁵

The imitative relation between words and meaning appears on three levels in Stoic theory. In one sense a poem taken as a whole imitates life, in that it presents the actions, characters and passions of men.⁸⁶ This is close to Aristotle's view of poetry as

the various *genres* simply as different means of accomplishing a single end. Cf. the very interesting passage in Heidmann, p. 15: *ως καὶ τὸν διαφέροντας εἰπὼν τεχνεῖς ὅμοιαν εἰκόνα ποιεῖν ἐν ἀλλοις ὑποκειμένοις, τῆς παραλλαγῆς οὐδὲν βλαπτούσης, ἐπιτειμᾶς τοῖς τὸν ποητὴν ἐκ τῶν ὑποκειμένων θεωροῦσιν, οὐθενὸς ἐκ τῶν ὄμολογουμένων δυντας τὴν ψυχὴν κινεῖν θεωροῦντος τὸν ποητὴν.*

⁸³ Diog. Laer., VII, 61, quoted above, p. 244. Cf. Strabo, I, 2, 5: *τὴν μιμητικὴν τοῦ βίου διὰ λέξην and Plut., Aud. Poet., 18B: ἔπαινονμεν . . . τὴν τέχνην εἰ μεμίηται προσηκόντως τὸ ὑποκειμένον.* Cf. also *ibid.*, 17F and Porphyrius, *Quaesit. Hom. ad Iliadem pert.*, pp. 104, 20 and 176, 1 Schrader.

⁸⁴ SVF, II, 44, 41-2: *φύσει (sc. ἔστι τὰ ὄντα), μιμουμένων τῶν πρώτων φωνῶν τὰ πράγματα.* Cf. Dionys. Halic., *Comp. Verb.*, 16.

⁸⁵ Proclus, *In Cratylum*, pp. 7 f. Pasquali; a similar view appears in Ammonius, *In Librum De Interp.*, pp. 34 f. Busse.

⁸⁶ Cf. Strabo I, 2, 3; 2, 5; Horace, *Ars Poet.*, 317-18; Plut., *Aud. Poet.*,

imitation.⁸⁷ It involves appropriateness in the sense that the words and actions of a character in a play must conform to what would be considered appropriate to such a character in real life. The just man must speak justly, the unjust man unjustly, and so forth.⁸⁸ Sometimes a poem or other work of art does not literally copy that which it signifies, but rather presents a situation in which the relations of the elements correspond to those found in the thing signified, though the elements themselves are different. For example, Heracles' killing the many-headed hydra signifies the philosopher's triumph over pleasure.⁸⁹ Chrysippus interpreted Athena's springing from the head of Zeus to signify the emanation of the voice from the head,⁹⁰ and he took the traditional portrayal of Justice as a virgin with a serious and severe countenance to mean that justice never yields to evil doers, but rather fills them with fear.⁹¹ Thus the imitation may be symbolical or allegorical, as when Crates called Agamemnon's shield an imitation of the universe.⁹²

The imitation of meaning is found not merely in extended passages or entire poems; it is present also in single words. Here the imitation is again expressed in terms of relationships, rather than simple copying. The name of an object imitates the object in that the name is derived from some word which denotes a quality of the object. So the etymology of the name reveals the nature of the object. The word *didasko*, I teach, is derived from

25B; A. Hausrath, "Philodemī περὶ ποιημάτων libri secundi quae videntur fragmenta," *Jahrb. Philol.*, Suppl. XVII (1890), p. 251, 5. For music as imitative cf. Philod., *Mus.*, p. 65 Kemke = 142 Van Krevelen = *SVF*, III, 224, 14 ff.; pp. 45; 103 Kemke = 98 i.; 212 Van Krevelen (not in *SVF*); Arist. *Quint.*, II, 4, p. 40, 15 ff. Jahn.

⁸⁷ Cf. Aristotle, *Poetics*, 1447 a 16; 28.

⁸⁸ Cf. Cicero, *Off.*, I, 97 f.; Philod., *Poems* V, col. 32, 23-27; Hausrath, p. 258, 18; Plut., *Aud. Poet.*, 18A-E, especially 18D: καλῶς γάρ ἐστι τὸ πρεπόντως καὶ οἰκεῖως, οἰκεία δὲ καὶ πρέποντα τοῖς αἰσχροῖς τὰ αἰσχρά.

⁸⁹ Heraclitus, *Quaest. Hom.*, 33, p. 49 (page references are to the Teubner ed. of 1910). The Stoics are mentioned at the beginning of the passage as authorities for the interpretation of Heracles as a philosopher. Cf. the interpretation of Odysseus, *iid.*, 70, p. 91.

⁹⁰ *SVF*, II, 256, 6 ff. The Stoics made many such interpretations of Homer and Hesiod.

⁹¹ Gellius, XIV, 4; cf. the interpretation of the Graces in Seneca, *Benef.*, I, 3-4; also *SVF*, II, 314, 11 ff.; 21 ff.

⁹² See below, pp. 261 f.

asko, I train, for teaching involves training.⁹³ The word *heimarmene*, fate, is from *siromene*, linked together, for fate is a linking together of causes.⁹⁴ The Stoics were inordinately fond of such etymologizing.

The etymologizing process, however, is regressive, and ultimately elements must be reached that cannot be further analyzed. Such elements would be the various sounds of the language, and at this stage the imitation is either onomatopoetic or in some other way directly expressive of the meaning.⁹⁵

Though the relation of words to meanings can always be accounted for in terms of "nature" and "imitation," yet the Stoics recognize that there is no one-to-one correlation between words and meanings, inasmuch as a single thing can have several names, and a single word may have several meanings. God, for instance, has a great many names, in accordance with his many aspects.⁹⁶ On the other hand, the name of a particular god may signify either the god or something he bestows, as the name Ceres refers either to the goddess of crops or to the crops themselves.⁹⁷ Such a name would be ambiguous; and Gellius reports that according to Chrysippus all words are ambiguous.⁹⁸ Furthermore, the relation of words to meanings does not follow a uniform pattern. In his work *On Anomaly* Chrysippus pointed out that "similar things are denoted by dissimilar words, and dissimilar things by similar words."⁹⁹ And finally, words may have either a

⁹³ *SVF*, II, 47, 17 ff.

⁹⁴ *SVF*, II, 265, 27 f.

⁹⁵ Cf. Augustine, *Princip. Dial.*, 6; Ps.-Plut., *Hom.*, II, 16; Gellius, X, 4; Steinhthal, *Geschichte der Sprache*. (2nd ed., Berlin, 1890), I, pp. 332 ff.; Reitzenstein, *op. cit.* (see note 8), pp. 24 f.

⁹⁶ *SVF*, I, 121, 34; II, 305, 15 ff.; 306, 19 ff.; 316, 29 ff. Interpretations of epithets and of names derived from *συμβεβηκότα* appear in ancient works on Homer; cf. Heraclitus, 15, p. 24, 1; Ps.-Plut., *Hom.*, II, 17; F. Wehrli, *Zur Geschichte der allegorischen Deutung Homers im Altertum* (Borna-Leipzig, 1928), p. 59.

⁹⁷ Cf. Cic., *Nat. Deor.*, II, 60; Plut., *Aud. Poet.*, 23A.

⁹⁸ Gellius, XI, 12 = *SVF*, II, 45, 29; cf. Augustine, *Princip. Dial.*, 9.

⁹⁹ Varro, *Ling. Lat.*, IX, 1 = *SVF*, II, 45, 21; cf. Diog. Laer., VII, 192; Barwick, *op. cit.* (see note 11), p. 179; Steinhthal, I, p. 367. This is not quite the same as the grammarians' anomaly, though it is close to it. For the grammarian analogy and anomaly have to do with the relation of words to other words, not to their meanings. Cf. Varro, *Ling. Lat.*, VIII, 25; Gellius, II, 25. Yet the Stoics use grammatical

proper or a figurative meaning. In order to clarify the relations of words to the things they signify the Stoics found it necessary to differentiate eight kinds of ambiguity,¹⁰⁰ and they recognized that the use of words in altered meanings is especially common in poems.¹⁰¹

The figure known as allegory is particularly important to the Stoics in their efforts to determine the meaning of a poem. Allegory is present when a poet says one thing and means another,¹⁰² or when he presents one thing by means of another.¹⁰³ Many of the Stoic allegorical interpretations of Homer have been preserved in the works of such writers as Eustathius, Heraclitus, Ps.-Plutarch on Homer, and in the scholia. Such interpretations of Homer and Hesiod were made long before the beginning of Stoicism, and they are by no means the exclusive property of that school; but from the first the Stoics gave them a special prominence.¹⁰⁴

Allegory is associated with a number of rhetorical figures.¹⁰⁵ One of these is *catachresis*. In general, according to Porphyrius, Homer concealed his views of gods and daemons "by not talking about them *προηγουμένως* (i. e. with words employed in their primary meanings), but by using what he says with catachresis (*καταχρῆσθαι*) for the presentation (*παράστασιν*) of other

analogy in etymologies: *θέτις* is to *θέσις* as *φάτις* is to *φάσις* (Eustathius on *Iliad*, I, 397); *ut Portunus a porta sic Neptunus a nando* (Cic., *Nat. Deor.*, II, 66 = Mette, *op. cit.* [see note 56], p. 133). Cf. Mette, p. 138, 14 and Wachsmuth, *op. cit.* (see note 56), pp. 13 ff.

¹⁰⁰ *SVF*, II, 45, 34 ff. It is perhaps significant that Diogenes of Babylon placed poems and ambiguities in close proximity in his work on *phonē*; Diog. Laer., VII, 44. Cf. Jensen, p. 156; Heraclitus, 5, p. 8, 9 f.

¹⁰¹ Cf. Plut., *Aud. Poet.*, 2εC.

¹⁰² Heraclitus, 5, p. 5, 15 f.: δὲ γὰρ ἄλλα μὲν ἀγορεύων τρόπος, ἔτερα δὲ ὡρ λέγει σημαίνω, ἐπωνύμως ἀλληγορία καλεῖται. Cf. Quint., VIII, 6, 44.

¹⁰³ Ps.-Plut., *Hom.*, II, 70: ή ἀλληγορία, ἥπερ ἔτερον δι' ἔτερου παρίστησιν. Cf. Philod., *Poems* in Heidmann, *op. cit.* (see note 82), pp. 6 f. (Mette, *op. cit.* [see note 56], pp. 160, 24 ff.): οὐτοὶ γὰρ εὐθέως τῆς μήνιδος ἀρχεσθαι τὰ σημαίνοντα πολλάκις διολογοῦντες δύμας παριστάνειν ἄλλα βούλονται τὸν ποητὴν, ὡς καὶ τὰ περὶ τῆς σφαρωπότας δὲ Κράτης.

¹⁰⁴ Cf. Cicero, *Nat. Deor.*, I, 36; see Wehrli, *op. cit.* (see note 96), pp. 40-52 for Crates on Homer; 52-64 for Chrysippus; 64-94 for the pre-Stoic allegorizers.

¹⁰⁵ For the relation of allegory to etymology and to metonymy cf. Wehrli, pp. 61 f.

things.”¹⁰⁶ Catachresis is properly the application of the name of a thing to another thing that has no name of its own, as in the application of the word *box* to containers not made of boxwood. But, according to Quintilian, poets use words by catachresis even when the things so designated have names of their own.¹⁰⁷ The Stoic use of catachresis in the interpretation of Homer is implied in Aristo’s statement that Homer is good not *κυρίως* but *καταχρηστικώς*—not when his words are taken in their proper meanings, but when they are interpreted by catachresis.¹⁰⁸

Another figure useful in allegorical interpretations is *metalepsis*, which, according to Quintilian, provides a passage from one trope to another, as when the centaur Chiron is called Hesson. In such a figure a middle term must always be supplied before the figure is intelligible.¹⁰⁹ Between the name Chiron and the name Hesson (inferior) must be understood the adjective *χείρων*, which means “worse.” Ps.-Plutarch explains this figure as the use of a synonym in a non-synonymous sense;¹¹⁰ that is, *χείρων* and *ἡσσων* are synonyms, but not as names for the centaur. So when Homer uses the phrase *νήσουσιν . . . θοῆσιν* he does not mean “ swift islands,” but the word *θοή*, swift, suggests the word *δέξια*, which means either swift or pointed. The term *θεή* therefore refers to the pointed shape of the islands, through the middle term *δέξια*.¹¹¹ So according to Heraclitus the Homeric “ swift night ” really means “ pointed night ”; that is, the earth’s shadow is pointed, or cone-shaped. Homer wanted to indicate that the sun is larger than the earth.¹¹² The value of metalepsis for allegorical interpretation is evident.

Perhaps the figure most often linked with allegory by the Homeric commentators is *ainigma*, which Quintilian defines as

¹⁰⁶ Stobaeus, *Ecl.*, II, 1, 32; cf. C. Reinhardt, *De Graecorum Theologia* (Berlin, 1910), p. 74; Mette, p. 161. Porphyrius was a Neo-Platonist.

¹⁰⁷ Quint., VIII, 6, 34 f.; cf. Ps.-Plut., *Hom.*, II, 18.

¹⁰⁸ Philod., *Poems* V, col. 15, 5-6; cf. Plut., *Aud. Poet.*, 25B (speaking of Euripides): *μεταφοράῖς καὶ καταχρήσεσι*.

¹⁰⁹ Quint., VIII, 6, 37 f. Cleanthes wrote a work entitled *περὶ μεταλήψεως*, *SVF*, I, 133, 3 ff.

¹¹⁰ Ps.-Plut., *Hom.*, II, 21.

¹¹¹ Heraclitus, 45, p. 67, 13 ff.

¹¹² Cf. Heraclitus, 46, p. 68, 17 ff. (Mette, p. 220, 10 ff.). This interpretation was not accepted by Crates; cf. Mette, p. 217, 14 ff.

allegoria quae est obscurior.¹¹³ According to Eustathius, Crates and the allegorizers said that the bosses on the shield of Agamemnon signify the stars by enigma.¹¹⁴ Closely associated with both allegory and enigma is *emphasis*, which Quintilian calls *illam plus quam diceris significationem.¹¹⁵* For instance, the line in Homer that contains the words, "The son of Cronos embraced his wife"¹¹⁶ means by emphasis (*ἐμφαντικῶς*) that the aether surrounds the air.¹¹⁷ Eustathius, speaking of Achilles' shield, says, "The ancients show in detail that the poet is here indicating by emphasis (*ἐπεμφαίνει*) many philosophical doctrines."¹¹⁸

Allegory is also linked with the "symbolical" use of words. Homer, we are told, did not leave the invisible world of the dead without allegorical meaning, but he expressed a philosophical doctrine symbolically (*συμβολικῶς*) even in his account of the underworld. The first river, at least, is called Cocytus, to designate the evil of human sorrow, for the lamentations for the dead are from the living.¹¹⁹ Again, the statement that Proteus changed into a tree means that the original matter of the universe, signified by Proteus, is fashioned by providence to take on many forms, one of which is air, here called symbolically a tree.¹²⁰

¹¹³ Quint., VIII, 6, 52. Still other species of allegory are listed in VIII, 6, 54, 57, and 59.

¹¹⁴ Eustathius on *Iliad*, XI, 32-40 (Mette, p. 174, 5 f.). For other instances of the figure cf. Strabo, I, 1, 10; Mette, pp. 161, 13; 176, 3; 188, 3; 190, 24; Heraclitus, pp. 7, 6; 37, 13; 57, 7; 81, 9; 86, 16; Ps.-Plut., *Hom.*, II, 100; 101; 102; 126; 201. The term *ὑπαινττέσθαι* appears in Heraclitus, pp. 49, 15; 69, 6; 72, 14; 76, 3.

¹¹⁵ Quint., IX, 2, 3; cf. Ps.-Plut., *Hom.*, II, 26: ἡ ἐμφασις, ἥπερ δὲ ὑπονοεῖς ἐπίτασιν τοῦ λεγομένου παρίστησιν and II, 92: εἰ δὲ δὲ αἰνιγμάτων καὶ μυθικῶν λόγων τινῶν ἐμφαίνεται τὰ νοήματα, οὐ χρὴ παράδοξον ἡγείσθαι.

¹¹⁶ *Iliad*, XIV, 346.

¹¹⁷ Heraclitus, 39, p. 57, 20 ff. For other examples cf. Mette, pp. 136, 3; 164, 2; Ps.-Plut., *Hom.*, II, 102 (*ἰλληγορικῶς ἐμφαίνων*); 110; 131; 217; Plut., *Aud. Poet.*, 19A; 35A.

¹¹⁸ Eustathius on *Iliad*, XVII, 481 (Mette, p. 178, 7 f.); cf. Arist. Quint., II, 9, p. 51, 7 Jahn; Philod., *Poems* V, col. 14, 16-7 ([έμ]φα[ι]-ν[ό]ντ[ων]); *Mus.*, p. 74 Kemke = 158 Van Krevelen = *SVF*, III, 228, 1 and 4.

¹¹⁹ Heraclitus, 74, p. 97, 16 ff.

¹²⁰ Heraclitus, 66, p. 86, 1 ff.; for other examples cf. pp. 37, 3; 41, 5; 70, 10; Mette, p. 178, 25.

Chrysippus combines *emphasis* and *symbolon* in his comment on Hesiod's account of the birth of Athena: ἀλλοι τινός συμβόλου ποιοῦντ' ἔμφασιν.¹²¹

But most important in allegory is the notion of imitation. What is said may copy, resemble, or imitate what is meant. The most conspicuous instance of this kind of allegory is Crates' interpretation of the shields of Agamemnon and Achilles. The shield of Agamemnon is a μίμημα τοῦ κόσμου, according to Crates.¹²² Heraclitus, discussing the shield of Achilles, gives a similar interpretation, without mentioning Crates by name. He says the shield is an image of the cosmic revolution (*τῆς κοσμικῆς περιόδου . . . εἰκόνα*).¹²³ Ps.-Plutarch finds in the shield an image (*εἰκόνα*) of democracy.¹²⁴ So Alcaeus' use of the storm at sea as an allegory of civil strife is termed an *εἰκασία* by Heraclitus.¹²⁵

From all this it is evident that the Stoic critic must know the various kinds of relations that may exist between a word and its meaning, and he must be able to determine what the relation is in any particular occurrence of a word in a poem. He must not expect the poet always to use words in their proper senses, or to present the thought in technical terms,¹²⁶ but he must be able to resolve the poet's allegories,¹²⁷ and show how the words are appropriate to the meaning.¹²⁸ With all their apparatus for

¹²¹ SVF, II, 257, 32.

¹²² Eustathius on *Iliad*, XI, 32-40; cf. Mette, pp. 173, 1; 175, 2; 176, 2; 177, 3 f.; Ps.-Plut., *Hom.*, II, 176: τοῦ κόσμου παντὸς μίμημα; Reinhardt, *op. cit.* (see note 106), pp. 59 ff. On the interpretation of the shield cf. Mette, p. 30.

¹²³ Heraclitus, 43, p. 24, 11 f.; cf. 48, p. 70, 12.

¹²⁴ Ps.-Plut., *Hom.*, II, 182.

¹²⁵ Heraclitus, 5, p. 7, 2; cf. εἰκάζει, p. 7, 12; πρωσεικάζειν, pp. 6, 10; 74, 2; 84, 2; 93, 19; ἀπεικάζει Ps.-Plut., *Hom.*, II, 127; εἰκάζονται, Mette, p. 178, 20.

¹²⁶ Cf. Eustathius on *Iliad*, XVIII, 484 (Mette, p. 206, 1): οὐ γὰρ τεχνολογῆσαι προηγουμένως ἐνεστήσατο (δὲ ποιητής); cf. Mette, p. 50, note 5; Strabo, I, 2, 7: πρὸς ἐπιστήμην ἀλληγορῶν.

¹²⁷ Cf. Philod., *Rhet.*, Vol. I, 180, 9 ff. Sudhaus; Geminus, XVI, 27 (Mette, p. 238, 9 ff.): Κράτης μὲν οὖν παραδξολογῶν τὰ ὑφ' Ὁμήρον ἀρχαϊκῶς καὶ ιδικῶς εἰρημένα μετάγει πρὸς τὴν κεττὰ ἐλήθειαν σφαιροποιίαν; Strabo, III, 4, 4 (Mette, p. 225, 8 ff.): . . . πρὸς ἐπιστημονικὰς ὑποθέσεις ἔτρεψαν τὴν Ὁμήρου ποίησιν, καθάπερ Κράτης τε δὲ Μαλλώτης ἐποίησε καὶ ἄλλοι τινές.

¹²⁸ Cf. Ps.-Plut., *Hom.*, II, 17 and 83. It is not clear whether the Stoics demanded of poems the virtues of clarity and brevity (cf. Diog.

analyzing a text it is not surprising that the Stoics seldom felt obliged to make emendations. They could give a rational explanation for almost everything they found in Homer, or in any other poet.¹²⁹ This is an attitude that one would expect in the Stoics; for in their physics and ethics too they are more interested in explaining or using whatever they come upon than in changing it. They interpreted a poet's thought, however, by reference to their own philosophical doctrine; and before the full range of Stoic poetics can be grasped, this aspect of their criticism must be considered.

2. THE MEANING OR THOUGHT OF POEMS.

The thought signified by speech is judged by the logician to be true or false, valid or invalid, and so forth, in accordance with the rules of logic. The thoughts contained in a poem must be subjected to the same tests as thoughts otherwise expressed. They are therefore not strictly within the province of the art of poetry.¹³⁰ They can be judged only by the logician, who has the criteria to determine whether they are true or false. Yet correctness of thought is very important to the excellence of a poem,¹³¹ for the wisdom contained in a poem is beneficial to the auditor, and poetry, like any other art, is good only in so far as it is beneficial. Even the enjoyment of a poem is derived from the belief that it confers some benefit.¹³² The poet must be a master not only of logic, but of the other arts as well, if he is to be competent to insure the truth of the thought he expresses.¹³³

Laer., VII, 59). According to Heraclitus, 24, p. 37, 3: *συμβολικοῖς δύναστι τὴν φιλοσοφίαν ἀμαρτοῦ* (*sc. δὲ ποιητής*). These virtues are assigned to poems by an unnamed opponent in Philod., *Poems* V, cols. 27, 7; 17 ff.; 28, 7 ff.; cf. Sextus, *A. M.*, I, 318 f.; Horace, *Sat.*, I, 10, 9; *Ars Poet.*, 25. Ps.-Plutarch, *Hom.*, II, 15; 19 recognizes that poetic figures make for vividness.

¹²⁹ Cf. Wachsmuth, pp. 18 ff.; yet Zeno and Crates proposed emendations to the texts of Homer and Hesiod; cf. *SVF*, I, 63, 16 ff.; Mette, pp. 273; 277; 282; 287; 290.

¹³⁰ Cf. Crates' view that the praise of *dianoia* is *ἄτεχνος*, that is, outside the art; Philod., *Poems* V, col. 24, 3-7. Cf. also Heidmann, p. 18.

¹³¹ Cf. *HV²* IX, 28 (Jensen, p. 132): *πότημα καλὸν εἶγαι τὸ σοφῆν διάνοιαν περιέχον*, and above, pp. 252, 254 f. For the contrary view, that truth and poetry are antithetical, cf. Dionys. Halic., *Lys.*, 14; *Isochr.*, 20.

¹³² See above, p. 249.

¹³³ Cf. Philod., *Poems* V, col. 2. Homer is often portrayed as master-

Similarly the critic must not limit himself to mere grammatical and philological problems,¹³⁴ but must know logic and the arts.¹³⁵ This is an instance of the Stoic doctrine of the inseparability of all branches of knowledge, and the wise man's mastery of all.¹³⁶

The fact that good poems express the truth gives these poems a place in philosophical discussions. Chrysippus was especially fond of quoting lines from the poets in support of some doctrine. He inserted in his works a tremendous number of lines from all the poets ($\piληθος \epsilonπων παραγράφειν \xi\pi\alpha\pi\tauων των ποιητῶν$) in support of his theories about the nature of the soul.¹³⁷ He used Homer as evidence that all things are determined by fate,¹³⁸ and Euripides to show that delicacies of food are not among the necessities of life.¹³⁹ Later Stoics used Homer primarily as a source of moral instruction, citing Ulysses, Agamemnon, and Achilles as examples of virtues and vices.¹⁴⁰ The work on Homer ascribed to Plutarch is in large part a systematic attempt to prove that Homer anticipated the philosophical doctrines of the various schools.¹⁴¹ A rather surprising instance of the use of Homer as an ethical teacher appears in the work of the Epicurean Philodemus, *On the Good King According to Homer*, where the character of the ideal king is derived from the Homeric poems.¹⁴²

The interpretation of poetry by the standards of ethics is of the various arts; cf. Strabo I, 1, 2; I, 2, 3 ff.; Ps.-Plut., *Hom.*, II, 92 ff.; Heraclitus, 35, p. 52, 16 f.; Dionys. Halic., *Epist. ad Pomp.*, 1.

¹³⁴ Cf. Seneca, *Dial.*, X, 13, 2; *Epist. Mor.*, 108, 24 ff.

¹³⁵ Cf. Sextus, *A. M.*, I, 79 (Mette, p. 156); Philod., *Poems* V, col. 19, 3-6.

¹³⁶ Cf. *SVF*, III, 164, 17 ff.

¹³⁷ *SVF*, II, 252, 18; cf. 241, 31; 254, 7; 255, 15 ff. and 30 ff.

¹³⁸ *SVF*, II, 266, 35 ff.

¹³⁹ Gellius, VI, 16, 6; cf. Sextus, *A. M.*, I, 288. Horace, *Epist.*, I, 16, 73-9.

¹⁴⁰ E. g. Seneca, *Epist. Mor.*, 31, 1; 56, 15; 66, 26; 88, 7; 104, 31 f.; 123, 12; *Benef.*, IV, 27, 2; *Dial.*, II, 2, 1; IX, 2, 12; Arrian, *Epict.*, I, 11, 31; 22, 5-8; 25, 10; 28, 23-5; II, 24, 21-26; III, 22, 7; 30-37; IV, 2, 10. The most famous statement of this view is perhaps Horace, *Epist.*, I, 2.

¹⁴¹ Cf. also Porphyrius, *Quaest. Hom. ad Iliadem pert.*, pp. 297, 5; 305, 22 Schrader; Heraclitus, 79, p. 104. Seneca disapproved of this kind of Homeric criticism; cf. *Epist. Mor.*, 88, 5.

¹⁴² It was not characteristic of the Epicureans to regard poets as philosophers, and in all probability Philodemus is here following a non-Epicurean source.

especially apparent in Epictetus' remarks about tragedy. "What else are tragedies," he asks, "but the passions of men who have admired things external, presented through such and such a metre?"¹⁴³ Elsewhere he says, "See how tragedy occurs, when fortuitous happenings befall stupid men."¹⁴⁴ It is obvious that for Epictetus there was nothing "heroic" about a tragic hero. A Stoic Oedipus would neither desire to know the story of his birth nor be horrified at the discovery. The refusal to discriminate between tragedy and life is revealed in the reverse direction by Epictetus' comparison of man's conduct in life with a role in a tragedy.¹⁴⁵

A curious use of poetry to provide exercises in logic appears in a papyrus.¹⁴⁶ Sentences containing negatives are taken from Euripides, Sappho, and other poets, and in each case questions are raised concerning the possibility of formulating corresponding affirmative sentences. The point of the exercise seems to be that a sentence can be considered as a logical proposition, either true or false, only if it has a contradictory. For example, the sixteenth exercise is as follows:

If that which Euripides stated in the following way is true or false, that "We do not thus bury sailors who have perished,"¹⁴⁷

There is an affirmative proposition contradictory to the sentence, "We do not thus bury sailors who have perished;"

There is or is not an affirmative proposition contradictory to the sentence, "We do not thus bury sailors who have perished."

That which Euripides stated in the following way is either true or false, or neither true nor false, that "We do not thus bury sailors who have perished."

Apparently the student is to decide whether or not there is such a contradictory affirmation, and so to determine whether or not the original sentence is a logical proposition. These exercises seem to have little to do with the interpretation of poetry, but they suggest that the Stoics, with their emphasis on the thought

¹⁴³ Arrian, *Epict.*, I, 4, 26; cf. I, 24, 16-18; 28, 31-33.

¹⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, II, 16, 31.

¹⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, I, 2, 16; 29, 42; III, 22, 26.

¹⁴⁶ *SVF*, II, 52-58.

¹⁴⁷ Euripides, *Helena*, 1245.

of poems, must have paid some attention to the problem of translating the language of the poets into its logical equivalent.

The interpretation of poetry in terms of Stoic physical, ethical, and logical teaching led in some instances to rejection of poetry as immoral or untrue, and therefore harmful. Even Chrysippus barred from the citizens of the ideal state certain "pleasures of ears and eyes,"¹⁴⁸ which probably included some forms of poetry and drama. Cicero and Quintilian speak of the danger of infecting the minds of the young through poetry, especially comedy.¹⁴⁹ Seneca rejects the view that Homer was a philosopher, and in general he places little value on the poets as ethical teachers.¹⁵⁰ In defense of the presence of evil in poems was the view that the good is simple and not suited to literary development.¹⁵¹

The condemnation of poetry normally involves the assumption of a simple relation between the *phone* of a poem and its meaning. Poems are interpreted literally, as if each word were used with the precision and clarity of a philosophical writing. The more usual Stoic view was that the poet does not mean literally what he says, but rather disguises his meaning by giving it poetic elaboration. Were this not the case, there would be no difference between poetic and philosophical statements. The extant evidence indicates that the Stoics discussed at some length both the nature and the purpose of this poetic elaboration.

3. THE POETIC ELABORATION OF THOUGHT.

A large part of the poetic elaboration of thought no doubt lay in the disposition of speech sounds and the figurative use of words.¹⁵² But beyond these devices the Stoics recognized that

¹⁴⁸ *SVF*, III, 180, 3 ff.

¹⁴⁹ Cicero, *Laws*, I, 47 = *SVF*, III, 55, 24 ff.; *Quint.*, I, 11, 1-2; X, 1, 72. Cf. the statement that Homer should be read *με-ὰ συγγνῶμης*, *Philod., Poems V*, col. 14, 32 f.; Jensen, p. 134.

¹⁵⁰ Cf. Seneca, *Epist. Mor.*, 115, 11 f.; *Benef.*, I, 3, 10; 4, 5-6; *Dial.*, X, 16, 5; Arrian, *Epict.*, IV, 4, 1-4. It has been argued that Panaetius rejected allegorical interpretations of Homer; but cf. Van Straaten, *op. cit.* (see note 15), pp. 93, 136 f.

¹⁵¹ This view appears in Ps.-Plut., *Hom.*, II, 5 218; cf. Plut., *Aud. Poet.*, 16A, 25D; Hausrath, *op. cit.* (see note 86), p. 257, 15. It is not demonstrably Stoic.

¹⁵² Discussed above, pp. 245-263.

philosophical thought itself may be recast into forms appropriate to poems. The most important alteration was in the direction of particularization. Chrysippus said that what is good in a poem must be interpreted as applying to things of the same kind beyond the limits of the poem;¹⁵³ and Seneca would have us regard the Vergilian line, *Una salus victis nullam sperare salutem*, as applicable to the whole human race.¹⁵⁴ Most often the shift is between a theoretical statement and a story or narrative. The persons and events in the story express in poetical form a philosophical doctrine, and the poetic myth replaces the philosophical example.¹⁵⁵ Miss Berthe Marti's recent articles on Lucan and Seneca are interesting attempts to interpret Stoic poems from this point of view.¹⁵⁶

The presentation of philosophical doctrine in poetic form requires the mixture of reason and fable, of *logos* and *mythos*.¹⁵⁷ The poet adds myth to philosophy in order to please or to amaze the audience.¹⁵⁸ This mixture takes on a variety of forms, according to the author's purpose; a pleasant myth, for instance, may be used to draw the hearer to a certain course of action (*προτροπή*), a fearful myth to dissuade him (*ἀποτροπή*).¹⁵⁹

The place of truth and falsity in stories was regularly discussed by the ancient rhetoricians and grammarians. They classified narratives as (1) true; (2) false but like the true; and

¹⁵⁵ Plut., *Aud. Poet.*, 34B: *τὴν δὲ ἐπὶ πλέον τῶν λεγομένων χρῆσιν ὑπέδειξεν ὄρθως ὁ Χρύσιππος, θτὶ δεῖ μετάγειν καὶ διαβιβάζειν ἐπὶ τὰ δημοιεῖδη τὸ χρήσιμον.*

¹⁵⁶ Seneca, *Nat. Quaest.*, VI, 2, 2. Cf. also Ps.-Dionys., *Ars Rhet.*, 11, 2.

¹⁵⁷ Cf. Plut., *Aud. Poet.*, 20BG: *οἱ γοῦν φιλόσοφοι παραδείγμασι χρᾶνται, νουθετοῦντες καὶ παιδεύοντες ἐξ ὑποκειμένων, οἱ δὲ ποιηταὶ ταῦτα (ταῦτα;) ποιοῦσι πλάττοντες αὐτοὶ πράγματα καὶ μυθολογοῦντες.* This relation of story to thought is probably referred to by the phrase *πρέπον κατὰ σοφίαν*, as opposed to *πρέπον καθ' ἔκαστον πρόσωπον καὶ πράγμα*, which refers to the relation of diction to action and character; cf. Philod., *Poems* V, col. 35, 23-28, discussed by Pohlenz, *op. cit.* (see note 16), pp. 84 f.

¹⁵⁸ B. Marti, "The Meaning of the Pharsalia," *A.J.P.*, LXVI (1945), pp. 352-76; "Seneca's Tragedies. A New Interpretation," *T.A.P.A.*, LXXVI (1945), pp. 216-45; "The Prototypes of Seneca's Tragedies," *C.P.*, XLII (1947), pp. 1-16.

¹⁵⁹ Cf. Plut., *Aud. Poet.*, 14E: *δέγματα μεμειγμένα μυθολογίᾳ* and 15F: *λόγις . . . μηγγυμένος πρὸς τὸ μυθῶδες.*

¹⁵³ See below, p. 270.

¹⁵⁵ Strabo, I, 2, 8; cf. Athenaeus, XIV, 626F.

(3) false and incredible. A true narrative is called history; a narrative that is false but like the true is an *argumentum (plasma)*; one that is false and incredible is a *fabula (mythos)*.¹⁶⁰ Of these three kinds of narrative, the second and third are appropriate to poetry,¹⁶¹ that which is false but like the true being associated with comedy, and the false and incredible with tragedy.¹⁶² Ps.-Longinus makes an analogous distinction between the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*, the *Iliad* having an "abundance of imagery taken from actual things," the *Odyssey* containing "fabulous and incredible tales of wonders."¹⁶³ It is possible that the same scheme underlies the terms *μῦθοι ιδιοί* and *ιπτοθέσεις*, which Philodemus assigns to one of his opponents, though the fragmentary state of the papyrus prevents an exact determination of their meaning.¹⁶⁴

The Stoics seem to have rejected the scheme of the grammarians in favor of the view that truth and falsity exist side by side, at least in Homer. According to Strabo the Homeric poems contain *historia*, *diathesis*, and *mythos*.¹⁶⁵ The terms *historia* and *mythos* clearly imply truth and falsity,¹⁶⁶ and the second term, *diathesis*, must mean in this context a disposition of the true and false elements of a poem in such a manner as to make them most effective. Plutarch says in one passage that a "well woven disposition of mythology" (*ἐν πεπλεγμένῃ διάθεσις μυθολογίας*) is able to "gratify and wheedle" the audience even more

¹⁶⁰ Cf. Quint., II, 4, 2; *Rhet. ad Herenn.*, I, 13; Sextus, *A. M.*, I, 263-4. Somewhat different is the rather more complex classification of Asclepiades in Sextus, *A. M.*, I, 252. On the general topic cf. Immisch, *op. cit.* (see note 8), pp. 12 f.

¹⁶¹ Cf. Quint., II, 4, 2: *grammaticis autem poeticas deditimus: apud rhetorem initium sit historia.*

¹⁶² Contrast Aristotle, *Poetics*, 1460 a 18 ff.; 1461 b 11 f.

¹⁶³ Ps.-Long., *De Sūl.*, 9, 13 (Einarson's translation [Chicago, 1945]).

¹⁶⁴ Philod., *Poems* V, cols. 5, 2 f.; 26 f.; 6, 24 f.; cf. Immisch, p. 13. The terms *μυθάρια* and *ιπτοθέσεις* are paired in Plut., *Aud. Poet.*, 14E; on *ιπτοθέσεις* cf. also *ibid.*, 25B, Strebo, I, 2, 11; Hausrath, *op. cit.* (see note 86), p. 251, 5.

¹⁶⁵ Strabo, I, 2, 17.

¹⁶⁶ Cf. Strabo, I, 2, 5; Horace, *Ars Poet.*, 151; Plut., *Aud. Poet.*, 16BC; 36E. The Stoics would not agree with Ps.-Longinus that the *Odyssey* is improbable; cf. Strabo, III, 4, 4. On the presence of truth, falsity, and probability in Homer cf. also Ps.-Plut., *Hom.*, II, 6.

than metre and figures of speech.¹⁶⁷ Strabo says expressly that the end of *diathesis* is activity or action (*ἐνέργεια*), as when Homer introduces fighting men.¹⁶⁸ This may be compared with the statement of Ps.-Plutarch that Homer made the gods active (*ἐνέργοῦντες*) in order to present the knowledge of them to the perception of the readers.¹⁶⁹ If this interpretation of Strabo is correct, the concept of disposition is used to explain a poem as a combination of true and false elements resulting in activity which produces its proper effect on the hearer. This disposition of thought appears as a counterpart of the disposition of speech sounds discussed in Section 1.¹⁷⁰

The notion that a work can be interpreted on two different levels, one mythical, the other philosophical, appears in the *Art of Rhetoric* ascribed to Dionysius of Halicarnassus, where it is said that Euripides' *Melanippe the Wise* has a double σχῆμα: (1) that of the poet himself, (2) that of the character in the play. That is, the play expresses the philosophy that Euripides took from Anaxagoras, as well as the thoughts appropriate to Melanippe.¹⁷¹ There is, however, no clear evidence that the author of this work was influenced by the Stoics.

It remains to examine the justification for this translation of truth into a poetic form. There are basically two justifications, one in terms of the audience, the other in terms of appropriateness of expression to subject matter. Audiences are divided by the Stoics into the educated and the uneducated.¹⁷² An uneducated audience is unable to appreciate a philosophical discourse and must therefore be drawn to philosophy gradually, through poetry and music. The poets, for instance, present the gods in human form in order to teach *τοῖς ἔλασσον φρονοῦσιν* that the gods

¹⁶⁷ Plut., *Aud. Poet.*, 16B, cf. 17B. Plutarch also uses the term *diathesis* of the subject matter of a poem in 20B.

¹⁶⁸ Strabo, I, 2, 17.

¹⁶⁹ Ps.-Plut., *Hom.*, II, 113.

¹⁷⁰ It is possible that Macrobius' remarks in *Somn. Scip.*, I, 2, 1 ff. about the philosophers' use of *fabulae* reflect Stoic doctrine. At any rate, his mention of stories that edify *per turpia et indigna* (*ibid.*, 11) suggests the Stoic *impias fabulæ* (Cicero, *Nat. Deor.*, II, 64).

¹⁷¹ Ps.-Dionys., *Arts Rhet.*, 8, 10; 9, 11. The same author recognizes that comedy may contain political and philosophical thought (8, 11).

¹⁷² Aristo in Philod., *Poems* V, col. 19, 33 ff.; Strabo, I, 2, 8; Ps.-Plut., *Hom.*, II, 92: *οἱ μὲν φιλομαθοῦντες . . . οἱ δὲ ἀμαθεῖς*.

exist.¹⁷³ Thus poetry and music are considered a kind of preparation for philosophy,¹⁷⁴ or even a first philosophy;¹⁷⁵ and their end is the same as that of history and philosophy.¹⁷⁶

It is apparent that poetry and music are particularly important in the education of children.¹⁷⁷ The pleasure that they give is a bait that draws the hearer's attention to the thought¹⁷⁸ and so instructs him in virtue and the arts.¹⁷⁹ The poet deters from vice by examples of evil, and provides good examples for imitation.¹⁸⁰ He uses not only pleasure, but also ἔκπληξις and κατάπληξις, which the Stoics analyze as kinds of fear, as means of influencing the auditor.¹⁸¹ Not all the Stoics were agreed on the educational value of music and poetry. Seneca, in particular, believed that the study of poetry does not give instruction in virtue, though he conceded that it prepares the way.¹⁸²

An educated audience does not require the bait of pleasure for the pursuit of virtue, though it may derive enjoyment from poems.¹⁸³ The philosopher recognizes a different justification for

¹⁷³ Ps.-Plut., *Hom.*, II, 113; cf. the statement (*ibid.*, 92) that the poets use myths so that the untutored may not despise what they cannot understand.

¹⁷⁴ Philod., *Mus.*, p. 8 Kemke = 16 Van Krevelen = *SVF*, III, 222, 14 ff.; Sextus, *A. M.*, VI, 29 f.; Plut., *Aud. Poet.*, 15 F: ἐν ποίημασι προφίλοσοφητέον, 36D-37B, especially the concluding phrase: ἵνα . . . ὅπε ποιητικῆς ἐπὶ φίλοσοφίᾳ προπέμπται.

¹⁷⁵ Strabo, I, 1, 10; 2, 3. Cf. Sextus, *A. M.*, I, 277; Arist. Quint., III, 27, p. 97, 3-5 Jahn; Philod., *Mus.*, p. 52 Kemke = 112 Van Krevelen.

¹⁷⁶ Strabo, I, 2, 9; Sextus, *A. M.*, VI, 7.

¹⁷⁷ Philod., *Poems* V, col. 14, 19-20; Strabo, I, 2, 3; Athenaeus, XIV, 623F; Heraclitus, 76, p. 100, 8 ff.; Amsel, *op. cit.* (see note 8), pp. 42-45.

¹⁷⁸ Strabo, I, 2, 8; Heraclitus, 26, p. 40, 5 ff.; Sextus, *A. M.*, VI, 7: μετὰ θελγούσης τινὸς πεθῶν; Hausratl., p. 239, 4; Jensen, p. 132. Contrast Aristotle, *Poetics*, 1480 b 2 ff.

¹⁷⁹ Ps.-Plut., *Hom.*, II, 6; Athenaeus, XIV, 628BC.

¹⁸⁰ Cf. Heraclitus, 70, p. 92, 12 ff.; Philod., *On the Good King*, p. 23 Olivier.

¹⁸¹ Cf. above, p. 249 and Plut., *Aud. Poet.*, 16B; 17A; 20F; *De Audiendo*, 41C; Philod., *On the Good King*, pp. 52; 58 Olivier. The use of allegory, along with such devices as emphasis, ambiguity, hyperbole, and imitation, as means of achieving δεινότης is discussed by (the non-Stoic) Demetrius, *On Style*, 243; 282 f.; 285; 238; 291; 298.

¹⁸² Seneca, *Epist. Mor.*, 88, 3 and 9; and especially 20: *sic liberales artes non perducunt animum ad virtutem, sed expediunt.*

¹⁸³ See above, p. 250.

poetry. Cleanthes stated that certain philosophical truths are of such grandeur that they cannot be adequately expressed without metre, song, and rhythm.¹⁸⁴ Poetry is a kind of trumpet which amplifies the human voice to the point where it is capable of expressing its divine theme.¹⁸⁵ Whether this justification applies to poetry in general, or only to hymns such as Cleanthes' *Hymn to Zeus*, is not clear; but the latter seems more likely, as a divine theme is specified. It may also be significant that the mythological element is at a minimum in Cleanthes' *Hymn*.¹⁸⁶

From the foregoing discussion the conclusion may be drawn that the Stoics analyzed poems in terms of multiple sets of relations: the relation of speech sounds to each other, the relation of the disposition of speech sounds to the disposition of the auditor, the relation of words to meaning, the relation of a poem's meaning to truth, the relation of the complex of words and meanings to the moral edification of the auditor. In order to judge a poem the critic must determine whether its many relations are "appropriate." Appropriateness is in poetry what consequence is in logic, or what causation is in physics, for appropriateness implies conformity to reason. A poem of such a character is at once beautiful, beneficial, and a source of enjoyment.

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¹⁸⁴ Philod., *Mus.*, pp. 97 f. Kemke = 202 Van Krevelen = *SVF*, I, 109, 9 ff.

¹⁸⁵ Seneca, *Epist. Mor.*, 108, 10.

¹⁸⁶ Fragments of Cleanthes' other poems (*SVF*, I, 127 ff.) are also conspicuously lacking in mythology. For an analysis of the traditional features of the hymn cf. E. Neustadt, "Der Zeushymnos des Kleanthes," *Hermes*, LXVI (1931), pp. 387-401.

THE REVOLUTION OF THE 400.

Before the discovery of Aristotle's *Constitution of the Athenians* in 1891 the one ancient source (Thucydides, VIII, 48-97) which described the revolution of the 400 was accepted without question except for a few details in which it seemed to suffer contradiction by passing references in later authors.¹ The opposing bits of evidence were weighed on their merits, and the resultant patchwork or complete vindication of Thucydides' account provided the history of the revolution.² After the discovery of Aristotle's monograph with its account of the revolution (29-33) differing markedly from Thucydides', the same process was repeated. But now there was not only the consideration of details on their merits, but also the weighing of two historical methods, of two men and what they seemed to know, wished to know, and could or should have known.³ This was an era, at first, of partisanship for either Aristotle or Thucydides,⁴ but because the extent of their differences and their considerable weight as authorities prevented the complete acceptance or rejection of either, a period of selection and patchwork began and with variations has continued up to the present.⁵ The method

¹ Notably ps. Lys., XX, 2, 13; Harpocration and Suidas, s. v. *syngrapheis*.

² Grote, VII, pp. 276 f.; Curtius (tr. A. W. Ward), III, pp. 464 f.

³ E. Meyer, *Forsch.*, II, pp. 411 ff.

⁴ T. Lenschau, *R. M.*, 1913, pp. 202 f.

⁵ Convenient bibliographies may be found in Busolt, *Gr. Staatsk.* (1920), I, p. 78 and *C. A. H.* (1927), V, pp. 516 ff. through the years 1909 and 1926 respectively, after which there has been only one article and a review. The following list is not complete and will serve only for reference from this article: Wilamowitz, *Aristoteles und Athene* (Berlin, 1893), I, pp. 99 ff.; II, pp. 113 ff.; 356 ff.; U. Köhler, *Ber. d. Berl. Akad.*, 1895, pp. 451 ff.; 1900, pp. 803 ff.; L. Whibley, *Greek Oligarchies* (London, 1896), App. C; E. Meyer, *Forsch.*, II, pp. 406 ff.; V. Costanzi, *Riv. Fil.*, 1901, pp. 84 ff.; W. Judeich, *R. M.*, 1907, pp. 295 ff.; F. Küberka, *Klio*, 1907, pp. 351 ff.; 1908, pp. 206 ff.; U. Kahrstedt, *Forsch.* (Berlin, 1910), pp. 236 ff.; *Hermes*, 1914, pp. 47 ff.; A. Ledl, *Wien. Stud.*, 1910, pp. 38 ff.; A. v. Mess, *R. M.*, 1911, pp. 366 ff.; T. Lenschau, *R. M.*, 1913, pp. 202 ff.; M. O. B. Caspari, *J. H. S.*, 1913, pp. 1 ff.; K. J. Belcch, *Gr. G.* (Strassburg, 1914), II, 2, 2, pp. 311 ff.; Th. Thalheim, *Hermes*, 1919, pp. 333 ff.; G. Busolt, *Gr. Staatsk.* (Munich, 1920), I, pp. 69 ff.;

used both before and after the discovery of the *Constitution of the Athenians* raises the question: what treatment would a hypothetical third account of the revolution receive? Since it would probably not agree in every detail with either Thucydides' or Aristotle's (nor would it settle the matter if it did, since it would then not be independent evidence), again each step of the revolution would be reviewed, the three accounts would be arranged in parallel columns, the events which had been made parallel (by the modern critics, not by the ancient authors) would be weighed against one another, and another eclectic patchwork would emerge. The weakness of the method seems to me to lie in the rejection of part of an account on the basis of a parallelism which is neither necessary nor certain, but only assumed.

A study of the reconstructions of the revolution not only reveals that there are questions and problems which have either never been dealt with or not convincingly handled, but also shows that new questions arise each time a different twist of interpretation is applied to the old questions. (1) Too little attention has been given the fact that Aristotle confines himself to a revolution of the 5000, although he introduces his account as that of the 400 and corrects himself at the end as to the non-existence of the 5000. (2) Although the greater part of the revolution must have taken place after Peisander's return from negotiating with Alcibiades and Tissaphernes, no one has taken into consideration the effect of his failure both on the oligarchs and on the people of Athens who had resigned themselves to oligarchy only as the price which must be paid for Persian aid. (3) It seems to have become a general assumption among the critics that because this was an oligarchic revolution, the men who were popularly elected were automatically oligarchs. (4) The further assumption that either Aristotle or Thucydides must be mistaken where they seem to disagree on a point has generally been taken for granted without adequate explanation of causes for the mistake. (5) Equally without grounds is the common assumption that although for the most part Aristotle and Thucydides report different details they are nevertheless

449; 461 ff.; V. Ehrenberg, *Hermes*, 1922, pp. 613 ff.; W. S. Ferguson, *C. P.*, 1926, pp. 72 ff.; *C. A. H.* (Ferguson), V, pp. 325 ff.; U. Wilcken, *Berl. Sitzb.*, 1935, III, pp. 34 ff.; F. Taeger, *Gnomon*, 1937, pp. 347 ff.

describing exactly the same events. (6) And finally, some critics have attempted to avoid the apparent contradictions between Aristotle and Thucydides by transferring those contradictions to the oligarchs themselves. They explain the diverse policies in the two accounts as rising from differences of policy and opinion among the oligarchs even at the beginning of their revolution when such division could only have ruined their cause.⁶

Since in this problem not only the true course of the revolution is at stake, but also our whole habit of respectful dependence on both Aristotle and Thucydides as sound authorities wherever their accounts cannot be checked, it seems worthwhile to attempt a different method of reducing the two divergent accounts to a consistent flow of events. By the orthodox method, critics first made parallel the events in the two accounts which have similarities, but greater differences than similarities, and were then forced to assume that the differences which cannot be reconciled must be the result of mistakes on the part of Thucydides or Aristotle. I believe that a different method is possible and that it should be based on the authority of Thucydides and Aristotle rather than on their fallibility. By this method the differences in the accounts become fully as important as the similarities. A reconstruction on this basis will show that the two accounts do not so much duplicate each other as interlock in such a way that details or events told in full by Thucydides are ignored or only hinted in Aristotle and *vice versa*. The two actual accounts of the revolution will be seen to fall short of the "ideal" account not by errors but by omissions, which unlike errors have complete justification in the purpose and method of the writer. Since the two authorities differ greatly in both purpose and method, it is right and fitting that their accounts should differ not only in information included but in material omitted. If the following reconstruction shows that the different details and omissions in

⁶ Wilcken (pp. 46 f.) even explains that though opposed to each other the two groups of oligarchs had decided not to vent their opposition in the assembly; if that was the case, there is every reason to assume that they were united privately as well as publicly, since an agreement to disagree silently implies a lack of any real disagreement. And oligarchs who would be willing to leave the settlement of their policy to a vote of the *demos* were hardly the men whom one would expect to achieve a revolution.

each author are related to and result from the different purposes of the two, it will justify the attempt to maintain their authority.

In the winter of 412/11 Alcibiades appealed to the most influential men in the army at Samos, suggesting the possibility of Persian aid at the price of his recall, which in turn predicated a change of government from democracy to oligarchy (Thucydides, VIII, 47, 2).⁷ The most influential men were interested in a proposition which would serve as a pretext for the realization of their own desires. Thus the revolution "was first initiated in the camp and came later to the city from there" (*ibid.*, 48, 1). After conferring with Alcibiades some of the influential men returned to Samos, formed a conspiratorial group, and reported Alcibiades' proposition to the whole army, shifting the emphasis (in accordance with Alcibiades' suggestion, 48, 2) so that it was the Persian king who required the change of government. The army did not like the proposition but made no trouble (48, 2-3). The Samian conspirators then sent Peisander and others to effect the necessary changes in Athens (49).

In what may be called the first assembly Peisander proposed the change of government and recall of Alcibiades as the price of the King's support. The people were with difficulty convinced; and here where the simple fact of persuasion is concerned, the parallelism is immanent in the two accounts and not merely assumed (Aristotle, 29, 1; Thucydides, 54, 1). In Thucydides' account the assembly's acceptance gave rise to no action except the despatch of Peisander and ten others to negotiate with Tissaphernes and Alcibiades. But, in the first place, their acceptance must have been more than a merely passive withdrawal of objections, and, in the second place, Peisander and the ten had to have some assurance of a projected change in government in order to continue the negotiations which the influential men of the army at Samos had already carried through the preliminary stages. The assembly must have both shown their acceptance and given surety to the envoys by the passage of some other decree. Since this first assembly was the only one in which Persian aid was still the motivating factor

⁷ All references to Aristotle will be to the *Constitution of the Athenians* unless otherwise noted; all references to Thucydides will be to the eighth book.

for the change of government, the decree recorded by Aristotle (29, 2-3) as having been passed under these circumstances must be added to the action of the assembly. This decree provided for the election of 20 men to be associated with the previously elected (Thucydides, 1) ten *probouloi* to formulate a constitution as they thought best for the safety of the state. It further provided that anyone else might bring forward proposals, and an amendment was added that the commission should also consider the Cleisthenic constitution. Both the second proposal and the amendment (cf. Andocides, I, §4) suggest that these *syngrapheis* were not *autokratores* and so could not be identical with the ten of Thucydides, 67, 1. Since this decree cannot be identified with the decree electing the ten *syngrapheis autokratores* and since it was passed when the people were persuaded that Persian aid would be forthcoming to an oligarchy, it must belong to this assembly. This decree is just what is required in the first assembly as described by Thucydides both to express the people's persuasion and to provide Peisander with material for his talks with Tissaphernes and Alcibiades. And yet Thucydides ignored the decree, although it is implicit not only in his statement that the people were persuaded but also in the decree sending Peisander, which would have been impossible without it. His failure to make explicit mention of it is completely consistent with his method of mentioning policies or acts only if and when they become effective.⁸ It will be seen shortly that the effectiveness of this decree was temporary in the extreme and almost immediately voided by a more effective measure, for which this purely constitutional step toward oligarchy seemed only a blind to Thucydides.

The assignment of Aristotle's decree to the first assembly would necessitate some explanation of his failure to mention the decree concerning Peisander and the other envoys if it were not obvious that he is interested in the constitutional question to the exclusion of all the concomitant political and diplomatic moves. For the same reason Aristotle does not even hint at the conspiratorial activity instituted by Peisander after the first assembly (Thucydides, 54, 4), nor is there any reflection of it in his subsequent account, which reads far more like the de-

⁸ Meyer, *G. d. A.*, III, pp. 263 f.; Finley, *Thucydides* (1942), p. 117.

scription of a constitutional convention than an account of a revolution.⁹

After the departure of Peisander and the other envoys, two groups in Athens, impelled by the same force but differently constituted, initiated the revolution. The commission of 30, popularly elected without benefit of intimidation, must have included not only radical and moderate oligarchs, but also democrats.¹⁰ Nothing illustrates the fact that the commission was not a strong oligarchic group so well as the constitution which it proposed. The basic principles of the constitution are summarized by Aristotle (29, 5) after a statement of the 30's first proposal which obliged the *prytaneis* to put all proposals to the vote¹¹ and suspended *graphe paranomon*: money should be expended only for the war; all officials (except the nine archons and whatever *prytaneis* there should be) should be unpaid for the duration of the war; the government should be intrusted to the 5000 or more citizens who were most able to serve the state. In addition the commission ordered that ten men be chosen out of each tribe to catalog the 5000.

While the commission was holding its constitutional convention, a second group of Athenians was working in other ways. And it is the activities of this second group which Thucydides describes without any reference to the commission, again because the effectiveness of the commission was completely obliterated by the activities of the second group, and because, judged from the point of view of the completed revolution, the commission's activities seemed only a blind for the oligarchs' more radical and violent intentions, which could be estimated only by their results (Thucydides, 66, 1). Before describing it in detail, Thucydides

⁹ Meyer, pp. 420 f.

¹⁰ One member of the commission was accused of being an oligarch; this was Hagnon, the father of Theramenes, in the speech against Eratosthenes by Lysias. But the accusation consisted only of responsibility for the oligarchic constitution, which all the *syngrapheis* shared by virtue of their assignment (Lysias, XII, 65'). In the same way Aristotle (*Pol.*, 1299 b 30 ff.) designated *probouloi* as oligarchic by virtue of their functions. But a conversation quoted by Aristotle (*Rhet.*, III, 18) shows that it was not the political leanings of the members but what was necessary that guided their actions.

¹¹ This proposal suggests that the *syngrapheis* were not *autokratores* and so not identical with the ten of Thucydides.

summarizes their work from the point of view of its effectiveness when he reports that the returning Peisander found the revolution more than half-accomplished (65, 2). After the ground had been prepared by intimidation, the oligarchs made public their program: that no one be paid except those on military service, and that the government be shared by no more than the 5000 who were most able to benefit the state (65, 3). The similarity of this program to the constitution of the 5000 outlined by the 30 *syngrapheis* (Aristotle, 29, 5) is obvious; and both programs have the revolutionary virtue of appearing acceptable to the people at the same time that they materially increase the opportunities for oligarchic control. It is the differences between the two programs which point not only to the differences in the groups promulgating them but also to the narrators' points of view. Unimportant differences which arise merely from the disparity between a program and a constitutional outline are the legal implementation of the 5000's selection and the unnecessary detail concerning the 5000's power in foreign affairs. One important difference is the apparent conflation of Aristotle's two clauses about finance into Thucydides' one; to say that no one in the government is to be paid except those on military service seems to say that no money shall be expended except for the war and that no officials are to be paid. But the statement of program in Thucydides implies something perhaps not even dreamed of by the democratically elected *syngrapheis* who were formulating the oligarchy under pressure: that the new government should not include any essentially democratic officials like *prytaneis*, who are as expressly excluded from the non-payment clause in Aristotle as they are implicitly included by the oligarchic program in Thucydides. The second important difference is between "not more than" and "not fewer than." Five thousand was a round number which could inspire hopes of inclusion in the breasts of many Athenians. "Not fewer than 5000" expresses exactly the intentions of the representative *syngrapheis* to make the base of this necessary oligarchy as broad as possible. "Not more than 5000" expresses less exactly because more deceptively the intentions of the oligarchs to inspire hopes of 5000 and yet contemplate far fewer.

To continue with the softening-up activities of the oligarchic

clubs in the psychological order in which Thucydides presents them (first, a calculated kind of violence; second, a deceptively mild program; and third, the use of the first two as levers of persuasion and intimidation): the assembly and the council still met, but all speech and action were prescribed by the oligarchic clubs, and the general populace was completely intimidated by the sudden death of democrats and the impossibility of determining the extent of oligarchic support (Thucydides, 66). Truly Peisander and his colleagues found the revolution more than half accomplished. And it was well for them that they did find it so since they had failed to obtain Persian aid and no longer had any pretext for establishing the oligarchy in which they were already compromised. Now more than ever it was necessary to establish the strictest oligarchic government possible in order not only to provide themselves with power but even more to protect their very lives. Since it seems unlikely from the point of view of the continued course of the revolution that Peisander and his colleagues could at this point have told the assembly that their negotiations had failed, they must have planned to cover up their failure until they had established an oligarchy strict enough to smother all opposition. And since the news of Persian non-cooperation must become evident before much time had passed they must provide that those in power should include only oligarchs who would not take steps against them for what had proved to be false provocation to change the government. But the already formulated oligarchy of 5000 or more was not sufficiently narrow. Since they must make some report of their negotiations, what could be more natural than that they should make out of their report a pretext for reconsidering the constitution of the 5000? They must, therefore, have announced at the third assembly that the Persians were willing to aid the Athenians but required more than the mild oligarchy promulgated by the 30.¹² This deception is confirmed by Aristotle in another connection in a statement which cannot refer to the proposals of the first assembly, since at that time they were neither false nor deceptive:

¹² Costanzi (p. 99) used the Persian requirement for stricter oligarchy to explain the two constitutions.

Pol. 1304 b 12: ὅτε μὲν γὰρ ἔξαπατήσαντες τὸ πρῶτον ἐκόντων μεταβάλλοντι τὴν πολιτείαν, εἴθ' ὑστερον βίᾳ κατέχουσιν ἀκόντων, οἷον ἐπὶ τῶν τετρακοσίων τὸν δῆμον ἔξαπάτησαν φάσκοντες τὸν βασιλέα χρήματα παρέξειν πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον τὸν πρὸς Λακεδαιμονίους, ψευσάμενοι δὲ κατέχειν ἐπειρώντο τὴν πολιτείαν.

Peisander and his colleagues, having brought mercenaries back to Athens, mobilized the clubs, and formulated the necessary change in tactics, asked the *prytaneis*, as was usual for a returned commission, to call an assembly. In this third assembly, as has been suggested, they lied about the failure of the negotiations, turning it into an offer from Persia to help a truly oligarchic Athens, and proposed the election of ten *syngrapheis autokratores*¹³ to draw up a stricter oligarchic government to satisfy the King. Now, more readily than in the first assembly, because of their recent intimidation, the people acceded. The commission of ten was elected; but who was to guarantee that its members were all staunch oligarchs? Even if the people had been eager to satisfy their bloodthirsty terrorizers by electing only oligarchs, they would have been hard put to it to know exactly who were oligarchs, since by secrecy the oligarchs magnified their effectiveness and the people's mistrust of one another. The oligarchs themselves must have doubted whether the elected commissioners could be brought to a radical oligarchic way of thinking in a sufficiently short time. Since any day news might arrive of further Persian help to Sparta, time was more important than it had been for the work of the 30 *syngrapheis*, so that a definite day, probably in the very near future, was set for the fourth assembly, thus making impossible any delay or interference on the part of the *prytaneis*. "When the day came" (Thucydides, 67, 2) the assembly was called for Colonus. The designation of Colonus could hardly be an effort to prevent the mass of Athenians from attending since 6000 were required for a vote of *adeia*.¹⁴ It is far more likely that this was still another subtly terroristic move which would increase the ordinary citizens' fear of the strange and unknown forces about them. The implications of such a meeting-place to the rank and file

¹³ Swoboda, *Gr. Staatsk.* (1925), II, p. 905; Küberka, p. 344; Wilcken, p. 38.

¹⁴ Busolt, p. 461.

might well be the possibility of betrayal to the nearby besieging enemy.

Because the oligarchs could not trust the ten commissioners to produce an oligarchic constitution that would satisfy their urgent need, it was easier to provide that the commission should merely make the one proposal that would legalize any oligarchic move. Thucydides states (67, 2) with great emphasis that the commission made only the one proposal. His emphasis has been variously interpreted, but he may well have intended to point a contrast between the actions of these ten commissioners in the fourth assembly and those of the 30 in the second. The emphasis would then show that although Thucydides thought the second assembly unimportant and without significance from his end-point-of-view¹⁵ he knew of the 30.

It will be necessary to leave Thucydides' account and consider how Aristotle's description bears on these events. Of the conspiratorial and terrorist activities he has nothing to say; of Peisander's departure and return he makes no mention; of the failure to win Persian help he seems to be unaware. Of one thing he is certain (30, 1; 32, 1): that the assembly passed a decree embodying the outline of the oligarchic government of 5000. And it is his certainty on this point that has made the non-constitutional activities appear insignificant and unnecessary. The argument tends to become cyclic: it was Aristotle's exclusive interest in constitutional matters that blinded him to accompanying political and diplomatic action; and this self-imposed blindness confirmed him in his belief that the constitutional changes were all-important. Then, having accepted one constitutional change (that to government by 5000) and considering unimportant further "unconstitutional" activity which voided that change, he has placed himself in the position of not being able to reconstruct the actual accession of the 400 and is reduced to recording only their constitution (31). The two constitutions of Aristotle, however, present problems of their own and will be considered at length below.

We may continue now with the fourth assembly as reported

¹⁵ Thucydides, 66, 1: *ἵν δὲ τοῦτο εὑπερέσ πρὸς τὸν πλεῖον. . . .* It is constantly his effort to describe not what apparently happened, but what actually happened, and his interpretation of the actuality is often distorted by his *ex post facto* judgments.

by Thucydides (67, 3). Peisander proposed that all existent offices be abolished, that no offices in the future be paid, and that five *proedroi* be chosen, that these should choose 100, that each of the 100 co-opt three, and that the 400 thus chosen should take over the *bouleuterion* and rule as they might think best and summon the 5000 when it seemed good to them. With no dissentient vote (for who knew whether in this strange place of assembly oligarchic spies might not be watching?) the whole proposal was passed, and the 400 entered the *bouleuterion* on the same day (69, 1). The problems involved in the removal of the 500 *bouleutai* have been discussed and magnified by Caspari (pp. 10 ff.), who questioned the likelihood of the *prytaneis* allowing the ecclesia to be held at Colonus and permitting Peisander to propose revolutionary motions which should have been preconsidered by the *boule*. But in Thucydides' account, which would not have raised such questions if it had not been "corrected" from Aristotle's account, it is quite clear that the combination of setting the date for the fourth assembly in the third and the election of *syngrapheis* who were *autokratores* obviated the customary rôle of the *prytaneis*.¹⁶ It further seemed ridiculous to Caspari that the dissolved *boule* should return to the *bouleuterion* and that the oligarchs should use both force and bribery to get rid of them. Their return is understandable on at least two counts; they had not, as a body, been officially informed of their abolition, nor had they formally wound up their business and handed unfinished business to their successors; and they had not been paid. The use of force as well as bribery is also explicable: the force was merely the continuation of their terroristic methods, i. e., a show of force is part of the oligarchic pattern; the payment was in part a debt, but much more a mollifying gesture quite in keeping with their need for support and pretence of legality.

We come now to a consideration of the dates of these events, a problem complicated by the possible authenticity of the constitutions in Aristotle's account (30; 31). In 32 Aristotle writes:

¹⁶ If even *syngrapheis autokratores* were not empowered to call assemblies, or designate the place after they had been called Swoboda, *Gr. Staatsk.*, II, p. 904 from Aristophanes, *Lys.*, 980 ff.), there is still the intimidation described in Thucydides, 66, to motivate the *prytaneis'* action.

Οἱ μὲν οὖν ἔκατὸν οἱ ὑπὸ τῶν πεντακισχλίων αἰρεθέντες ταύτην ἀνέγραψαν τὴν πολιτείαν. ἐπικυνοθέντων δὲ τούτων ὑπὸ τοῦ πλήθους . . . ἡ μὲν βουλὴ . . . πρὶν δὰ βουλεῦται κατελύθη μῆνος Θαργηλιῶν τετράδι ἐπὶ δέκα, οἱ δὲ τετρακόσιοι εἰσήσαν ἐνάτῃ φθίνοντος Θαργηλιῶν.

These statements are inconsistent, since they imply the co-existence in power of the 5000 and the *demos* with its *boule* (doubly suggested by *plethos* and the time sequence). But since the 5000 never existed,¹⁷ perhaps the inner consistency of Aristotle's statements can be discovered, not merely by removing or discounting all references to the 5000, but by attempting to follow the train of thought which led him to a belief in the existence of the 5000 and these inconsistent statements. If Aristotle knew that a decree giving power to the 5000 had been passed (29, 5; 30, 1), he would assume that anything done after the passage of that decree must have been done by the 5000. But if he also knew that in the revolution of 411 the change of government was from the democracy not to an oligarchy of 5000 but to one of 400 (29, 1; 32, 3), he would have had to assume that it was the 5000 rather than the *demos* which instituted the oligarchy of the 400, both because that would be the natural order for the limitation of power and because he knew of no decree which removed the power from the 5000. And if there was in his sources or in the archives a double constitution which defined the powers of the 5000 and the functions of the 400, he would have had to assume that it was drafted at the command of the 5000; but also, if he knew that there had never been a meeting of the 5000 and that they had never governed (32, 3), he would have had to assume that the double constitution had been passed on the same day on which the power was entrusted to the 5000. The sum total of his assumptions would then involve him in the following inconsistencies: that the 5000, having been decreed the ruling power, preceded and produced the government of the 400, so that, although they themselves were never chosen, the drafters of the double constitution which provided for the 400 must have been elected by them; that those drafters were 100 in number must have come to him from the constitution itself (30, 3; 31, 3). Aristotle's inconsistencies can be explained only

¹⁷ Thucydides, 86, 3, 6; 89, 2; 92, 11; 93, 2; 97, 1; Busolt, p. 74, n. 1.

if the double constitution was an official and authentic document and presented in its superscription facts which could only inconsistently be combined with his preconceived conviction that the 5000 held the power. The superscription must have read:¹⁸

"Ἐδοξε τῇ βουλῇ εἰς τῷ δῆμῳ, . . . ἐπρυτάνεις, . . . ἐγραμμάτεις,
Ἀριστόμαχος ἐπεστάτει· τάδε οἱ ἀναγραφεῖς ἀνέγραψαν."

Such a superscription would have confirmed him in his belief that although the 5000 must have instituted the 400, they never existed. Although this is a possible explanation of Aristotle's inconsistencies, it does not show what actually happened.

If Thucydides' account is used, in accordance with the method followed above, not to contradict but to supplement Aristotle's account, it may be possible to arrive at the correct order of events. There is no reason in Aristotle's account for the eight-day interval between the dissolution of the *boule* and the entrance of the 400, and the very absence of reason or rationalization gives authority to the dates. The favored explanation¹⁹ dates the passage of the constitution to the same day as the decree giving power to the 5000 and assumes that the dissolution of the *boule* on that day (Thargelion 14) was only technical and that the oligarchs intended to leave the *boule* nominally in power till the end of the year (Skirophorior 14). The entrance of the 400 into the *bouleuterion* and the actual eviction of the *boule* on Thargelion 22 is then explained as the result of fear that the army in Samos would not approve of the oligarchy (Thucydides, 72, 2). According to this explanation, immediately the oligarchs began to feel that fear they evicted the *boule* and established themselves in the *bouleuterion* on Thargelion 22. According to Thucydides (72), immediately after their establishment they sent ambassadors to Samos to explain the oligarchy. But the first news from Samos that might have caused fear was that brought by Chaereas (74) about the purely Samian revolt

¹⁸ *βουλὴ* and *ἐπρυτάνεις* must have been there or otherwise Aristotle could not have assumed that the bill was passed before the dissolution of the *boule*; *δῆμῳ* must have been there or he could not have said *ὑπὸ τοῦ πλήθους*.

¹⁹ Lenschau, pp. 202 f.; Busolt, p. 77; C. A. H., p. 329; Wilcken, pp. 44 ff.; of the four, however, only Busolt and Wilcken date the acceptance of the double constitution on Thargelion 14.

against the Samian oligarchs with which the democratic elements in the army had only sympathized rather actively. The army's own democratic pronunciamento came only after Chaereas' return, since it was only after his return that they learned that the 400 were ruling (75). The ambassadors, who were despatched after the *katastasis* of the 400, arrived at Delos only after Chaereas' propaganda had taken effect. But when Chaereas was sent from Samos, and when he arrived at Athens, the 400 were already ruling (74, 1). Since Chaereas, arriving while they were ruling but before they had sent ambassadors, brought the first news which could have made them fear the democratic leanings of the army in Samos sufficiently to establish themselves and send ambassadors, the 400 must have been ruling before their establishment, and the eight-day interval must extend not from the technical dissolution of the *boule* to its actual eviction by the 400, but from the actual eviction of the *boule* to the technical establishment of the 400. Since Athens could not have remained without government during the eight days, the 400 must not only have evicted the *boule* on Thargelion 14 but also entered into power just as Thucydides describes (69). The only possible reason for the eight-day interval is that during that time the instrument of the 400's *katastasis* was being drafted. Thucydides' account seems to support this assumption, not only in 72 and 74 where the 400 are obviously ruling before their *katastasis* (which only just preceded their despatch of ambassadors to Samos), but also in their actions after their entrance into the *bouleuterion*. At first they acted suspiciously like the *boule*, but later they assumed unprecedented control (70, 1). Surely the reason for this change must be the same as for the eight-day interval of Aristotle's account.

The natural assumption then is that the double constitution of Aristotle's account is the instrument by which the *katastasis* of the 400 was accomplished. Even in itself it seems to guarantee that the 400 was ruling before its *katastasis*:

31, 2 τῶν δὲ στρατηγῶν τὸῦ οὐν εἶναι τὴν αἵρεσιν ἐξ ἀπάντων ποιεῖσθαι τῶν πεντακισχιλίων, τὸν δὲ βουλὴν ἐπειδὰν καταστῆ ποιησάσαν ἐξέτασιν. . . .

Whether it can have been passed on Thargelion 22 must be determined not on the basis of Aristotle's inconsistent deductions

but from what led to his deductions, that is, what appeared in the superscription of the constitutional decree quoted above.²⁰ Now it becomes clear why the 400 at their first entrance into the *bouleuterion* acted as if they were the *boule*; if the constitution defining their power was to be passed in the name of the *demos* (an undeniable basis for power), there had to be *prytaneis* to call the assembly and put the constitution to the vote.

Under the double constitution passed on Thargelion 22, Athens was governed for almost a year; the radical oligarchs certainly intended that the part of the constitution which was designated for the future should not be used, but division, the bane of oligarchy (Thucydides, 89), set in and with the fall of the 400 the definitive part of the constitution was put into practice.²¹ It is also clear that although the two constitutions are not one as Beloch attempted to prove, they are inextricably connected in so far as they base the 400's power on that of the 5000 while allowing the 400 to bring the 5000 into existence at its own discretion (*ibid.*, 67, 3). As a double constitution, ostensibly providing for the present strict demands of the Persians as well as the citizens' hopes for the future, it is a masterpiece of deception which by seeming to limit the action of the 400 by the power of the 5000 actually gives unlimited power to the 400. So peculiarly fitting is it to this time and situation that it could be the product of no other time nor indeed of the most vivid imagination working *in vacuo*.

The first part of the double constitution has been adequately treated by many scholars and is not further concerned in this reconstruction, but the second requires additional consideration. Since Meyer (pp. 425 ff.) and Kuberka (p. 355) maintained that it provided the outward form of the 400's power, the following arguments are only supplementary. The chief problem presented by the constitution is the method of selecting the 400:

Aristotle, 31, 1: τετταράκοντα ἐξ ἔκάστης φυλῆς, ἐκ προκρίτων οὖς ἀν
έλονται οἱ φυλέται τῶν ὑπὲρ τριάκοντα ἐτη γεγονότων.

²⁰ That the *prytaneis* are only an imitation of the *boule* and temporary is proved by the inscription of the 400, which reveals that they did not use them: *I. G.*, I², 258.

²¹ Ehrenberg, pp. 315 ff.; Caspari, pp. 15 ff.; Wilcken, pp. 47 ff.; Ferguson, pp. 72 ff.

The machinery is not complete, nor is it meant to be, since it must be the 5000 in their tribes who are to choose the *prokritoi* from whom an undesignated agent will choose the 400. Since it was intended that the 5000 should not come into existence, this method of selection was obviously not meant to be used (and so need not be practical), and was certainly not used for the original 400. That 400, according to Thucydides (67, 3), was chosen by a double co-optation instituted by five *proedroi*. But a member of the 400, Polystratus, was said by his son (ps. Lys., XX, 2, 13) to have been elected by his tribesmen. Thalheim (p. 324) and Busolt (pp. 74 ff.) showed that his election was not necessarily to the 400 but more likely to the *katalogeis*, of whom he was also one. That he was both one of the 400 and one of the 100 *katalogeis* need not mean that the 100 *katalogeis* were identical with the 100 of Thucydides, 67, 3, but that there is some connection is evidenced by certain of his son's remarks and his subsequent career. It seems likely that Polystratus was elected a *katalogeus* and was proceeding with the cataloging of the 5000 before the third assembly²² until Peisander's return and the fourth assembly put an end to the possibility of the 5000. Then the oligarchs, using the method of selection described in Thucydides, took Polystratus into the 400 as a matter of policy which may well have included all the *katalogeis* who were not staunch oligarchs, in order that their cataloging activities might be kept in check. But he was kept in the 400 as an active member in Athens only so long as he might be dangerous, that is, for eight days, and was then sent to Euboea. If this is a reasonable reconstruction of Polystratus' career in the oligarchic revolution, only one problem remains in the selection of the 400: the five *proedroi*. The scholars who identify the two 100's of Aristotle, 29, 5 and Thucydides, 67, 3 on account of Polystratus dispose of the five by saying that they have crept into the account from the first part of the constitution (30, 5) or later practice (Küberka, p. 350) or that they were unofficial (Wilamowitz, pp. 357 f.), but they are certainly the only group which is sufficiently small to insure an oligarchic

²² The cataloguing activity which is described by his son (ps. Lys., XX, 13) would be impossible in those reconstructions where the election of the *katalogeis* was followed in the same assembly by Peisander's proposal.

400. And since the smallness of their number must be the reason for their existence, they cannot have been elected by the assembly. It is most probable that Peisander actually named the five in his proposal or that the appointment was managed through the intimidated *syngrapheis autokratores*.

A second difficulty in the constitution arises from the following sentence (31, 2): *τοῖς δὲ νόμοις οἱ ἀν τεθῶσιν τῶν πολιτικῶν χρῆσθαι καὶ μὴ ἔξειναι μετακυνέν μηδὲ ἐπέρους θέσθαι.* Here again, as in the method of selection, the meaning is not intended to be clear since the "laws" must be those to be drawn up by the 5000,²³ and there was no intention that the 5000 should ever have an opportunity to make laws. This same illusion that the 5000 are "just around the corner" is fostered by the method for the present election of generals, but the real intention is present also. The 100 in §1, 3 are presumably the *katalogeis* and give further proof of the oligarchs' need to keep a check on Polystratous and his colleagues. A brief summary of the reconstruction will serve both to show the points at which the accounts of Thucydides and Aristotle interlock and supplement each other and to point up the reasons for their respective omissions:

1st assembly (early spring, on Peisander's first arrival [T]): Athenians are persuaded by Melobius (A) and Peisander (T) to accept oligarchy in order to obtain Persian aid (A, T). Two decrees are voted: one, proposed by Pythodorus, provides for election of twenty men to serve with ten *probouloī* as *syngrapheis* for the preservation of the state (A); the other provides for the despatch of Peisander and ten others to negotiate with Tissaphernes (T).

Oligarchic clubs become active with murder, intimidation, and conspiracy. They advertise a deceptively mild program which bars payment except for military service and puts the government in the hands of fewer than 5000 (T).

2nd assembly (middle spring, during Peisander's absence): 30 *syngrapheis* present proposals: that the *prytaneis* be obliged to put all proposals to the vote and that all legal bars against unconstitutional proposals be suspended; that for the duration no money should be expended except for the war, no officials except archons and *prytaneis* be paid, and government be entrusted to 5000 or more, and ten men be chosen from each tribe to catalog these (A).

²³ Wilamowitz, p. 115; Meyer, *G. d. A.*, IV, p. 590.

3rd assembly (beginning of Thargelion, after Peisander's return): Peisander and his colleagues suppress the failure of the Persian negotiations and, because that failure necessitates immediate oligarchic control, report that the Persians demand a stricter oligarchy than that of the 5000. They propose that ten *syngrapheis autokratores* be elected to report on a definite day how best the state should be governed (T).

4th assembly (Thargelion 14 at Colonus): Ten *syngrapheis autokratores* propose only complete *adsia*. Peisander proposes abolition of all offices, cessation of payment, and the selection of 400 who shall have complete power, even to call 5000 (T).

Thargelion 14: 400 invade *bouleuterion*, evict *boule*, and organize themselves as a *boule* in every respect (T).

Between Thargelion 14 and 22: Army at Samos, unaware of 400's rule, sends Chaereas to report Samian democratic coup. Chaereas, escaping 400, reports back to army the horrors of 400's rule; army swears to put down oligarchy (T). Meanwhile, at Athens, *anagrapheis* draft instrument of 400's establishment.

5th assembly (Thargelion 22): Double constitution is passed (A), and the establishment of the 400 is accomplished (A, T). 400 sends ambassadors to Samos who hear of army's rampant democracy when they reach Delos (T).

It can be seen from this summary that there are definite and consistent rules or principles governing the omissions in both accounts. From Aristotle's account not only everything which happened on a purely diplomatic or political level was omitted, but also any legislative action resulting from these moves, while the whole account is thrown out of focus by Aristotle's belief that the 5000, because they were first given power, must have created the 400. From Thucydides' account everything which was not finally effective or fundamentally important in the accomplishment of the revolution as such was omitted. That the omissions in both authors are purposeful can be seen from the extent to which the opposite principles govern what is present in each account. All of the details and steps of the revolution which Aristotle records have documentary basis or legislative significance, while all those included by Thucydides are those which were proved by the end result of the revolution to have been actual and effective actions.

MABEL LANG.

MARGINALIA BY SENECA ON THE VITA
PHILOSOPHICA.

I. THE PHYSICAL RELAXATIONS OF THE PHILOSOPHER
(*Epistulae Morales*, 15, 7-9).

The fifteenth of the *Epistulae Morales* is largely concerned with the physical relaxations of the student of philosophy, and deserves for its common sense on the subject to be widely publicized in contemporary college circles. The remarks (§ 3) on the effects of training for heavy sports like football are as sound today as when they were penned and just as annihilating to commonly entertained views, while the suggestions on the choice of a type of exercise for the student and on the spirit in which all exercise should be approached will seem wholly admirable except to those who make athletics an end in itself. It is unfortunate for the ready appreciation of the argument as a whole that when we reach the subject of voice-culture as a form of relaxing exercise, we encounter difficulties of two sorts, the one set arising from extreme condensation and marked mannerism on Seneca's part, the other from a text that in § 8 is manifestly corrupt and has long been a subject of debate. On the other hand it may well be that the very fact that the argument must be regarded as continuous in its nature will assist us to certain conclusions about the thought-drift and to some consequent manuscript emendations in the contentious passage.

Seneca has, as we have noted, been speaking of the forms of physical exercise appropriate for the student, and, as § 7 opens, he includes among those which have his approval *vocis intentionem*. This is obviously some magnification or amplification of the natural tone, just as in Cicero, *De Orat.*, III, 59, 222 *intentio oculorum* is a heavy concentration of eye-power, a long steady look running to a stare. But this voice-amplification must not become involved in the web of professional hocus pocus, any more than must any other form of light exercise: *intentionem vocis quam VETO te per gradus et certos modos extollere, deinde deprimere*. This must refer surely to running the voice up the different keys (*modos*) through the successive notes (*gradus*) of an octave or more of these keys, and, after reaching the top

note in each, dropping suddenly to the opening tone of the next key; anyone who has lived near a student of vocal music will understand the nature of the performance without further elucidation. That is professionalism; "why, you'll be preparing next (*deinde*) to take lessons in 'ambulation'!" Let us have no misunderstanding about what voice-amplification means to a serious student of philosophy; it is an exercise, not a form of artistic display or something leading in that direction.¹

An objection of the interlocutor (or Lucilius) follows from *quid ergo?* to *implorat*. <"You have recorded your absolute veto on scale-running in the voice-amplification exercise of the student of philosophy>; do you then want my voice to start its intensification directly from a shout and from top pitch?² <After all, I would arrive there more satisfactorily by starting at the bottom of a scale and running up to some desired note which I could then hold.> Quarrels begin conversationally, you know, pass gradually to shouting, and it is only in the end that they come to shrieks of 'Help! Help!'>" Seneca admits the validity of this objection with the concessive *ergo* "well then," and it is from that point that the interpretation of the close-packed meaning must begin.

In what follows, *viciis* is the consensus of the best MSS including Q, and this Hense retained in his second edition, although suspecting it as an addition, but Pincianus' "codd. emendatores" showed *viciis* (i.e. *vitiis*), and Hense (Supplementum Quirinianum, p. II) now reads *fac vitiis convicium* on the basis of *E. M.*, 108, 9 and *Dial.*, VII, 18, 1. I cannot myself appreciate the cogency of these supposedly determinative parallel passages. *Convicium* means any kind of disturbing noise (cf. *E. M.*, 56, 15), and musical lessons or vocal relaxations are, one fears, a troublesome commonplace of metropolitan life in

¹ *N. Q.*, VII, 31, 2: *tenero et molli ingressu suspendimus gradum;* NON AMBULAMUS SED INCEDIMUS. On *incedo* as an epic word, and hence bitterly sarcastic here, cf. *Aeneid*, I, 46. The word is practically untranslatable into English in the Virgilian line.

² Cf. Cicero, *De Orat.*, III, 30, 225-7 where the story is told in some detail of Gaius Gracchus being used to have a fistulator conveniently posted to give him the correct key and note for definite points in his speeches: *qui inflaret celeriter eum somum quo illum AUT REDMISSUM EXCITAEET AUT A CONTENTIONE REVOCARET*. The whole passage is a most instructive parallel. Cicero's own feeling is no doubt expressed in the last words of § 227: *sed fistulatorem domi relinquetis*.

every age, even if traceable to a student of philosophy. It is the fact that the student in this passage is merely exercising his body through his voice that makes me question the appropriateness of *fac vitiis convicium*. Surely Seneca is suggesting quasi-cynically that no one can obtain exercise by an *intentio vocis* without making himself considerable of a nuisance to other people.

Further difficulty arises at the end of the next sentence as between *et latus* (b and vulg.) and *in id latus* (QL and p ex corr.). The former, because of the arbitrary and unexplained *et*, seems to me like an attempted correction by some one who found the MS text difficult, and happened to know that *latus* could mean "lung-power" ³ and sometimes formed a recognized combination with *vox*; *-abitur et latus* is however a non-rhythmic clausula. On the other hand *-abitur in id latus* is rhythmic (cretic with one resolution plus a second cretic). The clause may mean "in proportion as your voice urges you to that flank," viz. the *lentius* as against the *vehementius*; Beltrami² *ad loc.* suggests that some technical gladiatorial expression is involved. I do not care for Buecheler's view that *latus* = *crexθeis*, though it is rhythmically and syntactically possible; if adopted, it in no wise detracts from the remainder of the present argument on the passage.⁴

Translate thus: "Very well then, in what manner soever your outburst of spirits persuades you, turn loose your din on the neighbors, sometimes faster, sometimes more slowly, in proportion as your voice urges you too <like other people> to that side <rather than to the other>." I understand that by the first word of this, viz. *ergo* (note how differently used from the other *ergo* five lines back which introduces the objection), Seneca concedes the point of working up along some scale to a good sonorous note rather than leaping at it suddenly with a shout (*a clamore*). In

³ Quintilian, except when quoting Cicero or commenting on him, uses the singular. Hence *latus*, not *latera*, appears to be the technical Silver Latin word in the sense of "lung-power" (see J. E. Sandys, *ad Cicero, Orator*, 25, 85).

⁴ As for the placing of *te*, it would certainly go better after *quoque* (so b and vulg.); *vox quoque* introduces a new consideration over and above *impetus animi* of the *utcumque* clause. But the order *te quoque hortabitur in id latus* produces a triple cretic finish, and Seneca may have found that appealing. We cannot always speak with finality of what determines order.

what follows, treating the subject very concisely, he introduces the new idea of high speed (*vehementius*) in repeating that note once it is attained, or, alternatively, of a reduced speed (*lentius*) if your voice has given you an urge in that direction, as indeed it well may through sheer strain, and of course the student of philosophy has no need to strain himself over any mere exercise. I think therefore that at this point we must imagine our philosopher having worked himself up the scale of his choice to a fairly high and intensified note of which he may now vary from time to time the tempo; what is to happen when he decides the moment has come to terminate each phase of the exercise? This carries us into the next sentence and another nest of troubles.

Of these the first is the smallest. *Receperis* should certainly be read for *recipies* if *revocaris* is to stand, and I had long since noticed that Fickert credits *p* with *recepereis*. Yet the logical case is good for viewing the time of the *cum* clause action as coincidental with that of the jussives *descendat* and *decidat*, and I shall join Summers in reading, with certain of the inferior MSS, *recipies . . . revocabisque*.⁶

Modesta means, in the light of the whole passage, "under control," and *descendat, non decidat* (Summers compares *E. M.*, 83, 4: *iam aetas nostra non descendit sed cadit*) implies: "let the voice be lowered, not suddenly dropped." The sudden dropping, with its strain, would undo the benefit of the exercise; Seneca has suggested this already at the beginning of § 7. The *mediatoris vi* following I regard as arising from *medium i oris vim*, where the *i* has been mistaken for *t* and the strokes were omitted indicating the accusatives *medium* and *vim*. This *medium in oris vim* constitutes the limiting phrase for *habeat*, i. e. actually *abeat*; "let the voice pass off into the average strength of the mouth." Unquestionably, as Summers, *loc. cit.*, urges, the *oris* "seems very otiose, seeing that *vox* is the subject to (*h*)*beat*," and I venture to suggest that the correct restora-

⁶ W. C. Summers, *Select Letters of Seneca* (London, 1913), p. 17, app. crit. This little work of Summers, designed to form a textbook in a well-known college series, far transcends the necessities of the case and constitutes a very able, scholarly, and penetrating commentary on those parts of the *E. M.* which it contains. It is a liberal education in itself to read the notes by which the text is explained, and in his critical notes, abbreviated as they are, he repeatedly lays his finger on the exact source of the difficulty even if he cannot suggest the cure.

tion of the whole phrase is: *mediam in <orat> oris vim*, i. e. “into the average force of a pleader,” the natural point of return for an orator after a marked *contentio vocis*.⁶

Et hoc is read by all the MSS and should definitely be retained. My note of fifteen years ago still stands: “If it (*et hoc*) is kept, the sentence translates: ‘when you check the voice and call it back, let it come down gently, not crash. Let it trail off by the mid-passage of the mouth’ (I then read: *media [sc. via] oris sui abeat*), ‘and work off its force in this unscientific and undignified manner.’ A person who follows Seneca’s advice will necessarily be indocte to the professors, rusticus to their fashionable pupils. The irony is perfect if we retain *et hoc*. Seneca is adopting the epithets of the enemy, and with mock solemnity he allows them to stand as a description of his own simple voice methods.”⁷

In the last sentence of § 8 Löfstedt’s square-bracketing of the *ut* following *sed*, with a resultant double cretic clausula, appropriate in bringing to an end the whole discussion and in clearly marking that close, is at least attractive.⁸ In § 9 Summers’ *est* is to be adopted for the *et* of the MS *consensu*, following *mercedula*; a double cretic is thus gained.⁹ It is odd that Summers failed to see that this simple alteration of his really cleared up the whole passage, but went on to fumble with *unum Graecum*. We must remember that at the close of each of the first twenty-nine letters the play-acting is maintained of Seneca’s being a rather niggardly awardee of small trifles to Lucilius and of Lucilius being a rather grasping recipient of all that he can get. In the light of that we now translate: “I have lifted from your shoulders no small weight of trouble”; (ironically) “that is one trifling bit of profit for you. A single—no more!—Greek item shall be added to these favors; mark you, it is a noble maxim.”

⁶ Cf. again Cicero, *De Orat.*, III, 61, 227, which Seneca may have had in mind. There are striking similarities; there it is laid down, for instance, that *a principio clamare agreste quiddam est* precisely as Seneca’s interlocutor is in effect urging.

⁷ *Notes and Emendations to the Epistulae Morales of Lucius Annaeus Seneca* (Edmonton, Un. v. of Alberta Press, 1932), p. 6.

⁸ Einar Löfstedt, “Zu Senecas Briefen,” *Eranos*, XIV (1915), p. 147.

⁹ *Loc. cit.*, app. crit., p. 18.

II. THE APPROVED STYLE OF DISCOURSE FOR THE PHILOSOPHER
 (E. M., 40, 9-10).

This is a very trying passage. I offered one solution for it in the pages of this Journal fifteen years ago,¹⁰ but only a portion of that attempt would now pass the test of my own maturer judgment and my more intimate acquaintance with Seneca's style.

As a preface to another effort on my part a summary of what has preceded §§ 9-10 may be first offered. Lucilius has furnished Seneca an account of a visit paid by him to the lectures of a certain Serapion, a philosopher; on the basis of the report that Serapion's verbosity and rapidity of utterance interfered with clarity in the presentation of his subject, Seneca enters on a discussion of the best style to be employed in genuine philosophical discourses. He puts himself on record as favoring a simple, straightforward, and definitely controlled manner; "such speed in speaking as you tell of is not subject to its own internal constraints, nor is it sufficiently becoming for philosophy, which ought to set its words down in place, not throw them around, and should pick its way forward cautiously" (§ 7 *fin.*). Even pleaders in the courts should remember the same advice and not let their exhibitionist desires or their overwrought emotional displays run away with them. "Don't listen to people who are concerned about how much they say rather than about how they say it," is another warning (§ 9 *init.*).

(Since we have taken time enough to reproduce in précis Seneca's views, it may perhaps be permissible to undertake a short explanatory note on the report made by Lucilius in § 2 *init.* [Serapion] *solet magno cursu verba convellere, quae non effundit una, sed premit et urguet.* *Una* is the reading of a number of the MSS *inferiores* for *ima* of the consensus [Q p L P b]; Summers reads, unnecessarily, *unda*.¹¹ The subject for *effundit* is *cursus*, carried forward in mind from the *magno cursu* of the preceding sentence; "Serapion makes a practice of uprooting words with a tremendous rush, which it does not carry down stream with it," but instead "it grinds and pounds them"

¹⁰ A. J. P., LIII (1932), pp. 262-4.

¹¹ *Select Letters of Seneca* (London, 1913), p. 35, app. crit.

in some eddy or backwater. Thus *una*, as referring to *cursus*, means *una secum*.)

The above summary has carried us to the words *et ipse* (§ 9) where the trouble begins. The word preceding the proper name is almost certainly *vul* and the undoubted balance of MS authority is for the name itself standing in the accusative; the meaning is: "you will, as far as you are concerned, prefer even a Publius Vinicius to do the speaking"; this agrees admirably with the *non audieris istos* of the *inferiores* in the *si* clause following *facies*, the reading ably championed by Hense.¹² The student of philosophy is represented as sitting in judgment on the orators in order to select a style for himself; he will be justified in refusing to listen to the windbags, and will actually prefer to have a P. Vinicius do the talking.

The *qui itaque* which follows cannot possibly be understood in the sense "how sc?" as attempted by Hense² and Beltrami³. *Qui* with the value "how" is non-Senecan,¹³ and in any event *qui itaque?* for *quam ob rem ita?* seems to me intolerable Latin. Summers also, by a reference to *E. M.*, 29, 6, shows that the transition in Seneca from a proper name to an illustrative anecdote relating to it is effected through the formula *ce + ablative of appropriate pronoun (or noun with appropriate pronominal reference attached)* followed by the conjunction *cum* with its verb in the subjunctive. This appears to me to make it clear that the MS reading here breaks off thus: *P. Viniciu-n dicere, qui . . . , to be resumed after the gap by itaque cum quicereretur quo modo P. Vinicius diceret.* The illustration in this case does not follow precisely the formula set out above, for the reason, I believe, that the lost *qui* clause was fairly long, thus justifying the repetition of the name, a repetition which certainly needs justification. Further, *itaque* in itself closely resembles a pronominal transition.

As for Asellius' reply, there is a style described by Cicero, *De Orat.*, II, 15, 64 in these words: *genus orationis fusum atque TRACTUM et cum levitate quadam aequabiliter profluens*; this would appear to be everything that the style of Vicinius was not.¹⁴ The adverb would be *tracte*, "smoothly, fluently," so close

¹² *Rh. Mus.*, LXXIV, p. 118.

¹³ Summers in *C. Q.*, II (1908), p. 28.

¹⁴ Cf. also *Orator*, 20, 66: *TRACTA quaedam et fluens orat-o.*

to *tractim* in form and origin, so remote from it in meaning, thus forming the very essence of a sophisticated thrust. Asellius' answer might best be rendered: "by slow degrees." It would not seem necessary to seek to find more than that in the word Asellius chose. That this is sound seems clear from the confirmatory *nam* sentence following, where the idea of Vinicius getting a sentence out "by slow degrees" is exaggerated by Geminus Varius into a characterization of the man as one unable to put three words together. Cf. *singula verba vellenti* following.

The factual statement of the first part of § 9 ("you will prefer, etc.") turns up again at the end of the section as a question: "why should you not prefer to speak as Vinicius did?" and with this question I couple closely the *nam . . . volo* sentence of § 10 *med.* The sense is: "Why would you not prefer to speak like Vinicius? For the speed of Q. Haterius is, I insist, completely divorced from a man in his senses." The passage from *aliquis* to *dicas* is, as it stands, an objection propounded either by Luzilius or, more likely, by Seneca for Lucilius, against following the style of Vinicius, and is quite comprehensible in that category. One might wish that Seneca had written *quamvis* between *Vinicius* and *aliquis*, definitely assuming all the sentence for himself, and one could understand how the homoeoteleuton in minuscules of -ius in *Vinicius* and -uis in *quamvis* could cause the loss of the latter, but it is not necessary to urge this.

As for *numquam dicas* I fail to see that Madvig's *num iam* or Buecheler's *numquid* or the *numquid iam* of Beltrami², or the *nunquidnam* of Löfstedt (with Marouzeau's blessing upon it) paralleled by Clem., I, 16, 4, presents us with anything that could even wistfully aspire to be regarded as a witticism, a justification, that is, for telling the story at all. The fact is that Summers is expressing a most natural doubt when he says: "I do not see that the emendations *num iam* or *numquid*" (add here: "or *nunquid iam* or *numquidnam*") "help us much. The words 'I say, are you speaking?' are a mere repetition of the clause *tamquam dictaret, non dicaret*, which becomes entirely otiose: what we want is a saying which would be obscure without that clause to explain it."¹⁵

¹⁵ Summers' excellent and solidly founded work appears to be little known by the European cognoscenti. This is a familiar experience with those of us who labor *in partibus infidelium*.

Since the words which apparently belong to the interrupter must be closely related to the *tamquam* clause, one might reasonably expect to find, if not its two verbs *dictaret* and *diceret* adequately represented in the interrupting sentence, yet certainly the one of them which is more important for the occasion, viz. *dictaret*. This has led me to suspect that in *dicas* is concealed *dic<tas>as*. With regard to *numquam* I lean to the idea that it is a crasis for *num umquam*. Thus the whole interruption would be a truly Plautine thrust: *dic, num umquam dictas?* This, with the significance "Say, you don't ever dictate, do you?" is fairly ironical at the expense of a speaker whose style always suggested that he was never capable of doing anything else but dictate.

A translation may now be assembled for the concluding sentence of § 9 and the whole of § 10. Why would you not prefer to speak as Vinicius did? "Somebody¹⁶ will turn up as silly as the fellow who, when Vinicius was painfully rooting up a word at a time, as though he were giving dictation and not making a speech, shouted: 'Say, you don't ever dictate do you?'" <Yet you would so prefer>, for the speed of Q. Haterius is, I insist, completely divorced from sanity. He never hesitated, never paused; he made a single continuous job of it from start to finish.

Thus obviously the style of even a slow and rather aggravating searcher for the *mot juste* is stylistically preferable for the expression of philosophic thought; certainly that of the oratorical windbag, who never trips or stumbles, is ruled out.

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¹⁶ Summers, *ibid.*, is right in preferring *alius* here, but *aliquis* can be tolerated.

NOTE ON A *PROGYMNASMA* OF LIBANIUS.

The *Progymnasmata* of Libanius include a brief imaginary speech demanding the penalty of death for a physician who is alleged to have poisoned certain of his patients.¹ In keeping with the ordinary practice in composing rhetorical exercises of this sort, the defendant and his supposed victims are anonymous and the whole situation is more or less abstract and generalized, but some indication can be given of the probable source or sources.

Needless to say, numerous allusions to poisoning can be found in the classical literatures,² and a few to physicians as purveyors of drugs or poison,³ but the field grows narrow when one looks for the idea of a physician administering poison with his own hand.⁴ Again, we find that the writers of Latin declamations had occasionally treated the general theme of poisoning well before Libanius' day,⁵ but, as far as one can judge from the extant literature, he was the first to deal in Greek with this special subdivision of it,⁶ and, like many of the contemporary

¹ Libanius, *Kara tarpoū φαρμακέως* (VIII, pp. 182-94, ed. R. Foerster [Leipzig, Teubner, 1915]).

² Many of these, though by no means all, have been collected by L. Lewin, *Die Gifte in der Weltgeschichte* (Berlin, 1920), and David B. Kaufman, "Poisons and Poisoning among the Romans," *Class. Phil.*, XXVII (1932), pp. 156-67.

³ Cf. Hippocrates, *Iusitrandum* (see the discussion below); Plautus, *Merc.*, 472; Seneca, *De Ben.*, III, 24; Tacitus, *Ann.*, XV, 64; Spartianus, *Vita Hadriani*, 24 (cf. Dio Cassius, LXIX, 22); Apuleius, *Met.*, X, 11. In general, the professions of pharmacy and medicine were not sharply distinguished; cf. the introduction to the so-called *Plinii Medicina* (ed. V. Rose [Leipzig, Teubner, 1875]), a compilation probably of the fourth century: *Frequenter mihi in peregrinationibus accidit ut aut propter meam aut propter meorum infirmitatem varias fraudes medicorum expericeret, quibusdam vilissima remedia ingentibus pretiis vendentibus*, . . . The *pharmacopola circumforaneus* mentioned in Cicero, *Pro Cœlent.*, 40, must have been exceptional.

⁴ Cf. Cicero, *Pro Cœlent.*, 40; Suetonius, *Div. Aug.*, 11 (cf. Cicero, *Ad Brut.*, I, 6, 2); Apuleius, *Met.*, X, 25.

⁵ Cf. Seneca pater, *Controversiae*, III, 7; VI, 4 and 6 (cf. Calpurnius Flaccus, 39); VII, 3 (cf. Ps.-Quintilian, *Declamationes Maiores*, 17, *Decl. Min.*, 377); IX, 6 (cf. Ps.-Quintilian, 381; Calpurnius Flaccus, 12), and for a somewhat later period, Juvenal, *Sat.*, VII, 169.

⁶ In Ps.-Quintilian, *Decl. Min.*, 321, we have a case of a physician

sophists, he had never attempted to learn the other language. In the "progymnasmatic" field we must concede him a certain degree of originality, for he and his student Aphthonius were the founders of a tradition that extended down as far as the thirteenth century.⁵ No doubt the idea of a doctor as poisoner is anything but profound, since it might well have occurred independently to many rhetoricians that they could heighten the dramatic interest of an imaginary accusation by choosing as the supposed defendant a member of that class or profession which enjoyed the best opportunity of committing the crime in question, perhaps with the attendant improbability that such a person would ever yield to the temptation. The same principle was followed in devising other subjects as well: John of Sardis cites the titles *κατὰ φονέος* ἢ *κατὰ πόρνου* ἢ *κατὰ ἱεροσύλου* as examples of "simple" themes and *κατὰ φιλοσόφου πόρνου*, *κατὰ ἱατροῦ φονέως*, *κατὰ ἱερέως ἱεροσύλου* as instances of "double" themes.⁶ A doctor who murders or, more specifically, poisons his patient, presents the same paradox as an adulterous philosopher or a priest who plunders a temple.

It might appear, then, that with this enough has been said about Libanius' probable source, but a little more can be gleaned by examining a section (9) in which he refers to the oath taken by physicians when entering upon the practice of their pro-

accused of poisoning, but it is quite different from Libanius' composition, and in particular it is not colored by principles of medical ethics (see below).

⁵ See O. Schissel, "Rhetorische Progymnasmistik der Byzantiner," *Byzantinisch-neugriechische Jahrbücher*, XI (1934), pp. 1-10.

⁶ Cf. Joannes Sardianus, *Commentarius in Aphthonii Progymnasmata*, 7 (p. 93, lines 1-6, ed. H. Rabe [Leipzig, Teubner, 1928]). Stith Thompson, in his valued *Motif-Index of Folk-Literature* (*Indiana University Studies*, XXII, Nos. 108-10 [Bloomington, 1935]), p. 130, gives the following short summary of an Arabian tale: "Doctor who can cure can also poison. This reflection brings the doctor under the king's suspicion"; but the *progymnasma* has none of the romantic or imaginative trappings characteristic of folk-tales. The two stories in Apuleius (cited in notes 3 and 4 above) may conceivably owe something to folk-literature (at least they are additions to the "Oros-story": see S. Hammer, *Eos*, XXVI [1923], pp. 6-26; B. E. Perry, *T. A. P. A.*, LIV [1923], p. 220), but these versions seem to have nothing in common with that of Libanius beyond the basic idea, and that, as we have seen, is simple enough.

fession: *τοὺς μὲν οὖν ἄλλους ἐπαινοῦμεν τῷ τε ἀρχηγέτῃ, θεῷ καλῶς ἐπομένους καὶ τοῖς ὄρκοις οἷς ὁμοσαν ἀπτόμενοι τῆς τέχνης ἐμμένοντας, κτλ.* One thinks first of the famous Hippocratic oath, which includes the statement: *οὐ δύσω δὲ οἰδεὶ φάρμακον οὐδεὶν αἰτηθεὶς θανάσιμον, οὐδὲ ὑφηγήσομαι συμβουλίην τοιῷδε.* If this sentence could be properly interpreted as meaning that the physician is asked by some third party to administer poison to his patient and so commit a criminal assault, one would suppose that it might have provided the immediate inspiration for Libanius' exercise, since he would have needed only to imagine an infringement of the provision and then exploit the case rhetorically; one passage might then appear to develop the idea of *αἰτηθεὶς*, because it presents the situation in which an enemy of one of the patients bribes the physician to poison him (11). But the most recent commentator on the *Oath* has pointed out that it is awkward to assume, contrary to the tenor of the text as a whole, that any third party figures at all: rather, we are to think of the physician as refusing to dispense poisons to one whose sufferings have become so painful that he wishes to commit suicide.⁹ According to this very reasonable view, Libanius' allusion cannot be regarded as bearing directly upon the Hippocratic oath, for though it might be urged that he, like certain modern scholars, misinterpreted the *Oath*, such an assumption would probably seem too devious to compel a ready assent. A metrical cath of unknown date appears to fit the case a little more satisfactorily:

. . . οὕτε τις ἀν δώροις με παραβιασίν ἀλεγεινήν
ἐκτελέειν πείσειε καὶ ἀνέρι φάρμακα δοῦναι
λυγρά, τάπερ κακότητα θυμοφθόρον οἴδεν δπάζειν.¹⁰

Here the idea of bribery, at least, emerges clearly enough, and seemingly a third person (*τις*) is involved beside the doctor and his patient, unless we are to suppose that *ἀνέρι* has merely pronominal force or otherwise refers to the same person as *τις*. But since there may have been many physicians' oaths, the only definite conclusion would be that Libanius was well versed in

⁹ See Ludwig Edelstein, *The Hippocratic Oath (Supplements to the Bulletin of the History of Medicine, No. I [Baltimore, 1943])*, pp. 7-10, where further and perhaps even weightier arguments are given in support of this interpretation.

¹⁰ Printed in *Hippocratis Opera (Corpus Medicorum Graecorum, I, 1)*, p. 5, lines 15-17.

those traditions of ancient medical ethics of which the Hippocratic oath is the most conspicuous document.¹¹

Finally, since it is clear that various trends or events of his own age are sometimes mirrored in his declamations,¹² there remains the possibility that the suggestion apparently derived from medical readings or discussions was reinforced by some actual occurrence with which Libanius was acquainted. A case in point is to be found in the speech (*O.*, XXXVII) addressed to Polycles, a former *consularis Syriae*¹³ who had once been in the habit of visiting Libanius every afternoon (*ibid.*, 1), frequently discussing with him the regime of the rhetor's idol, the late emperor Julian. While ostensibly praising the emperor, Polycles had really censured him (*ibid.*, 2), going so far at last as to allege that he had used the jewelry left him by Basilina, his mother, for the purpose of bribing a certain physician to poison his wife Helena.¹⁴ In the course of his indignant refutation, Libanius dramatizes the situation in terms that remind

¹¹ Sec. 7 of the *prygymnasma* is interesting for its reference to the doctor's apprenticeship, and one of Medicine's exhortations to the doctor (. . . εἰσελθὼν δῆλη τῇ διανοῇ τὸν δοτέροντα σκόπει, κτλ.) is quite in the spirit of medical ethics; cf. Hippocrates, *Iustitiae iudicium*: ἐς οὐκας δὲ δόκιμας ἀν ἔστω, ἐσελεύσομαι ἐπὶ ὄφελετη καμνόντων, κτλ. Cf. Ps.-Soranus, *Quæstiones Medicinales* (p. 245, lines 15-17, ed. V. Rose, *Anecdota Graeca et Graecolatina*, II [Berlin, 1870]): *domes autem quas ingrediatur (sc. medicus) ita ingredia ut ante oculos habeat curam tantummodo laborantis. Memor etiam sit iuramenti Hippocratis ut ab omni culpa se abstineat . . .* That Libanius had some acquaintance with the Hippocratic corpus hardly calls for proof, but it may be worthwhile to observe that his letters refer to certain friends as readers of Hippocrates (cf. *Ep.*, 316, 2; 409, 4, in Olympius, a physician: for his biography, see O. Seeck, *Die Briefe des Libanius zeitlich geordnet* [Leipzig, 1906], pp. 222-23). His strong personal interest in medical matters is evidenced by many passages of his autobiography (*Or.*, I), and he had almost certainly read the *Τερψινός* of Aelius Aristides, a sort of medical diary (see *Class. Phil.*, XLII [1947], p. 20).

¹² For example, Campbell Bonner has discussed passages in *Decl.*, XLII relating to magic and pointed out that this art had a certain influence upon the course of Libanius' own life (*T. A. P. A.*, LXIII [1932], pp. 34-44, especially 40-42). The present writer has set forth his reasons for believing that *Decl.*, XXVI, 36 also reflects the sophist's personal experience (see *A. J. E.*, LVI [1935], p. 350, note 6).

¹³ Cf. *Or.*, XXXVII, 12; Seeck, *op. cit.*, pp. 67, 388.

¹⁴ *Or.*, XXXVII, 3: τούτοις προσέθηκας τῆς μητρὸς τῆς ἐκείνου τὸν κόσμον, δν λατρῷ τινι δοθῆναι μιθὸν τοῦ θανάτου τῆς οὖσης: σύντῷ γυναικός.

one (*ibid.*, 6) of the *progymnasma* itself: *καὶ τοιαύτας ἀν ἀφῆκε πρὸς τὸν ιατρὸν φωνάς; κέρτσον φάρμακον, ἔμβαλε δὸς ἢ ὅτῳ γε βούλει τρόπῳ δεῖξόν μοι τῆς γυναικὸς τὸν νεκρόν, ὑπόμεινον ἔργον ἐναντίον τῇ τέχνῃ, μισθὸς δέ σοι τὰ κοσμοῦντά μοι ποτε τὴν μητέρα.* Especially noteworthy is the penultimate clause, in which Julian is ironically imagined as urging the doctor to violate the ethics of his profession.¹⁵

For a while, Polycles had claimed that his charge rested upon a sworn statement made by one Elpidius, who had been *praefectus praetorio Orientis* in 360/61, at the time of Helena's death, but in the end he had been forced to admit that it was no more than a rumor which he had heard from the lips of one of Elpidius' *assessores* (*ibid.*, 3). All of the arguments given by Libanius in rebuttal (*ibid.*, 9-11) seem fairly cogent, and the charge was probably nothing but one of the whispered scandals so rife at the court.¹⁶ One of the points which he makes—that there were many court physicians, some one of whom would have

¹⁵ If Libanius had this episode in mind while writing the *progymnasma*, the abstract treatment of the subject may well have been dictated by considerations of prudence or good taste as well as rhetorical practice, but in any case the resemblances are not sufficiently clearcut to permit of its being dated with certainty after the death of Julian or of Elpidius. As Foerster indicates in his introduction to *Or.*, XXXVII, Elpidius' death provides the later *terminus* for that speech; but the allusion to the death of one Elpidius in Philostorgius (*H.E.*, VII, 10) is referred by Seeck to another individual so named (*op. cit.*, s. v. "Helpidius II," p. 170).

¹⁶ This is probably true as well of Ammianus' statement (XVI, 10, 18) that the empress Eusebia, the consort of Constantius, tricked Helena into taking a rare drug which would always cause miscarriage thereafter; it is implied that her death in Rome some three years later was due to the lasting effects of this potion. Ammianus adds that even earlier, when in Gaul, Helena had lost a child because the midwife had been bribed to kill it: . . . *praesecte plus quam convenerat umbilico.* On this matter, cf. Soranus, *Gynaecia*, II, 7 (p. 58, ed. I. Ilberg, *Corpus Medicorum Graecorum* [Leipzig u. Berlin, Teubner, 1927]): *δεῖ δὲ τέσσαρας δακτύλους διαστήσασαν ἀπὸ τῆς γαστρὸς ἀποκόπτειν τὴν δύμφαλδα διά τινος ἐπάκμου χάριν τοῦ μηδεμίαν γενέσθαι περιθλασίν.* Soranus then explains that midwives had a superstitious objection to using for this purpose an iron knife, the only proper instrument, so that accidents sometimes resulted from their preference for certain cruder instruments, which he enumerates. This text suggests that we might well reject the motive assigned by Ammianus in favor of some commonplace explanation, assuming that he has reported the correct technical detail.

betrayed the plot if there had been any truth in it (*ibid.*, 9)—raises the question as to whether Oribasius was one of those in attendance upon Helena at the time either of her death or of the miscarriage which she had suffered before (see note 16); all that is known with certainty, however, is that on the earlier occasion he had been a member of Julian's retinue in Gaul.¹⁷

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PINDAR, *ISTHMIAN*, 8, 24-28.

The earliest reference in Greek literature to the four cardinal virtues is usually credited to Aeschylus, who in the *Seven against Thebes* (produced in 467 B.C.) describes Amphiaraüs as a σώφρων δίκαιος ἀγαθὸς εὐσεβῆς ἀνήρ.¹ There is some evidence, however, to suggest that even before this first explicit allusion the Greeks were familiar with a canon of four (or five) virtues.²

¹⁷ In dedicating his *Collectiones Medicæ* to Julian he recalled that his *Epitomæ* had been written when he was with the emperor in Gaul (cf. p. 4, ed. I. Raeder, *Corpus Medicorum Graecorum* [Leipzig u. Berlin, Teubner, 1928]). Probably his duties at that time were solely or chiefly of a literary character.

¹ v. 610. For the authenticity of this line see Wilamowitz, *Der Glaube der Hellenen* (Berlin, 1931), I, p. 15, note 1, and Erwin Wolff, *Platos Apologie* (Berlin, 1929), pp. 77 ff. The words ὁ μάντις . . . μέγας προφήτης (vv. 609-611) are sometimes interpreted as a reference to *sophia*, but the addition of this quality is not essential to complete the canon. In the early dialogues of Plato piety or holiness (*εὐσέβεια* or *δαιότης*) often appears instead of wisdom (*σοφία* or *φρόνησις*). See, for example, *Laches* 109 D, *Gorgia* 507 B, *Protogoras* 324 E, *Meno* 78 D, and cf. Xenophon, *Memorabilia*, I, 1, 16. It seems that at first there were five virtues which were admitted to be of primary importance (cf. *Protogoras* 349 B); only in the *Republic* did Plato definitely establish the canon of four which was to become traditional. Euripides, Frag. 234, in listing the civic virtues, mentions wisdom, courage, moderation, and justice, omitting piety but adding as a fifth virtue the ability to defend the city from foreign and civil wars, by means of speech, i.e., *εὐγλωσσία*. Cf. Anon. Iambl., 95, 13-15. On the substitution of *εὐσέβεια* for *φρόνησις* under certain circumstances consult F. M. Cornford, *C. Q.*, VI (1912), p. 254, note 3.

² There are several theories about the origin of the canon. At one time

A passage in Pindar's third Nemean Ode (vv. 72-75) of uncertain date³ has often been interpreted as a reference to the canon. Many scholars have contended that when Pindar says that life brings with it four virtues he has in mind wisdom, justice, courage, and moderation. This interpretation is now generally rejected.⁴ But no one, so far as I am aware, has yet suggested that the following passage (vv. 24-28) from Pindar's eighth Isthmian Ode (*ca. 478 B. C.*) be read with the canon of cardinal virtues in mind:

... δῖον ἔνθα τέκες
 Αἰακὸν βαρυσφαράγῳ πατρὶ κεδύστατον ἐπιχθονίων. ὁ καὶ
 δαιμόνεσσι δίκας ἐπέρασε· τοῦ μὲν ἀντίθεοι
 ἀρίστευον νιέες νιέων τὸ ἀρητήφιλοι παιδες ἀνορέᾳ
 χάλκεον στονόειτ' ἀμφέπειν ὅμαδον·
 σώφρονές τ' ἐγένοντο πινυτοί τε θυμέν.

Since this Ode honors Cleander of Aegina, who triumphed in the boys' pancratium in 478 B. C., it is appropriate for Pindar to introduce the myth of the Aeacidae, the descendants of Aeacus, who settled the island of Aegina. These heroes are among Pin-

it was the custom to seek a Pythagorean source; see W. D. Geddes, *The Phaedo of Plato* (London, 1885), pp. 254-262; J. W. Donaldson, *Pindar's Epinician or Triumphal Odes* (London, 1841), p. 210; James Adam, *The Republic of Plato* (Cambridge, 1902), I, p. 224. That the canon arose from the division of society into classes according to age and sex, each group with its own proper virtue, is the view of F. M. Cornford, *loc. cit.*, pp. 246-265. For a summary of other theories, which regard the four cardinal virtues as 1) the invention of the sophists, 2) the result of popular usage, or 3) a purely Attic development arising from the ethics of the city-state, see Otto Kunsemüller, *Die Herkunft der platonischen Kardinaltugenden* (Erlangen, 1935), pp. 11-12.

³ Wilhelm Christ in his edition of the Odes (Leipzig, 1896, p. 249) suggests 469 B. C. Richmond Lattimore (*The Odes of Pindar* [Chicago, 1947], p. 157) places the Ode close to 476 B. C. All references to Pindar in this paper are from the edition of C. M. Bowra (Oxford, 1935).

⁴ Those who would read the cardinal virtues into the passage include Donaldson, Geddes, and L. R. Farnell *ad loc.*, and Cornford, *loc. cit.*, pp. 254-255. This interpretation is rejected by Fennell and Bury *ad loc.*, Kunsemüller, *op. cit.*, and Wilamowitz, *Pindaros* (Berlin, 1922), p. 279, note 3. The fourth and most ambiguous of the *τέσσαραι ἀρεταί* (*φρονεῖν . . . τὸ πάρκειμενον*, v. 75) has been equated by various scholars with justice (Cornford), wisdom (Bury), and sophrosyne (Kunsemüller). Farnell, on the other hand, denies that this phrase is meant to indicate any of the virtues; it is only a "prudential maxim," according to his view.

dar's favorite mythical *exempla*. Eleven other Odes deal with Aegina, and in each of them the praise of the Aeacidae occupies a position of importance.⁵ Generally Pindar celebrates the war-like achievements of Peleus, Achilles, Ajax, and other members of the family, but in *Isth.*, 8, 24-28 the very qualities which were at this time gaining recognition as the "civic" virtues are ascribed to the Aeacidae.⁶ Godlike Aeacus, the dearest to Zeus of mortal men, gave judgments to the gods themselves (*δαιμόνεσσι δίκας ἐπείρωνε*). We do not know the circumstances in which these judgments were delivered, but at least it is clear that Aeacus at some time won renown for settling a dispute among the gods. Pindar himself and other ancient sources tell us that Aeacus was famed for his justice, as well as for the favor which he found with Zeus. Hence he frequently appears as a judge in the Underworld.⁷ The sons and grandsons of Aeacus are endowed with three additional qualities. Pindar says that they excelled in manliness (*ἀρίστευν . . . ἀνορέα*) and proved both moderate and prudent (*σώφρονές τ' ἔγένοντο πινυτοί τε θυμόν*).

⁵ *Ol.*, 8; *Pyth.*, 8; *Nem.*, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8; *Isth.*, 5, 6, 8. See also Frag. 1 and Paean 6.

⁶ In other Aeginetan Odes, to be sure, Pindar frequently praises the Aeacidae and the island of Aegina for being just (*Ol.*, 8; *Pyth.*, 8; *Nem.*, 8; *Isth.*, 5; Frag. 1), friendly to strangers (*Ol.*, 8; *Nem.*, 4 and 5; *Isth.*, 5; Frag. 1; Paean 6), and pious or dear to the gods (*Ol.*, 8; *Nem.*, 4 and 5; *Isth.*, 8), but nowhere else do we find a reference to all four "civic" virtues. *Isth.*, 8 was written soon after Thebes disgraced herself by melizing, and Pindar, while he makes no explicit reference to the recent events, is eager to "confer the fairest gift of the Graces upon Aegina" (vv. 17-18), Thebes' twin sister-city, which had won the prize of valor at Salamis. The theme of glory conferred by song is recurrent throughout the Ode (see vv. 52-53; 61-68; 73, and compare *Isth.*, 5 which alludes openly to the glorious exploits of the Aeginetans at Salamis and the *aretae* of the sons of Aeacus). Doubtless Pindar intends to honor, not merely the Aeacidae, but the entire island of Aegina and its present inhabitants. It may be for this reason that he for once introduces, not the familiar *aretae* of the aristocrat, but the basic virtues of the citizen, and attributes them all to the earliest and most renowned Aeginetan heroes.

⁷ For the justice and wisdom of Aeacus, see Pindar, *Nem.*, 8, 7-12, and Demosthenes, 18, 127. As a judge in the Underworld Aeacus appears in Plato, *Apology* 41 A and *Gorgias* 523 E f.; Isocrates, 9, 15; Horace, *Odes*, II, 13, 22. For the *εὐέθεια* of Aeacus, as proved especially on the occasion of a drought which could be relieved only by his intercession, see Isocrates, *loc. cit.* and Pausanias, II, 29, 17 and I, 44, 9.

All these virtues are mentioned elsewhere in the Odes, sometimes in pairs, sometimes in conjunction with other qualities not mentioned here, but the striking thing about this passage is that Pindar introduces these four virtues together and no others. It is tempting to see in them the quartet that was destined to be canonized by Plato and the Stoics. Only sophrosyne, to be sure, goes by its traditional name, but the others present no difficulty. Aeacus himself represents justice. *ἀνορέα* is an epic equivalent of *ἀνδρεία*, while the term *πινυτοί τε θυμόν* describes the possessors of wisdom or prudence. Sophrosyne must therefore approximate its secondary significance of "temperance" or "moderation," rather than "wisdom, soundness of mind," for the latter quality would hardly be mentioned twice.⁸

Pindar's model for the use of the adjective *πινυτός* is doubtless Homer, in whose vocabulary the word always means "wise, prudent, discreet."⁹ In certain Homeric references to the twofold *areté* which consists of martial valor and intelligence, the intellectual element is represented by the noun *πινυτή*.¹⁰ Nowhere else in the extant Odes does Pindar use the word *πινυτός*, but there can be no doubt that here too it denotes the intellectual virtue, which Pindar ordinarily terms *σοφία*.

Immediately after listing the virtues of the Aeacidae, the poet says, "These things the assembly of the blessed remembered" (v. 29)—when the question of the marriage of Thetis came up for discussion. At the suggestion of Themis, the Nereid was awarded to Peleus, because he was rumored to be the most pious man (*εὐσεβέστατος*) of all who dwelt on the plain of Iolcus

⁸ The word *σώφρων* (or *σοφρών*) occurs in only three other passages in Pindar: *Pyth.*, 3, 63, where it means "wise, sage," and *Paeans* 1 and 9, in both of which it is connected with wisdom and moderation in government. The word "chaste" which is sometimes used in translating *Isth.*, 8, 28 is an anachronism here. Not until later in fifth-century Attic usage does sophrosyne commonly denote chastity. *σώφρων* in the sense of "moderate" is not common in lyric and elegiac poetry, but some instances can be cited. See, for example, *Theognis*, 39-42; 754-756, and *Bacchylides*, 13, 186, which, incidentally, praises Aegina and says that the city is guided by *σώφρων* *Εὐνοίᾳ*.

⁹ See *Od.*, I, 229; IV, 211; XI, 445; XX, 131; XXI, 103; XXIII, 361. In the last four of these passages the adjective *πινυτή* is applied to Penelope.

¹⁰ *Il.*, VII, 289; *Od.*, IV, 211.

(v. 44).¹¹ Obviously, the *εὐσέβεια* of Peleus has now taken the place of the four civic virtues as the "thing remembered" by the gods.¹² At first glance it seems that one or another of the qualities listed in vv. 24-23 should be close to *εὐσέβεια*, if Pindar's equation is to be accepted. But none of the terms here mentioned can be interpreted as a reference to piety. The closest scrutiny can find in vv. 24-28 only justice, courage, moderation, and prudence. Yet *εὐσέβεια* is felt by Pindar to be, if not equivalent, at least so closely related to the four virtues already listed that his audience would perceive no want of logic in his sequence of thought. Such a close relationship among the five virtues does indeed exist, because, as is well known, all five originally belonged to the canon of cardinal virtues, *εὐσέβεια* no less than the others.¹³ To judge by *Isth.*, 8, Pindar knew the entire canon, and what is more, could rely on his audience to be familiar with it too. We are still no closer than before to discovering the source of the canon, but whatever its origin, there is no difficulty in accounting for Pindar's acquaintance with it. Presumably it was current in Greek thought for some time before it appeared in poetry. The special importance of *Isth.*, 8, 24-28 lies in the fact that it precedes by a decade the *Seven against Thebes*.

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¹¹ *εὐσέβεια* is one of the qualities often ascribed to the Aeacidae; see notes 6 and 7 above. Helenus was regarded as an exemplar of chastity, because he repulsed the advances of Hippolyta (or Astydamia), the wife of Acastus. This episode is of central importance in two of Pindar's Odes: *Nem.*, 4 and 5, both of which suggest that Thetis was given to Peleus as a reward for his virtuous conduct in this affair. On the sophrosyne of Peleus, see especially Aristophanes, *Clouds*, 1063 and 1067 and the Scholiast *ad loc.*; Plato, *Republic* 391 C; Horace, *Odes*, III, 7, 17; Apollodorus, III, 13, 3; Zenobius, *Cert.*, 5, 20.

¹² The equation implicit in v. 44 was drawn to my attention by Professor Friedrich Solmsen.

¹³ See note 1 above.

EXAGELLIA.

In several Latin texts of fifth to seventh century date we find a noun variously spelled as *exagella*, *exagallia*, *exagillum* a. o., which has so far been considered a *vox dubia* as regards both formation and meaning.¹

Patricius (d. 461), *Confessio*, 14:² “In mensura itaque fidei Trinitatis oportet distinguere, sine reprehensione periculi notum facere donum Dei et consolationem aeternam, sine timore fiducialiter Dei nomen ubique expandere, ut etiam post obitum meum exagallias (ex/agallias A, in marg. z et incertus liber: exgallias VFC. ex gallicis G^{corr.} gallias R. exgæleas P) relinquere fratribus et filiis meis quos in Domino ego baptizaui.”

Ennodius (d. 521), *Vita S. Epiphanius (Opuscula, III)*, 191:³ “sacerdotibus in itinere positis munificus, communis, adfabilis et quasi exagellam (-iam B. -ium Boll. -illum Bonnet) relinquens se ipso praestantior.”

De virtutibus S. Iohannis (sixth century; published by J. A. Fabricius, *Codex Apocryphus Novi Testamenti II*), p. 582: “quid igitur uobis pro exagillo relinquam” (so M. Bonnet, *Arch. f. lat. Lexicogr.*, II, p. 132, with cod. Guelferbytanus Vircebburg. 48, in which *ag* has been erased; ex agello Guelferbytanus Helmstad. 497; pro illo Paris. lat. 18298; exengyesi, with the editio princeps of Wolfgang Lazijs, Fabricius); in the parallel Greek redaction (M. Bonnet, *Acta Apostolorum Apocrypha II/1*, p. 205, 11) we read now the plain words: τί γὰρ ἔτερον ἔχοιμι σπὸς ὑμᾶς εἰνέιν;—evidently a retouch.

Regula Magistri (seventh century), c. 91:⁴ “de portione eius (i. e. monachi) tres fiant partes aequaliter, una distributa abbatis

¹ Cf. *Thes. Ling. Lat.*, V, 2, 1146, 70-77, where the earliest witness—Patricius—is missing.

² *Libri S. Patricii*, ed. Newport J. D. White (*Proc. Royal Irish Acad.*, XXV C [Dublin, 1905]), p. 239, 5-9. The symbols for the MSS are White's.

³ *Ennodii Opera*, ed. F. Vogel (*M. G. H. Auctores Antiquissimi*, VII [1885]). The symbols for the MSS are Vogel's.

⁴ The *Regula Magistri* has sometimes been claimed as a source rather than an adaptation of the *Regula S. Benedicti*; the arguments for this opinion are not convincing, see Dom B. Capelle, *Revue d'histoire ecclésiastique*, XLI (Louvain, 1946), pp. 66-75, with bibliography.

manibus pauperibus uel indigentibus erogetur; aliam uobis uel fratribus suis pergens ille ad comitatum sarctorum exagiliario munus titulo ('under the title of legitimate portion') derelinquit; tertiam uero partem uictici sui uilitate deferat secum monasterii usibus profuturum.”⁵

There is an entry in Baxter's *Medieval Latin Word-List*: “† *exagiliarius* by weight, 7th century,” which I cannot verify in any seventh century text read for this compilation.

Ansileubi Glossaricon (ca. 750): *excilia*, but no equivalent or explanation is written beside.

In these texts we find the following spellings:

- 1) *exagallias*: *Patricius*.
- 2) *exagellam* (*exagelliam* B): *Ennodius*.
exagello: *Virtutes S. Iohannis* (Guelf. 497).
- 3) *exagillo* (*ag* erased): *Virtutes S. Iohannis* (Guelf. 48).
exagilia: *Ansileibus*.
exagiliario: *Regula Magistri*.
† *exagiliarus*: *Baxter*.

The word in question is generally regarded as a diminutive of *exagium*; we should therefore expect a form *exagellum* or possibly, with vulgar vocalism, *exagillum*, cf. *labiu n labellum* and the parallel forms *mamn-ella* *mamilla*. There is, however, ample evidence of a feminine form in *-ia* (*Confessio*, all MSS; *Ennodius*, cod. B—the best MS; *Ansileibus*; *Regula Magistri*). Double *l* before the termination is better attested than single *l*, and the vowel preceding *l* (*ll*) must have been originally *e*, not *i*. Thus the genuine word-form is presumably *exagellia*,⁶ perhaps with a by-form *exageuum*.

What does the word mean? *Exagellia* is probably a diminutive of *exagium*. *Exagiu n*, related to *exigere* *examen*,⁷ originally denoted the act of weighing (*examen trutinae*); as a technical term it means “standard weight.”⁸ It was applied metaphorically

⁵ This passage and the one from *Ennodius* are quoted by Du Cange; his third reference (to Zeno, *Sermo ad neophytos*, 3) is erroneous.

⁶ The second *a* in *exagallias*, *Conf.*, 14 (attested by all MSS) may be due to the miscopying of a form *exagellias* by the scribe of the archetype, or may be a phonetic variant (cf. *rcuerantia* in A at p. 239, 2 White).

⁷ A. Walde-J. B. Hofmann, *Lateinisches etymologisches Wörterbuch* (3rd ed., 1938), I, p. 454.

⁸ *Thes. Ling. Lat.*, V, 2, 1135, 3 ff.; cf. *Corpus Gloss. Lat.*, II, 246, 13

cally to *cogitationes quae mentiuntur opera pietatis* by Cassian, *Conlationes*, I, 22, 1, who compares such thoughts with forged coins lacking full weight (*exagio seniorum non . . . adaequari*). It is this meaning of *exagium* “ad quod nummi exiguntur” > “example, standard, rule” that has been assumed for *exagellia* by Sirmond and, following him, by F. Vogel⁹ and M. Bonnet.¹⁰

A different explanation was given by Du Cange, *s. v. exagella*: “Trutina, seu potius quota pars quae unicuique heredum ex successione obuenit: legitima pars heredis, cum aliis ueluti ad exagium seu trutinam exaequata”; he then quotes Ennodius and the *Regula Magistri*. With reference to Du Cange, Sir Samuel Ferguson¹¹ postulated for *Confessio*, 14 the meaning “legacy, bequest, inheritance”; he was followed by Dr. Newport White.¹²

One fact, which has so far been strangely overlooked, tells much in favour of the second interpretation, viz. that, wherever the word in question occurs in a context, it is followed by the verb *relinquere* (Patricius: *exagellias relinquere*; Ennodius: quasi *exagelliam relinquens*; *Virtutes S. Iohannis*: *quid . . . uobis pro *exagello* relinquam*; *Regula Magistri*: *exagiliario munus titulo relinquat*). In three of our four instances the “bequest” must be understood metaphorically: St. Epiphanius, on his last journey, is *se ipso praestantior*; it is this portrait of his personality which, kept alive in the memory of his clergy, is his “bequest.” In the *Virtutes S. Iohannis*, and similarly in the *Confessio* of St. Patrick, the “bequest” is a last and final utterance of the saint (in one case oral, in the other written). That *exagellia*, *exagellum* means “bequest” is indirectly confirmed by the occurrence of the unambiguous *hereditas* in a phrase that is almost identical with those quoted: *Vitae Patrum*,

ἄρτου ἐντυπή *exagies*—obviously a stamp on the bread which guaranteed full weight.

⁹ In his edition of Ennodius, p. 382.

¹⁰ Bonnet (*Archiv. f. lat. Lex.*, II, 132) thinks *exagillum* (as he prefers to spell the word) is a pre-Vulgate translation of 1 Petr. ii. 21 ὑπὲ ὑπολιμπάνων ὑπογραμμόν (*relinquens exemplum Vulg*). As far as I can see, all our Old Latin witnesses (*l q t z Cypr*) read *exemplum*, which is also the Latin equivalent of ὑπογραμμός in the earliest version of 1 Clem. (ed. G. Morin, 1894) xvi. 17; xxxiii. 8.

¹¹ *Proc. Royal Irish Acad.*, 2nd Series, II: Polite Literature and Antiquities (1879-88), pp. 1-3.

¹² *Libri S. Patricii*, p. 285.

V, 1, 10: "rogantes uerbum aliquod compendiosum et salutare loco hereditatis sibi relinqui."

Finally we have to explain the plural *exagellias* in *Confessio*, 14. I think the author refers here individually to each of his "brethren and sons," whereas the singular in the other instances is used with reference to some community as a whole. If, according to Du Cange, *exagellia* originally denotes the equal portion falling to each of several co-heirs, then Patrick's choice of the plural might indicate his intention of leaving his *Confessio* as a legacy that should be shared equally by each and every one of his converts.

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ATHENS AND THE AMPHIKYTONIC LEAGUE.

An alliance made by Athens during the First Peloponnesian War has been partly preserved on a stone tablet now in the National Epigraphical Museum (E.M. 6807). Since it is a document of some consequence for the political history of the mid fifth century, and since it has been generally misinterpreted and incorrectly read a new tentative restoration seems in order, and is given here:

A PROPOSED TREATY

Part of a marble stele, found on the south slope of the Acropolis,¹ and now in the Epigraphical Museum (E.M. 6807). H. 0.29 m.; W. 0.25 m. (Koumanoudes, *Αθηναίον*, VI [1877], p. 128); Th. 0.07 m. The top surface and apparently the right lateral surface (somewhat damaged) are original.

The writing is early Attic stoichedon (3-barred sigma) with a chequer-unit which measures 0.018 m. across and 0.017 m. down.²

¹ R. von Scala, *Staatsverträge*, I, no. 56, incorrectly says "am nördlichen Burgfuss ausgegraben."

² I.G., I², 26 + . [Tcd, *Gr. Hist. Inscr.*, I², 39]. W. Bannier, *Rh. Mus.*, LXXVII (1928), p. 2'0, note 2. H. Nesselhauf, *Klio*, Beiheft XXX (1933), pp. 7-8. The present text, without commentary, is scheduled for publication in *S.E.G.*, X.

ca. 458 B.C. [ἔδοχσεν τῇ βο]λῇ καὶ τῷ[ι δέμῳ] ΣΤΟΙΧ. 24

[οὐ, . . . ντὶς ἐπρ]υτάνευε, Αἰ[...]
 [.... ἐγραμμάτ]ενε, Μένυλλ[ος ἐ]
 πεστάτε,]τεστέ εἶπε· χρ[υθ]
 5 έκας ἔναι καὶ χ]συνημαχίαν [τοῖ]
 [σ μετέχοσι τέσ] Πιλοίας ἀπα[σι]
 [ἡόρκος δὲ δόγα]ι τοῖς Ἀμφι[κτί]
 οσι ἡοῖσπερ μέ]τεστιν τῷ ἥ[ιε]
 ρῷ, ἐμμενὲν τῷ δόμοσαντας ἐν [τῇ]
 10 ι χρυνημαχίαν νὲ τ]ὸν Ἀπόλλο[κα]
 ι τὴν Λετό καὶ τὴν] *Ἀρτεμιν ἐ[χρ]
 ολειάν τε ἐμῆν α]ύτοῖς ἐπαρ[ου]
 ἐνος ἐάν παραβαί]γομεν φσε[φί]
 σματος δὲ γενομένο] τριῶν ἐ[με]
 15 ρῶν πρέσβεις πέμψαι] ἐς Πύλ[ας]
 ήοὶ ἀπαγγελοῦτι τὰ ἐφσε]φισ[μέ]
 [να -----]

Line 2: The name of the phyle to be restored is either Aiantis or Leontis. Lines 2/3 and 4: For the secretary Tod (*op. cit.*, p. 78, p. xx in the first edition) suggests Αἰ[σιμίδης] or some similar name, and for the orator probably Αἰσχί[ψης]; for the orator Raubitschek (by letter) reads [....]τεστέ. Lines 4/5: χρ[υθέκας ἔναι καὶ χ]συνημαχίαν, Koumanoudes; χρ[υθέσθαι μὲν τὴν χ]συνημαχίαν, Kirchhoff, von Scala, Hiller, Tod. Lines 5/6: [πρὸς Φοκέας] has been restored by earlier editors. Line 12: [α]ύτοῖς depends on Wilhelm's reading of the initial letter as Υ or Ν. Von Scala read [--- ἐαν]τοῖς ἐπαρ[---] and suggested some form of the verb ἐπάρσθαι. Lines 12/13: Kirchhoff (and others) read τοῖς ἐπ' Ἀρ[ιστονος ἄρχοντος γε]νομένοις, but the letters in line 13 (especially Φ) are not compatible with [γε]νομένοις (von Scala and Bannier rightly rejecting the interpretation of Φ as ΟΙ),³ and the restoration ἐπ' Ἀρ[ιστονος ἄρχοντος γε]νομένοις is too long by one space for the stoichedon order. Line 14: τριῶν, Koumanoudes; επιον, Kochler in *I. G.*, I, Suppl. p. 8, no. 22b; the reading τριῶν is confirmed by Wilhelm (*apud* von Scala). Numerous other restorations no longer retained may be found in the earlier publications.

TRANSLATION

Resolved by the Council and Demos; Aiantis (or Leontis) was the phyle in prytany, Αἰ[---] was secretary, Menyllos was pre-

³ Koumanoudes (*op. cit.*, p. 128) correctly described the phi as having a dot in the center of the circle in addition to the vertical stroke. Since omicrons did not normally have the dot in the center, and since the phi here is like the other two preserved phi's in having the dot, the reading of this phi as omikron iota, even if one wishes to assume such a contamination, is technically not permissible.

siding officer, [---]ies made the motion: (1) That there be a covenant and alliance with all members of the Py_{laia}; (2) To pledge oaths to the Amphiktyons who share in the control of the sanctuary, having sworn by Apollo, Leto, and Artemis, that we will remain firm in the alliance, and calling down the curse of utter destruction upon ourselves if we transgress; (3) To send envoys to Pylai within three days after this vote is taken who shall report the decision ---.

COMMENTARY

Contrary to traditional opinion, this decree makes no mention of Phokis, and there is no reference in it to any earlier oaths or treaty. The oaths of the archonship of Ariston (454/3) are fictitious, and have depended on false restoration. Epigraphically, the text seems to belong before the middle of the century, where an appropriate date is the period of Athenian supremacy in Central Greece after the battle of Oinophyta in 458 B.C.⁴ If Athens made an alliance with all the members of the Amphiktyonic League, Sparta and other enemies of Athens must have been excluded. Boiotia and Phokis are known to have been in alliance with Athens at least earlier than 454 (Thuc., I, 111, 1). Delphi presumably belonged to Phokis after the Athenian victories of 458; it was seized from Phokis by Sparta at the beginning of the Second Sacred War (Thuc., I, 112, 5), but was again restored to Phokis by the Athenians in 447.

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⁴ The date 458 for Oinophyta will be argued elsewhere. The letter phi has a protruding vertical bar, but phi's of this shape are also found in *I. G.*, I², 19 of 458/7 (cf. *S. E. G.*, X, 7).

AN INSCRIPTION FROM MESSAD.

In an illuminating article in which they collected the inscriptions from Messad (*Castellum Damm.*) in Algeria, the late M. Albertini and M. Massiera published an inscription which records the dedication of an altar by a detachment of *legio III Aug.* on behalf of Maximinus, Maximus, and the imperial family.¹ This inscription of fourteen lines is broken at the beginning and at the end.² The editors have restored two lines at the beginning of the inscription which with the first three extant lines give this result:— [*pro salute imp. Caes. C. Iuli / Veri Maximini sanctissimi (?)*] / *imp. et C. Iuli Veri Ma/ximi nobilissimi / Caes. Augg. totiusq. d. d. / ...*

There are three objections to this restoration. a. The first restored line has 21 letters, the second 23. The first seven extant lines contain 16, 15, 17, 16, 16 (counting III as if it were one letter), 16, 16 letters.³ Lines 8-10 are spaced unevenly and do not come to the right margin; lines 11-14 are broken at the right. The cutting of the letters is not expert, but it is clear and there is no marked difference in the size of the letters. Consequently, about 16 letters per line would be expected in the restored lines. b. It would be unusual to find the emperor's name without complimentary additions such as *invictus*, *pius*, *felix*, or the official titles—*pont. max.*, *tr. pot.*, *p. p.* and either *procos.* (in 235) or *cos.* (236 and after) or both.⁴ c. The word *sanctissimi* has apparently been restored to modify *imp.* in the first extant line, but this adjective is not used at any other place to describe Maxi-

¹ "Le poste romain de Messad (Algérie)," *R. E. A.*, XLI (1929), pp. 238-9 (no. 15); *A. E.*, 1940, 153. The completion *Damm(idi)* in *A. E.* is only a guess since it cannot be justified by any of the inscriptions from Messad—reference was made to *A. E.*, 1906, 124, 147, but these two inscriptions do not give the full form.

² I am grateful to M. Louis Leschi, Directeur des Antiquités de l'Algérie, who very generously sent me a clear photograph of the inscription which he had taken himself. In a letter he states: "La reproduction de la Revue des Études anciennes est exacte; mais c'est une réduction . . ."

³ In making the count the spaces between words have not been included since they are very small in lines 1-7.

⁴ Cf. Dessau, *I. L. S.*, III, 1, p. 294 and *C. I. L.*, VIII, p. 1048 (index).

minus, and if it were used it would come at the beginning of the name.⁵

The following restoration answers these three objections: [*pro salute imp. Caes. / C. Iuli Veri Maximini / pii felicis pont. max., / trib. pot., p. p., procos.*,] / *imp. et . . .*. This restoration not only makes the lines about even in length (16, 17, 17, 15 letters) but also brings the form of the name into harmony with that used in the sacerdotal *Fasti* referring to the year 235.⁶

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⁵ As it does when used to describe Severus Alexander:—e.g. . . . domini / n. sanctissimi / imp. Severi Ale[xandr] . . . (Dessau, *I. L. S.*, 485).

⁶ Dessau, *I. L. S.*, 436 = *C. I. L.*, VI, 2009. Lines 19-20 in which Maximinus' name occurs are partially restored. In general cf. Hohl, *R.-E.*, X, 1 (1917), cols. 852-868, *s. v. Julius* 523 and *P. I. R.*, II, pp. 218-219, no. 406.

REVIEWS.

MICHAEL GRANT. From Imperium to Auctoritas; A Historical Study of Aes Coinage in the Roman Empire, 49 B. C.-A. D. 14. Cambridge University Press; New York, The Macmillan Co., 1946. Pp. xvii + 510; 12 plates.

Michael Grant's study of the *aes* coinage in the Roman empire for the period of Caesar and Augustus is a "must" for any serious student of the years during which the Roman imperial government was established. Perhaps only numismatic specialists will follow the detailed discussion of the individual coins. Those who do so will come away with profound admiration for the painstaking and accurate research necessary to identify, as Grant says in his preface, over a thousand separate issues falling into three hundred and forty series, of which not more than seventy-six have previously been correctly assigned. Grant modestly disclaims complete success in his own identifications of coins which are often poorly struck, badly preserved, or incorrectly described. But his extensive autopsy of European collections and his wide familiarity with the relevant literature will discourage anybody not equally well equipped both with knowledge and with time from undertaking a detailed re-examination of the numismatic material. The full bibliography contains a list of the abbreviations regularly used and classified lists of ancient sources and modern works subdivided into those on local history, reports of coin finds, and other numismatic works. Since the notes frequently refer to several books by the same author and occasionally use "l. c." for books once cited in a given chapter, the reader interested in checking a given point might find more convenient for ready reference a straight alphabetical bibliography by authors. The bibliography also lacks indications of publishers and dates and places of publications. Presumably, however, the serious reader of Grant's book will have access to such information. Thus with a little patience, the citations in the notes can be traced.

Grant does not, however, confine himself purely to numismatics, and the Roman historian will find his book of fundamental importance for the conclusions which he draws from the coins with respect to administrative and constitutional aspects of the Roman imperial government. The preface underlines the significance of the contemporary evidence of coins and points up the general thesis of the work, that the basis of Augustus' power was not an *imperium maius* but *auctoritas*. There follow five pages of *addenda*, *corrigenda*, and *errata* which anyone interested in the detailed discussions should collate with the text. The text itself falls into four main parts: "The Official Coinage," "The Roman Cities," "The Peregrine Communities," and "*Imperium* and *Auctoritas*."

The official coinage is divided between two periods: that from 49-28 B. C., as issued by Caesar and his lieutenants, by the Pompeians, by the Republicans, by the Triumvirs, and by Octavian as sole ruler; and that from 27 B. C.-A. D. 14. The second period is

subdivided into issues of the transitional years 27-23 B. C. and those minted after Augustus' reform by his *legati* or by equestrian and senatorial governors. The numismatic results of this first part are summarized in the first two appendices, which list the issuing officials and mints chronologically for the two periods 49-27 B. C. and 27 B. C.-A. D. 14. The first appendix also gives approximate weights to show the wide variation which prevailed before the Augustan reform.

More general historical information derived both from the official coinages and from those of the Roman and peregrine communities is summarized in the following three appendices. The third presents some fifty-one proposed additions and alterations to lists of governors for fourteen provinces, chiefly in the eastern part of the empire. The fourth lists Roman officials mentioned on the coins in connection with "new foundations." These "new foundations" are, of course, often only changes in status of existing communities, generally their elevation to become Roman colonies or *municipia*. Grant concludes that the majority of colonial and *municipia* issues were commemorative either of the actual "foundation" or of the anniversaries thereof (pp. 147-148, but contrast pp. 295-301 for the use of certain mints to supplement the "official" issues). The fifth appendix proposes some fifty-six additions and alterations to the lists of Roman colonies and *municipia* founded or restored during the whole period under discussion. The sixth gives some forty-five additions and alterations to lists of peregrine foundations. No cross references to the arguments in the text are given in these appendices, but the appropriate discussions can be found by the use of the second index, of mints, and the third, of persons. These appendices and indices make easily available Grant's important contributions to our knowledge of Roman officials and of the local history of provinces and communities.

More specialized conclusions of the first three parts are summarized in the remaining appendices. Grant shows that in the east, many issues which are marked simply Σεβαστός must be dated by style and fabric to the post-Augustan period and that, therefore, they can no longer be used as evidence for Augustus (pp. 328-334). He concludes that Σεβαστός was equivalent not only to *Augustus* but also to *durus Augustus* (pp. 360-361). Appendix seven gives the posthumous local issues with heads of Augustus. The eighth lists Asian local issues with contemporary heads of Augustus according to the official categories of *denarii* whose portraits they imitate. This last group alone affords valid evidence for the Augustan period.

The ninth appendix gives the Asian local issues which in the principate of Augustus portrayed members of his family. During the "transition" period of 27-23 B. C., the dynastic character of the principate is recognized on coins issued by Glabrio, a proconsul of Africa in 25 B. C., and bearing portraits of Marcellus and Julia (p. 81), and by Primus, who as governor of Macedon in 23 B. C. placed the head of Augustus on his coins (pp. 83-84). Grant concludes that these proconsuls recognized not an *imperium maius* but an *auctoritas* of Augustus and that Primus' famous defense for his violation of the *lex de maiestate* when he made war on the Odrysae, namely

that he acted in accordance with the $\gamma\nu\omega\mu\eta$ of Augustus and Marcellus, referred to this *auctoritas*. In the period from 9 B. C. to the final recognition of Tiberius as heir in A. D. 13, the coins give increasing attention to persons not members of the imperial family but *amici principis*. Grant concludes that these "friends" already constituted a recognized group of close associates, as they had at the courts of Hellenistic monarchs, on whom Augustus came to depend in a period when death and retirement removed the members of his family (pp. 140, 229-230).

The tenth appendix briefly surveys autonomous coinages not relevant, directly or indirectly, to the Roman state. The last, the eleventh, discusses the art of the *aes* coins. Though the artistic accomplishment is generally low, and though the types and portraits are often copied from silver *denarii*, definite local characteristics appear on the *aes* minted in the different parts of the empire. These indicate the survival of native diversities beneath the overriding and leveling "imperial" style. Thus these coins contribute their bit to the evidence that local pre-Roman artistic standards survived beneath the surface of Romanization, to reappear once the control of Rome began to loosen. Besides the indices of mints and persons, there is one for types and a general index. Twelve plates show one or both sides of some four hundred and thirty-five coins.

The term *aes* covers copper, bronze, and orichalcum. During the Republic, bronze, containing copper alloyed with tin and lead, was the ordinary metal (p. 85). Julius Caesar introduced an alloy of copper with zinc called orichalcum (pp. 11, 13, 87). Moreover he issued the new metal in weights much lighter than had been customary for Republican bronze and Grant suggests that Caesar meant it to be a token coinage, attractive because of the novel metal but affording by its low metal content a profit either to his central financial bureau (pp. 18, 88) or to the individual moneyers (p. 64). These last, significantly, prove to have been members of families with considerable experience in finance (pp. 18, 64, 89). Grant's study of this problem was helped by spectrographic analyses of sample coins, the results of which he gives in a table (p. 493). He concludes that Caesar's "brilliant and unethical financial policy" (p. 89) was taken over by Augustus, but that in 23 B. C. a thorough-going reform was necessary to regularize the *aes* currency (p. 90). Under Caesar, and down to 23 B. C., coinage had been authorized by those holding the *imperium maius* or by their agents. Augustus, however, restored the control of *aes* wholly to the senatorial *aerarium*. Copper and orichalcum were used for official minting, bronze for local issues. Grant regards the *aerarium* as the only central office at the time available to standardize and supervise the *aes* coinage since the imperial *fiscus* had not yet come into being at Rome and the provincial *fisci*, even when under imperial agents, were simply local departments of the *aerarium* (pp. 97, 118, 129, 296). This control by the *aerarium* of *aes* coinage did not mean a division of function, in the sense of Mommsen's dyarchy, because the issues were authorized by decrees of the senate moved by Augustus in virtue of his tribunician power (p. 446). This authorization may be represented on the *aes* coinage in both imperial and senatorial provinces either by

S(enatus) C(onsulio) or by *C(aesaris) A(uctoritate)* or occasionally by other abbreviations of similar import (pp. 101, 108-110). *Aes* was minted not only at Rome but in many Italian and provincial cities and was generally current in all provinces; countermarks might be imposed on *aes* coins in special circumstances but were not necessary to ensure free circulation (pp. 91-110). Grant has little to say about the emission of gold and silver, which lie outside of his subject. He implies, however, that the situation was parallel for these metals (pp. 97-98, 120). Hence he denies completely the traditional view that under Augustus there was a separation of coinage between the emperor and the senate, so that the emperor minted gold, silver, and *aes* in the imperial provinces in virtue of his *imperium*, but left the senate in Italy free to mint *aes* only (cf., e.g., *C. A. H.*, X, pp. 197-198).

A further argument in favor of the emperor's control of the empire through his *auctoritas* is drawn from the coins commemorating the foundation of Roman colonies or *municipia*. Before 27 B.C., many holders of *imperia*, including senatorial proconsuls, appear as founders; thereafter Augustus alone is the founder or restorer and the proconsuls, *legat*, or other agents act simply as his deputies (pp. 292-293, 322-323). Grant agrees, despite some reservations, with the thesis advanced by Hans Rudolf in his *Stadt und Staat im römischen Italien usw.* (Leipzig, Dieterich, 1935), namely that Caesar proposed a program for universal and uniform municipalization. Augustus was much more conservative in the extension of Roman rights but compensated therefor by a generous policy of organizing peregrine communities, whose *libertas* depended on his *auctoritas* (pp. 302-307, 311, 349, 401-405). Augustus followed Julius in establishing uniform municipal institutions both through his direct intervention as founder and by initiating municipal regulations valid for the whole empire (pp. 308-313). The relation of Augustus to the Roman communities was that of patron to client (pp. 317-325). For the eastern peregrine communities he stepped into the position of the Hellenistic monarchs as founder and revealed divinity (pp. 356-378). This argument follows the thesis advanced by A. von Premerstein in his *Vom Werden und Wesen des Principats* (Munich, 1937), that the extension of *clientela* during the later Republic and the extra-constitutional religious sanctions devised for subject peoples were the fundamental means by which Augustus entered into a direct personal relationship with the inhabitants of the empire. In general, Grant's discussions of the extension of Roman rights and of the relationship between communities and the emperor reinforce those of A. N. Sherwin-White in his *The Roman Citizenship* (Oxford, 1939). Caesar appears as the daring and universal genius; Augustus, with his western sympathies and suspicions of the Greeks, as a cautious follower in his predecessor's footsteps (pp. 304-305).

All of these lesser arguments on the character of the coinage, on the authority for its issue, and on the position of Augustus with respect to issuing communities, lead up to the contention of the last part. Grant supports the thesis advanced by D. McFayden in *C. P.*, XVI (1921); pp. 34-50 and XXIII (1928), pp. 388-393, which runs

roughly as follows. As *triumvir*, Augustus possessed an *imperium maius* such as had been held by Caesar and later both by the Pompeians and by their republican opponents (pp. 33-36, 65). In virtue thereof Augustus and his subordinates, like his predecessors and their agents, coined *aes* without consulting the senate (pp. 6, 10, 18-19, 411-414). The *imperium maius* went back to Pompey, whose sons designated their father's unusual position by speaking of themselves as *Imperator filius*. Sextus even used the term as a sort of praenomen, *Imp. Sex. Magnus* (pp. 22-23, 408-409). Though Caesar had neglected the title *Imperator*, a rare coin shows *Antonius Imp.* (pp. 36, 414). Augustus carried the innovation of Sextus a step further by making *Imperator* fully a praenomen, *Imp. Caesar* (p. 415). This assertion of an initial connection between the praenomen *Imperator* and the *imperium maius* modifies McFayden's complete denial of such connection in his *History of the Title Imperator*, etc. (Chicago, 1920).

The *imperium maius* indicated by the praenomen technically ceased after the triumph of 29 B. C. but was continued by common consent, *per consensum uniuersorum* (*Res Gestae*, 36), until 27 B. C. Grant perhaps gives this phrase too legalistic a meaning; it may simply indicate that all now admitted Augustus alone controlled the state. *Consensum* suggests Cicero's concept of a government supported by the *consensus bonorum*. At all events, in 27 B. C. the Republic was restored, *Res Publica Restituta* (*Res Gest.*, 34, 1, with Gagé's notes, p. 144). Thereafter Augustus was only the equal of his colleagues in office as respects power, *potestas*, but excelled all in authority, *post id tempus auctoritate omnibus praestiti* (*Res Gest.*, 34, 3, Grant, p. 425). According to Grant, *Imperator* is conspicuously absent from the coinage after 27 E. C. (p. 440); yet his table (p. 457) shows six occurrences on the *aes* between 27 B. C. and A. D. 14. These he would explain, as he would its occurrence on gold and silver and its regular use in inscriptions, as merely official usages without implication of an *imperium maius* (p. 440). He cites F. Christ, *Die römische Weltherrschaft in der antiken Dichtung* (*Tübinger Beiträge*, XXXI [1938]), p. 118, for the conspicuous absence from Augustan literature of the terms *imperator* and *imperare* with respect to Augustus. And he points to the well-known refusal of Augustus' immediate successors to use the praenomen until Nero revived it in A. D. 66 as a prefix which did not displace his own praenomen (p. 441; cf. Dessau, 233; *B. M. C. R. E.*, I, pp. clxvi-clxviii). He thinks that the quinquennial and decennial celebrations which Dio, LVII, 24, 1, refers to the renewal of the *imperium* actually commemorated the *auctoritas* (p. 434). There is great need of a detailed study of the evidence for these celebrations during the early empire. Grant holds that Augustus retained a simple *imperium* as consul till 23 B. C. and thereafter had an *imperium consulare* without office for the command of troops, including the guards in Italy (pp. 437-438). But he refers the verb *ἰσχύειν* to the *auctoritas* and not to an *imperium maius* in the passages in which Dio, LIII, 32, 5 and LIV, 28, 1, states that Augustus throughout the empire and Agrippa in the east were superior to the individual governors (pp. 427, 429, 445). Augustus frequently intervened in virtue of his *auctoritas*

directly in senatorial provinces (p. 431). Instances are the case of Primus in Macedonia, referred to above, or the Cyrene Edicts. "But he preferred when convenient to act through the senate" (p. 445); namely to initiate decrees by his *auctoritas* as derived from the tribunician power. This accounts for the prominence which Augustus gave to the *tribunicia potestas* after 23 B. C., when he retained no other regular magistracy and had only the *imperium* necessary for the command of his provinces and the troops (pp. 446-453).

Thus Grant supports from the coins the general trend of modern study of the position of Augustus. First, he attacks the dyarchy by which Mommsen explained the coexistence of Augustus with a supreme military *imperium* alongside the sovereign Senate and Roman People. Secondly, he argues that at least ostensibly the Republic was restored with Augustus simply in the position of First Citizen, *Princeps*, as a sort of omnipresent handy man to keep the wheels properly oiled. Thirdly, he holds that in fact Augustus was the master of the state. And lastly, he finds the basis of the emperor's over-all control not in any legal or constitutional grant of extraordinary power but in the informal, psychological domination of his personality, expressed through the typically Roman concept of his *auctoritas*. The experience of the last twenty-five years has shown that dictatorial power does not derive from a position as chancellor, prime minister, or chief of state; it rests on being recognized as *Führer*, *Duce*, or the like. Even the leaders of less dictatorial states have appealed more and more, for instance by "fireside chats," to their personal prestige with the public rather than to their constitutional powers. It nevertheless remains true that modern dictators have felt the need for some legitimization of their position; for recognition thereof through constitutional procedures, whether under the title of chancellor, prime minister, or chief of state. Even Pericles, for all his command of the Athenian assembly through his persuasive eloquence—or perhaps as a means of getting a hearing—retained the position of general, *στρατηγός*. It may be questioned whether *auctoritas* and *tribunicia potestas* would have satisfied the lawyers of Augustus' day. Despite Grant's denial that Augustus' legislative power necessarily derived from an *imperium maius* (pp. 425, 430-434), the lawyers must have desired some legal basis for his pronouncements. And the senatorial proconsuls might listen to his mere authority but probably preferred a recognized "chain of command." The lack of any evidence for an *imperium maius* on the *aes* coinage is adequately explained on the ground that Augustus acted in this traditionally senatorial sphere through the *aerarium*. It is, in fact, clear that the military basis of his power was constantly played down and that attention was centered on the restored powers of the Senate and Roman People. Certainly in such a program, the importance of *auctoritas* in giving Augustus a veiled control throughout the state cannot be minimized, any more than can such extra-legal aspects of his position as his widespread patronage or his assumption of an aura of divinity. Grant marshalls a persuasive array of arguments, modern authorities, and explanations against the *imperium maius*. Yet Mommsen should still remind us that the Romans were legalistically minded; that *auctoritas* carried great weight but could,

as in the case of a *senatus auctoritas*, be disregarded; and that command must in the end rest upon legal power as well as on psychological dominance. The possession by Augustus of some sort of ultimately superior legal power over the Republican magistrates and proconsuls cannot be regarded as finally disproved even by such learned and weighty arguments in favor of *auctoritas* as those advanced by Grant.

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NOTE

Since the above review was written, the reviewer has been fortunate enough to receive from Professor Hugh Last of Oxford University an offprint of his " *Imperium Maius: A Note*," published in the *Journal of Roman Studies*, XXXVII (1947), pp. 157-164. In criticism of Grant's arguments, Last reviews the history of the *imperium maius* and concludes that there were two types. The original *imperium maius* of the consuls vis à vis the praetors, which he calls type A, did not make the consuls directly responsible for every act of the praetors but simply gave them the right of way in event of conflict. The *imperium maius* of the dictator, type B, gave him ultimate responsibility for all acts of any holders of *imperia*. Last holds that Caesar and the triumvirs perpetuated type B but that Augustus, following the model proposed for Pompey in 57 B. C., held an *imperium maius* of type A vis à vis the consuls and proconsular governors; one which did not make him responsible for all their *acta* and which was therefore kept in the background and only invoked when emergencies, such as that which called forth the Cyrene Edicts, necessitated his intervention. Last refers in n. 11 to A. Magdelain, *Auctoritas Principis* (Paris, 1947), as a work which reached him after his note had been written but whose ingenious interpretation did not make him alter his view. This latter work is not yet available to the reviewer. While the distinction between Last's types is perhaps one of fact rather than theory, the reviewer welcomes his learned support of the *doubts* expressed above concerning Grant's conclusions.

AURELIO PERETTI. *La sibilla babilonese nella propaganda ellenistica*. Firenze, "La nuova Italia" editrice, 1942. Pp. 509. Lire 50. (*Biblioteca di cultura*, Vol. XXI.)

The fundamental research work in the curious and, in certain aspects, very important poems, called the Sibylline Oracles, was made in the beginning of our century by Geffcken and Bousset.¹ Since

¹ J. Geffcken, "Die babylonische Sibylle," *Gött. Nachr.*, 1900, pp. 88; "Komposition und Entstehungszeit der Oracula Sibyllina," *Texte und Untersuchungen zur Geschichts- der altchristlichen Literatur*, N. F., VIII (1903), edition of the *Oracula Sibyllina*, 1902. W. Bousset, "Die

then they have often been mentioned and commented upon, but no larger book devoted to them has appeared until that reviewed here. The author starts from the foundation laid by Geffcken and Bousset and treats especially the earliest and most important book, the third, trying to distinguish its elements and to refer them back to historical events and circumstances.

Geffcken and Bousset showed that part of the third book is due to the Chaldaean Sibyl whom Pausanias also calls the Sibyl of Berossus; she is also called the Babylonian Sibyl. The reason why the Jewish Sibylline poet borrowed elements from her was the same as his reason for taking over Greek oracles, using them for his aims, and re-working them, without being able to obliterate all traces of their origin, namely to prove that even the pagans acknowledged or, at least, had a presentiment of the superiority of the Jewish religion and people. Later the Christians used the Sibylline poetry for their aims in the same manner. A similar reaction against the Greeks appears in Berossus who tries to prove the superiority of the Babylonian people through its age and its history. It appears that from this point of view certain similarities between Berossus and the Babylonian Sibyl will result, but it is doubtful and cannot be proved that Berossus knew the Babylonian Sibyl, as the author admits. A Persian Sibyl is also mentioned; she is shadowy and perhaps identical with the Babylonian. For the words of the Babylonian Sibyl, or at least those which are attributed to her, are penetrated by Mazdaism, especially in the eschatology and in the ideas of the Aeon.

The Babylonian Sibyl is named Sambethē or Sabbe. The author rejects the etymology of this name from Aramaic *sabatha*, "the Old one." In fact it is a good name for the Sibyl whose authority was vouchsafed by her proverbial old age, *Phœbi longaeva sacerdos*, Vergil, *Aen.*, VI, 628. It is a misunderstanding on the part of the author, p. 71, to object that the Sibyl calls herself *νύμφη*, III, 827, for this word designates her not as a young woman but, as the author states rightly in another place, as the daughter-in-law of Noah. Nor should it be objected that *m* is absent in the Aramaic word; it is absent in the Babylonian word too from which the author derives the name, *Sabitu*. On the other hand certain similarities cannot be denied. Sabitu shows the road to Gilgamesh and is connected with the myth of the Great Flood, just as the Babylonian Sibyl is. The author has not understood the words at the end of the third book, 813 ff. The Sibyl says that the mortals of Hellas will call her the Shameless one of Erythrae, giving her another native country, and others will call her the frenzy and lying Sibyl, daughter of Circe and Gnostos (*sic!*). He says (p. 87, cf. pp. 447 f.) that the Jewish Sibylline poet polemizes against the identification of the Babylonian Sibyl with the Greek Sibyl. On the contrary the Babylonian Sibyl says that she leaves Babylon to spread fire over Greece and to prophesy the wrath of God and wishes by the identification with the Erythraean Sibyl to acquire authority among the Greeks. The polemics are directed against the unbelievers who blamed the Sibyl, even the Greek Sibyl, as a liar. The references in the romance of

Alexander to Sabitu, pp. 88 f., are rather loosely added and the etymology of Lehmann-Haupt, deriving the name of the god Sarapis from the Babylonian *sar apsi*, Lord of the Waters (p. 91), should not be adduced.

In chapter 3 the author discusses the long section on the sons of Cronus, 130-156, which differs markedly from the rest in style. He thinks that it is a euhemeristic, originally pagan, poem and attributes it to the Babylonian Sibyl (with Geffcken, *loc. cit.*, p. 9, points of connection, p. 173). He thinks that it is connected with an oracle of the time of the Maccabaeans, 162-195, by the brief verses 156-161. After this the Sibyl returns once more to the sons of Cronus, 197-210, this time in the future. Moses of Chorene has a larger tradition of this section which is attributed expressly to the Sibyl of Berossus (see pp. 111 ff., cf. p. 297). Bousset, *loc. cit.*, p. 30, noted that in the enumeration of the Titans, Zrwan, Titan, and Japetosthe (*sic!*), Zrwan is a translation of Cronus. The author passes over this, content with an Iranian influence. That is so, but the fact of a translation makes it probable that we have to do with a re-working of a later age, coloured by Iranian ideas. The author is of the opinion that Euhemerism is part of the syncretism; more justly speaking it is a means of dissolving the belief of the Greeks in their gods; for the contention, p. 110, that it was an attempt to save what could be saved of this belief is unbelievable. The Sibyl knows very well what Euhemerism is good for. A point of contest between the author and Geffcken is whether the Sibyl incorporated what she found with her oracles in good faith, amplifying it in her manner, or whether she is guilty of fakes such as abound in the Jewish literature of this age. Truth is probably to be found somewhere in the middle.

Chapter 4 is of special interest for the dissensions among the Jews themselves. The author starts from certain similarities between the Samaritan historiographer Pseudo-Eusebius (especially the fragment in Eusebius, *Praep. Evang.*, IX, 171) and the above-mentioned euhemeristic section of the third book and tries to find traces of polemics against the Samaritans, although these are not named. He recognizes them, however, in the Phoenicians against whom the woes in verses 492-503 are directed and who are especially accused of lying and unjust words (pp. 137 ff.). Further he remarks, pp. 144 ff., that 283-294 repeat the same arguments as the Jews of Alexandria adduced against the Samaritans (Josephus, *Ant. Jud.*, XIII, 3, 4), but the verses 286-287 are said to be a later Messianic addendum.

Chapter 5 treats of the prophecies on the dominion on the world, a most complicated and old problem. Verses 167-193 have a certain doublet in 194-210 and moreover there are repetitions and allusions which are collected, pp. 170 f. The opinion of the author is this: verses 211 ff. were originally a continuation of the narrative of the sons of Cronus. Some oracles concerning the dominion of the world, directed against the Seleucids, were interpolated before these and ousted part of the narrative of the Sibyl concerning the dispersion of the peoples after the building of the tower in Babylon and the veneration of idols. The tale of the Oriental monarchies was replaced by the story of the house of Solomon. Verses 175-191 which refer

to Rome seem to contradict the dating in the time of Ptolemaeus Physcon. They begin mentioning Rome in a not unfriendly manner (175-178, cf. the first book of the Maccabaeans) and continue with an angry attack, 179-191. The author tries to evade this difficulty by attributing the beginning to the age of the Maccabaeans, in which the Jews were friends and allies of Rome, and letting the attack originally be directed against the Graeco-Macedonians and turned against Rome after Pompey had imposed the yoke of Rome upon the Jews, perhaps in the time of the triumvirs. Through this view he is able to save 192 f. which refer to Ptolemaeus Physcon and which Geffcken cancelled. This is a sagacious but very complicated hypothesis. It can be objected that verse 190 which the author pulls out and refers to the Macedonian reign offers no difficulty in the context and can be referred to the devastations by the Romans in the war 146 B. C. Of course such a wrathful attack against the Romans is impossible at this time. Geffcken's opinion, *loc. cit.*, p. 6, seems simpler, namely that 178 is continued by 190. With the aid of book I, 388-391, the author tries to reconstruct the original text, pp. 201 ff. I must, however, give voice to doubts. The presupposition of the author is that only one text existed which was remodelled, but in a literature of this kind it is probable that various and varying parallel texts existed. If this be so the problem will be put on another basis and become more difficult and nearly insoluble in view of the rhapsodical and illogical character of this poetry. Something like this is apparent if verses 105-195 are compared with 196-217, although the end is different.

Having treated the parallel tradition in chapter 6 the author turns in chapter 7 to the controversy between Geffcken and Bousset on one hand, who try to prove traces of a pagan syncretism in the narrative of the building of the tower in Babylon and its consequences, and on the other P. Schnabel. *Berossos und die babylonisch-hellenistische Literatur*, who derives it exclusively from the Bible and various popular legends. The author thinks that it is impossible to attribute the differing points in the Sibylline oracles to Berossus and that they agree with the Samaritan syncretism, which was less disinclined to pagan elements. I do not enter upon his discussion but agree with him in so far as the interrelations seem to be more complicated than was thought earlier.

In chapter 8 the author treats the second section of the third book which Geffcken attributed to the Erythraean Sibyl. It contains a loose series of oracles directed against various cities, preceded and followed by some Jewish oracles, 295-519. The author thinks that this collection originated shortly after the Mithridatic war, among the Greeks of Asia Minor, and is derived from the propaganda against Rome which at that time was fierce, but that also older elements were incorporated: the anti-Macedonian oracle, 381-7, which is attributed to the Persian Sibyl, and the oracle against Antiochus IV, 314-8. The anti-Roman oracles are especially remarkable. The author shows that the Jewish propaganda was first directed against the Seleucids, thereafter against the Idumaeans, and turned its wrath against Rome only after Judaea was made a Roman province in 6 B. C. But he is not consistent; in another place, p. 212, he says

that the interference of Pompey called forth the hatred of the Jews. At all events the anti-Roman oracles are due to Graeco-Orientals. The author rightly disapproves of Tarn's opinion in his paper, "Alexander Helios and the Golden Age," *J.R.S.*, XXII (1932), pp. 140 ff., that the oracle, 350-380, belongs to the propaganda of Cleopatra. Although it has been re-worked in a Messianic sense, it belongs to the time of the Mithradatic war. Tarn's argument that the δέσποινα, 359, cannot be a personification does not hold good. The personification is still more apparent in Aeschylus, *Persae*, 176 ff. Another argument for the Greek origin of this section can be added. The discussion of the Sibylline oracles has paid little attention to a passage in Tibullus, II, 5, 65 ff., which proves that the Sibylline oracles circulating in Rome told of prodigies. Such a prodigy, a comet, is mentioned as a disastrous omen, 534-6, cf. Tibullus, II, 5, 71.

At the end of this chapter the author gives a welcome synopsis of his results, cf. pp. 459 f.: 1. The tale of the sons of Cronus, etc., 96-161, is due to the Babylonian Sibyl and belongs to the beginning of the second century B.C. 2. The anti-Syrian oracles, especially 162-209, belong to the age of the Maccabaeans, the middle of the same century. 3. The re-working which fused the work of the Babylonian Sibyl and the earlier Jewish propaganda took place in the last period of the Hasmonean dynasty. 4. The interpolation in the section ascribed to the Erythraean Sibyl and the Messianic re-working of the anti-Roman oracles of Oriental origin, 336-488, were made shortly after the conquest of Egypt. 5. The third section, 520-829, was re-worked in a Messianic and apocalyptic sense under Mazdaic influence.

In chapter 9 the author returns to this subject, treating the relations of the Sibyl to the so-called Oracles of Hystaspes. In agreement with Windisch, "Die Orakel des Hystaspes," *Verhandlungen, Akademie Amsterdam*, N. F., XXVIII, 3 (1929) (cf. Bidez et Cumont, *Les mages hellénisés*, I, pp. 217 ff., and the fragments, II, pp. 361 ff.) they are considered to be not Jewish, but pagan-syncretistic. The apocalyptic picture of the king who, coming from the East with fire and sword, will cause the millennium dominates the third and last section of the third book. The relations to the oracles of Hystaspes are taken as proving the Babylonian origin of the Sibyl. The re-working of the apocalyptic material by the Jewish Sibyl is attributed to the age of the Emperor Augustus. It is related by Suetonius, *Aug.*, 31, that he ordered the oracle books to be sought for and burned. The friendly disposition of the Jews in the age of the Maccabaeans had by this time been converted into a furious hatred of the Roman oppressors.

The tenth and last chapter is devoted to the revolutionary propaganda. It surveys the anti-Roman propaganda and takes into account the fourth and fifth books also which are of Jewish origin. The Jewish propaganda addressed itself originally to the Greeks with missionary zeal, magnifying the Jewish religion; it was friendly to Rome which was an ally of the Jews. But because of the loss of independence and the destruction of the temple by Titus it was converted into a fierce hatred of the Romans and filled with apoe-

alyptic dreams. The Christians who were persecuted by the Roman state took over the Sibylline oracles, including the hatred of Rome. The author depicts vividly the disastrous consequences of this revolutionary propaganda which contributed to the dissolving of the Empire. It is found everywhere in Christian authors, not only in the Sibylline oracles. "It contributed in fact in a large measure to the internal dissolution of the Roman state and to implanting in the minds of the majority the conviction of the inevitable end of the state of things created by Rome" (p. 486). According to the author the hostility was continued, after the victory of Christianity, in the *Civitas Dei* of Augustine. "It is difficult to defend the confines of a state when its near and inevitable end, the lack of every moral value and justice in its institutions, its traditions, and its civilization are preached, a state in which a rising theocracy elevates itself as a judge over the acts of the state in the name of principles which imply a criticism and a negation of the concept of the state, of its social structure, of its culture" (p. 501). The author maintains that the victory of Christianity did not lead to an adjustment but that the fight between the secular state and the *Civitas Dei* was continued by a fight between the Christian state and the Church. It ought to be remarked, however, that things went otherwise in the Eastern than in the Western Roman Empire. In the East the creation of Constantine the Great, Caesopapism, stood the test until the end, a thousand years later. Then it was transferred to Moscow and revived for political ends when Stalin resurrected the patriarchate. The West had not forgotten that Rome had been the ruler of the world and as no Emperor dwelt there the Pope entered upon his heritage and made claims for the Church to rule the world.

I have been lengthy, but have by no means exhausted the contents of the book. The subject is such that the discussion becomes of necessity very detailed and every detail must be considered in itself and its relations to others. It is a pity that the author has added neither an *index rerum* nor an *index locorum*. The subject makes them very necessary. This lack impairs seriously the usefulness of the book. The book is easy to read, although it has a certain prolixity and certain repetitions. There is nothing revolutionary, but it broadens ours views and deepens the problems. It must be read and earnestly taken into consideration by all who are interested in the complicated problems of the Sibylline literature. The last chapter is recommended for consideration by those who take an interest in the history of the fall of the ancient world.

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ANDRÉ PIGANIOL. *L'Empire chrétien* (Histoire générale, fondée par Gustave Glotz: Histoire romaine, tome IV, deuxième partie). Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1947. Pp. xvi + 446.

The present book on *L'Empire chrétien*, by M. André Piganiol, is the work of a distinguished historian, who has been studying and writing about the culture and institutions of the later Roman period for very many years. The chief merits of *L'Empire chrétien* are, in the reviewer's opinion, the effectiveness of its synthesis, the rigorous accuracy of its factual detail, the generous abundance of its bibliography, and the direct simplicity of its style. The book suffers from the author's desire to give some attention to every possible aspect of imperial history from the Council of Nicaea to the accession of the first Theodosius. Piganiol begins with a bibliographical note in which his readers will find succinct and critical appraisals of the chief literary, legal, epigraphical, papyrological, and other sources from which the history of the fascinating fourth century must be written, together with some mention of the better known secondary literature. He presents thereafter, in a general introduction, a picture of the provinces and peoples that made up the empire of 325. The main body of his work follows, with a detailed account of the more important personages and events of the seventy years of history (325-95) to which the author pretty much confines himself. However, although St. Jerome (d. 420) and St. Augustine (d. 430) receive a fair amount of attention, Synesius of Cyrene and St. John Chrysostom, who more nearly belong to the fourth century, are very largely neglected. The Emperor Constantine is especially well dealt with; of him Piganiol knows much; indeed, fifteen years ago he gave us a biography of *L'Empereur Constantin* (Paris, 1932). With the minute details of his portrait of the enigmatic Constantine we cannot here deal; but one may well wonder whether Constantine's "philosophic" Christian deism, if we may adopt Piganiol's own oxymoron, is the psychological background of the theocratic ideal of Charlemagne and the crusading ardor of St. Louis (cf. *L'Empire chrétien*, p. 27, with similar reflections elsewhere). Piganiol acknowledges frankly that the character of Constantine was too complex for any delineation of assured accuracy or objectivity, but he insists that Constantine was not a realistic, calculating statesman whose acceptance of Christianity sprang from political expediency. After his fashion, Constantine possessed a passion for truth and justice; he entertained hopes that Christianity would reveal the one and the other to him; "et ce n'est pas la faute de Constantin si le christianisme refusa d'unir sincèrement sa cause à celle de la patrie romaine" (p. 72). This has become by and large a not uncommon view of Constantine.

The sons of Constantine and the career of the usurper Magnentius are well described; the military details of numerous campaigns are carefully given; and the author, while scrupulously refraining from rhetoric, often stirs the reader with a sense of the grand spectacle being unrolled before his eyes. Piganiol has taken especial care with the Emperor Constantius, whose real courage and honest devotion to duty deserve no less recognition than his political ineptitude, suspi-

cions, despotism, cruelty, and religious bigotry. While admitting that the Emperor Julian was grossly superstitious, obviously no free thinker and rationalist in the realm of religious ideas (pp. 117-118), and even a sort of spiritual anachronism, Piganiol has nonetheless much admiration for him: "Plus que la plupart des théologiens, ses contemporains, qu'on déclore de ce beau titre, il mériterait d'être considéré comme un saint" (p. 145).

This book is rich in the history of political, economic, and social institutions, weak in cultural history, and poor in intellectual history. Contemporary sources and modern monographs are admirably exploited to write the history of slavery and serfdom, the great estates, the towns, crown properties, and the deserted lands; the government's regimentation of labour in *corpora* and *collegia*; problems of transport and the imperial post; monetary changes and their economic consequences; trade routes and commercial activities; but no attempt is made to explore the reasons why the fourth century, unlike the fourteenth, failed to achieve anything that we can regard as industrial capitalism, and why mechanical and technological progress was so strangely inhibited (and here one may well doubt that slavery was in any sense a basic cause). Piganiol prefers to describe, with scholarly patience, the multiplicity of offices in the imperial bureaucracy, the titles and functions which pertained to them, the administration of the provinces, and the organization of the dioceses and prefectures; the army and its commanders; the imperial financial system and the excessive burden of taxation it laid upon a discouraged and tired world; and the many gradations in the social hierarchy, from the affluent senator to the impoverished peasant and proletarian. One chapter, brief but good, describes the organization of the church, the growth of monasticism, and the expansion of Christianity (pt. II, chap. V), and only seventeen pages—out of a total of four hundred and twenty-two!—are devoted to literature, science, education, and the arts in the fourth century (pt. II, chap. VI), while the intellectual efforts of this *saeclum theologicum*, the germinal period of so much of what subsequent centuries will regard as "Christianity," is dismissed with the ludicrous observation that "they discourage us" (p. 420). But Piganiol finds intellectual strength and spiritual hope in this century because there was a school of thought which could entertain the concept of a plurality or infinity of worlds (pp. 391, 420). Christian theology, however, did not mean the end of this kind of speculation; for better or worse this very doctrine has a considerable medieval history which will end up in the rhetorical pantheism of Giordano Bruno.¹ Piganiol consistently laments the gradual triumph of Platonic-Neoplatonic-Christian thought—*le christianisme étant, à certains égards, une forme du platonisme accessible aux masses* (p. 401)—and so it is ironic that he should choose the doctrine of the plurality of worlds as a mark of fourth-century intellectual vitality which Platonic-Christian dominance was to help extinguish. Piganiol does not seem to realize that this very doctrine was itself the "logical

¹ I have briefly discussed the importance of this doctrine as emphasized by A. O. Lovejoy and others in an article on "Some Recent Views of the Italian Renaissance," in the last *Report of the Canadian Historical Association* (1947).

consequence of the Platonic principle of plenitude" (D. B. Durand, in *Journal of the History of Ideas*, IV [1943], p. 12). We cannot allow Piganiol to have it both ways.

In the opinion of many scholars *L'Empire chrétien* will be found to overemphasize the deleterious influence of Christianity, which the author regards as having undermined the moral and legal bases upon which the structure of Roman society stood, and which, once the cohesive force of this magnificent tradition had been sapped, were never replaced by any Christian equivalents of equal strength: "Mais le christianisme ne désire pas réformer cette société terrestre qui est passagère. Les institutions les plus simples suffisent à la vie sur terre. Il y a un singulier contraste entre ce renoncement et la complication croissante des organes sociaux au IV^e siècle" (p. 403). Piganiol is surely too hard on Athanasius, whom he regards chiefly as a scheming troublemaker (pp. 44-45, 55, 72); he is even harder on Augustine (pp. 232 ff.); and one may question whether the political ideal of Ambrose was "to see the Emperor at his feet" (p. 370). We find, however, that Pope Damasus is portrayed with unexpected sympathy and appreciation, *le grand Damase* (pp. 225-27, *et alibi*). An index which contains the names of so many obscure officials (*arcarii*, *bastagarii*, *biarchi*, *commentarienses*, etc., etc.) does not contain the word *Logos*, and the author is hardly at his best in discussing the growth of dogma and the development of the Christian cult (e.g. pp. 370 ff.). We might expect better than this even from one who takes such a dim view of the writings of the church fathers, *ces Frères dont le fatras remplit encore des volumes* (p. 226), and who sees in Christianity such a menace to the political authority and spiritual welfare of the fourth-century empire (pp. 412, 418-19, *et passim*).

In his consideration of Eusebius' insistence upon *la parenté entre les doctrines de Platon et la religion juive [et le christianisme]*, Piganiol might well have inserted a paragraph or two, at least, on the significance of the doctrine of the "spermatic Logos" and its use by Christian theologians who sought, with unwarranted courage I would agree, to find a common inspiration behind Judaism, Hellenism, and Catholicism (cf. pp. 29-30). The author's bold and inadequate reference to the Christian cosmology of the fourth century (pp. 390-91) contributes nothing to his study. One would like to know something, during this period, of the problem of adjustment to Ptolemaic ideas of Christian views of the world; for medieval Christianity made this adjustment only to have it shattered by the concept of a decentralized universe in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries: An important chapter in European intellectual history thus began in the second century when Ptolemaic astronomy upset the cosmological ideas of the Old and the New Testaments. How did all this stand in the fourth century? Piganiol has not thought to ask the question. But these are considerations which one would like to see given space taken up by Augustine's mockery of the theory of the Antipodes and by Filastrius' theory of the movement of the stars as being released in the evening, like sheep, and coralled again in the morning by the angel who controls their movements (pp. 390, 391).

The fourth century was an age in which the Church was beginning to wield the most powerful sanctions, in which baker and bath-

attendant were engrossed in theological discussion, as Gregory of Nyssa tells us in a much-quoted passage in a little-read work (*Oratio de deitate Filii et Spiritus Sancti*, in *Patr. Graeca*, XLVI, p. 557B), and in which a full score of Arian creeds and formulaires kept in intellectual turmoil the religious life of Christendom. The Christian Empire was an empire, as Justin Martyr wrote, of another world (*Apol. I*, 11, ed. G. Rauschen, *Florileg. patristicum*, fasc. 2 [1904], p. 20), a world of faith and christological speculation, a world, in fact, of which Piganiol has written very little in his book, thus almost misnamed *L'Empire chrétien*.

The career and attempted reforms of Valentinian; the reign of Valens and Adrianople; Gratian; the elder Theodosius; Eugenius and Arbogastes; and the Emperor Theodosius—these, together with the names and episodes with which we associate them, are all made subjects of detailed description. The author is very critical of Theodosius I, who failed the empire both as a soldier and an administrator (pt. I, chaps. IX-XI): “Théodore, au moment où l’empire croule, apporte pieusement des pierres à la construction de la cité de Dieu” (p. 221). The political history of the years between 325 and 395 is fully presented; facts long known and recently discovered occupy the text, enlivened by many stimulating reflections by the author; controversies, old and new, problems of chronology, disputed motives of various historical figures, identifications of individuals, and the like are commonly relegated to the notes. Although the pressure of other duties has made the reading of this book just a little more rapid than I should have wished, I have noted nineteen typographical errors; they are mostly in the notes, and this is a good record for a book which contains more than twenty-five hundred notes. A few slips of the pen may be observed: “sa soeur *Constance*” for *Constantia* (p. 63); “l’Illyricum en faveur de *Gratien*” for *Valentinien II* (p. 205); while St. Melania possessed sixty (not sixteen) villas (p. 275). Considering the content which the historians of nationalism have given to the term during the last two or three decades, one wonders increasingly whether ancient historians should continue to speak of nationalism and nationality, as Piganiol does frequently, during the Roman empire and earlier periods of antiquity (cf. Hans Kohn, *The Idea of Nationalism* [New York, 1944], pp. 3 ff., 579 ff.). Piganiol overestimates, I think, the importance of the *Anonymi de rebus bellicis liber* (pp. 200, 334, 390). Ulfilas was not a bishop in 332, as Piganiol carelessly implies (p. 53), and I have believed that the chances were more likely that he was consecrated bishop (in 341) at Antioch, rather than at Constantinople, as Piganiol twice states without discussing his reasons (pp. 77, 383).

L'Empire chrétien is the work of a scholar obviously a liberal in politics and apparently an agnostic in religion. Although there is an occasional reference to the nineteenth century (p. 237), and Ausonius lives well after his retirement, *sur le marécé noir* (p. 415), there are no direct references in the book to contemporary events, but the years of war have apparently left their mark, and the author is one who can understand the meaning of political despotism, its services to society in the fourth century and, above all, its work of exhaustion. One is struck, from time to time, by the eloquent simplicity of phrases like, referring to Constantine, “digne d’un

honneur éternel, la plus belle de ses lois ordonne que les prisonniers aient le droit de voir chaque jour le soleil" (p. 70).

In his discussion of the fall of ancient civilization (pp. 411 ff.), Piganiol dismisses the climatic explanation of the late Ellsworth Huntington and that of V. G. Simkhovitch; the demographic explanations, so-called, of Otto Seeck, E. Ciccotti, Tenney Frank, and others; the political and socio-cultural explanations of Guglielmo Ferrero and M. Rostovtzeff (the latter's points of view are much too sparsely presented); the economic and financial failure of the imperial government emphasized by C. Barbagallo; and the economic and social analyses of the decline given by M. Weber, Rostovtzeff again, and others. Sweeping aside the learned studies of Alfons Dopsch in this connection, in a single footnote (p. 420, n. 33), Piganiol goes back to the "catastrophic" explanation which has been popular since the Renaissance, and which Dopsch has especially disputed: "La catastrophe est survenue sous la forme des invasions barbares" (p. 420). "La civilisation romaine n'est pas morte de sa belle mort: Elle a été assassinée" (p. 422). If so, it was the assassination of a near corpse. This is, despite the criticisms which I have felt it just to make, an excellent book, *et ego utinam scriptissem!*

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AURELIO PERETTI. *Epirrema e Tragedia, Studio sul Dramma Attico Arcaico.* Firenze, Felice le Monnier, 1939. Pp. 307. (*Pubblicazioni della R. Università degli Studi di Firenze*, Facoltà di Lettere e Filosofia. III Serie, Vol. IX.)

In the work under discussion the author undertakes to throw new light on the origin of Greek tragedy by a minute study of the lyric portions of the extant plays, especially of the earlier tragedies of Aeschylus. In other words, it is not a discussion of newly discovered material, but an examination of evidence that has always been available. A general idea of his method of procedure may be seen from his chapter headings which are as follows: Threnos e kommos; L'esodo dei "Persiani" e dei "Sette"; Il "satyricon" epirrematico; Il satyricon e le "Supplici"; L'epirrema arcaico; L'evoluzione dell'epirrema; L'epirrema nei commi dell' "Oresteia"; La forma delle scene epirrematiche; La rhesis arcaica; La tragedia preeschilea.

It should be noticed at the outset that the author uses the word epirrhema in a sense that it does not have in ancient writers. As is well known they use it as the name of one of the parts of the parabasis of the old comedy, a jocular address in trochees probably delivered by the leader of one half of the chorus and followed by an antepirrhema delivered by the leader of the other half. Peretti uses it for the short passages, usually in iambic trimeters, which follow certain lyric strophes. Thus Aeschylus, *Supplices*, 348-417 is designated as an epirrhematic passage. The trimeters which follow

strophes α , β , and γ , and their antistrophes, would be epirrhemata. There is no specific form for the epirrhemata in tragedy as he uses it, but he notes a change from the form it has in the earliest plays of Aeschylus to that found in the latest tragedies of Sophocles and Euripides.

This so-called epirrhemata, he points out, had its part in the development of tragedy. It is closely associated with the kommos, which in its origin goes back to the ritual threnos of Asia as is shown by the metres, the melodies and the outries which accompany it, as well as by many stylistic elements, the identity of motives and development of thought, e.g. the laments in the *Persae* and the *Septem*. The iambio-dochmiae metre is characteristic of the kommos whether lyric or epirrhematic. This cannot go back to a song of satyrs. It is out of keeping with a Dionysiac song of ithyphallic demons. Its origin must have been a severe ritual song such as a funeral dirge. When Aristotle speaks of the dithyramb as the origin of "satyric" tragedy he means the "cycle ritual dithyramb," not that of Pindar and Bacchylides. Pre-Aeschylean tragedy, to be sure, had had a satyric element that had developed from the satyr chorus, but this was eliminated by Phrynicus and Aeschylus and its place supplied by the satyr dramas of Pratinas.

The choral songs represent the original element of tragedy because they are the unique means of expressing tragic pathos. Aristotle's dictum $\tauὰ τοῦ χοροῦ ἡλάττωσε$ is commented on by the author who points out that the choral songs of the *Agamemnon* are no less full or less important than those of the *Supplices* or the *Persae*. The reduction of the part sung he would connect with the introduction of the second actor, whose part in the *Supplices* was very slight.

The epirrhemata is certainly an important part of the ancient drama, but it has a modest extent when compared with the choral songs and the dialogue. The first form of the stasimoni was a ritual song in which the chorus turned to the gods. It was closely associated with the dramatic action by which especially divine intervention was called for. The dramas of the sixth century must have had in common with those of Phrynicus and Aeschylus a religious feeling for human actions to which severe ritual forms appealed. It is inconceivable that there should have been a change from an improvised satyr song to severe tragedy which transforms into a tragic religious aspect even joyful events like the victory of Salamis celebrated in the *Phoenissae* of Phrynicus and the *Persae* of Aeschylus. The severe religious character of the primitive tragic song explains how it could welcome funeral laments and other ritual forms. The author declares that in reality the *Persae* is not a tragedy of Atossa, Darius, or Xerxes, but from parodos to exodus the protagonist is always the chorus. The epirrhematic scenes in the play are not dramatically effective and stop the action of the tragedy. The epirrhema of the Persian messenger shows affinity with the kommos of Xerxes. Its religious origin may be traced in the repetition of words, thoughts, and rhythms. In the *Septem* the epirrhemata for the first time contains a dramatic contrast lacking in the earlier plays. Here we find in place of the parallelism of thoughts and motives a lively debate in which strong passions and opposing wishes meet and with intense pathos reveal the characters represented. In the *Prometheus* (136-

195) the anapaestic metre is used in the epirrhema for the first time and the author analyzes the thought and the metre and comments on the effect of the one on the other. He points to the monody of Io (561-612) as an example of the importance the epirrhematic dialogue assumes in tragedy.

Epirrhematic scenes in Aeschylus may be divided into three periods. In Period I (*Suppl.* and *Pers.*) they are merely the means of making a dialogue of the liturgical songs and the traditional motives of the threnody which constituted the original nucleus of the drama. In Period II (*Sept.* and *Prom.*) they become dramatically effective. In Period III (*Oresteia*) the lyric-epirrhematic dialogue, besides preserving the pathos of the primitive threnody, becomes the poetic and dramatic centre of the whole tragedy. In later plays it was often transformed into a musical dialogue.

In Aeschylus, too, these epirrhematic scenes are regularly introduced by a "rhetic," or speech, which in the older tragedies has an informative character, because of which he concludes that the "rhetic" and the first actor were introduced at the same time and by the same poet. It transformed the ritual proclamation into a narrative. Incidentally, the role of the first actor in the tragedy of Thespis must have been like that of Danaus in the *Supplices*.

That the traditional threnodic character of the lyric-epirrhematic scenes concludes the tragedies of Aeschylus he thinks is evident. Equally evident is the ritual element in the first episode. This is in direct dependence on the ritual song of the parodos. The importance of the parodos in primitive and Aeschylean tragedy is pointed out. It preserves faithfully the ritual hymn to the divinity. But besides the nucleus of the original liturgical song the parodos of Aeschylean tragedy contains the elements of the dramatic action to follow, e.g., in the *Supplices*, the composition of the first part of which the author analyzes.

In the *Septem* the importance of the ritual element, which predominates in the *Supplices* and the *Persae*, is lessened, as is the parallelism between the parodos and the epirrhematic scenes of the first episode.

The epirrhematic scenes do not have an informative object, or decide the action of the drama, but answer the "rhetic" of the actor or a stichomythia. Like the stasima they are closely associated with the traditional notices of the threnody in form, thought and metres and are a direct and unique expression of tragic inspiration and sentiment.

The author examines the "rhetic" and its structure and points out that originally it had a function different from the lyrics. It was objective and impersonal and the starting point for a new situation. The typical form of the archaic "rhetic" consists of three parts, exhortation, description and reflexion, with a conclusion, cf. speech of Danaus (*Suppl.* 980-1013). In the later plays this tripartite scheme disappears. The parodos of the *Supplices* is typical of early tragedy when there was no actor. Besides the action which creates the drama, it contains in itself the whole tragedy. In the *Septem* the entrance of the chorus is the completion of a ritual act, the invocation of the gods in a difficult moment. In the *Persae* where the historical subject creates a peculiar situation there is lacking in the parodos the form of the original liturgical hymn.

The address of the coryphaeus (e.g. *Suppl.* 625-629) is archaic and suggests the theme for the song which follows. Both address and theme are elements of the ritual prologue. It is so old and so essential to tragedy that it survived after the anapaestic prologue disappeared. The liturgical element which originally made up the anapaestic prologue became transformed into a dramatic and pathetic representation of the tragic action. It was Dionysiac ecstasy which transformed the leader of the chorus into an actor and the impersonal liturgical address into an invocation full of pathos. This, he says, is what is meant by the influence of the Bacchic thiasos on tragedy; and so must be interpreted Aristotle's famous phrase on the origin of tragedy *ἀπὸ τῶν ἔξαρχόντων τὸν διθύραμβον*. He thinks the passage in Suidas *αὐδὴν πρὸς τὸν Διόνυσον* means that originally tragedies were written in honor of Dionysus, but not connected with Dionysiac myths. This may have been in the time of Cleisthenes. The adoption of a myth in dramatic form is inseparable from the introduction of the first actor. It was Thespis who created the actor. Among the members of the Academy in the time of Plato or a little later the work of Thespis was considered a dramatic representation with a true actor, with scenic illusion and heroic, not Dionysiac, myths.

The peculiar difference between the semi-equine demons of Attica, in contrast with the goat nature of the *τράγοι* of the Peloponnesus represents a survival of Ionic origin previous to the introduction into Attica of the Bacchic thiasos of *τράγοι* and the mimetic song which has the name of tragedy. It could go back to a very ancient phase of ritual usage in Attica of which traces remain in fifth century drama and in learned tradition.

He concludes that pre-Aeschylean tragedy was not a burlesque or satyric epirrhema, but a threnodic tragedy sprung from a fusion of Doric and Ionic elements, i.e. of the mimetic song in use in the more austere Dionysiac ceremonies combined with Ionic ritual threnody.

The conclusions arrived at by the author do not admit of positive proof, but his arguments are not unreasonable and no serious objection can be taken to them. Incidentally, it may be noticed that he rightly rejects the ephyrrhium inserted by some editors after line 1566 of the *Agamemnon*, pointing out that 1567 refers to the antistrophe, 1560-66.

The book is fully documented.

There are several misprints in the numbers of the lines quoted. Thus p. 134, line 255 should be 272; p. 187, line 1557 should be 1567; p. 194, 847-69 should be 848-69; p. 195 table should read 11, 7, 8, 8, 11; p. 196, 927-36 should read 927-37.

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KURT THEODOR SCHNEIDER. Zusammensetzung des römischen Senates von Tiberius bis Nero. Zürich, Ernst Lang, 1942. Pp. 196. (Diss.)

SIEGFRIED J. DE LAET. De Samenstelling van den Romeinschen Senaat gedurende de eerste eeuw van het Principaat (28 vóór Chr.-68 na Chr.). Antwerpen, De Sikkel, 1941. Fp. 338. (Rijksuniversiteit te Gent, Werken uitgegeven door de Faculteit van de Wijsbegeerte en Letteren, 92^e aflevering.)

It is an understandable coincidence that after the publication of the two books of Pierre Lambrechts on the composition of the Roman Senate from Hadrian to Commodus (Antwerp, 1936) and from Septimius Severus to Diocletian (Budapest, 1937), two attempts were undertaken, evidently independent of each other, to do the same for the Julio-Claudian dynasty. The period from Vespasian to Trajan had been ably taken care of by B. Stech (*Klio*, Beiheft X, 1912).

One of the two works originated under the influence of Professor Hubert Van de Weerd who had previously suggested Lambrechts' studies, at the same University of Ghent, and its preface is dated April 1940; the other one was submitted to the Faculty of Philosophy of the University of Zürich on June 30, 1939 as one learns from the *Vita* (p. 196). The author gives no hint as to when work on his thesis was concluded. The reference "Stein, Legaten, p.", etc. (p. 12) (I presume, to A. Stein, *Die Legaten von Moesien* [Budapest, 1940]), is misleading since he does not elsewhere quote this important book (e. g., p. 44 not in connection with A. Didius Gallus, nor p. 92 in connection with C. Terentius Tullius Geminus). Neither is Groag's *Reichsbeamte von Achaea* (1939) cited nor Syme's *Roman Revolution* (1939). Therefore it seems safe to assume that Schneider's dissertation represents the state of his knowledge in 1938 or 1939.

Between the two works there is one very important difference as to their scope: Schneider omitted the period of Augustus which had been treated in the dissertation of F. Fischer, *Senatus Romanus qui fuerit Augusti temporibus* (Berlin, 1908); on the other hand De Laet included it because he justly considered Fischer's dissertation inadequate.

Thus for the period between 14 and 69 A. D. one should expect a close resemblance between the two studies, inasmuch as investigations of this type consist largely of lists of senators which may in details diverge, but which in general should agree since they are based on factual evidence. So, one is amazed at the enormous difference in the number of senators listed by the two authors for the same period. The 592 names of Schneider correspond to 1222 names given by De Laet. This discrepancy of more than 100% is due (not entirely though, see below p. 339) to Schneider's negligence. He arranges his lists of senators (which amount to about four-fifths of the whole book, if one excludes bibliography, *vita*, and table of contents) according to emperors. Each chapter is divided into six sections according to the rank: *consulares*, *praetorii*, *tribunicii*, *aedilicui*, *quaestorii*, and senators of undetermined rank. In each category

dated officials are given first in chronological order, then follow in alphabetical order those whose tenure cannot be dated. The *consulares* have a third subdivision: men who had been consuls under a previous emperor. Since it did not occur to Schneider to equip his book with a simple index of names and since cross references regularly indicate the name of the emperor only under whom a senator is reported, it is very difficult to find one's way around, the more so because there always is a good chance that the name one is trying to locate does not figure at all in this collection. I give only a few striking examples (the numbers are De Laet's): no. 506. Apidius Merula, whose name was struck from the *album senatorium* in 25; no. 514. (Aquillius) Regulus, *quaestor Ti(beri) Caesaris Augusti*; no. 526. C. Ateius Capito, the famous jurist, consul in 5 A.D., who died in 22; no. 527. Augurinus, proconsul of Crete under Gaius; no. 531. L. Axius Naso, proconsul of Cyprus in 29; no. 543 — 77. Q. Caerellius, *legatus Ti. Caesaris Augusti, proconsul*; no. 550. C. Calpurnius Bibulus, *aedilis* in 22; no. 704. C. Octavius Laenas (*consul suffectus* in 33 A.D. as we know now from a fragment of the *Fasti Ostienses*, cf. A. Degrassi's suggestion to G. Calza, *Ezigraphica*, II [1940], p. 205), *curator aquarum* from 34 to 38; no. 956. C. Cadius Rufus, proconsul of Bithynia between 46 and 48; no. 1290. M. Annaeus Lucanus, the poet of the *Pharsalia*, *quaestor* under Nero.

Where foundations are so faulty one might rightly expect defects in the structure also. That any work of this kind would have to depend greatly on the *Prosopographia Imperii Romani* and on the prosopographical articles in *R.-E.*, is obvious, but there is no reason why for each consulate all references should be copied from the *P.I.R.* A more serious objection is that Schneider has the tendency to present Groag's arguments as if they were his own: cf., e.g., p. 20, no. 29 and *P.I.R.*², I, p. 254, no. 1242; p. 12, no. 12 and *P.I.R.*², II, p. 27, no. 141; p. 43, no. 79 and *P.I.K.*, II², p. 215, no. 928 (this latter article is almost a literal translation of Groag's, two of whose neutral statements have been changed into personal opinions introduced by "ich").

Schneider's dissertation is concluded by three chapters on the *nobiles* and the *patricii* from Tiberius to Nero. His statistical conclusions naturally suffer from the defects already discussed. Others must be added. In his list of the ancient patricians under Tiberius (p. 179) Paullus Aemilius Paulli. f(ilius) Regillus, *quaestor Ti(beri) Caesaris Aug.*, has been forgotten, undoubtedly because he had been placed on p. 64, no. 216 between T. Olius and Ti. Plautius Silvanus, as in general disturbances in the alphabetic order are too frequent (in this particular list which consists of nine names there are three errors). M. Iunius Silanus, *consul suffectus* under Claudius (p. 146, no. 497), is lacking in the list of patricians on p. 185. And so one could go on.

If further arguments were needed to oppose the custom of Central European universities of indiscriminately demanding the publication of every doctor's dissertation—regardless of its qualities—Schneider's dissertation surely might serve as a convincing demonstration.

It is a relief to turn from this performance to De Laet's scholarly work, although the language in which it is written (Flemish) does

not exactly facilitate the use of this book. An investigation which is so obviously addressed to an international audience should be presented in a medium which is accessible to the audience (cf. also Charlotte E. Goodfellow, *C. W.*, XL [1946], p. 48). One feels this way all the more because in this case there is every reason to believe that the author would have been quite able to write his book in French as he did the résumé (pp. 308-324).

The bulk of De Laet's book, too, consists of lists of senators (pp. 18-214), divided for each of the four emperors Augustus, Tiberius, Claudius, and Nero (Gaius is omitted), into *certi* and *incerti*. In each of the eight chapters resulting from this division, the alphabetic order is followed, and an index of names makes it even easier to locate any given name.

De Laet has made use of all available sources, besides the *P. I. R.* and *R.-E.*, principally the rapidly growing collection of excellent *Fasti* of Roman provinces and the *Année épigraphique*. The lists seem to be complete; in fact, occasionally, doubtful names are included. The principle adopted by the *P. I. R.* to admit members of the two *ordines* and their relatives (*P. I. R.*, I², p. VII) is sound for the *P. I. R.*, but it cannot be used without modification in a study of the composition of the Senate. Not everyone who qualified for membership in the Senate was actually a member of that body. L. Aelius Tubero (De Laet, no. 489), *duovir* in Pompeii in 23 A.D., may well have been a son of the consul of 11 B.C., Q. Aelius Tubero, but this evidence does not necessarily make him a senator; Dessau was as correct in printing his name *I.L.S.*, III, p. 6 in ordinary letters as was Groag in including him in the *P. I. R.*, I², p. 45, no. 274, but De Laet should have listed him among the *Incerti*. Arruntius (no. 45) and Aquilius Regulus (no. 515) need not have been members of the Senate because their brothers were. Asinius Saloniinus (no. 524), Pollio's grandson, died in 22 A.D. "He had had no chance to attain the age for an important office" (J. H. Oliver, *A.J.P.*, LXVIII [1947], p. 148). Whether, technically spoken, he was a member of the Senate at the time of his death we do not know. Quite uncertain is also the case of Sisenna, *patronus liberti ciuisdam* (no. 147), who may be identical with no. 145, 146, or 147. De Laet lists M. Antonius Labeo, under Tiberius (no. 501), although it is doubtful whether the great jurist survived Augustus. All we know is that he died between 5 A.D. and 22, the year in which Ateius Capito, who quotes him, died (cf. Schanz-Hosius, *Gesch. der römischen Lit.*, II⁴ [1935], p. 383). De Laet's remark (no. 29) that Labeo died shortly before 22 A.D. is not borne out by Gellius, XIII, 12. L. Aemilius Paulus (no. 494—20), *frater Arvalis* in 14 A.D., should not have been listed at all under Tiberius since he died before May 15 of that year, whereas Tiberius succeeded Augustus on August 19. A. Larcius Gallus (no. 1443) should have been omitted altogether in view of A. Stein's still valid opinion (*Der römische Ritterstand*, p. 308) that he was not a senator since his son is called συγκλητικός in contrast to his father in an inscription from Gortyn (cf. *Ann. épigr.*, 1916, p. 69). In Frontinus, *De Ag.*, 102 an Albius Crispus is named as *curator aquarum* from 68 to 71. Dessau and Groag (*P. I. R.*², I, p. 82, no. 483) substitute for him by conjecture

Vibius Crispus. De Laet lists both names (no. 1287 and no. 1150 == 1584), specifying each as "curator aquarum van 68 tot 71."

These criticisms should, however, not detract from the great value of De Laet's prosopographic lists, which is enhanced by the use he makes of them in the last sections of his book.

On pp. 217-223 he gives *alba senatoria* according to ranks for the years 20 B. C., and 14, 37, 42, 54, and 68 A. D. These are followed by lists of patricians under the four emperors (pp. 224-225), of senators whose Italic origin can be determined (pp. 226-229), and by convenient *Fasti* of the provinces during this period (pp. 230-248).

The most interesting part are the conclusions (pp. 251-307). They start with a well documented demonstration of the rapid decline of the patriciate, in spite of the creation of new patricians by the emperors, a decline which, incidentally, goes hand in hand with a similar development among the *nobiles* (cf. R. Syme, *Roman Revolution*, pp. 490-508). The attitude of the four emperors toward *homines novi* is treated in this connection. Here Tiberius comes out as favoring the *homines novi* at the cost of the higher aristocracy. This is in opposition to the opinion of F. B. Marsh in *A. H. R.*, XXXI (1926), pp. 233 ff. (pp. 271, 316). De Laet has not convinced me, aside from the fact that Marsh's views have been unduly simplified. As to the last years of Tiberius, Marsh was quite correct when he said with respect to the list of consuls that the emperor balanced class against class (pp. 249-250; cf. *Epigraphica*, II [1940], pp. 201-205).

The gradual infiltration of the Senate with men from the provinces, mainly of the Romanized West, well set forth by De Laet (pp. 278-286), reaches a climax under Nero. The influx of "orientals" (who may be descendants of Roman soldiers, however: cf. A. Stein, *Die Reichsbeamten von Dazien* [*Dissertationes Pannonicae*, ser. I, no. 12], Budapest, 1940, pp. 103-109) also increases under this emperor, but does not become really important before Trajan.

In a chapter on the administration of the provinces, De Laet deals particularly with the problem of prolonged tenure of provincial governors under Tiberius (cf. Tacitus, *Ann.*, I, 80) (pp. 289-299), a question which had already been treated well by F. B. Marsh, *The Reign of Tiberius* (1931), pp. 157-159. I share the objections raised by R. S. Rogers in this connection (*C. J.*, XLII [1947], p. 375).

Notwithstanding certain criticisms that have been voiced in this review, there can be no doubt that De Laet's book is a praiseworthy and valuable addition to the literature on the Roman Empire.

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N. I. HERESCU. Bibliographie de la Littérature Latine. Paris, Société d'édition "Les Belles Lettres," 1943. Pp. xviii + 426. 250 francs. (*Collection de bibliographie classique*, publiée sous la direction de J. Marouzeau.)

J. VAN OOTEGHEM, S. J. Bibliotheaca Graeca et Latina, à l'usage des professeurs des Humanités gréco-latines. Deuxième édition revue et augmentée. Namur, Éditions de la Revue *Les Études Classiques*, 1946. Pp. 387. 150 francs (Belgian).

M. Herescu (pp. v-x) briefly outlines his purposes as an attempt to present within a compact volume a critical bibliography which will be useful for students and teachers. The arrangement is chronological rather than alphabetical. The minor delay in finding individual authors is lessened by an index of Latin authors (pp. 419-421), and by a good table of contents (pp. 423-426). A full index of modern scholars would be useful but hardly worth the additional work and cost. This volume was completed and in proof in 1939, but its appearance was delayed until 1943. Herescu explains in a postscript to his preface that a few additional items were included, but no attempt was made to carry it beyond the year 1939.

A brief introduction lists the bibliographies in a clear fashion, showing how the earlier bibliography can be traced. A list of general works and collections follows. In listing Klussmann (p. xi) the volume numbers in the *Jahresbericht* (i. e. 146, 151, 156, 165) should have been included. To our ears the use of *Clarendon* as an abbreviation for *Scriptorum classicorum bibliotheca Oxoniensis* and reference to the *Loeb Classical Collection* are strange (p. xiv).

Each period of Latin literature is given a single chapter: I. The archaic period before Livius Andronicus (pp. 1-4); II. The pre-Ciceronian period divided into the third century and the introduction of Hellenism, and the second century with the progress of Hellenism and national opposition (pp. 5-36); III. The period of Cicero (pp. 37-133); IV. The period of Augustus (pp. 135-245); V. The period of the early empire, i. e. to the Antonines (pp. 247-345); VI. The Christian period to the fifth century (pp. 347-418). As the page numbers show, the proportion is fairly standard. This is true also of individual authors, e. g. Cicero (pp. 69-129). The sixth chapter is more summary than the others. However we must be grateful for the inclusion of that period—it would have been simpler for Herescu to have stopped with the age of the Antonines. Within the chapters the material is partially chronological. In chapter V the postponement of the learned writers until the end of the chapter places Pliny the Elder after Pliny the Younger. The divisions are generally by author, but sections such as those on the historians and orators (pp. 35-36) in chapter II, and those on the epic and the theater (pp. 220-221) in chapter IV are valuable. Within the six chapters there are subdivisions by paragraph numbers which are useful, especially in the longer sections.

This work is not a simple listing of bibliographical material. Brief comments on individual items occur frequently. Even more useful is the method used in certain sections in presenting a bibli-

ography by idea rather than by chronology. An excellent example is paragraph 539 (pp. 321-323) in which the studies on Suetonius are divided into four parts. The first part cites Macé and then gives the references for the disputed date of Suetonius' birth and for his tenure in the office of *ab epistulis*. The second part concerns his place in the history of biography and his use of sources. The third includes items on his relations with Tacitus and Plutarch as well as miscellaneous items. The fourth is on grammar and style.

A brief survey of the longest item in the book—that on Cicero—will show how the material has been analyzed (pp. 69-129, paragraphs 116-285). The first eight paragraphs are general: bibliography (116), manuscripts (117), scholiasts (118), complete editions (119), partial editions (120), indices and dictionaries (121), translations (122), and studies (123). The last is long and carefully analyzed: a) Life and work: including general works, biographies, studies on politics and political thought, accounts of his influence, religious ideas, and historical knowledge; b) Miscellaneous: including such items as discussion of Plutarch's *vita*, Cicero's relations with Pompey, his year in Cilicia, his family and his legacies; c) Language and grammar; d) Style and rhythm; e) Metrics; f) Influence. Cicero's works are then divided into the standard five classifications: Orations (124-210); Rhetorical treatises (211-236); Philosophical treatises (237-277); Correspondence (278-281); Poetry (282-285). Under each general heading the works are followed by paragraphs on individual works where again there may be for each work as many as four paragraphs—i. e., manuscripts, editions, lexica and indices, studies. The value of the inclusion of the *sigla* in the paragraphs on manuscripts is usually small.

This volume was undertaken under the influence of the great French scholar and bibliographer, Jules Marouzeau. It is a special work in the series of the *Collection de bibliographie classique*, fondée et publiée par J. Marouzeau, which comprises the *Dix années de bibliographie classique* (1914-1924) and *L'année philologique* (1924 to the present). The reverse of the cover gives the pleasant information that there is in preparation in the same Collection a volume of about 1500 pages which will close the gap between 1896 (at which point Klussmann's *Bibliotheca scriptorum classicorum* ends) and 1914. This volume is *Bibliographie classique rétrospective, bibliographie des années 1896 à 1914*, by S. Lambrino.

Father van Ooteghem's work is a revision, enlargement, and consolidation into a separate volume of material which appeared in *Les Études Classiques* between 1936 and 1940: *Bibliotheca Latina*, V (1936), 227-378; *Bibliotheca Graeca* in 14 sections, V (1936), 644-651; VI (1937), 90-98; 257-266; 438-443; 596-624; VII (1938), 102-116; 259-267; 409-422; 566-581; VIII (1939), 106-113; 399-407; 548-549; IX (1940), 67-74; 215-219. The total of 301 pages was increased by over 25 per cent in the new edition. In his preface Father van Ooteghem modestly states that his aims are limited—it is not a complete bibliography but was planned particularly for the use of teachers in the secondary schools; special attention was given to the fundamental authors—Homer, the tragic dramatists, Demosthenes, Herodotus, Plato, Xenophon, Caesar, Cicero, Horace, Ovid, Sallust, Tacitus, Livy, and Virgil; authors less frequently read in the schools were either omitted or treated more briefly.

The organization is simpler than in the case of Herescu's work. The first part (pp. 3-49) contains general works, ancient geography and history, histories of Greek and Latin literature, works on grammar, metries, and lexicography. Pages 53-205 contain the *Bibliotheca Graeca* and pages 209-384 the *Bibliotheca Latina*. The authors are arranged chronologically; in the earlier edition the Latin authors were arranged alphabetically, the Greek authors were arranged haphazardly. In the Greek section in addition to those authors mentioned above the following are included: the chief lyric poets (especially Pindar), Thucydides, Lysias, Aeschines (not in the earlier edition), Theocritus, Callimachus, Plutarch, and Lucian. The most startling omission is, of course, Aristotle. In the Latin section the following additional authors are included: Lucretius, Nepos, Catullus, Tibullus, Propertius, Phaedrus, Seneca the Younger, Martial, Pliny the Younger, and Juvenal. There is good precedent for stopping with Juvenal, but starting with Cicero seems to the reviewer too close to the method of Procrustes. The arrangement within sections on individual authors is satisfactory. For example, thirty-eight sub-headings are used for Virgil: editions (fourteen headings); dictionaries; general studies and biography; ideas; art; grammar, language and meter; sources; influence; instruction; one each for the *App.*, *Buc.*, *Buc. IV*, *Georg.*, and *Aen.*; one each for the first eleven books of the *Aeneid*.

For the majority of the items a very brief summary or criticism is included at the end in parentheses. Ordinarily this is not more than one line; this addition is extremely valuable, especially for articles. The reviewer would take exception to some of these summary statements; e. g. on Tenney Frank, *Vergil* (Biographie vivante, suggestive, mais romanesque, p. 270), on E. G. Sihler, *Cicero of Arpinum* (Non particulièrement recommandable, p. 210). Further critical judgment has been exercised by the use of asterisks to mark the more important works. Also prices have been included for books which are in print. Within sub-headings the items are at times arranged chronologically and at times by subject. In some of the longer sections this is very confusing. No date has been listed on the title page, but some of the items show the date given at the head of the review.

While checking these two works side by side the reviewer soon realized what Father van Ooteghem meant when he said in his forward:

L'on s'étonnera peut-être de la ressemblance frappante entre telle partie de notre répertoire et telle page d'un ouvrage bibliographique paru récemment: pour déterminer à qui revient la priorité, on voudra se reporter à notre première édition.

A sample of the similarities can be found by comparing *Ét. Cl.*, V (1936), pp. 262-263 and Herescu, pp. 85-86 (par. 159 on *in Cat.*); pp. 264-265 and p. 89 (par. 167 on *pro Archia*) or pp. 266-267 and pp. 97-98 (par. 198 on *pro Milone*). The first set is particularly enlightening. Of twenty-two citations in Herescu only two are not in the earlier edition of van Ooteghem. For the twenty which appear in Herescu there is only one word which does not appear in van

Ooteghem. The comment on Salmon's article (*Crassus et César furent complices des deux conspirations de 66 et 63 av. J.-C.*) appears in abbreviated form in Herescu as a heading (*César et Crassus, complices de Catilina*). In the title of Prof. Potter's article the spelling "oratio" for "oration" appears in both lists. Most striking of all is the fact that Prof. Ullman's pamphlet, published by the University of Pittsburgh in 1918, appears in both lists as issuing from Pittsburg and with the title: *Questiozs politiques suggérées par les discours de Cicéron contre Catilina*. Instances are not confined to the section on Cicero but can be multiplied for other Latin authors treated by Father van Ooteghem. To be sure each bibliography must use materials from its predecessors, but the stones should be more thoroughly recut. On p. xiii Herescu says: Tel se présente, à l'heure actuelle (1942), *l'instrumentum bibliographicum* des études classiques; il a été copieusement utilisé, cela va sans dire, par l'auteur de la présente bibliographie. However, neither Father van Ooteghem nor *Les Études Classiques* is mentioned by name on the preceding pages.

In the listing of the items in Herescu exception might be taken to the printing of the items as *continucus* paragraphs. This makes the individual references harder to find, but is very economical in space. In van Ooteghem each item is paragraphed. Misprints and errors especially in the spelling of American and English names occur somewhat frequently in both works: e.g. Carry for Cary, Wescott for Westcott, I. B. Pike for J. B. Pike (Herescu, p. 320). The paper in the former volume is poor, that in the latter fairly good. The coverage of the fundamental materials within the limits set seems to the reviewer very good in both works.

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AUGUSTO ROSTAGNI. Aristotle, *Poetica*. Introduzione, Testo, e Commento. Seconda Edizione Riveduta. Torino, Chiantore, 1945. Pp. c + 209. (*Biblioteca di Filologia Classica*.)

The Introduction of this edition is unchanged from that of 1927, though a page of postscript is added. A few changes have been made in the commentary. The text is not much changed, but the critical notes have been thoroughly reviewed, and additions made, as from the edition by Gudeman (1934), and the Latin MSS. Since the earlier edition was not reviewed in this Journal and the second seems to represent Professor Rostagni's present views, the volume will be considered as though wholly new.

On the text the author says that it is reconstituted because of the changed valuation of the manuscripts, especially Riccardianus 46, and because of better knowledge of the Arabic version, and the discovery of the mediaeval Latin translations. He has not, however, attempted a true critical edition. In other words, he presents what may be called the traditional text with revisions. His comparison of the Parisinus (A) and Riccardianus (B) MSS is so put as to lead

one to wonder whether if attempting a critical text he would not base it on the latter rather than on the former. His admirable principle of refraining from emendation as much as possible sometimes allows him to use readings found only in lesser codices. For example, the reading $\pi\eta\lambda\epsilon\delta\delta\omega$ (58 a 3) is taken from Paris. 2038, as against both A and B; Gudeman's emendation adds several words. In 51 a 17, however, Rostagni accepts the conjecture $\gamma' \acute{e}v$, while Gudeman follows B and others; both editors claim the support of the Arabic. In this instance Rostagni has changed both the text and the note of his first edition, in which Vettori's conjecture was not fully given; following his principle of brevity, he has not mentioned Gudeman's debate on this as showing the independence of B. In 52 a 36 Rostagni accepts $\sigma\nu\mu\beta\alpha\iota\omega\epsilon\omega$ on the authority only of "apogr. quaedam," though Bywater, Gudeman, and Hardy find no difficulty in reading $\sigma\nu\mu\beta\alpha\iota\omega\epsilon\iota$. In 47 a 27, like most editors, he drops $\acute{e}\tau o\tau o\iota\omega\iota$ from the text. Albecciani (Aristotle, *La poetica* [1934]), however, in his list of "Varianti portate all' edizione del Rostagni," points out, as the editors mentioned do not, that the word is also lacking from the Arabic at 47 a 13, and declares that it can be retained, "perchè l'epopea è il genere poetico fondamentale fra quelli enumerati nell'introduzione (47 a 13), e ricorre anche dopo (47 b 14)." The propriety of retaining the word has apparently been settled by an article in this journal (XLV [1944], pp. 340-53) by Seymour M. Pitcher, "Epic, As I Here Define It"—presumably not accessible to Rostagni. But in spite of such passages, he holds generally to the codices.

The explanatory notes are concise, rich in their references to Greek and Latin literature, and do not avoid difficulties or passages that can be used in opposition to the editor's views. The latter is exemplified by the treatment of the element of spectacle in tragedy. Rostagni alludes often to Aristotle's view of spectacle as "aliena dall'arte" (pp. 33, 34, 35, 42, 76, 107, 113, 173, 174). In the last (62 a 17) he defends a reading found in the codices, but often amended, which makes the passage apply to music as a source of pleasure, excluding spectacle. Yet he holds that in 55 b 32-56 a 3 Aristotle intended to establish the spectacular as the fourth type of tragedy. Rostagni's clear demonstration of the non-poetic quality of spectacle seems alone enough to convince one that Aristotle could not have made the tragedy depending on $\delta\psi\iota\omega$ one of the types deserving commendation; bad tragedy can hardly enter into his classification. In this connection, Rostagni, properly as I believe, interprets $\mu\epsilon\rho\eta$ as indicating the four parts of tragedy. This fits with Chapter 24, in which $\epsilon\delta\eta$ and $\mu\epsilon\rho\eta$ are distinguished. The latter appear as peripeties, recognitions, and scenes of suffering, which according to Chapter 18 characterize the two types of tragedy founded on plot. Rostagni points out that $\eta\theta\omega\varsigma$, mentioned in the list of types, is to be understood in that of the parts, where it does not occur. The simple plot is also not mentioned. But to the list of parts which, according to Chapter 18, may dominate the drama to form types, $\delta\acute{a}\nu\omega\alpha$ and $\lambda\acute{e}\zeta\iota\varsigma$ are added. This suggests that they, like complexity of plot, scenes of suffering, and character, are poetically fundamental, as spectacle is not.

The part of the Introduction on the history of the *Poetics* and the history of the text is brief, learned, and clear.

One section of the Introduction is given to the catharsis, with the statement: "Il problema della *catarsi* è indispensabile per comprendere la posizione di Aristotele e per determinare quali concetti egli facesse della natura e del fine dell'Arte" (p. lvi). This is the traditional position. But is it a necessary one? In our present text the word occurs but once. It may have been dealt with more fully in the lost second book of the *Poetics*, but if that book dealt with comedy, would it have thrown much light on the catharsis of pity and fear, even if comedy may require more explicit justification than tragedy because it deals with lower passions (p. xlvi)? If the catharsis was very important for Aristotle's theory, would he not have alluded to it in one of the passages where he mentions tragic effect? Rostagni, indeed, seems to think that references to pity and fear imply also the catharsis (note on 50 a 29-30), but would implication have been enough if the catharsis was of great moment to Aristotle? Why did not some inkling of it come to Horace, whose *Ars Poetica* is presented by Rostagni in his édition as derivative from the *Poetics*? Is modern emphasis on the catharsis largely derived from the Renaissance critics who seized hold of it as concerned with the didactic function of literature—a topic that they supposed Aristotle must have discussed but which did not appear prominently in the *Poetics*?

\ A topic in which Rostagni (*Gnomon*, 1935, p. 231) proclaims his agreement with Gudeman is the relation of Aristotle's poetic theory to that of Plato. Rostagni's presentation of the Aristotelian view is virtually based on what is at best negative, namely that Aristotle was attempting to rescue poetry from its enemy Plato, whose "ostilità verso l'eloquenza e la poesia" is often alluded to (pp. xxxii, xxxv, xxxviii, lxxii, lxxxii, 99, 100, 155, 159, 163). Aristotle is great enough not to need such increase of fame as can come from refuting his teacher. For centuries there has been an uncomfortable feeling that one can hardly take as Plato's aesthetic his banishment of the poets from his imaginary republic. Maximus Tyrius, for example, had something of it. In our own day, voices have been raised against the notion that Plato was an enemy of art. For example G. M. A. Grube, in *Plato's Thought* (1935), discussing the matter at length with caution, is far from making him contemptuous of poetry. Hugo Perls goes farther: "Puisqu'à Platon on n'a épargné aucun reproche susceptible d'embrouiller l'ensemble de sa doctrine, l'identité du beau et du bon, en d'autres mots l'absorption de l'esthétique dans la morale appartient aux thèses les plus connues quant à l'oeuvre de Platon. L'aspect superficiel de l'oeuvre platonicienne semble confirmer cette thèse. Dans le *Banquet* la science du beau mène à la vertu; dans la *République* les artistes sont chassés de l'Etat, parce que leurs œuvres ne sont pas toujours morales. . . Mais cela n'empêche pas que Platon apprécie Homère selon sa juste valeur, qu'il aime le poète et que, quant à la morale et l'éducation de la jeunesse, il suffit de les avoir négligées quelques fois, pour bannir Homère de l'Etat. La séparation du beau et du bon est nette et rien ne le prouve mieux que cet exemple" (*L'art et la beauté vus par Platon* [1938], pp. 92-3). The view that Aristotle came from a good school and that he set out to speak because Plato's distinction between the practical and the aesthetic qualities of poetry had cleared the ground for study of poetry itself, is at least as

complimentary to him as the belief that he was defending poetry against the obscurantism of his teacher. Doubtless such a suggestion will seem to Professor Rostagni contradictory to his admirable remarks in the Preface on the method and end of historical study, but antiquity is not easy of estimation.

The *Index rerum*, a valuable addition to the second edition, yields in completeness to Bywater's indexes. A few references may be added: δευόν 53 b 14, 56 b 3; διάγονα 60 b 5; ἐκπληκτικός 60 b 25; ἔλεος 55 a 37; φόβος 56 b 1. Ἡδονή does not appear. Since the comment is not included, there is no reference under τέχνη to the discussion on p. 138, where the word does not occur in the text. This topic of nature and art is also discussed in Rostagni's valuable edition of Horace's *Ars Poetica*, line 408.

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AGNES CARR VAUGHAN. *The Genesis of Human Offspring. A Study in Early Greek Culture*. Northampton, Mass., 1945. (*Smith College Classical Studies*, XIII.)

We have grown used to books which apply the results of anthropological research to the study of Greek customs, religion, or thought. Andrew Lang, Jane E. Harrison, and F. M. Cornford—in his earlier books—have been the pioneers in this field; more recently George Thomson in his *Aeschylus and Athens* has made a determined attempt to arouse us classicists from our humanistic parochialism and complacency. Miss Vaughan's book represents the latest addition to the growing body of studies which try to utilize for a better understanding of Greek civilization what is being discovered about the outlook and mores of primitive tribes.

The book includes many pages of criticism directed against George Thomson whose anthropological information Miss Vaughan considers out of date. Her own research follows a different line of reasoning; it owes its inspiration to M. F. Ashley-Montague's *Coming into Being among the Australian Aborigines* (London, 1937; New York, 1938), a book which attempts to show that in the view of the native tribes of Central Australia a child has no biological or physical relation to either father or mother but derives its substance—soul and body—from its totem, the body of the mother serving merely as a temporary host for the tire which the child needs to unfold its own nature. This nature, to say it once more, is in every respect determined before the child enters the mother's body.

Miss Vaughan has searched the records of Greek mythology and ritual for vestiges of similar beliefs—beliefs of non-biological maternity. However, it is her conviction that the notions of the Australian aborigines may not only throw light on the views and beliefs of the Greeks regarding the origin of human beings but also provide illuminating parallels to early Greek conceptions in the realm of cosmogony.

In works of this kind an *a priori* conviction that the beliefs of widely separated races are fundamentally alike figures frequently

as a tacitly assumed major premise. Whether in identifying Greek myths, rituals, and thoughts with those of other races we hit what is essential in Greek civilization or rather miss the specifically Greek elements is a much debated question on which no agreement is in sight. It must be said, however, that anthropological research in the classical field has frequently been open to the charge of indifference to the ordinary and "time-honored" methods of studying a "text" and that the investigators often ignore the problems and results of philological and literary scholarship. Miss Vaughan must share this criticism.

Of the Greek authors with whom she deals Hesiod looms largest and fares worst. Miss Vaughan defines the Chaos of the *Theogony* as a "physical existence limited in space and time" (p. 21). She arrives at this description by a paralogism: Since even later Greeks had difficulty in conceiving endless space Chaos cannot be endless space; therefore it must have been conceived as "limited in space." How can it be made probable that this is really an essential feature of Hesiod's conception and not an altogether inappropriate category? And why does Miss Vaughan who goes on to assert that the entities emerging from Chaos, to wit, Gaia, Tartaros, Eros, Erebus, Nyx, "exist in a physical medium to which the Greek mind was apparently obliged to assign limits" make no attempt to interpret *Theog.* 735-745 where the physical and local relation between these entities and the huge *χάσμα* is set forth? Perhaps, she considers this passage as interpolated, yet she certainly does not hesitate to use for her purposes the story of Zeus swallowing Metis (886 ff.) although the reasons which tell against the Hesiodic origin of this passage are considerably stronger.

Shortly afterwards (p. 23) Miss Vaughan assures us that the birth by Gaia of Uranus, Pontus, and the Mountains is "non-biological." If so the reason is evidently their peculiar, non-biological nature. The subsequent narrative of the origin of the Titans, the erotic *ἱμέρος* of Uranus, his emasculation, and the birth of Aphrodite from his seed (cf. Paul Friedlaender, *Gött. Gel. Anz.*, 193², p. 257) can throw ample light on the question—on which Miss Vaughan feels doubtful (p. 24)—whether the biological rôle of the sexes was clear at Hesiod's time. Their sexual rôles were certainly perfectly clear; for what one may call the biological point of view, see e. g. *Theog.* 262 where it is said that Nemertes, a daughter of Nereus ὁ νηρεότης (235) resembles him in that she πατρὸς ἔχει νόον ἀθανάτου. In fact it is a matter of peculiar interest to study the instances in which Hesiod has been at pains to find the right father and the right mother for his deities or to provide them with children which are οὐκοτέρα τέκνα γονεῖσσιν.

In reading Miss Vaughan's book one is again and again driven to wonder how early the "Greeks" were whose beliefs she is trying to reconstruct. As her material is not early in the sense of belonging to a primitive stage of civilization a good deal of ingenious interpretation and special pleading is required to elicit from it beliefs similar to those of the Australian tribes. Miss Vaughan collects evidence (pp. 67 ff.) which in her opinion proves that Sun, water, wind, touch, and certain types of food were thought to influence human productivity. Of this evidence a large part must be discarded; it stands to reason, for instance, that once Helios had received a status in Greek

mythology, local legends and poets would busy themselves with inventing unions between him and nymphs or other women without being either consciously or unconsciously guided by a belief that "the association between the sun and a woman influenced human productivity" (p. 71). If the remainder of the material is weighed in the balance, the possibility—no more—may be conceded that fertility rites which were practiced at a time when the basic biological facts were common knowledge may have their roots in a time when these facts were less well understood. But, again, how early a time was this, how confident can we be in tracing back to it customs attested for the historical era, and where, anyhow, do we find a firm foothold in these attempts to compare a hypothetically reconstructed X with a vaguely understood Y?

The Australian spirit-child, the final chapter tells us, is spirit and body, and these are "regarded by the natives not only as forming an indissoluble whole but as an entity which lives on after the decay and eventual disappearance of the visible body" (p. 103). If Miss Vaughan in her search for a Greek parallel had contented herself with asserting that the Greeks too at the beginning lacked the conception of an immaterial soul the statement would have been correct. To make the parallel closer she compares the Homeric conception of $\psi \lambda \chi \eta$ with the interpretation which H. J. Rose has given to a Solonic law regarding corpses, with certain hypothetical conclusions derived from the Greek custom of burying infants within the precincts of the home, and finally with the notion of transmigration for which since Plato "did not wholly succeed" (p. 107) the myth in Plutarch's *De sera numinis vindicta* supplies her with the suitable details. If elements of such heterogeneous nature may be pieced together it is indeed not surprising that something analogous to the Australian belief will emerge.

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ROLAND G. KENT. *The Forms of Latin: A Descriptive and Historical Morphology*. Baltimore, Waverly Press, 1946. Pp. 159. (*Special Publication of the Linguistic Society of America*.)

Latinists have made good use of the three editions (1932, 1940, 1945) of Kent's *The Sounds of Latin*. The present book is a continuation of that one, providing a similar account of the morphology for use with graduate students and in private study. It deserves the same sort of praise that reviewers have given the earlier book; it is admirable for its accuracy and completeness, but of course no scholar could be expected to agree with all the historical explanations suggested.

The most serious fault to be found with the book is recorded in the second paragraph of the preface, as follows:

This volume treats of word-formation and the inflections of Latin . . . except that the stem formation of nouns and adjectives has been excluded; this topic would have occupied more space than can be apportioned to it, and has already been treated in admirable detail by

Manu Leumann in the fifth edition of Stoltz-Schmalz's *Lat.-inische Grammatik*, pp. 191-254.

It happens that word-formation is a topic that has been shamefully neglected by classical scholars and teachers, in this as in other countries. It is the weakest point in the grammatical equipment of most of us, and therefore peculiarly needs to be stressed. The fact that there is at last a good treatment in German is to be welcomed, but Kent does not plead Leumann's excellent treatment of Latin inflections as a reason for suppressing the present volume; surely he ought not to have omitted the most needed part of his book.

What he has given us is excellent. A book intended primarily for students ought to be conservative, and this one is. Evidently Kent has studied the most recent literature of his subject, and he is not afraid to glean an occasional explanation from it. In general, however, he sticks to the old, frequently without giving a reference to recently proposed divergent theories. For instance his treatment of the Latin gender system (§ 203) is based upon a prehistoric system practically identical with the one formerly assumed for Proto-Indo-European, although he grants that it may have been Proto-Italic, or even only Proto-Latin. If he had adopted Meillet's suggestion (*B. S. L.*, XXXII, pp. 5-28) that Proto-Indo-European feminines included only forms in -ā from adjectives in -os and nouns in -tri from agent nouns in -ter/tōr, his facts would have appeared somewhat different. He would scarcely have overlooked the inherited agent nouns in -tā and -ā (Lat. *agricola*, *scriba*) so completely.

Somewhat more annoying are a few passages where the author uses a phrase that seems to imply deliberations on linguistic problems. In discussing the locative singular of third declension nouns (§ 353) he says: "because of the confusion of meanings ('loc. 'in,' abl. 'from'), it was necessary to develop a new form for loc. use, and the ending -i of -o-stems was so used: *rūri*, *Carthagini*, *tempeti* 'betimes'." What happened was, of course, that the relatively common locatives in -i tended to encroach upon the relatively rare third declension *rūre*, etc. In his very next sentence Kent records the continued use of *rūre* "in the country," and thus proves that a new form was not "necessary." Similarly he says (§ 374) that "the fut. perf. replaced -unt by -int in the 3d pl., partly in imitation of the perf. subj. and partly to avoid confusion with the perf. and in -erunt." It would be better to say "and partly on account of the confusion . . ." Of course Professor Kent is under no misapprehension on such points as these, but his readers are prone to think of linguistic developments as dependent upon the theories and discussions of grammarians; we should neglect no opportunity to impress upon them the nearly complete lack of purpose in linguistic change.

There is one small group of explanations for which the author must accept full responsibility, but that can safely be called wrong. He lays (§ 203) the neuter gender of Lat. *vulgus* to the "influence of Gk. πλῆθος N." The final -s of early Lat. *hosticapas* and *pēricidas* is ascribed (§ 214) to imitation of Greek words like *νεῖρις*; this is possible only if we assume that Festus or his authority invented the forms cited. I can make no suggestion of a source for the epigraphical gen. s. *BONAE FEMINAES*. (§ 217), but if it contains a final

s from a Gk. gen. s. in -ης, the inscription must have been written by a Greek. These suggestions are of a piece with Kent's strange opinion that the classical Latin accent was a pitch accent taken over from their Greek teachers by upper class Romans of the best period; —but I have said my say on that topic elsewhere.

These slight blemishes would not be worth mentioning if it were not for the need a reviewer feels to say something. Kent's book will serve its double purpose well; it is an excellent school book, and it will be a safe reliance for scholars.

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M. DAVID and B. A. VAN GRONINGEN. Papyrological Primer. Second (English) Edition. Leyden, E. J. Brill, 1946. Pp. ix + 40* + 167; 6 facsimiles; 2 maps.

Like the first edition of this well-known book, the second, rendered in an entirely acceptable English, is designed specifically *in usum scholarum*, but whereas, on the Continent, its use will be largely confined to the schoolboy level, in America it may serve also in the graduate schools, either as an introduction to papyrology, or as a reader in Hellenistic Greek or Hellenistic history. For either purpose, it is better constructed than any other similar text known to me.

The substance of the volume consists of eighty-five papyrus texts or parts of texts, all from Egypt and designed to offer the reader a selection of materials of all types and times. In date they run from 311 B. C. to A. D. 592, in subject from high policy and public administration, through private law, to the letters, accounts, and memoranda of private life. Included are the famous things, the Elephantine marriage contract, the Gnomon of the Idios Logos, the Revenue Laws of Ptolemy Philadelphus, the letter of Claudius to the Alexandrines. Otherwise the basis of the selection has been the desire to present complete, representative, and where possible, newly published and little known material. So are included texts from the Oxford Papyri published by Wegener and from the Warren Papyri published by the editors themselves during the War, from the latest Michigan volumes, from the Athens Papyri, and so on. Each text has a line or two of introduction and the minimum of explanatory notes. Bibliographical notes are held to the irreducible minimum in view of the purpose of the volume. Plates are added to give a little idea of the paleographical development, the subjects being chosen from the Leyden collections. An excellent introduction of forty pages tells what a beginner ought to know to read intelligently, and two glossaries at the end explain technical terms of the administration and law.

The volume is sensibly and carefully done. The printing of the texts is not disfigured by misprints, and the comments are based on the latest discussion. While this is in no sense a new Mitteis-Wilken, it will be read by all practicing papyrologists with profit.

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(It is impossible to review all books submitted to the JOURNAL, but all are listed under BOOKS RECEIVED. Contributions sent for review or notice are not returnable.)

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AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY

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WHOLE No. 276

THE *BIRDS* OF ARISTOPHANES—A SOURCE BOOK FOR OLD BELIEFS.*

The *Birds* is important not so much for the views which Aristophanes himself expresses with reference to old beliefs, but rather as a source book for legends about birds and gods which were current in Athens in the late fifth century B.C. Jane Harrison, writing at a time when the analogy of the newly discovered Minoan bird and pillar monuments afforded some reason to suppose that the play contained direct evidence for the existence of bird cults in prehistoric Greece, said that "the Birds of Aristophanes seen in this new religious light, would well repay detailed examination";¹ and although few scholars would be prepared to subscribe to the sanguine views of forty years ago, a restatement of those views in the light of the ancient evidence is not without profit in a study of Greek religion. It is natural, as Nilsson has pointed out,² that augury should play a considerable part in a play about birds, but references to the science were

* It is necessary to acknowledge here the debt which I owe to those scholars without whose advice and criticisms this article would hardly have seen the light. In particular I would like to express my gratitude to Professor E. R. Dodds who read the article in its original form; to Professor J. D. Beazley who gave me the inestimable benefit of his detailed criticisms, and supplied me with much additional and some hitherto unpublished evidence; to Professor H. J. Rose and Mr. W. F. Jackson Knight, who encouraged me to publish it, and to Mr. T. J. Dunbabin whose kindnesses are too many to enumerate. It is perhaps unnecessary to add that I am alone responsible for the opinions expressed and for any errors or omissions which may still exist.

¹ *Transactions of the Third International Congress for the History of Religions*, II, p. 163.

² *Geschichte der G. Religion.*, p. 740.

certain to be appreciated by the Athenian citizen of the fifth century B.C., who, although he was in some sense the most rational of men, was also in his daily life religious to an extent bordering on superstition and remained so down to the latest times. St. Paul remarked upon Athenian *δεισιδαιμονία* more than four centuries later,³ while Aelian tells how a man was tried and executed for slaying one of the birds which were sacred to Asclepius.⁴ Xenophon was a good representative of the ordinary educated Athenian of his day, and he is most religious.⁵ Let a soldier but sneeze, and the event is hailed as an omen.⁶ Let an eagle but appear, and he is prepared to modify his actions in accordance with the directions of a soothsayer.⁷ Hence there is no reason to suppose that the poet was exaggerating when he stated that almost any event in the life of an ordinary Athenian citizen was liable to be construed as being ominous, to be hailed as a "bird."⁸

The subject matter of the play was not of course unique in Attic drama. Magnes, we are informed, wrote a play called "The Birds,"⁹ and indeed animal titles were of frequent occurrence in Old Comedy.¹⁰ What is more striking is the remarkable acquaintance with the habits of the various species of birds which the play reveals. Rogers, in his introduction, lists some eighty different species, most of which can be identified;¹¹ while those which take a specific part in the action of the play are accurately cast, e.g. in the description of the building of the walls of Nephelokokkygia, each species is allotted its appropriate task,¹² while types of men are accurately compared with birds possessing similar characteristics.¹³ Cranes carry the foundation stones because, according to the legend, they swallowed stones as ballast; corn-crakes acted as masons because they knew how to "rasp";

³ Acts, XVII 22.

⁴ *Vera Historia*, V, 17.

⁵ Cf. Nilsson, *Geschichte*, p. 747.

⁶ *Anabasis*, III, 2, 9.

⁷ *Anabasis*, VI, 1, 23.

⁸ *Birds*, 719 f.

⁹ Suidas, s. v. Μάγνης.

¹⁰ Cf. A. W. Pickard-Cambridge, *Dithyramb, Tragedy and Comedy*, pp. 244 f.

¹¹ *The Birds*, Introduction, pp. lxxxiii f.

¹² *Birds*, 1183 f.

¹³ 760 f.

storks helped to build the "storkade," water-fowl brought water, geese used their webbed feet to shovel with, while the swallows supplied cement. From all of which it would be reasonable to suppose that the audience was well able to appreciate those nice distinctions between the various species, without which much of the effect of the play would be lost. On the other hand, in attempting to estimate the value of any one piece of evidence which the play may seem to contain, e. g. in support of the view that bird cults formerly existed in Greece, it is important to realize that the ordinary Athenians of the fifth century B. C. were not gifted with an historical imagination or a scientific curiosity where religion was concerned, so that legends or sayings current among them had no deeper significance for *them*. They may, however, and in fact do, have a deeper significance for us, but even so it is necessary to proceed with special caution in the case of a poet whose main characteristic is *εὐτραπελία* and evidence from whom is not infrequently open to the objection that he may not always mean what he seems to say.

The main problems raised by the *Birds*, although often interrelated, will be discussed, for convenience sake, under the following sub-headings.

- I. The problem of Zeus and the Woodpecker.
- II. The problem of Zeus and the Cuckoo.
- III. Legends associated with the Cock and the Kite.
- IV. Bird-tipped sceptres and bird-crowned deities.
- V. The wind egg.

I. The problem of Zeus and the Woodpecker.

Peisthetaerus' claim that the birds are older than the gods, the audacity of which moved even the birds themselves—

ἀρχαιότεροι πρότεροι τε Κρόνου καὶ Τιτάνων ἐγένεσθε
καὶ γῆς. ΧΟ. καὶ γῆς; . . .¹⁴

is based upon stories with which contemporary Greeks were presumably well acquainted. The poet gives an example of the type of story which he had in mind, viz. Aesop's fable of how the crested lark got its crest,¹⁵ and follows this up with the line

¹⁴ *Birds*, 468 f.

¹⁵ *Birds*, 471 f.

which has perhaps been more discussed than any other in the play.

*οὐκ ἀποδώσει ταχέως ὁ Ζεὺς τὸ σκῆπτρον τῷ δρυκολάπτῃ.*¹⁶

A. B. Cook quoted it to support his theory of the existence of ritual oak-kings in prehistoric Greece, who were changed at death into woodpeckers.¹⁷ “The recurrence of oak and axe and wood-pecker in the Tereus-Polytechnus myth cannot be accidental. I infer that Tereus and Polytechnus were oak-kings, armed with the weapon of and transformed into the birds of an oak-Zeus. When Euelpides in Aristophanes *av.* 480 spoke of Zeus as ‘soon destined to restore the sceptre to the Woodpecker’ it was no mere flight of fancy but a genuine folk-belief.”¹⁸

If the evidence which he produces in support of this view were at all sound, it would go far to establish the influence of Minoan-Mycenaean beliefs in bird epiphanies throughout a wide area in Greece. But unfortunately most of the evidence is open to the gravest objections, as will appear.

One form of the Tereus-Polytechnus myth is at least as old as Homer, but in this version Itylus, not Itys, is said to have been the son of Zeus, not Tereus, and the only transformation mentioned is that of his mother, the daughter of Pandareus, not Pandion, into a nightingale.¹⁹ The legend was apparently known to Hesiod²⁰ and Sappho,²¹ is referred to by Thucydides,²² and was a favourite with the three tragedians,²³ but the forms sometimes differ in detail, e. g. Aeschylus describes the nightingale as “pursued by a hawk”²⁴—whereas Aristophanes, in the *Birds*, refers to Sophocles’ version wherein Tereus was transformed into a hoopoe, the most popular form of the legend.²⁵ A considerable fragment of this latter play has survived through the medium of Aristotle,²⁶ who referred it, seemingly in error, to Aeschylus.

¹⁶ *Birds*, 480.

¹⁷ See “Zeus, Jupiter and the Oak,” *C. R.*, XVII-XVIII (1903-1904); cf. *Zeus*, II, pp. 690 f.: The Axes of Penelope.

¹⁸ *C. R.*, XVIII (1904), p. 81.

¹⁹ *Od.*, XIX, 58 f.

²⁰ *Op.*, 568.

²¹ *Frag.* 88.

²² II, 29, 3.

²³ E. g., Aesch., *Supp.*, 60 f., *Ag.*, 1442; Soph., *El.*, 167, 148; Eur., *Rhesus*, 545, frag. 773, 23.

²⁴ *Supp.*, 62.

²⁵ Frag. 581 Pearson.

²⁶ *Hist. An.*, IX, 49, 633A 19.

However, Book IX of the *Historia Animalium* is not usually considered to be by Aristotle himself. This fragment refers in an obscure phrase to the twy-form of Tereus, who wore a hawk's plumage in his youth, but changed later into an hoopoe.²⁷

We may therefore conclude that the transformation of Tereus into either a hawk or a hoopoe were the only alternatives known in classical times.

The evidence of the mythographers is of less value, because, except in the case of Antoninus Liberalis, we are ignorant of the sources upon which they drew. Both Ovid²⁸ and Apollodorus²⁹ tell how Tereus was transformed into an hoopoe. The latter, however, mentions how he pursued the women with an axe "ἀρπάσας πέλεκυν," which Cook considered possessed a ritual significance,³⁰ and which Schröder thought was an oriental feature.³¹ The story as told by Conon,³² Libanius,³³ Achilles Tatius,³⁴ Nonnus,³⁵ and Eustathius³⁶ preserves no outstanding features. Hyginus, however, follows the Aeschylean form of the legend, telling how Tereus was transformed into a hawk,³⁷ and includes the story of Dryas, the brother of Tereus, whom the latter slew because he feared that he was plotting against his son. This version has been considered to be more significant on the grounds that the name Dryas seems to be connected with δρῦς, an oak,³⁸ but as against this there is no mention of a woodpecker, which, on Cook's own theory, one would have expected Tereus to have become.

Antoninus Liberalis preserves an interesting doublet to the Tereus-Progne myth in the story of Polytechnus and Aeson.³⁹

²⁷ δύο γὰρ οὖρ μορφὰς φαρέι
πα:δός τε χαύτοῦ ρηδόνος μᾶς ἄπο (5-6).

²⁸ Met., VI, 433-674.

²⁹ III, 14, 8.

³⁰ C. R., XVIII (1904), pp. 80 f.

³¹ Hermes, LXI (1926), pp. 424 f.

³² Narr. 31 (F. Gr. H., 26 F 1).

³³ Narr. 12, p. 1103.

³⁴ 5, 5.

³⁵ IV, 320 f.

³⁶ Opusc., p. 1875.

³⁷ Fab., 45.

³⁸ A. B. Cook, C. R., XVIII (1904), pp. 81 f.

³⁹ XI. The earliest representation of this legend in art is a painted metope at Thermon which dates from the third quarter of the 7th century. Cf. Payne, B. S. A., XXVII (1925-1926), p. 124.

The story corresponds in general with the more usual forms of the Tereus myth, but in the end Politechnus is transformed into a woodpecker—πελεκᾶν—ὅτι Ἡφαιστος αὐτῷ πέλεκυν ἔδωκεν τεκταίνοντι.⁴⁰

Legends preserved by Antoninus are of special interest to students of mythology, because we know that one of his main sources was Boeus' *'Ορνιθογονία*,⁴¹ a mysterious work, which was extant in Alexandrian times—it was apparently known to Philochorus,⁴² and may have contained material dating from a very much earlier era. The work was apparently attributed to an ancient priestess of Apollo at Delphi, called *Boώ*—but somehow in later times the name became changed into the masculine form *Βοῖος*.⁴³ But even Antoninus makes no mention of woodpeckers except in the strange story entitled “the thieves”⁴⁴—which like that of Polytechrus derives from Boeus. This story tells how Laius, Celeus, Cerberus, and Aegolius visited the cave in Crete where Zeus was born, in order to steal the honey upon which the infant god had been nurtured. Zeus frustrated their design by turning them all into birds. Now the interesting member of these four for our purpose is Celeus—for κελεός is “the green woodpecker.” Certain features of the story, e. g. the boiling of the afterbirth and the ritualistic clashing of bronze are so arresting that one is bound to consider the possibility of their having derived from an ancient source. Unfortunately, however, there appears to be no reason why special emphasis should be placed upon the part played by Celeus in the story, and so we seem to be as far from proving the existence of a woodpecker cult as ever.

⁴⁰ Rogers (*Birds*, Introduction, pp. lxxvi f.) argued that πελεκᾶς and πελεκάν were two forms of the same word and that both meant “pelican,” but as Professor Sir D’Arcy W. Thompson says (*Glossary*, s. v. πελεκᾶς) pelicans do not make a noise with their beaks which is the point of *Birds*, 1156 f.: οὐδὲ κτύπος αὐτῶν πελεκάντων.

⁴¹ The difficult problem as to whether Antoninus and Athenaeus derived direct from Boeus was carefully considered by G. Knaack in a thesis published in 1880 (*Analecta Alexandrino-Romana. Dissertatio inauguralis Philologica. Cap. I: De Boei Ornithogonia*), and again by E. Oder in a thesis published in 1886 (*De Antonino Liberali*). But neither scholar was able to settle the matter beyond all reasonable doubt.

⁴² *Βοῖος ἐν Ὀρνιθογονίᾳ, ἦ Βοώ, ὡς φῆσι Φιλόχορος, apud Athen. IX, 2, 393E; F. G. H., I, frag. 207.*

⁴³ Cf. G. Knaack, *apud Pauly-Wissowa, s. v. Boio.*

⁴⁴ *Φῶρες*, xix.

The next piece of evidence produced by Cook in support of his theory is the curious version, preserved by Suidas, of the inscription said to have been observed by Pythagoras upon the tomb of Zeus in Crete.

Pythagoras, according to Porphyry, was reputed to have visited the tomb of Zeus in Crete, and to have inscribed it with the words—

ἄδε θαρὼν κεῖται Ζᾶν, ὃν Δία κικλήσκουσιν.⁴⁵

Saint Chrysostom gives a slightly different version—

ἐνταῦθα Ζᾶν κεῖται, ὃν Δία κικλήσκουσιν,⁴⁶

while the *Palatine Anthology* gives

ἄδε μέγας κεῖται Ζᾶν, ὃν Δία κικλήσκουσιν.⁴⁷

Suidas, however, preserves the interesting variation—

ἐνθάδε κεῖται θαρὼν Πῆκος ὁ καὶ Ζεύς.⁴⁸

Now the history of the phrase Πῆκος ὁ καὶ Ζεύς is as follows. It is preserved in a late epitome of the sixth book of Diodorus' history,⁴⁹ where Πῆκος ὁ καὶ Ζεύς is said to have been the brother of Ninus, son of Belus, the first king of Assyria. He ruled Italy, was the father of Faunus, and was buried at Zeus' bidding, in Crete. A temple was raised to him which could still be seen, inscribed with the words—

ἐνθάδε κατάκειται Πῆκος ὃν καὶ Δία καλοῦσι.

Elsewhere the phrase only appears in the works of Byzantine writers such as John Malalas, who, in a rationalisation of the

⁴⁵ *Vit. Pyth.*, 17. A. B. Cook (*Zeus*, II, pp. 340 f.) considered that "Zan" was an old title of Zeus, related to Italian "Janus"; but the evidence is inconclusive. Cook, *Zeus*, II, p. 342, draws attention to an interesting variant in the margin of the *Palatine Anthology*, *ἄδε μέγας κεῖται βοῦς*, δρ Δία κικλήσκουσιν, which suggests that the title possessed mystical affinities. Certainly Euphides employs the word with mock heroic power in line 570. Cf. W. K. C. Guthrie, *Orpheus and Greek Religion*, note 35 to ch. IV, p. 146. Bronze statues of Zeus were, according to Pausanias, called *Zāves*, V, 21, 2.

⁴⁶ *Hom. III. in Titum, ad init. LXII*, col. 676 (Migne).

⁴⁷ VII, 746.

⁴⁸ *S. v. Πῆκος*. For the variant Πῆκος, cf. A. B. Cook, *Zeus*, II, p. 694. For other references, cf. *ibid.*, pp. 341 f.

⁴⁹ VI, 5.

story of Leda and the Swan says that "Κύκνος" was descended ἐκ τοῦ πίκον Διός.⁵⁰ Nicetas describes Zeus in one passage as ἥπτος πίκος.⁵¹ Further references are found in John Malalas,⁵² in the *Chronicon Paschale*,⁵³ and the *Chronica Minora*,⁵⁴ but none of them reveal precisely who Πίκος was. It seems to be quite certain that he was never a woodpecker, for the Greek for "woodpecker" is δρυεκολάπτης, πελεκᾶς, or κελεός never πίκος. He can only be a Graecised form of Italian Picus, the story of whose metamorphosis is told so picturesquely by Virgil.⁵⁵

The association of Picus with Mars probably dated back to early times, for a reference to "Piquier Martier" occurs in an Umbrian inscription.⁵⁶ Again Dionysius of Halicarnassus mentions an oracle of Mars at Tiora Matiene, where a woodpecker mounted on a stump performed the functions of the doves at Dodona.⁵⁷

The story, however, is given at second hand, and we know nothing of the ritual referred to. On the whole it would seem reasonable to suppose that the association of the bird with Mars dated back to a time when the latter was purely an agricultural deity,⁵⁸ and the woodpecker a prophet of rain.⁵⁹ In which case it would seem that Picus belonged to the realm of folklore rather than of cult. The woodpecker appears on the François tomb attached to a boy's wrist by a thread, but it is uncertain whether the scene is connected with augury.⁶⁰ Such then is the nature of the evidence upon which A. B. Cook based his arguments for the former existence of oak-kings, and woodpecker cults. J. Rendel Harris, employing the comparative method, went even further. He regarded the woodpecker as a European representative of the "thunderbird," which is associated with American Indian beliefs, and primitive mythology elsewhere.⁶¹ The

⁵⁰ Frag. 20, *F. H. G.*, IV, 549.

⁵¹ *Épithet. Deor.* (*Meletem.*, I, 18).

⁵² I, 19; II, 28, 34. Migne, *Patr. Graec.*, XCVII, cols. 85, 95, 104.

⁵³ 36-38; 44. Migne, *Patr. Graec.*, XCII, cols. 143 f.

⁵⁴ *Ecclesia Barbari* in Frick, *Chronica Minora*, 243, 23.

⁵⁵ *Aen.*, VII, 189.

⁵⁶ Tables of Iguvium. Conway, *Italic Dialects*, I, pp. 421 f.; II, p. 645.

⁵⁷ *Ant. Rom.*, I, 14.

⁵⁸ C. Bailey, *Religion in Virgil*, pp. 109 f.

⁵⁹ Cf. Jane Harrison, *Themis*, p. 100.

⁶⁰ P. D. Goidanich, *S. E.*, IX, 107 f.

⁶¹ *Boanerges*, Ch. IV.

"thunderbird" lived in the oak, and was associated with Zeus. Important cult centres grew up about certain oaks where the "thunderbird" was frequently observed, and these gave rise to towns, e.g. Keleae or Picenum—bearing woodpecker names,⁶² which were mystically associated with the cult of the heavenly twins. A good example of Rendel Harris' method of argument is his analysis of Antoninus' story of the Φῶpes.⁶³ This was, in origin, according to him, a mystic attempt to steal wild honey from an oak-tree. Now woodpeckers are inordinately fond of bees' larvae, and an attempt to get at the honey would quickly attract the attention of any woodpecker which happened to be in the neighbourhood. This often resulted in a contest between the woodpecker and the thieves for the contents of the hive. Such a contest then became mythologised into the story of the Cretan cave, with Laius and his companions taking the part of the rustics, and Zeus that of the woodpeckers, the spirits of the oak. This analysis does not attempt to explain the interesting features of the boiling blood and the ritual rattle, and fails to show why such a trivial incident, or succession of trivial incidents, should give rise to so strange a story. His attempt to explain the prominence given to honey in ancient mythology by the fact that woodpeckers were fond of *larvae* is even more ludicrous.

The best modern analysis of the myths associated with Zeus and the woodpecker was given by W. R. Halliday in the *Classical Review*.⁶⁴ Halliday pointed out the weaknesses in the kind of speculations mentioned above, and proves conclusively that the origin of the phrase Πίκος & καὶ Ζεύς was due to the Euhemerism which became rife in the second century B.C. A legend which told of a mortal Zeus was naturally popular among the Christian fathers. "The association, therefore, is that of Picus, not of a woodpecker, with Zeus, and it takes place not in Crete, but in the study of the historians."

What then can be safely concluded with reference to Aristophanes' line?

A. Aristophanes refers to some legend about Zeus and a woodpecker.

B. The myths of Tereus and Polytechnus tell of the trans-

⁶² *Ibid.*, pp. 322 f.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, pp. 357 f.

⁶⁴ XXXVI (1922), p. 110.

formation of a king into a hawk, a hoopoe, or a woodpecker. No ritual significance can be attached to these transformations.⁶⁵

C. The story of the transformation of Celeus into a wood-pecker appears to be mere mythologising.

D. The phrase Πῆκος ὁ καὶ Ζεύς preserved by Suidas appears to be a product of Euhemerism, and can have no bearing on Aristophanes' line.

E. Specious conclusions have been drawn owing to the unscientific habit of placing alongside of one another pieces of evidence taken from totally unrelated sources, and sources which are often separated by many centuries of time.

F. The reference is probably to some folk myth or the poet may be simply playing upon words as the scholiast suggests—ἐπεὶ οὐν ἡ δρῦς τοῦ Διός ἐστιν, ἐπαυξε παρὰ τὴν δρῦν ἡ ἐστιν ἱερὰ τοῦ Διός.⁶⁶

II. *The problem of Zeus and the Cuckoo.*

Not only the woodpecker was king before Zeus, but the cuckoo too, according to Peisthetaerus; and when they heard its call, the Phoenicians set about gathering the harvest. Hence, says Euelides, arose the rustic phrase—“κόκκυ ψωλοὶ πεδίονδε.”⁶⁷ This is all that Aristophanes says about the cuckoo, but it has been considered by certain scholars⁶⁸ that we have here, and in the title of the city of the birds itself, an oblique reference to the cuckoo cult of Zeus and Hera, which, according to Pausanias, formerly existed upon mounts Pron and Thornax (Kokkygion), which are situated in Argolis.⁶⁹

All that is known about this supposed cuckoo cult is not very much.

Pausanias says that sanctuaries sacred to the two deities still survived in his day upon the tops of the mountains, but he gives no indications of their probable age; while a ruined temple still

⁶⁵ Cf. Nilsson, *A History of Greek Religion*, p. 69.

⁶⁶ Ad 480.

⁶⁷ *Birds*, 507.

⁶⁸ E. g., A. B. Cook in *Zeus*, III, pp. 44 f., and Jane Harrison, *Themis*, p. 179.

⁶⁹ II, 36, 2. Cf. Cook, *Zeus*, III, pp. 1043 f.; A. Klinz, “ΙΕΡΟΣ ΓΑΜΟΣ,” pp. 99 f.; F. Robert, *C. R. A. I.*, 1941, pp. 293 f.

stood at the foot of Kokkygion. He mentions that Thornax, "took the name of Cuckoo Mountain, because, they say, the transformation of Zeus into a cuckoo was fabled to have here taken place."⁷⁰

The scholiast on Theocritus, XV, 64, where Praxinoa says

πάντα γυναικες ἴσαντι, καὶ ὡς Ζεὺς ἡγάγεθ^θ Ἡρα—

gives the legend in detail. Zeus, wishing to take advantage of Hera, transformed himself into a cuckoo, and lay in wait for her in the neighbourhood of Mount Thornax. He next caused a storm to brew, and when the goddess took pity upon his bedraggled appearance, accomplished his purpose. This is why the image in the Argive Heraeum bears a cuckoo-tipped sceptre.⁷¹ Pausanias explains the cuckoo-tipped sceptre by the same legend, but hastens to add, "This and similar stories of the gods I record, though I do not accept them."⁷²

All this is typical Hellenistic mythography; but the question is whether there is any evidence to show that the legends which had grown up in the neighbourhood of the two mountains had any basis in primitive beliefs. Now although we are ignorant of the age of the sanctuaries which Pausanias saw on the mountains, he does say that the statue of Hera was the work of Polyclitus;⁷³ which would mean that the cuckoo-tipped sceptre dated back to about 423 B. C. The birds on the sima of the Argive Heraeum are probably cuckoos,⁷⁴ but Hera, like Athena, was associated with birds of various species. She is accompanied by a falcon on an Attic red-figured lekythos, now in Providence, R. I.,⁷⁵ which is probably by the Brygos painter, while a bronze dove was found in her temenos at Perachora.⁷⁶ In Roman times Juno was associated with the peacock.⁷⁷

The cuckoo, as the harbinger of spring, has always been associated with husbandry, and Euelpides' comment would

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, trans. by Frazer.

⁷¹ *Scholia in Theocritum Vetera*, ed. C. Wendel.

⁷² II, 17, 4, trans. by Frazer.

⁷³ *Ibid.*

⁷⁴ A. J. A., VIII (1893), Pl. XI; cf. Frazer, *Pausanias*, III, p. 169; H. Möbius, *A. M.*, LII (1927), Pl. 21, 5, 6; pp. 182-3.

⁷⁵ A. J. A., XXXII (1928), pp. 53-54, figs. 18-19; O. V. A., Prov. R. I., XIX, 1.

⁷⁶ Payne, *Perachora*, I, p. 133, Pl. 41.

⁷⁷ Cf. Steier in *Pauly-Wissowa*, XIX, p. 1419, s. v. Pfau.

appear to glance at this fact.⁷⁸ But it is also true that Aristophanes is at pains to associate the bird especially with Egypt and Phoenicia,⁷⁹ and not with his homeland, so that whatever the reason for the cuckoo sceptre at the Heraeum there seems no reason to suppose that the poet had the Argive cult in mind when he wrote this passage. A. B. Cook thought otherwise, considering that the second half of the name Nephelokokkygia, and the introduction of Basileia, whom he identifies with Hera, represented a deliberate attempt on the part of the poet to curry favour with the state which at that time held the balance of power between Athens and Sparta.⁸⁰ Jane Harrison too considered that Nephelokokkygia was intended to remind the audience of the Argive mount Kokkygion, and the legends associated with it. "Turning finally to literature, it is, I am convinced, on no mere fancy of the comedian but on the actual foundation of ancient bird-cultus, that Cloud-cuckoo-town, Nephelokokkygia, is built. Did not Zeus himself woo Hera in the form of a cuckoo? The Sky-Father in bird form wooed the Earth-Maiden. He wooed her on the mountain Kokkygion near Sparta, and, for that, Pausanias says, was a cuckoo perched on Hera's sceptre."⁸¹ But the weakness of this argument is that there is nothing to show that the story of Zeus and the cuckoo is not an aetiological myth invented perhaps to explain certain features associated with the Argive cult of Hera. On the other hand the association of Hera with the cuckoo may be a legacy from Mycenaean times.

All that can be safely concluded from the ancient evidence with reference to cuckoo cults is that:

A. Legends were apparently extant in Aristophanes' time to the effect that the "cuckoo" had once ruled in Egypt and Phoenicia. The precise nature of these legends we do not know.

B. The cuckoo was associated in ancient times with the coming of Spring, and with husbandry.

⁷⁸ Cf. Hesiod, *Op.*, 486.

⁷⁹ *Birds*, 504. Rogers considered that the reference to the circumcised peoples of Egypt and Phoenicia was merely intended to lead up to Euelpides' comment. This view is supported by the poet's deliberate ignoring of the fact that the season of the cuckoo's call in Greece would hardly coincide with harvest time in Egypt or Greece.

⁸⁰ *Zeus*, III, p. 63.

⁸¹ *Transactions of the Third International Congress for the History of Religions*, II, pp. 163 f.

C. Sanctuaries, of unknown antiquity, dedicated to Zeus and Hera existed on Mounts Kokkygion and Pron in Pausanias' time. Mount Kokkygion was formerly known as Mount Thornax, and was associated with a myth, probably of a late and aetiological nature, which told how Zeus first visited Hera in the form of a cuckoo.

D. The association of Hera and the cuckoo may possess Minoan-Mycenaean affinities, but there is no evidence to show that Zeus was ever associated with the bird.

E. There is no evidence to show that Aristophanes had the Argive cult of Hera in mind when he wrote the passage which we have been considering.

III. *Legends associated with the Cock and Kite.*

The Cock.

More lines are devoted by Aristophanes to the cock, as an example of a bird which formerly ruled as king, than to any other species. But this fact is hardly remarkable in itself, for the cock would be most familiar to the audience, and its claim would be likely to excite most interest.

Aristophanes says (1) that it formerly ruled the Persians, and so gained the title of "the Persian bird,"⁸² (2) that it still wears a comb, the symbol of royalty, upon its head,⁸³ (3) that the former respect in which it was held is shown by the way in which men still obey its summons, although this sometimes leads to unfortunate results.⁸⁴

The cock first appears in Greek art in the seventh century B. C.⁸⁵ and is first mentioned in literature by Theognis.⁸⁶ It is not mentioned by Homer or Hesiod, so it seems probable that it first arrived in Greece in the eighth century B. C. It was introduced from India into Persia at an early period, for, as Cumont has shown, it was sacred in primitive Iranian religion.⁸⁷ It did not reach Western Asia or Africa until much later, for it is not

⁸² *Birds*, 484, cf. 707, and Cratinus *apud Athen.*, IX, 374D.

⁸³ *Birds*, 487.

⁸⁴ *Birds*, 488.

⁸⁵ Cf. Payne, *Necrocorinthia*, Fig. 21, p. 74.

⁸⁶ Frag. 864.

⁸⁷ *C. R. A. I.*, 1942.

mentioned in the Old Testament, or in the older Egyptian records.⁸⁸

The cock appears to have been associated with the sun, as the herald of day, from early times,⁸⁹ and when poetical and esoteric speculation identified the latter with Apollo,⁹⁰ though never completely, the association seems to have passed to him. It seems more probable that Socrates paid a cock to Asclepius⁹¹ because it was the right price, rather than because it was especially associated with that god. Certainly a cock appears to have been a current offering to Demeter and Persephone in the first half of the fifth century B. C.⁹²

Later the cock became associated with mystic cults, and notably with Mithraism.⁹³ It is also found in a Spartan relief of the third century B. C. in association with the Dioscuri.⁹⁴ J. Rendel Harris based arguments upon this later evidence, and upon the reference in the *Birds*, to show that the cock, like the woodpecker, had been originally worshipped as a "thunderbird." "It was," he claimed, "discharging (in Persia) the same function of thunder-hood, and original royalty as the woodpecker was doing in Greece."⁹⁵ But, as we have seen, there is no evidence to show that the woodpecker was ever doing anything of the kind, whatever the cock may have been doing in Persia. All that can be deduced from Aristophanes' statement is:

A. That he intended to make a joke, basing the cock's claim to kingship in Persia upon the fact that its comb resembled the stiff crest of the Great King's tiara.⁹⁶

B. It is possible that he was aware of the important part played by the cock in Iranian ritual, but there is no evidence of this in the play.

⁸⁸ Cf. Frazer, note to Pausanias, IX, 22, 4.

⁸⁹ Cf. A. Roes, *Greek Geometric Art*, pp. 30-31.

⁹⁰ Cf. Euripides, frag. 781, 11 (Nauck); Plutarch, *Mor.*, 400 C.

⁹¹ Plato, *Phaedo*, 118 A.

⁹² Cf. a sacrificial scene on a Locrian relief now in the Museum at Thebes; P. Stengel, *Die griechischen Kultusaltertümer*, Pl. I, fig. 2, facing p. 178.

⁹³ Cf. Cumont, *Monuments relatifs au culte de Mithra*, I, 210, 212.

⁹⁴ Dressel und Milchöfer, *Die Antiken Kunstwerke aus Sparta und Umgebung*, Pl. XXII.

⁹⁵ *Boanerges*, pp. 38 f.

⁹⁶ Xenophon, *Anabasis*, II, 5, 23.

The Kite.

The prominence given by Aristophanes to the kite is without parallel in Greek literature, and may perhaps be significant. The references in the play are as follows:

1. Peisthetaerus astounds the chorus by claiming that the kite once ruled the Greeks.⁹⁷
2. The reason which he gives in support of this claim is that men are accustomed to bow before kites; a statement which Euelpides quickly confirms.⁹⁸
3. The kite tells of the coming of Spring, and the season to begin sheep-shearing.⁹⁹
4. He bids the priest pray first to Bird-Hestia, the guardian, and to kite—the "thieving-watcher"—τῷ ἐστιούχῳ.¹⁰⁰
5. Later in the same scene he points out that a single kite could carry off the priest's whole sacrifice.¹⁰¹
6. He explains to Heracles that, under the new system, the kite would be charged to steal on behalf of the gods.¹⁰²

Now the kite's reputation in ancient times was no better than it is today. Theognis emphasises its ruthless qualities,¹⁰³ and mentions the aerial dexterity, which is reflected in its character.¹⁰⁴ In Plautus its name is a synonym for men of grasping nature.¹⁰⁵

Peisthetaerus' claim that the bird formerly ruled the Greeks is amusing purely because the bird was so disreputable, and that is why the poet is at pains to emphasise its more sordid characteristics. It is bracketed with Hestia in the litany, because it is a "watcher" too, a watcher for an opportunity to steal.

On the other hand there seems no reason to doubt that the mention of the custom of bowing before the kite—καὶ κατέδειξεν γ' οὗτος τρῶτος βασιλείων προκυλινδεῖσθαι τοῖς ἱκτίνοις—is based upon a genuine piece of folklore. No other reference to the custom is known, but Euelpides' comment seems to prove that it was familiar.¹⁰⁶

The Scholiast says that poor men were accustomed to greet the bird in this way, because its appearance heralded the return

⁹⁷ *Birds*, 499.

¹⁰⁰ *Birds*, 805 f.

⁹⁸ *Birds*, 500 f.

¹⁰¹ *Birds*, 891 f.

⁹⁹ *Birds*, 713.

¹⁰² *Birds*, 1624.

¹⁰³ Frag. 1302, φεύγεις ἱκτίνου σχέτλιον ἥθος ἔχων.

¹⁰⁴ Frag. 1261, ἱκτίνου ἀγχιστρόφου ἥθος.

¹⁰⁵ *Poen.*, 5, 5, 13.

¹⁰⁶ *Birds*, 501 f.

of Spring.¹⁰⁷ Certainly the sudden arrival of a flock of such conspicuous birds in the city streets would have excited annual comment.

But another view of the emphasis which the poet places upon the kite's activities is possible, if there be any truth in the suggestion put forward by Nilsson that the presence of birds of prey at a sacrifice had come to be regarded in pre-Homeric times as an indication of the presence likewise of the deity to whom the sacrifice was being made.¹⁰⁸ The kite "pounces down and bears off the worth of two fat lambs to the god," precisely at it may have been regarded as doing in Mycenaean times.¹⁰⁹

Similarly when Euelpides enquires why the gods wear birds on their heads, Peisthetaerus replies "in order that they may be able to forestall Zeus at the sacrifice."¹¹⁰ In other words the gods were regarded as employing birds of prey in order to gather tit-bits for them from the altar. Here the theory is put forward as a comic suggestion by Peisthetaerus, but it seems to be based upon the view that birds were regarded at one time as emissaries of the gods. A valid objection to this hypothesis is that the gods were supposed to enjoy the savour (*κνίσα*) of a sacrifice, and did not partake of the actual offering. Again, in later times the presence of kites at a sacrifice was considered to be an evil omen.¹¹¹ But we do not know what the view of the Mycenaean celebrants was, and some such theory, as that proposed above, seems necessary if we are to provide an explanation for the bird metamorphoses with which we are familiar in Homer. At any rate this, or something like it, appears to have been Nilsson's view.¹¹²

The following conclusions may then be drawn from Aristophanes' references to the kite:

The kite is said to have ruled Greece—

¹⁰⁷ οἱ γὰρ ἱκτῖνοι τὸ παλαιὸν ἔπει τὸ σῆμαν· οἱ πένητες οὖν ἀπαλλαγέντες τοῦ χειμῶνος ἐκυλιδοῦντο καὶ προσεκύνουν αὐτούς.

¹⁰⁸ Cf. Nilsson, *A History of Greek Religion*, p. 145.

¹⁰⁹ *Birds*, 1624-1625.

¹¹⁰ *Birds*, 519.

¹¹¹ Cf. L. Hopf, *Thierorakel und Orakelthiere*, pp. 94 f.

¹¹² "The gods are from the beginning localized to their customary haunts and the places of their cult. Their presence at the sacrifice has to be invoked. They are seen coming either in visible form floating down as a bird as in the Mycenaean representations or in imagination," *A History of Greek Religion*, p. 148.

A. Because of the custom of greeting kites in Spring.

B. Because its disreputable habits are good comic material.

There may be an unconscious echo of an ancient view that the gods sent birds of prey to a sacrifice as their emissaries.

IV. *Bird-Tipped Sceptres and Bird-Crowned Deities.*

"He's gi'en to her a silver wand,
With seven living larrocks sitting thereon."

Old Scotch Ballad

Bird-Tipped Sceptres.

Peisthetaerus mentions another sign that birds formerly ruled, viz., the fact that kings bore bird tipped sceptres—

ἵηρχον δ' οὐτω σφόδρα τὴν ἀρχὴν, ὥστ' εἴ τις καὶ βασιλεύοι
ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν τῶν Ἑλλήνων Ἀγαμέμνων ἢ Μενέλαος,
ἐπὶ τῶν σκῆπτρων ἐκάθητ' ὄρνις μετέχων ὃ τι δωροδοκοίη.¹¹²

Only a few references to bird-tipped sceptres occur in extant Greek literature, and it is important to distinguish (1) between those which refer to real birds, (2) those which refer to artifacts, as the latter may be merely decorative and of no religious significance.

The examples quoted by the Scholiast to line 575 from Pindar and Sophocles clearly belong to the first category.

Pindar's lines:

εὗδει δὲ ἀνὰ σκάπτῳ Δὺὸς αἰετός, ὠκεῖαν
πτέρυν' ἀμφοτέρωθεν χαλάξαι,
ἀρχὸς οἰωνὸν, κελαινᾶτν δὲ ἐπὶ οἱ νεφέλαν
ἀγκύλῳ κρατί, γλεφάρων ἀδὲ κλαῖστρον, κατέχενας¹¹³

were taken by Farnell¹¹⁵ to refer to a contemporary work of art, but this view seems less likely as the poet says elsewhere

οὐκ ἀνδριαντοπούσ εἰμ', ὥστ' ἐλινόσοντα ἐργά-
ζεσθαι ἀγάλματ' ἐπ' αὐτᾶς βαθμίδος
ἔσταότ'.¹¹⁶

The play from which the Sophocles fragment

ὁ σκηπτροβάμων αἰετὸς, κύων Διός,¹¹⁷

derives is unknown, but there is no doubt that the reference is to a real eagle.

The *aἰετός* mentioned by Herodotus¹¹⁸ in his description of oriental walking sticks is an artifact:

¹¹² *Birds*, 508 ff.

¹¹⁶ *Nem.*, V, 1 ff.

¹¹⁴ *Pyth.*, I, 6 ff.

¹¹⁷ *Frag.* 884 Pearson.

¹¹⁵ Note *ad loc.*

¹¹⁸ I, 295.

ἐπ' ἑκάστῳ δὲ σκῆπτρῳ ἐπεστι πεποιημένον ἢ μῆλον ἢ ρόδον ἢ κρίνον ἢ αἰετὸς ἢ ἄλλο τι· ταῦτα γὰρ ἐπισήμουν οὖσιν σφι νόμος ἔστι ἔχειν σκῆπτρον.

The figures are obviously of the smallest religious significance.

Similarly the *σκῆπτρον* described by Xenophon¹¹⁹ is really a standard and may have been carried by a bearer.

ἥν δὲ αὐτῷ τὸ σημεῖον ἀετὸς χρυσοῦς ἐπὶ δόρατος μακροῦ ἀνατεταμένος. καὶ νῦν δὲ ἔτι τοῦτο τὸ σημεῖον τῷ Περσῶν βασιλεῖ διαμένει.

The only actual example which occurs in art is a gold staff head from Cyprus, surmounted by two enamelled hawks, which probably dates from before 600 E. C.¹²⁰ Its significance is unfortunately very dubious, but the birds seem to be more than decorative. A design on an Attic amphora in Munich by the Nicoxenus painter¹²¹ dating from about the end of the sixth century B. C. shows Zeus bearing a *σκῆπτρον* surmounted by an eagle. He bears a similar *σκῆπτρον* in a design on an Attic red figured vase by the Geras painter,¹²² now in the Louvre, which dates from about 490-480 B. C. This is apparently the type of *σκῆπτρον* referred to by Pausanias in his description of the Phidian Zeus. Pausanias states that the statue of Zeus at Olympia bore an eagle-tipped sceptre—*τῇ δὲ ἀριστερᾷ τοῦ θεοῦ χειρὶ ἔνεστι σκῆπτρον μετάλλοις τοῖς πᾶσιν ἡθισμένον· ὃ δὲ ὅρνις ὃ ἐπὶ τῷ σκῆπτρῳ καθήμενός ἔστιν ὁ ἀετός.*¹²³ The statement is clear enough, and although the Zeus of Phidias does not appear upon coins, there seems to be no reason to doubt its accuracy. The eagle is described specifically and was obviously a separate and important feature. Pausanias also states, as we have seen, in another passage that the statue of the goddess in the Heraeum bore a cuckoo-tipped sceptre—and proffered the current *άιτιόν*. Κόκκυγα δὲ ἐπὶ τῷ σκῆπτρῳ καθῆσθαι φασι, λέγοντες τὸν Δία, ὅτε ἦρα παρθένον τῆς "Ηρας, ἐς τοῦτο τὸν ὅρνιθα ἀλλαγῆναι· τὴν δὲ ἄτε παίγνιον θηρᾶσαι.¹²⁴ Here again the cuckoo is clearly more than a decoration, and the sceptre doubtless resembled that of "Europa" on the coin from Gortyn quoted by Cook.¹²⁵ Now the eagle seems to have been a familiar of Zeus from the earliest times, and we must assume that

¹¹⁹ *Cyr.*, VII, 1, 4.

¹²⁰ Cf. L. H. Dudley Buxton, S. Casson, J. L. Myres, "A cloisonné staff head of gold from Cyprus," *Man*, XXXII (1932), pp. 1 f., Pl. A.

¹²¹ Munich, 2304 = J. 405. Cf. J. D. Beazley, "The Master of the Stroganoff Nikoxenos vase," *B. S. A.*, XIX (1912-1913), p. 235, Pl. 18; Furtwängler-Reichhold, III, p. 250, Pl. 158.

¹²² *C. V. A.*, Louvre 6, III 1. C. Pl. 43, 4 and p. 33.

¹²³ V, 11, 1. ¹²⁴ II, 17, 4. ¹²⁵ *Zeus*, I, pp. 528 f., figs. 391 f.

the cuckoo was associated with Hera. How the associations arose is not clear, but it is possible that they were inspired or at any rate influenced by Minoan-Mycenaean beliefs in bird epiphanies of the gods, or more likely of birds being emissaries from the gods.

Sir James Frazer¹²⁶ and A. B. Cook¹²⁷ considered that the bird on the sceptre symbolized the old king's soul, and, when he handed the sceptre to his successor, the power passed with it. "Taking into account these numerous transformations of the king into a bird, and especially that of Periphates,¹²⁸ who, when turned into an eagle, was allowed 'to guard the sacred sceptre,' I would conjecture that the soul of the slain king was supposed to escape in the form of a bird, and that its transmission to his successor was fitly symbolized by the eagle-tipped sceptre handed down from king to king."¹²⁹ But once again Cook's arguments are largely based upon evidence from later mythology. Homer mentions the handing down of the king's sceptre in a striking passage.¹³⁰ Hephaestus made it, and Zeus gave it, but there is no mention of any ghostly inheritance, whether symbolized by a bird or in any other way. The ceremony is referred to by Thucydides,¹³¹ and the word *σκῆπτρον* comes to mean "kingly power" in the poets, but nowhere is there any mention of the kind of transference suggested by Dr. Cook. Nor does his theory explain the bird-tipped sceptres of the gods.

Frazer too appears to have inclined to Cook's view, basing his arguments largely upon modern and savage parallels—but even he is forced to admit, "Of this transmission I have no direct proof; and so far a link in the chain of evidence is wanting. But if I cannot prove by actual examples this succession to the soul of the slain god, it can at least be made probable that such a succession was supposed to take place."¹³²

We may therefore conclude as follows:

- A. There is a certain amount of archaeological evidence for the existence of bird-tipped sceptres before the fifth century B. C.
- B. The notion of adding a bird as a deity's attribute may have derived from Minoan-Mycenaean beliefs.
- C. There is no sound evidence to support A. B. Cook's claim

¹²⁶ *Golden Bough*, II, p. 56.

¹²⁷ *Folklore*, XV, pp. 387 f.

¹²⁸ Antoninus Liberalis, 6.

¹²⁹ Cook, *op. cit.*, pp. 389 f.

¹³⁰ *Iliad*, II, 100 f.

¹³¹ I, 9.

¹³² *Golden Bough*, II, p. 56.

that bird-tipped sceptres symbolized the transmission of the soul from one being to another.

Bird-Crowned Deities.

Aristophanes' reference to gods bearing birds on their heads—

ὅ δὲ δεινότατον οὐ ἔστιν ἀπάντων, ὁ Ζεὺς γὰρ ὁ νῦν βασιλεύων
αἰετὸν ὅρνυ ἔστηκεν ἔχων ἐπὶ τῆς κεφαλῆς βασιλεὺς ὅν,
ἡ δ' αὖθις θυγάτηρ γλαῦχ', ὁ δ' Ἀπάλλων ὄσπερ θεράπων ἕρακα,¹³³

has given rise to much speculatio*n*, both in ancient and modern times. The Scholiast was puzzled by the phrase and suggested two possible explanations:

1. δέον εἰπεῖν ἐπὶ τοῦ σκῆπτρου εἶπεν ἐπὶ τῆς κεφάλης, which is, to say the least, most unsatisfactory.

2. ἐπειδὴ εἴώθεσαρ τὰ ἀφιερωμένα ἐκάστῳ θεῷ ὅρνεα ἐπὶ κεφαλῆς ἰδρύεσθαι, which begs the question.

Only one other reference to bird-crowned deities occurs in classical Greek literature, viz. Pausanias' description of the cock-crowned image of Athena at Elis.¹³⁴ ἐν ἀκροπόλει δὲ τῇ Ἡλείων ἔστιν ιερὸν Ἀθηνᾶς· ἐλέφαντος δὲ τὸ ἄγαλμα καὶ χρυσοῦ. εἶναι μὲν δὴ Φειδίου φασὶν αὐτήν, πεποίηται δὲ ἀλεκτρυὼν ἐπὶ τῷ κράνει, ὅτι οὗτοι προχειρότατα ἔχουσιν ἐς μάχας οἱ ἀλεκτρυόνες. The statement is not a strict parallel as it refers to a helmet and not to a head. Also πεποίηται could refer equally well to a relief as to an actual bird. The discovery of the Grächwil Hydria,¹³⁵ however, strengthens the latter possibility. In this example, the only one which occurs in art, and which dates from the early sixth century B. C., the πότνια θηρῶν is supported by animals, but a bird of prey is perched on her head. The only other example which bears any resemblance to this latter is the bronze figure of a priestess with a pole on her head topped by a bird, which was found at Ephesus.¹³⁶ ΛΥΣΑ¹³⁷ has a dog's head on her head on an Actaeon vase in Boston which dates from about 427 B. C. But the dog is doubtless intended to indicate her nature. The birds on the heads of the figures in what may be intended to represent a Tereus scene, although there are three women instead of two, on a small unpublished neck-*amphora* in Naples by the Attic Diosphos painter, which dates from the early fifth century B. C., are

¹³³ *Birds*, 514 f.

¹³⁴ VI, 26, 2.

¹³⁵ Cf. H. Bloesch, *Antike Kunst in der Schweiz*, Pls. 3, 4, 5.


¹³⁶ Cf. Hogarth, *Ephesus*, Pl. 22.

¹³⁷ Pfuhl, 515, p. 195. Beazley, *Attic Red Figure Vase Painters*, p. 691.

probably intended to illustrate the myth. The only other parallels which occur are of course the bird-crowned female idols from the IIIrd shaft-grave at Mycenae,¹³⁸ and the idols from Cnossus,¹³⁹ Gazi,¹⁴⁰ and Karphi.¹⁴¹ A. B. Cook¹⁴² is doubtless right in supposing that the memory of such archaic forms is hardly likely to have survived into classical times, but the Grächwil Hydria suggests that bird-crowned deities may have been more familiar to Aristophanes' contemporaries than has been suspected hitherto. The relationship of such deities to Minoan-Mycenaean deities cannot be proved, but it seems at least possible that there was some connection between the two.

V. The Wind Egg..

A comparison of Aristophanes' φύσις οὐγῆν¹⁴³ with the opening events in Hesiod's *Theogony*¹⁴⁴ might be represented in tabular form as follows:



The most striking difference between the two is the introduction of the φόν¹⁴⁵ by Aristophanes, and the fact that he makes Ἐρως emerge from the egg and become the father of the birds,¹⁴⁶ whereas Hesiod makes Ἐρως one of the original constituents of the Universe after Xáos.¹⁴⁷

The priority given to the egg is, of course, essential to the

¹³⁸ G. Karo, *Die Schachtgräber von Mykenai*, Pl. XXVII, figs. 27, 28. Assigned by Pendlebury to L. H. I, *The Archaeology of Crete*, p. 227.

¹³⁹ Evans, *Palace of Minos*, II, fig. 193; cf. Bossert, *The Art of Ancient Crete*, p. 169, fig. 295.

¹⁴⁰ Marinatos, *Eph. Arch.*, 1937, pp. 278 f., figs. 1, 8, 9, 2.

¹⁴¹ Pendlebury, *B. S. A.*, XXXVIII (1937-1938), Pl. XXXI.

¹⁴² Zeus, III, p. 46, note 4.

¹⁴⁶ *Birds*, 695.

¹⁴³ *Birds*, 691.

¹⁴⁷ *Birds*, 696 f.

¹⁴⁴ 116 f.

¹⁴⁸ *Theogony*, 120.

poet's main argument, namely that the birds are older than the gods.¹⁴⁸ The problem then arises as to whether Aristophanes invented this novel theogony for his own purposes, or whether he derived it from any other source.

Unfortunately the ancient evidence upon the subject of cosmic eggs is niggardly in the extreme.

Damascius says that Epimenides of Crete, who liyed in the seventh century B. C., held that Night existed before the egg, and appears to have produced it;¹⁴⁹ while Orpheus, in a fragment, is reported to have stated that Chronus fashioned a silvery egg.¹⁵⁰ In other words, there seems to have been a tradition which connected the egg with Orphism, although the reference to "Chrcnus" suggests that it is late.

Now although neither of the sources quoted is strong evidence for the existence of this belief at an early period, they may perhaps be considered to carry more weight in the light of Aristophanes' statement, which does show, at any rate, that the belief in a cosmic egg was well established in the fifth century B. C.

The epithet *ὑπηρέμιον* is perhaps more significant than might at first appear.

The Scholiasts say—*ὑπηρέμια καλεῖται τὰ δίχα συνουσίας καὶ μίξεως· καὶ τοῦτο δὲ, οὐχ ὡς ἔτυχεν αὐτῷ προσέρριπται, ἀλλὰ ἀπὸ ιστορίας τῆς κατὰ τοὺς Διοσκούρους· φασὶ γὰρ ἐξ ὧν αὐτοὺς γεγονέναι καὶ ὅτι σύνηθες αὐτοῖς μᾶλλον ἀνεμαῖον λέγειν καὶ Πλάτων ἐν Θεαιτήτῳ “γόνιμον ἀνεμαῖον τυγχάνει.”*¹⁵¹

In other words they offer two suggestions. First that eggs are so-called when they are infertile—second that *ὑπηρέμιον* is a synonym for *ἀνεμαῖον* and means “addled.” Now there seems no doubt that the poet is emphasising the latter sense, which makes a good joke, but he is also playing on the serious sense of the word, which probably existed in the version which he is parodying.

Night, he says, brought forth the egg.¹⁵² There is no mention of a father,¹⁵³ so it was naturally a “wind egg,” Night having been impregnated by the wind.

¹⁴⁸ *Birds*, 477.

¹⁴⁹ *De Theogoniis*, 68.

¹⁵⁰ Frag. 53: *καὶ γὰρ Ὁρφεύς· ἔπειτα δ' ἔτενες μέγας χρόνος αἰθέρι διώ
ῶεον ἀργύφεον.*

¹⁵¹ *Theaetetus*, 151 E.

¹⁵² *τίκτει πρώτιστον ὑπηρέμιον Νὺξ ἡ μελανότερος φόν*, *Birds*, 895.

¹⁵³ Aristophanes does say of course that Night brought the egg forth—*Ἐρέθους ἐν ἀπέρσαι κόλποις*, which would seem to imply some association with the latter, particularly in view of the fact that she is said to have

Now there is a certain amount of ancient evidence for this belief.

A Harpy is said to have been the mother of Achilles' horses by Zephyrus, the west wind,¹⁵⁴ while Virgil tells how, by the winds, mares became pregnant.¹⁵⁵

The origin of the belief is obscure. It might date back to a time when the processes of birth and generation were not fully related, if indeed there ever was such a time, but it is more likely that there is some connection with the notion of identifying the wind with life.¹⁵⁶ $\psi\chi\nu$ appears to be derived from the same root as $\psi\chi\nu\omega$ and was regarded as being of a like nature with the wind.¹⁵⁷ The soul departed at death into the winds, and life could presumably return through the winds at birth.

The explanation need not be doubted. It may appear to be too involved and mystical for the mind of primitive man, but is attested as Orphic by Aristotle.¹⁵⁸

The parallel with the Christian conception of the Virgin Birth is obvious.¹⁵⁹

The origin of the belief in a cosmic egg, whether Orphic or otherwise, is not easy to determine.

Eggs have always been popular symbols with inventors of theogonies and mythologists. The Egyptian demiurge Chnoum gave birth to a cosmic egg, according to Eusebius;¹⁶⁰ while Leda gave birth to the egg from which, according to one tradition, emerged Helen and the Dioscuri.¹⁶¹ This myth, however, was by no means universal as Nemesis was Helen's mother according to the Attic tradition which follows the *Cypria*.¹⁶² The reason why eggs have been chosen for these purposes seems clear; they

mated with him in Hesiod (*Theogony*, 124 f.)—but the relationship is not made explicit.

¹⁵⁴ Homer, *Iliad*, XVI, 150.

¹⁵⁵ *Georgics*, III, 274 f.

¹⁵⁶ Cf. W. K. C. Guthrie, *Orpheus and Greek Religion*, p. 94.

¹⁵⁷ Cf. Cumont, *Le Symbolisme Funéraire des Romains*, pp. 109 f.

¹⁵⁸ *De Anima*, 410 B 19; frag. 27 Kern. Cf. Cicero, *De Nat. Deor.*, I, 2, 27, who makes it Pythagorean.

¹⁵⁹ J. E. Harrison, *Transactions of the Third International Congress for the History of Religions*, II, pp. 163 f.; *Prolegomena*, pp. 626 f.

¹⁶⁰ *De Praep. Eu.*, 3, 11.

¹⁶¹ Cf. Euripides, *Helena*, 1642; Schol. Cellim. *Dian.*, 232.

¹⁶² Athen., VIII, 334 C; cf. R. Engelmann in Roscher, *s. v. Helena*, I, pp. 1929 f.

are excellent material for parables about births. There seems no need to postulate, with Jane Harrison, an origin from primitive taboos upon eggs.¹⁸³

The following conclusions may therefore be drawn, in connection with Aristophanes' reference to the "wind egg."

A. The poet was apparently parodying an old theogony, which told how life emerged from a cosmic egg.

B. He probably substituted "birds" for whatever first emerged from the egg in the original account. The transition was easy, for "Ερως too is winged.

C. The origin of the widespread belief in a cosmic egg is unknown, but it was probably introduced to Greece by the Orphic movement.

D. The epithet *ιπνέμου* appears to derive from ancient belief in the fertilising power of the winds. The origin of this belief is unknown, but may be connected with the conception of the soul, as the breath of life.

What then may be safely concluded with reference to the problems which we have been considering?

1. We have seen that the play is good evidence for the bird-mindedness of the Athenian populace in the late fifth century B.C.

2. There is no reason to suppose that the poet's references to the woodpecker, cuckoo, and cock were intended to be anything more than mere fairy tales. No sound arguments can be produced to show that these tales possessed any ritual significance whatsoever, or that they could be said to support the hypothesis that bird cults formerly existed in Greece.

3. Some of the features mentioned in connection with the kite may derive from a Mycenaean belief (hypothetical) that the presence of birds of prey at sacrifices represented the epiphanies of gods.

4. The custom in art of sometimes adding a bird in close association with a deity may derive from the Minoan.

5. The conception of a "wind egg" appears to be connected with the ancient belief in the fertilising power of the breezes.

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¹⁸³ *Prolegomena*, p. 629.

THE DATE AND NATURE OF THE SPANISH *CONSENSORIA MONACHORUM.*¹

In the fourth volume of his *Geschichte der römischen Literatur* (2nd ed., 1914) M. Schanz briefly discusses under the Late Latin literature of Spanish Priscillianism the so-called *Regula Consensoria Monachorum*.² This short work, the correct title of which is *Consensoria Monachorum* (henceforth abbreviated as *CM*), takes the form of an agreement among a group of individuals seeking to establish a monastic community. It defines the terms of association, the admission of new members and the secession of old ones, the abbot's powers, and the preservation of the community and its movable wealth in the event of violent assault from without. Although certain late medieval MSS and the earliest printed editions ascribe the text to St. Augustine,³ L. Holstenius rightly rubricated it *incerti auctoris* in his 1661 *Codex Regularum Monasticalium*.⁴ No attempt at identification, however, was made until 1907, when I. Herwegen published his important study of the monastic *pactum*, that uniquely Spanish written contract between abbot and monks under which, in the territories of Galicia, Asturias, Castile, and the Navarrese Rioja, the strongly authoritarian abbatiate of orthodox cenobitism was radically modified in favor of a constitutional monastic polity emphasizing the monks' rights, even to rebellion, against their abbot.⁵ Impressed by certain quasi-pactual features of the *CM*,

¹ For assistance in the course of this study, grateful acknowledgment is made to the authorities of the Biblioteca del Escorial; the Frederick Sheldon Fund, Harvard University; the Institute for Research in the Social Sciences, University of Virginia; and the Research Committee, University of Virginia.

² *Handbuch der klassischen Altertumswissenschaft*, ed. I. von Müller, VIII, iv, 1, p. 384.

³ P. Schroeder, "Die Augustinerchorherrenregel. Entstehung, kritischer Text und Einführung der Regel," *Archiv für Urkundenforschung*, IX (1926), p. 273.

⁴ References are to the 1759 Vienna edition of Holstenius, by M. Brücke, which prints the *CM* text, t. I, pp. 136-7. With minor revisions, this is the text reproduced in J. P. Migne, *Patrologiae Latinae Cursus Completus* (Paris, 1844-64), LXVI, cols. 993-6.

⁵ Dom Ildefons Herwegen, *Das Pactum des hl. Fructuosus von Braga* (Stuttgart, 1907; *Kirchenrechtliche Abhandlungen*, ed. U. Stutz, Heft 40), pp. 71-9.

Herwegen (pp. 71-9) very tentatively asserted the work might well emanate from the same general region and period which, as he ably demonstrated, produced the *pactum*, i. e., the old Roman-Visigothic province of Callaecia, Gallaecia, or Galicia, soon after 650. This proposal, however, was immediately and forcefully assailed by D. DeBruyne, who argued that its reference to the Germanic invasions of Roman Spain and its use of a pre-Hieronymian Bible necessarily dated the *CM* no later than the fifth century, while peculiarities of content and terminology proved it to be a monastic Rule used by communities of heretical Priscillianist monks.⁶

Since 1908 DeBruyne's conclusions have been almost unanimously accepted among students of Hispano-Latin literature and Spanish ecclesiastical history,⁷ the only exceptions being the already cited Schanz, who finds them "ohne durchschlagende Gründe," and Ángel Custodio Vega, the latest editor of the text, for whom the Priscillianist evidence particularly seems inconclusive.⁸ It is the aim of the present paper to attack this current identification and, after refuting DeBruyne, to prove that the *CM*, as Herwegen suggested, is a type of non-Priscillianist Galician monastic *pactum* of the later seventh century.

1. The charge of Priscillianism. DeBruyne's case for the *CM*'s

⁶ Dom Donatien DeBruyne, "La *Regula Consensoria*. Une règle des moines priscillianistes," *Revue Bénédictine*, XXV (1908), pp. 83-8. DeBruyne's Priscillianist theory apparently derives from a remark of U. Berlière, *Rev. Bénéd.*, XXIV (1907), p. 41*. Although Herwegen took occasion to reply to other strictures of DeBruyne upon *Das Pactum* (e. g., *Rev. Bénéd.*, XXIX [1912], pp. 97-8), he tacitly accepted the demolition of his *CM* hypothesis.

⁷ E. g., O. Bardenhewer, *Geschichte der altkirchlichen Literatur* (Freiburg i. B., 1902-32), III, p. 412; U. Moricca, *Storia della Letteratura Latina Cristiana* (Tirin, 1928-), II, 1, p. 504; Pascual Galindo, "Literatura hispano-latina. Escritores cristianos," in R. Menéndez Pidal (ed.), *Historia de España. II. España Romana* (Madrid, 1935), p. 557; H. Leclercq, "Cénobitisme," *Dictionnaire d'Archéologie Chrétienne et de Liturgie*, II, 2 (Paris, 1910), cols. 3220-1; Z. García Villada, *Historia Eclesiástica de España* (Madrid, 1929-), I, 2, p. 141; J. Pérez de Urbel, *Los Monjes Españoles en la Edad Media* (Madrid, 1933-4), I, pp. 158-162.

⁸ *La Regla de San Agustín* (El Escorial, 1933), p. 7. I have not seen B. Garnelo, "Datos históricos acerca de la Regla de San Agustín," *Archivo Augustiniano*, XXXVIII (1932), pp. 364-97, which includes a brief treatment of the *CM*, presumably based on DeBruyne.

Priscillianist origin is by no means strong. The work's promulgation by the monks themselves rather than by a monastic legislator, its sharp curtailment of the abbot's powers, and its marked interest in the monastic temporal, which is strangely viewed as the collective possession of the *consentientes*, all testify to a certain unorthodoxy, but this no more proves the *CM* Priscillianist than his mortality proves Socrates a hare. The first feature is abnormal only if the *CM* is assumed to be a Rule, which, as we shall see, it is not; the second recalls the non-monarchical abbatiatus of the *pactum*, which, however unorthodox, is certainly not Priscillianist; and as for the third, it may be pointed out that Priscillianism was at least as hostile as orthodox monasticism to the possession of material goods by avowed ascetics.⁹ Again, the single citation of a probably apocryphal scripture (c. iii: *amicum noli*, etc.), which DeBruyne relates to the known Priscillianist addiction to this type of literature, likewise carries little weight, for, down to the tenth century at least, Spanish writings of unimpeachable orthodoxy cite uncanonical prophetic and exhortatory tracts as if they possessed Biblical authority.¹⁰

Hardly more convincing is DeBruyne's claim that the strong fear of doctrinal contamination from without (c. v.: *aut si quis ab aliquo doctrinam audierit, praeter quam in monasterio consecutus est, ab eo cui se credidit hanc aut non suscipiat aut eam non subtrahat doctori* [i.e., abbatil]) is directed against orthodoxy. This really cuts both ways: orthodox monks in a Priscillianist milieu might well so seek to protect themselves against circumambient heresy. But the correct interpretation of this passage is surely not a doctrinal one, for in monastic circles *doctrina* commonly means not tenet of faith but ascetic practice.¹¹

⁹ Cf., *inter alios*, E.-Ch. Babut, *Priscillien et le Priscillianisme* (Paris, 1909), pp. 84-5; 135.

¹⁰ E.g., *Regula Monastica Communis*, c. xii: *omnis detractor eradicabitur* (Holstenius-Brockie, *Cod. Reg. Mon.*, I, 214, where its ascription to "Gal. 7" is equivalent to dating it on the Greek Kalends); Z. García Villada, *Crónica de Alfonso III* (Madrid, 1918), pp. 60-1: *in vanum currit*, etc.; and an 864 charter of the cathedral church of Santa María de Valpuesta, beginning *inquirite dominum*, etc. (L. Barrau-Dihigo, "Chartes de l'église de Valpuesta du ix^e au xi^e siècle," *Rev. Hispanique*, VII [1900], pp. 287-9).

¹¹ Cf. St. Benedict, *Reg. Monach.*, c. lxxiii: *sunt doctrinæ sanctorum patrum quarum observatio perducat hominem ad celsitudinem perfectionis* (ed. C. Butler [Freiburg i. B., 1927], p. 131).

To cite only Spanish examples, the council of VII Toledo in 646 (c. v) declares of itinerant anchorites: *in monasteriis omnimodo deputentur ut illic sancti ordinis meditantes doctrinam primum possint discere quae sunt a patribus instituta . . . atque tunc demum si doctrinae et sancti operis fructu exstiterint fecundati, ad summam virtutis properent.*¹² In XI Tolèdo (675) abbots are warned against tolerating any departure from traditional liturgical usage (c. iii); a violator is to be punished: *et necessariam officiorum doctrinam studiose addiscat.*¹³ The Galician *Regula SS. Pauli et Stephani Abbatum* parallels the *CM* passage closely, when it says (c. xiv): *nec ab adveniente hospite sine iussu prioris quidquam talium rerum aliquis audeat meditari, ne peregrinis varietatum doctrinis et quodammodo diliramentorum suavitibus irretiti, simplicitatis et veritatis maturitatem fastidiant.*¹⁴ That *doctrina* in *CM*, c. v, has the same meaning as in the foregoing instances is confirmed by the context: the monk believes (*se credidit*) the transmitter of the *doctrina*, but the *doctrina* itself is not so much believed as followed or observed (*consecutus est*). Monastic usage, moreover, is a subject upon which abbots might properly pass judgment; matters of faith would be more naturally referred to sacerdotal or episcopal authorities.

DeBruyne's final proof of Priscillianist origin is the *CM*'s use of *doctor* as equivalent to *abbas* (c. v), which he regards as unique in monastic history. The title *doctor* is known to have been applied by the Priscillianists to members of their ascetic governing élite, and its assumption by individuals was expressly forbidden in Spain by the anti-Priscillianist council of Saragossa in 380 (c. vii).¹⁵ But to identify the Priscillianist *doctor*, whose charismatic authority would in all likelihood make him a highly autocratic official,¹⁶ with the weak *primus inter pares* of the *CM*, hardly seems logical. Besides, early monastic literature both within and outside Spain frequently refers to the teaching functions of the abbot;¹⁷ and evidence exists to show that, whatever

¹² Migne, *Patr. Lat.*, LXXXIV, col. 408.

¹³ *Ibid.*, col. 459.

¹⁴ *Patr. Lat.*, LXVI, cols. 953-4.

¹⁵ *Patr. Lat.*, LXXXIV, col. 316.

¹⁶ Cf. A. Puech, "Les origines du priscillianisme," *Bull. d'Ancienne Littérature et d'Archéologie Chrétienne*, II (1912), pp. 176-7.

¹⁷ E.g., *Reg. Ia. SS. Patrum*, c. xvi (Holst-Brockie, I, p. 14; *Patr.*

its original heretical connotation, *doctor* eventually came to be used technically in Visigothic Spain to mean a ruler of monks, whether an abbot or (with reference to episcopal control over diocesan monasteries) a bishop. The *Regula Orientalis* of Vigilius, apparently written in Gaul in the early fifth century, and widely used in Spain, refers to the abbot (c. i) as *doctor et pater*.¹⁸ Two metrical Latin epitaphs of the *Anthologia Hispana* illustrate, it would seem, the episcopal application. One, that of the metropolitan bishop John of Tarragona (d. 519-20), speaks of him as *rector doctorq(ue) prefuisti monacis et populis*.¹⁹ The other, the epitaph of the bishop Justinian of Valencia (ca. 546), reads in part: *pius preclarus doctor alacer facundus / . . . / virgines institue(n)s monacos(que) gu(bernans)*.²⁰ The early tenth century Escorial MS Lat. a. I. 13, containing much pre-711 Galician material, speaks, in an as yet unidentified text, of penitents who remain *sub potestate iudicis aut doctoris vel abbatis*.²¹ Other examples might be cited from unpublished tenth and eleventh century Spanish charters in which Hispano-Visigothic ecclesiastical terminology is conservatively retained.²²

Lat., CIII, cols. 440-1); S. Orsiesius, *Doctrina de Inst. Monach.*, c. xxv (A. Boon-L. Th. Lefort, *Pachomiana Latina* [Louvain, 1932], p. 126); S. Fructuosus, *Reg. Monach.*, c. xx (*Patr. Lat.*, LXXXVII, col. 1108).

¹⁸ Holst-Brockie, I, p. 61; *Patr. Lat.*, CIII, col. 477; cf. Boon-Lefort, *op. cit.*, pp. 42-4.

¹⁹ José Vives, *Inscripciones Cristianas de la España Romana y Visigoda* (Barcelona, 1942), pp. 83-4 (no. 277); G. B. de Rossi, *Inscriptiones Christianae Urbis Romae* (Rome, 1857-8), II, 1, p. 294; E. Hübner, *Inscriptionum Hispaniae Christianarum Supplementum* (Berlin, 1900), p. 84 (no. 413). Vives is doubtless right in confining *doctor* in these two inscriptions to episcopal monastic jurisdiction and denying its equivalence to *abbas*; but since Visigothic bishops were commonly recruited from the abbatiate, an implied reference to the fact that John and Justinian had earlier served as abbots need not be altogether ruled out.

²⁰ Vives, p. 85 (no. 279); de Rossi, p. 293; Hübner, no. 409.

²¹ Fol. 52r; cf. G. Antolín, "Un 'codex regularum' del siglo IX," *Ciudad de Dios*, LXXV (1908), p. 316.

²² 970: *doctori Sigerrici abbatii* (L. Barrau-Dihigo, "Notes et documents sur l'histoire du royaume de Leon. I. Chartes royales léonaises," *Revue Hispanique*, X [1903], p. 399); ca. 980: . . . *abba siue doctor albel(d)ensis* (Madrid, Archivo Histórico Nacional, Clero, *Libro de Pergaminos de San Juan de la Peña*, I [MS 442], priv. 12-R; date restored on prosopographical grounds); 1087: *pelagius abba doctor*

Lastly, DeBruyne fails to explain the sanctions clause of the *CM*'s initial chapter: *in domino ergo iure observationis et legis nos teneamus*, etc. *Observatio* here means *observatio monastica*, i. e., the canonical obligations of the monastic vows; while *lex* has reference to the *lex civilis*, i. e., to secular enforcement in Late Roman and post-Roman law of the *conditio monastica*, as well as of the contract as such. Either we must assume, contrary to all probability, that the state in Galicia, whether Late Roman, Suevic, or Visigothic, was expected to enforce a heretical covenant which could have no validity in its courts following the Emperor Maximus' official proscription of Priscillianism (384), a ban never revoked under Suevic or Visigothic law, so far as we know; or, as is far more probable, the *CM* was a covenant not among heretics but among orthodox monks, binding in the *ius utriusque fori*. In the latter case, the charge of Priscillianism loses its last remaining support.

2. *The Germanic invasions.* Since Priscillianism, as the canons of the council of II Braga (572) show, survived in Galicia until late in the sixth century, DeBruyne uses other evidence to prove the *CM*'s fifth century origin, although its alleged heretical character naturally strengthened the case for an early date. From cc. vii-viii it appears that the *CM* monastery was frequently (*ut fieri solet*) menaced with destruction by *incursio repentina aut hostilitas*. In c. vii the monks promise that, if forced to flee for this reason, they will reassemble about the abbot and restore to him whatever monastic chattels they have been able to rescue at the time of attack. For DeBruyne, these mysterious assaults fix 500 A. D. as the *CM*'s *terminus ante quem*, for he explains them as due to the fifth century Germanic invasions of Roman Spain, at a time when the province of Gallaecia was repeatedly harassed by marauding bands of Alans, Asdingian Vandals, and Sueves. This interpretation would be more convincing if the context did not equally permit the destroyers to be the hostile Arabs or Berbers of the eighth century,²³ or, assuming the *CM* Priscillianist, orthodox extirpators of heretical

monacorum (Arch. Hist. Nac., Clero, *Tumbo de San Salvador de Celanova* [MS 986 B], fol. 41v).

²³ L. Barrau-Dihigo, "Recherches sur l'histoire politique du royaume asturien (718-910)," *Rev. Hisp.*, LII (1921), pp. 106-45, 150-7, and especially pp. 250-60 and 348-52 on monastic establishments in frontier territory still subject to hostile invasion.

monachism. But the true significance of these passages is clarified by other Galician references to destructive attacks upon monastic communities. The *Regula Monastica Communis*, written in the province ca. 660-675, speaks in several places of attacks upon abbeys by kinsmen seeking to recover property granted a house by some relative at the time of his monastic profession.²⁴ So, in c. i, it describes the frequency with which monks of what it calls false monasteries encompass the ruin of their communities: *quod si aliqua ex illis imbecillitas apparuerit, propinquos, quos in saeculo reliquerunt, cum gladiis et fustibus ac minis sibi adiutores adducunt, et qualiter haec disrumpant in prima dudum conversatione excogitant.* Such armed violence, however, was equally feared by more orthodox communities, for in c. xiv the *Reg. Mon. Com.* notes the necessity of expelling a monk who *contra seniorem vel fratres in facie perstiterit, et cum propinquis se vindicare maluerit*; and a little later it adds (c. xviii): *comperimus per minus cauta monasteria qui cum facultaticulis suis ingressi sunt, postea tepefactos cum grandi exprobratione repetere et saeculum quod relinquenter, ut canes ad vomitum, revo-care; et cum propinquis quod monasteria contulerant hoc extorquere et iudices saeculares requirere et cum senioribus²⁵ monasteria dissipare.* So, too, in the *pactum* appended to this Rule, the monk pledges the abbot that he will not *contra regulam occulte cum parentibus germanis filiis cognatis vel propinquis aut certe cum fratre secum habitante consilium de absente supradicto patre nostro inierit*. Other examples might be cited, but these will suffice to prove that cc. vii-viii of the *CM* refer not to such major political catastrophes as the Germanic or Muslim invasions, but to attacks of hostile kinsmen whose hopes of landed inheritance and other wealth lay in destroying the monastery and recovering their relative's portion of its temporal. This background of familial property concepts and of hostility toward Roman modes of alienation of goods illumines the *CM*'s insistence upon the temporal as permanently transferred to communal ownership. It reveals that this latter doctrine was designed to meet the needs of an environment in which monastic poverty and divine proprietorship of ecclesiastical goods were but dimly understood and little respected. All of which points not to the

²⁴ Holst-Brockie, I, pp. 208-19; *Patr. Lat.*, LXXXVII, cols. 1109-30.

²⁵ Perhaps read *sationibus*, with Herwegen, p. 3, n. 1.

Roman fifth, but the Visigothic seventh, century as the period of the *CM*'s composition.

3. *The Biblical citations.* In DeBruyne's judgment, the *CM*'s fifth century origin is decisively proved by its use of an Old Latin rendering of the Scriptures, since by 500 the Vulgate was well established in the Iberian peninsula.²⁶ Of the fourteen Biblical citations one, as already seen, is probably apocryphal: *amicum noli*, etc. (c. iii); a second is too brief or free a paraphrase to be significant: *unum*, etc. (c. i); two are the same in OL and Vulg.: *habentes*, etc. (c. i; Acts 2, 44 or 4, 32) and *pacifici*, etc. (c. iv; Eccl. 6, 6); and the remaining ten unquestionably contain a high proportion of OL readings, chiefly from *a*, *b*, *c*, and several African versions, above all, *k*. DeBruyne assumes (hence apparently Schanz's doubts, *loc. cit.*) that by the sixth century the Vulg. had either displaced or so corrupted OL Biblical MSS in Galicia that a work so predominantly OL in its citations as the *CM* could not have been written. Yet everything we know of the history of the Spanish Bible well into the Middle Ages testifies to the remarkable longevity of the OL and the retarded triumph of the Vulg. This applies with especial force to so relatively isolated and remote a province as Galicia. Berger and Dom Quentin have shown that even down to the eleventh century Spanish Biblical texts fall into four main categories: OL Bibles; Vulg. Bibles containing whole books in OL; Vulg. books peppered with OL readings; and Vulg. Bibles, although as DeBruyne himself notes, "on devait chercher longtemps avant de trouver [en Espagne] une Vulgate pure."²⁷ Peninsular Biblical citations, therefore, ordinarily display an admixture of OL and Vulg. readings, something a more careful analysis may show to be true of the *CM*, since two of its citations could be from the Vulg. and among the other ten there are some possibly distinctively Vulg. readings.

²⁶ On the OL in Spain, cf., *passim*, Samuel Berger, *Histoire de la Vulgate* (Paris, 1893); F. C. Burkitt, *The Old Latin and the Itala* (Cambridge, 1896; *Texts and Studies*, IV, 3); F. Stummer, *Einführung in die lateinische Bibel* (Paderborn, 1928); and D. DeBruyne, "Étude sur les origines de la Vulgate en Espagne," *Rev. Bénéd.*, XXI (1914-19), pp. 373-401.

²⁷ Berger, pp. 8-28; H. Quentin, *Mémoire sur l'Établissement du Texte de la Vulgate, 1ère partie: Octateuque* (Rome-Paris, 1922), chap. VI; DeBruyne, *Rev. Bénéd.*, XXXV (1908), p. 88.

In short, the strong probability exists of OL Bibles surviving in Galicia at least to 711, above all in the rural milieu from which the *CM* evidently springs. This argument DeBruyne partially anticipates by calling attention to the difference in the Biblical versions used in the seventh century Galician *Regula Monachorum* of Fructuosus of Braga and the *Regula Monastica Communis*.²⁸ The degree of "hieronymianization" of these two works in the unsatisfactory printed editions is uncertain, but in any case the four brief citations of the *Reg. Monach.* prove nothing. The some thirty-four citations of the *Reg. Mon. Com.*, however, reflect a highly mixed Bible, almost as much OL as Vulg., and with the same affinities as the *CM* to *a*, *b*, *c*, and the African group. The higher content here of Vulg. readings as compared with *CM* is explicable geographically as well as chronologically. It is just what might be expected in a literary work emanating from Braga, the chief cultural and ecclesiastical center; undoubtedly the rate of occurrence of OL readings and OL Biblical MSS would rise as one moved out from the provincial capital.

Until we get some much needed chronological and regional studies of OL-Vulg. interaction in Spain, we can only generalize with caution, but it seems reasonable to conclude that setting the fifth century as the arbitrary terminus of OL circulation in Galicia is hazardous, if not downright erroneous. This is particularly true if it can be shown that all the other evidence strongly points to a seventh century date for the *CM*, as examination of the text and its transmission will soon make clear.

If the *CM* is neither Priscillianist nor necessarily of the fifth century, then Herwegen's proposed identification as a type of later seventh century Galician monastic *pactum* merits the critical examination it has not yet received. Of first importance in this connection is the neglected evidence of the manuscript tradition. Three early medieval collections of monastic Rules preserve the *CM* text: (1) Munich Hof- und Staatsbibliothek Lat. 28118, saec. ix (*M*), the great Codex Trevirensis from the St. Maximinus abbey at Trier, containing the *Codex Regularum* of the Carolingian monastic reformer St. Benedict of Aniane (d. 821);²⁹ (2) Escorial Lat. a. I. 13, fols. 50^v, col. 2-51^v, col. 2,

²⁸ Holst.-Brockie, I, pp. 201-219; *Patr. Lat.*, LXXXVII, cols. 1099-1130.

²⁹ O. Seebass, "Über das Regelbuch Benedikts von Aniane," *Zeitschrift*

saec. x ineunte (*B*), copied by Leodegundia for the Galician nunnery of Bohadilla, near Samos, prov. Lugo;³⁰ and (3) Escorial Lat. s. III. 32, fols. 66^r-67^v, saec. ix (*E*), of northwest or north-central Spanish provenance.³¹ In addition, the rubric of a los^r text survives in London Brit. Mus. Addit. MS 30055, fol. 223^r, saec. x (*L*), a *codex regularum* from the archive of the monastery of San Pedro de Cardeña, near Burgos in Old Castile.³²

According to Seebass and Plenkers, Holstenius' printed text, which Migne reproduces with slight revision, is probably based upon a 1467 Cologne MS (Stadtbibliothek theolog. 231) that is an accurate copy of *M.*³³ Ángel C. Vega's 1933 edition is the first to use the important Escorial codices, but it regrettably fails to publish the majority of their variant readings, tending to conceal the fact that the Holstenius-Brockie-Migne text con-

für *Kirchengeschichte*, XV (1894-5), pp. 244-60; H. Plenkers, *Untersuchungen zur Überlieferungsgeschichte der ältesten lateinischen Mönchsregeln* (Munich, 1906; *Quellen und Untersuchungen zur lateinischen Philologie des Mittelalters*, Bd. I, Hft. 3), pp. 4-8. On Benedict of Aniane and his *Codex*, cf. P. Schmitz, "Benoit d'Aniane," *Dictionnaire d'Histoire et de Géographie Ecclésiastique*, VIII (Paris, 1935), pp. 177-88 (with good bibliography).

³⁰ G. Antolín, "Historia y descripción de un 'codex regularum' del siglo IX," *Ciudad de Dios*, LXXV (1908), pp. 23-33, 304-316, 460-71, 637-49; LXXVI (1908), pp. 310-323, 457-70; LXXVII (1908), pp. 48-56, 131-6 [also separately Madrid, 1908]; *idem*, *Catálogo de los Códices Latinos de la Real Biblioteca del Escorial* (Madrid, 1910-23), I, pp. 21-25. For the date, cf., most recently, A. Millares Carlo, *Nuevos Estudios de Paleografía Española* (Mexico City, 1941), pp. 106-7.

³¹ Antolín, *Catálogo*, IV, pp. 82-5.

³² W. M. Whitehill, "Un códice visigótico de San Pedro de Cardeña (British Museum, Additional ms. 30055)," *Boletín de la Academia de la Historia*, CVII (1935), pp. 513-14. The survival of still another early *CM* text in Paris Bibl. Nat. Lat. 10876, saec. x, is suggested by Gerou's reference to the *Regula S. Isidori* as there containing 25 titles (note that in *B* and *L* the *CM* appears as c. xxv of this *regula*); but L. Delisle's description of this MS, giving the Isidorian *explicit* and the rubrics of two short appended pieces (*Reg. S. Pachomii*, c. lxxvii; *Conc. Hispal. II*, c. xi) seems to rule out this possibility. Cf. Delisle, "Notices sur les manuscrits disparus de la bibliothèque de Tours pendant la première moitié du xixe siècle," *Notices et Extraits des Manuscrits de la Bibliothèque Nationale*, XXI, 1 (1884), pp. 246-7; *Catalogue Général des Manuscrits des Bibliothèques Publiques de France. Départements*, XXXVII, 1 (ed. M. G. Collon; Paris, 1900), pp. 493-4.

³³ Plenkers, *loc. cit.*

tains numerous errors. Vega's text also rests primarily upon *M*, so that the need for a new critical edition is evident. Collation of all three MSS, the results of which can only be briefly summarized here, establishes several important points hitherto overlooked. The most obvious is the just mentioned weakness of *M*, which is corrected not infrequently by the agreement of *B* and *E*. More striking, however, is the fact of the general agreement between *M* and *E* as against *B*, a divergence marked enough to justify the conclusion that there exist two fairly distinguishable versions of the text. This double tradition is established by the following major variant readings:

M and *E*: *communi definitione decrevimus apud nos, ab ullo, quod et (a E) nobis scriptum est, teneamus et in eo usque in finem permaneamus quoniam* (c. i); *vestimento, veste*m*ini, quaerite, cponentur (adponentur E)* (c. ii); *qui prior est, amicum noli cito comprobare* (c. iii); *indicet (om. E) abbati* (c. iv); *haec quae scripta sunt (hec conscriptum est E)* (c. v); *adversus alterum (abatem E) altercatus fuerit semel sed (altercatus emendet se E) secundum evangelium* (c. vi); *abatem, festinare debebunt, ullo modo poterunt* (poterint *E*) *separari quos divina charitas (karitas E) sociavit quia cautum* (c. vii); *superius, proprie* (cui per *E*) *retinere, cogitaverit* (c. viii); *propter, cauta qui* (c. ix).

B: *decretum est apud nos, ab ullis, quod a nobis ceptum est, teneamus quoniam; uestitum, utimini, querite primum, adicietur; qui precest, amicum noli cito conprobare aut si cito conprobaberis noli cito reprobare; renuntiet abbati; hec conscriptio; aduersus alius altercatus fuerit emendet secundum euangelium; abatem eorum, festinare debent, ullo metu poterint separari cautum; iam superius, cum ipso retinere, contigerit; non propter, cauta quia.*

Some of *B*'s variants from *M* and *E* are explicable as scribal omissions or alterations (e. g., in c. ii *utimini* and *adicie(n)tur* are Vulg. substitutions for the original OL), and at certain points its text is less clear than that of *M* and *E*. Nevertheless, there are indications that in some respects *B* stands closer than either *M* or *E* to a lost archetype. The apocryphal citation of c. iii, which no scribe would be likely to supplement, appears in fuller form; the *altercatio* passage (c. vi) avoids the confusing readings of both *M* and *E*, which disagree here; and the logical

non propter . . . stabiles of c. ix is found only in *B*. All these variants, although they do not affect the meaning of the text in any serious sense, suffice to establish two different traditions.

No less significant is the fact that this double textual tradition is reinforced by the MSS in another way. All four MSS attach the *CM* closely to a monastic Rule. In *M* and *E* the work immediately follows the *Regula S. Easili*, under the rubric *incipit consensoria monachorum*.³⁴ In *B* and *L* it stands as an additional twenty-fifth chapter of the *Regula S. Isidori* (in *B* simply rubricked c. xxv; in *L* as c. xxv. *incipit consensoria monachorum*). From this it may be inferred that before passing into the *codices regularum* each of these Rules must have circulated independently in MSS containing only the Rule and the attached *CM*. This testimony to what may be called Basilian and Isidorian lines of transmission takes on even greater interest when it is discovered to parallel exactly the double descent of the text. *M* and *E*, textually in basic agreement, both belong to the Basilian line; *B* (unfortunately the *L* text is lost), to the Isidorian.

All this throws much needed light upon the origins and nature of the *CM*. It confirms its Spanish and, specifically, Galician, provenance, first proposed by Herwegen but never proved, even by DeBruyne. Three of the known MSS are now seen to be Spanish (*B* from Galicia, *L* from Castile, *E* from the same general area); and it could be shown without much difficulty, although this is not the place to undertake it, that all the early medieval Spanish *codices regularum* (and a number of these are known) derive from one or more late seventh century Galician collections of monastic Rules. The same is true of Benedict of Aniane's *Codex Regularum*, which *M* preserves; this contains an undue proportion of Galician material, some of it not otherwise preserved, even in Galician MSS (e.g., the complete *Regula Monastica Communis*, the *Regula SS. Pauli et Stephani Abbatum*, and the *De Genere Monachorum* of the abbot Valerius), and it seems very likely that the great leader of the Carolingian Benedictine Reform drew heavily, and perhaps directly, upon the rich literary tradition of seventh century Galician monasticism.³⁵

³⁴ Benedict of Aniane places the *CM* after the Benedictine Rule, but for its post-Basilian position in *M*, see Plenkers, p. 8.

³⁵ According to Vega (pp. 27, 30), *M* is of Spanish provenance.

Furthermore, the collocation of the *CM* in Basilian or Isidorian MSS assists in determining its date, for it is possible to discover within reasonable limits when the *Regula S. Isidori* reached Galicia. Isidore did not write his Rule until the period of his metropolitanate, 620-636; and Fructuosus of Braga, author *ca.* 635 of the first Galician monastic Rule, shows no knowledge of it, although he draws freely upon such other monastic sources as Cassian, Pachomius, Jerome *ad Eustochium*, and the *De Ordine Monachorum*. On the other hand, the Galician *Regula Monastica Communis*, which appeared *ca.* 660-675, definitely cites the Isidorian Rule.³⁸ The latter thus seems to have reached Galicia soon after 650. The Basilian Rule cannot be traced in this fashion, but it was not used by Fructuosus and probably reached Galicia at much the same time as the *Reg. S. Isid.* To be sure, it is not enough to know that the *CM* could not have circulated in Galicia, as an appendix to the Isidorian and Basilian Rules, before *ca.* 650, since conceivably it could have done so earlier as an independent document. But if, as seems inherently likely, it was written to supplement a monastic Rule, and if, as the MSS indicate, it was normally used with either the Basilian or Isidorian *regulae*, then the probability is that it dates from about the same period as the Galician advent of these Rules, namely *ca.* 650-675.

That the *CM* was intended to accompany a Rule and be used with it, exactly as the so-called Fructuosan *pactum* was designed for use with, and was attached in the MSS to the terminus of, the *Regula Monastica Communis*, seems certain. Rule the *CM* emphatically is not, nor is it so entitled except in late non-Spanish MSS and the printed editions. It contains none of the prescriptions on daily régime, diet, clothing, labor, prayer, etc., indispensable to monastic Rules. The significant fact that, as in the Fructuosan *pactum*, the monks affix their signatures to it,

³⁸ *Reg. Mon. Com.*, c. ix: *et patrum exempla . . . lignarius fuit* is based on *Reg. S. Isid.*, c. v, 2: *nam patriarchae . . . officium gessit*. This passage originally comes from St. Augustine, *De Opere Monachorum*, c. xiii: *si Iudeos dixerint . . . faber fuit* (ed. J. Zycha, *Corpus Script. Eccles. Lat.* [Vienna, 1900], p. 555); but the language shows it reached the *Reg. Mon. Com.* through Isidore. For a clue to the advent and popularity of Isidore's writings in Galician monastic circles *ca.* 675, cf. the prologue to the *Vita S. Fructuosi* (ed. by F. C. Nock, *The Vita Sancti Fructuosi* [Washington, 1946; *Cath. Univ. of America Studies in Mediaeval History*, N. S., VII], pp. 88-9).

proves beyond all cavil its true character as a formal legal instrument. Style and terminology supply further evidence. The *CM*'s opening formulae closely resemble the juridical language of the Visigothic ecclesiastical synods, as can be seen by comparing its initial *communi definitione decrevimus* (*decretum est apud nos B*) . . . *residentibus nobis in monasterio . . . omnibus placuit* with *consensu communis decrevimus* (council of II Seville [619], c. xi); *communi definitione decrevimus . . . communis decreto sancimus* (IX Toledo [655], *praef.* and c. ix); *patribus residentibus* (XIII Toledo [683]); *nobis residentibus . . . patribus residentibus* (XVII Toledo [694]).³⁷ *Omnibus placuit* is a common commencement of conciliar decrees. This legal terminology is in keeping with the fact that in c. viii the *CM* expressly calls itself a *pactum*. This is in the passage prohibiting seizure of the monastic temporal by any of the *consentientes* on the grounds that this *per pactum ad omnes pertinet*; and it would be absurd to posit any other agreement on common ownership than cc. iv and viii of the *CM* itself. Five other terms occur in the MSS to describe the text: *definitio* (c. i: *M, E*); *conscriptio* (c. v: *B*); *liber* (c. ix); *sermo* (c. ix: *E*, which terminates: *finit hic sermo*); and the titular *consensoria monachorum*. *Conscriptio* is fairly neutral, and *sermo* is evidently a later scribal rubric; but *definitio* recalls the synonymous use of *definitio* and *pactum* (or *placitum*) in the *Leges Visigothorum* (e. g., II, 5, 8: *placitum sive definitio*; III, 1, 4: *pacta vel definitiones*).³⁸ The phrase *in isto libro* preceding the monks' subscriptions can be paralleled in the Mozarabic liturgy by the use of *libellum* to designate the monastic *pactum*.³⁹ Given the original terminal position of the *CM* in MSS of the Basilian or Isidorian Rules, however, it seems possible to take *liber* here as referring to the whole *liber regulae*, with the Rule and consensorial *pactum* taken together. The term *consensoria* is a ἀπαξ λεγόμενον, found only in the *CM*, and the *Thesaurus Linguae Latinae* (IV, 390, *s. v. cōsēnsōrius, -a -um*), misled by the printed editions, erroneously regards it as an adjective, with *regula* understood.

³⁷ *Patr. Lat.*, LXXXIV, cols. 598, 433, 437, 487, 551, 552.

³⁸ Ed. K. Zeumer, *Monumenta Germaniae Historica, Leges*, I, 1 (Hanover-Leipzig, 1802), pp. 109, 126, and index, *s. v. definitio, pactum*.

³⁹ M. Férotin, *Le Liber Ordinum en Usage dans l'Église Wisigothique et Mozarabe d'Espagne* (Paris, 1904; *Monumenta Ecclesiae Liturgica*, V), col. 83.

If anything is understood it is really *definitio* or the like, but the probability is that the word is a noun, not an adjective (cf. similar Late Latin first-declension feminines as *tractoria*, *completuria*, *tonsuriae*).⁴⁰ The employment of *consensoria* rather than *pactum* in the title reflects the juridical distinction between the *CM* and the *Reg. Mon. Com. pactum*: the latter is a bilateral contract between two parties, the abbot and the corporate body of monks, while the *CM*, in which each *consentiens* is a contracting party, resembles more closely the Roman *societas omnium bonorum*. Notwithstanding this difference, the *CM* from the monastic standpoint is essentially a *pactum*, i. e., a written and subscribed covenant for the foundation, governance, and enlargement of a monastic society.

At this point it becomes necessary to defend the unity of the text against DeBruyne's captious effort (pp. 83-4) to split it into two different redactions, one terminating with the sentence *iugiter* (*igitur MSS*) *haec*, etc. of c. v, and the other, of perceptibly later date, extending through to the conclusion.⁴¹ DeBruyne holds that (1) *iugiter haec*, etc. logically conclude an original form of the text; (2) the two mentions of property (cc. iv, viii) would have been united in a document written at one time, and c. viii could only have been added later after non-observance of c. iv; (3) disunity and incoherence are proved by the phrase *quod superius diximus* (c. viii), which has no application to anything whatsoever in the text. Actually, however, the words *iugiter haec*, etc. conclude and emphasize the immediately preceding directives on property and withdrawal, and could never have been followed by the signatures of the *consentientes*, as c. ix is. The separate treatment of property is accounted for by the fact that c. iv deals with it under normal conditions, c. viii with its preservation under abnormal conditions, i. e., after the monastery's destruction, as anticipated in c. vii. The phrase *quod superius (iam superius B) diximus* naturally and logically applies to the *causa necessitatis* theme of cc. vii and possibly iv. DeBruyne himself admits the text is "tout entière conçue dans le même esprit et peut-être aussi

⁴⁰ C. D. Du Cange, *Glossarium Mediae et Infimae Latinitatis* (Niort, 1883-7), VIII, p. 144; Férotin, *op. cit.*, index, *s. v. completuria, tonsurie*.

⁴¹ Ferlière (*Rev. Bénéd.*, XXV [1908], p. 72) also had his doubts concerning this partition of the text, which was first suggested by Herwegen, p. 72.

dans le même style." In short, the logic of the text surpasses that of the hypercritical attempt to dichotomize it.

Recognition of its unity and its pactual character considerably advances the problem of the *CM*'s chronological allocation. It is DeBruyne's greatest weakness that he wholly neglects to determine the work's logical place in the historical and institutional evolution of Galician monasticism.⁴² His major premises, that in fifth century Galicia (as nowhere else in Spain) Priscillianist anchoritism developed full-fledged monastic communities, that two centuries before orthodox monastic Rules were written in Spain Galician Priscillianism had produced one, and that the peculiarities of this Rule could be explained by its heretical background, are all of them historically unwarrantable assumptions. The truth is, cenobitism, as opposed to the asceticism of isolated individual ascetics or that of small unorganized groups, cannot be proved to have existed in Galicia before ca. 550, when with royal support it was introduced into the Suevic kingdom by the eastern monk Martin of Braga. Martin founded the *monasterium Dumicense* near Braga, and perhaps some other houses, presumably organizing them along normal oriental lines; but his cenobitism made little headway, and it was not until the following century, with Fructuosus of Braga (ca. 615/20—ca. 660), that a widespread, popular monastic movement swept over the province. By ca. 660, furthermore, for reasons that cannot be entered into here, Galician monasticism was abandoning certain basic institutions of orthodox monasticism and embarking upon a singular period of radical experimentation in the organization and government of the monastic community. The individual *professio* charter was replaced, or at least supplemented, by the group covenant-profession, variously called *pactum*, *sacramentum*, or *iuramenta* (*Reg. Mon. Com.*, cc. i, xviii); and this brought with it free election of abbots, as against the episcopal appointment normal to Visigothic monasticism and sanctioned in c. li of the council of IV Toledo (633), and diminution in varying degree of the abbot's authority. It entailed also a marked rise of chronic internal controversy among the now more or less

⁴² On Galician monasticism before 711, see Herwegen; Pérez de Urbel, *Monjes Españoles*, I, pp. 183-93; 377-450; and C. J. Bishko, "Spanish monasticism in the Visigothic period," *Harvard University, Summaries of Ph. D. Theses, 1937* (Cambridge, 1938), pp. 126-9.

equalitarian monks, weakening of the monastic ideal of *stabilitas*, and frequent withdrawals from monasteries by dissatisfied monks (*Reg. Mon. Com.*, cc. i, ii, xviii and xx, and the *pactum*). Furthermore, although perhaps due as much to contemporary property concepts as to internal weakness, all these Galician houses suffered from violent attacks by kinsfolk of disgruntled monks, often resulting in a monastery's destruction and the loss of its temporal (*Reg. Mon. Com.*, cc. i and xviii, and the *pactum*).

Into this world of contractual, equalitarian, unstable, and potentially short-lived monastic communities of post-650 the *CM* fits perfectly. It is, like the Fructuosan *pactum* and the *Reg. Mon. Com.*, c. i, *sacramentum* or *iuramenta*, a group *professio*; and like them it incorporates a tradition of non-episcopal institution of abbots, weakened abbatial authority, internal disorders, chronic secessions, and familial attacks. Just where the consensorial community stands with relation to these other types of Galician monastery is less clear. It was Herwegen's proposal that the *CM* might be the *pactum* of the type of monastery attacked in *Reg. Mon. Com.*, c. i; but there are certain objections to this otherwise attractive identification. The difference in title is of some importance, even though the *Reg. Mon. Com.* might contemptuously stigmatize a *consensoria monachorum* as a mere *sacramentum* or *iuramenta*. The *CM*'s silence about the wives, children, and serfs taken into the *Reg. Mon. Com.*, c. i, monasteries by the landowners who established them, is noteworthy; such houses would have to be double monasteries, and certain questions of servile manumission *sub modo* would arise. These are problems their covenant might logically be expected to treat. Again, the *CM*'s preservation in collections of Rules almost certainly put together in the late seventh century by monks of the *Reg. Mon. Com.* tradition indicates amicable relations between the latter and consensorial monachism, not the acrid hostility of *Reg. Mon. Com.*, c. i. Nor do we gain much by associating the *CM* with the presbyteral monasteries also denounced by the *Reg. Mon. Com.* in c. ii, for these were not of group origin and undoubtedly had in their presbyters abbots stronger rulers than the consensorial *doctor*.

A more fruitful line of inquiry into the precise connections of the *CM* is suggested by the two short texts that follow it in

MS Escorial Lat. a. I. 13, fols. 51^v-52^r. These have been published by Antolín under the titles (*De caritate fraterna*) and (*De poenitentia?*).⁴³ The first of these, rubricked in the MS as c. xxvi of the *Reg. S. Isid.*, is an impassioned plea for the abandonment of internal disputes in monastic houses, the unknown author arguing that those who have given up family, home, and wealth ought not to allow personal quarrels and animosities to destroy communal harmony. The second piece, without rubric or, more probably, included under the preceding rubric, deals with penitential discipline in cases of murder, adultery, and perjury. It insists that penance for such sins is to be determined by the bishop, not the priest; presents a list (*censum penitentie*) of seven money commutations (in *solidi*); and declares penitents are to remain under the authority of a judge or abbot, depending obviously on whether or not they have entered monasteries (cf. *Reg. Mon. Com.*, c. xix: *Quid in monasteriis debeant observare qui peccata graviora in saeculo commiserint*). Both these texts have significant links with the CM and probably come from the same locale. The appeal for internal concord strikes at a major CM problem; and the use of *doctor* for *abbas*, as noted above, parallels CM, c. v. The Biblical citations are mixed O_L-Vulg., with a perceptibly stronger Vulg. inclination than the CM, although this may be due partly to the hieronymizing tendencies of B. There is even an apparently apocryphal citation, beginning *non poterat loqui*, in the first piece. Until we know something about the origin of the probably Irish-inspired Galician penitential system, the establishment of which in the province hardly antecedes 650, the chronological data of these two texts cannot be fully exploited. But if they do have the same provenance as the CM, they prove that the houses using the latter were closely associated with the episcopate and the parochial system, which in turn shows that such houses, maintaining relations with what the *Reg. Mon. Com.* (cc. i-ii) would call an *episcopus saecularis*, stood outside the limits of the *Reg. Mon. Com.* monastic federation of Fructuosan and allied houses in the so-called *sancta communis regula*.

Further study of Galician monasticism in the latter half of the seventh century will be needed before all the institutional

⁴³ *Ciudad de Dios*, LXXV (1908), pp. 314-16.

problems, and the precise monastic, ecclesiastical, and secular connections of the *CM* can be fully understood. For the present, it need only be concluded that the current identification is completely misleading; and that the work properly belongs in the Late Visigothic period of Galician literature, between 650 and 711. So understood, it constitutes a new and important source for the history of Spanish monasticism on the eve of the Muslim invasion.

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ANCIENT TOWN ARCHITECTURE AND THE NEW MATERIAL FROM OLYNTHUS.

The appearance of each new volume of Professor David M. Robinson's *Excavations at Olynthus* is something of an event for our studies of ancient town-planning and architecture and makes us re-examine all our ideas in that field of research. That is not least true about part XII, published in 1946 together with 158 selected *testimonia* about Greek houses (pp. 399-452), a reference list of Greek words concerned with houses, and a bibliography on Greek domestic architecture.¹ Olynthus, fourth century Colophon—now easily studied in L. B. Holland's excellent publication in *Hesperia*, XIII (1944), pp. 91 ff.—, Priene, the megaron (Oecus) house of Priene type at Asea,² Delos, and scattered remains in S. Russia and in the Greek and Hellenistic world, afford us the Greek material to be compared with Pompeii and Ostia on Italic ground. Together with Priene, Olynthus thanks to Robinson's work and publications vies with those Italic sites in the complete survey that it offers us. This comparison on the other hand also reveals important differences. Olynthus had a very short history, founded, as it was, by the Chalcidians in the 5th century and destroyed by Philip of Macedonia 349/8 B. C. Even if sometimes more careful studies of stratification might have been desirable, Robinson has proved beyond question that the remains, excavated by him, belong in their entirety to this century.³ That gives a fixed point of outstanding value in the history of architecture and in some cases in the history of art too, as shown for instance by the study of the Asclepius statuette in Block B VI and its type. The town as it lies revealed to us by the stone foundations of its mostly unplastered mud brick houses, its *τοῖχοι πήλινοι* (for instance: Plutarch, *Demosthenes*, XI, cf. *Cato maior*, IV), can be regarded almost as a homogeneous creation. That is especially true of the regular planning of the main part of the town in marked contrast to the S. Hill, with its crowded shops, work-shops, and dwellings of the

¹ *Excavations at Olynthus*, XII: Domestic and Public Architecture (Baltimore, 1946) (*The Johns Hopkins Univ. Studies in Archaeology*, No. 36).

² E. Holmberg, "The Swedish Excavations at Asea in Arcadia," *Acta Instituti Romani Regni Sueciae*, XI (Lund, 1944), pp. 147 ff.

³ Cf. *Olynthus*, XII, pp. 84, 186, 225, 236, 264, 283, 295, 351.

proletariat around the old "civic centre." From one point of view this makes Olynthus less interesting than Ostia and especially Pompeii with their old history and all the traces of long development in the town plan. On the other hand Olynthus, with its uniform checkerboard plan, its streets crossing at right angles, and carefully-calculated rectangular blocks, provides a most striking specimen of Greek rational town-planning of the 5th century B. C. The ideas of the age of Hippodamus lie before us in the strongest possible contrast to towns which grew without control and rational planning, such as Athens remained in spite of all the new architectural ideas (Dicaearchus, 140), or as *Vetus Roma* appears in the descriptions of Cicero (*De leg. agr.*, II, 96), Livy (V, 55), Diodorus (XIV, 116), and even Tacitus: *artis itineribus hucque et illuc flexis atque enormibus vicis, qualis vetus Roma fuit* (*Ann.*, XV, 38).⁴ We see in Olynthus the other extreme, a fine example of the classical Greek creations that were destined to influence all later town-planning of European style.

The comparison with Rome is important also from a quite different point of view. In the same centuries in which Olynthus flourished, our material permits us to trace a fundamentally different system in Rome. The old Italic towns obviously—whether regular or not—consisted of rows of shops (*έργαστηρία, tabernae*) used as stores, workshops or dwellings for the proletariat (as still in old quarters of Italian towns), and interspersed *domus* with *atria*, belonging to the nobility. The Romans early started to build upper stories above their *tabernae*, thus gradually developing the principles of the typical domestic architecture of the late Republican and Imperial age with rows of *tabernae* along the streets and above them upper stories, accessible by straight, direct stairs. This system is to be seen in Rome, in Ostia, and on the Forma Urbis. This system started to influence Pompeii even in Sulla's time and is still alive in old Italian, French, and Swiss towns as a time-honoured tradition.⁵ The tendency of such

⁴ Especially Cicero (*loc. cit.*) and the very remains of Pompeii and Herculaneum reveal something of the same contrast between old, crowded Rome and Italic towns, which early in their history got more or less complete regular planning of Greek type. Sulla obviously made some efforts, but at least in Tacitus' eyes only with Nero real, regular town-planning reached Rome. It is interesting to see that Ostia outside the Castrum, though rebuilt in Imperial times, kept the old irregular planning.

⁵ G. Calza, "Contributi alla storia della edilizia Romana," *Palladio*,

a town is to fuse trade-, production-, and residential-quarters, by means of rather high tenement houses with shops on the ground-floor, in contrast to towns with separate bazaar-quarters and residential quarters. There is in the tradition of Roman domestic architecture something that reminds us of Plutarch's words about Numa Pompilius (*Δυναρύγον καὶ Νομᾶ σύγκρισις*, II) : *καὶ μὴν τῆς τε διατάξεως καὶ τῆς διαιωνέσεως τῶν πολιτευμάτων ὄχλους μὲν ἀκράτως ἡ τοῦ Νομᾶ καὶ θεραπευτικὴ τοῦ πλήθους, ἐκ χρυσοκόβων καὶ αὐλητῶν καὶ σκυτοτόμων συμμιγῇ τινα καὶ παμποίκιλον ἀποφαίνοντος δῆμον.* All this, most obviously, was an organic outcrop of the irresistible growth of the Roman *plebs*, which we usually regard rather from the point of view of legions or even city walls.

The Greek and Hellenistic towns were—as far as we can see—fundamentally different. There is no trace of the Roman *insulae* with their shops on the ground floor. The high Hellenistic tenement houses were high tower-like constructions without *tabernae*, to judge from the clay models from Alexandria (cf. Strabo, 753 about Arados and 757 about Tyros). As still in oriental towns production and trade were concentrated in bazaar-quarters, separated from the residential parts of the town. An ancient map showing broadly the main types of the Mediterranean towns would be similar to a map of the 19th or even 20th century with the same striking contrast between the towns of the Latin countries and those of the Orient.

Olynthus proves this. Carefully as always in his interpretation of the houses Robinson points out that shops are to be found in the residential quarters, though they are not common.⁶ But a most typical feature is the cluster of shops and workshops around the civic centre on the South Hill (pp. 272 ff.). There we see the bazaar-quarter in clear contrast to the regular residential quarters with few if any shops. We may compare Priene, where shops thronged around the *agorá* and the main street, or even old Pompeii, before shops were opened right and left of the vestibules

V (1941), pp. 1 ff. A. Boëthius, "Appunti sul carattere razionale e sull'importanza dell'architettura domestica di Roma imperiale," *Scritti in onore di Bartolomeo Nogara* (Rome, 1937), pp. 21 ff. "Den romerska hyreshusarkitekturen," *Göteborgs Högskolas Årsskrift*, 1944: 4 ("Roman tenement architecture, its local tradition and system." With an English summary).

⁶ For instance: Block B VI, p. 149; cf. pp. 115, 158; 161, 165 (house of Zoilos), section O, p. 266.

of the atrium houses. This distribution of trade and workshops all over the town—not to speak of *insulae* like the Terme del foro of the time of Sulla—no doubt was due to the influence of the Italic social system, in contrast to old Pompeii with the shops concentrated around the Forum and in the main thoroughfares. Anyhow, we see this latter system nowhere more clearly than at Olynthus with its crowd of shops around the “civic centre” on the South Hill. It gives us a *point d'appui*, when we try to distinguish between Greek and Italic urban traditions. Roman domestic architecture, especially the *domus*, obviously acquired many Hellenistic elements and probably even in archaic times Greek elements (peristyles, columns, decoration of the *atria*, etc.).⁷ But a Greek town like Olynthus at once makes us understand that the whole system was different and that Italian towns had aims and scopes of their own. The populous quarters of late Republican or Imperial Rome can never be understood, if taken as copies of Hellenistic towns. Olynthus is an excellent aid to the understanding of that.

It also helps us in another way to see the special course of development in the crowded, overflowing quarters of the Roman *plebs*. It is not only a matter of standardizing a local and spontaneous kind of building to what we see in 2nd century, brick-covered Ostia. It was not less a question of technique. The houses of Olynthus were obviously rather low and built of mud brick. Vitruvius, praising Greek methods of building and abusing Roman concrete (*structura caementicia*), defends adobe even in great palaces (II, 8, 9 ff.). Dio Cassius (XXXIX, 61), Sue-

⁷ F. Harsh, “The origins of the *insulae* at Ostia,” *Memoirs of the American Academy in Rome*, XII (1935), pp. 7 ff., traces also in the Roman *insulae*-architecture a Hellenistic feature in the central courts of the *insulae* like the Casa di Diana in Ostia (type IV in my classification, *palazzo di tutti* in Calza’s, cf. note 5). No doubt these courts or light wells transfer the traditions of the Greek peristyle courts to the *insulae* (cf. P. Grimal, “Les jardins Romains,” *Bibliothèque des Écoles Françaises d’Athènes e de Rome*, CLV [Paris, 1943], pp. 217 ff.). So far their Greek origin is evident. But we should remark that they appear in the *insulae* with typically Roman axial disposition and symmetry, that is reshaped by the Italic traditions and by no means directly imported from the East, cf. A. Boëthius, “Die Atriumhäuser und ihr Nachlass in der kaiserzeitlichen Palastarchitektur,” *Acta Instituti Romani Regni Sueciae*, IV (*Opuscula archaeologica*, I, Lund, 1935), pp. 182 f.

tonius (*Aug.*, 28), and other *testimonia* show that mud brick still occurred in the Rome of the first century A. D. But on the other hand primitive concrete constructions with volcanic mortar and chips of tufa obviously belonged to the stock of native arts of building in Italy. In the intense building activity of late Republican Rome, concrete was more and more used for monumental buildings and rather high tenement houses (*Vitruvius*, II, 8, 17). Concrete enabled the Romans to turn their unstable tenement architecture, with upper stories piled up on top of the *tabernae*, into the solid *insulae* of late Republican and Imperial Rome, *egregiae sine inpeditione habitationes* in Vitruvius' words (*loc. cit.*). Here is another point where Greek and Italic architecture diverge, and we trace behind the Italic tradition, as always, the *civium infinita multitudo* and the need of *innumera-biles habitationes* (*Vitruvius, loc. cit.*) in Rome. Again, Olynthus, with its mud brick architecture and its houses with little-developed upper stories (*Olynthus*, XII, pp. 231, 226, 380), makes us realize the fundamental differences between East and West at an early stage of the development. Again we see in the ancient Mediterranean world—in spite of Hellenistic “skyscrapers” especially emphasized as an exception in our sources—the same difference in general between the lowly architecture in the widely-extended towns of the East and the rather concentrated Western towns with their tradition of high tenement houses with shops—as in mediaeval and later times.

In the straight streets and in the regular blocks of Olynthus we meet with only one type of house, amply described over and over again in the Olynthus publication and in the reviews, of which there is a list, pp. 472 ff.⁸ Robinson (especially p. 126 and *passim*) carefully notes variations of plan, but the main type of building remains the same all over the residential quarters. As a rule the houses have their entrance on the southern long side. Longitudinally through the house runs a corridor, parallel with the front street (i. e. East-West), which

⁸We have to add now especially P. Fraccaro's fine review in *Athenaeum*, N. S. XXV (1947), pp. 195 ff., Jotham Johnson's article in *C. J.*, 1947, pp. 91 ff. with its broad views and appreciation of the importance of the Olynthian material for “The Study of Man,” and John H. Kent's review in *C. P.*, XLII (1947), pp. 199 ff., which is critical and useful but which fails to bring to the non-specialist the really great importance of Robinson's discoveries.

divides the house into a north and a south part. The northern part contained the main rooms and carried the upper story, if such was added. In the centre of the southern part of the house was a court. The corridor was left open to this court with some three or four columns in the wide opening. The court could also be transformed into a peristyle. As Robinson pointed out in part VIII of his publication (pp. 147 ff.), this type of house is known also from other places, but the fact that it was exclusively adopted, when Olynthus was built, is most interesting. There is, so far as I can see, not a single trace to be found in Olynthus of the other main, highly traditional house-type, the *megaron-oecus* type, described by Vitruvius, VI, 7, 1 ff. as *gynaeconitis* and best known from Priene (here referred to as the "Priene-house"); the Greek peristyle-houses reveal themselves in Olynthus only by the colonnades around the courts of rich houses, which were probably inspired by that type of structure. The exclusive use of different house-types in Olynthus on the one hand and Priene on the other is something of a riddle—not less than the fact that the combination of *gynaeconitis* (*megaron-oecus* type) and peristyle, described by Vitruvius, VI, 7, 3 ff. is still lacking in our archaeological material. Olynthus shows anyhow that the "Olynthian type" of house not less than the "Priene type" (= Vitruvius' *gynaeconitis* = *megaron-oecus*) was very influential in the 5th and 4th centuries. It is indeed remarkable that, without the archaeological material, we should not have known about the Olynthus type at all. Our literary sources seldom enable us to discern whether they refer to "Priene-houses" or "Olynthian houses," and never give a clear description of the latter type, as far as I am able to see by analyzing Robinson's "*testimonia*" and other evidence. Olynthus, in other words, has provided us with new knowledge, revealing what our other sources—because their descriptions are so general—do not permit us to see. Its architectural uniformity is a limitation but it also emphasizes the importance of a type of Greek domestic architecture, which has hitherto been almost completely hidden.

And—leaving now the comparative studies to which Professor Robinson's ample volumes invite—how much knowledge about Greek town-life do not the Olynthus volumes give us, in other directions also! Thucydides' famous words in the funeral speech of Pericles: *ἰδίαις δὲ κατασκευαῖς εὐπρεπέσιν, ὃν καθ' ήμέραν η τέρψις τὸ λυπερὸν ἐκπλήσσει* acquire a commentary from the scattered

remains of luxury (plates 30 ff., 34, 170 ff., above all 186 f., 191, 200, 209 ff., 218), stuccoes and colcurs (plate 114, 167, pp. 192 f., 222, 232, 248, 261, etc.). Exceedingly interesting are the pebble mosaics. Robinson deals with this most important discovery in an ample excursus (pp. 323 ff.) with three coloured plates. He emphasizes rightly the value of these—probably the oldest—specimens of Greek mosaics, explains their technique, gives a full interpretation of their patterns and proves their close connections with Attic red-figured vases of the late 5th century. Robinson is also convincing when he compares the figures of the mosaics with sculpture and adduces parallels to the lettering of the inscriptions, while the complicated question (p. 337) about Greek painting and textile art and possible influence on the mosaics from the latter naturally remains open. Some good references to literary sources also are to be found in Robinson's rich commentary. These mosaics are far the best proofs that we have of luxury in Greek private houses. The archaeological evidence from Olynthus has to be classed with the already quoted words of Thucydides,⁹ with the prosperous homes in Plato's dialogues, with the extravagances of Alcibiades,¹⁰ with the costly furniture to be seen on Greek vase paintings, and with Demosthenes' statement in the 3rd Olynthian speech (29), that some Athenians had private houses which were more sumptuous than the official buildings of the state. We can add also, for instance, the tombs of the Mustapha Pasha-necropolis in Alexandria¹¹ and what they permit us to conclude about Greek homes in the Egypt of the Ptolemies, or the houses of Delos. All this material shows us the Greek tradition of interior decoration and luxury, which we later on meet with on Italic soil in Pompeii and Herculaneum, though—as it seems—enriched in the Hellenistic world and reshaped, as far as the planning is concerned, by the special demands of the Italic house types. In this field the legacy from the Hellenic and Hellenistic towns is the obvious starting point for late Republican and Imperial development.

⁹ II, 38. Cf. II, 15: οἱ δὲ δυνατοὶ (Διυπόνυτε) καλὰ κτήματα κατὰ τὴν χώραν <ἐν> οἰκοδομῆσι τε καὶ πολυτελέσι κατασκευαῖς ἀπολωλεκότες.

¹⁰ Cf. also I. G., I, suppl. p. 178, n. 277 d = Dittenberger, *Sylloge*, 102, the process against the *hermacopidae*; Andocides, *Alcibiades*, 17; Demosthenes, *Meidias*, 147.

¹¹ A. Adriani, "La nécropole de Moustafa Pacha," *Annuaire du musée gréco-romain*, 1933/4, 1934/5 (Alexandria, 1934), pp. 71 ff.

Choosing from among the numerous smaller observations, of which Robinson's volumes are full, those which seem especially important for later development, we have to note the base to be found in the court of Block B VI (pp. 115, 156, plate 130). It has a stone core with burned brick all around it and does prove that the Olynthians understood the value of burned brick, though the Greeks—even Vitruvius, II, 8, 19—obviously never got over the difficulties summarized by Vitruvius, *loc. cit.*, and therefore unlike the Romans never succeeded in making any extensive use of fired brick. Robinson's observation gives a background to, for instance, the brick-covered columns of the basilica of Pompeii and other early, sparse, and sporadic instances of burned brick in late Republican architecture in Italy.

One architectural type of quite special interest is the "Stoa Type Assembly Hall" (A. IV. 10) with beautiful Doric capitals (pp. 82 ff., plates 66 ff.). Robinson's interpretation—for which he refers to William A. McDonald's useful book *The Political Meeting Places of the Greeks* (1943)—seems certain, as does the date (last quarter of fifth century); the suggested connection of the synoecism of the Chalcidians with Olynthus is most probable. A market hall, no doubt, would have had one long side open to the public. The building had a row of columns in the center. This feature is—as Robinson rightly explains—by no means surprising in a Greek assembly hall. It was among the boasts of the Romans and the triumphs of their technical skill that they were able to construct large roofs without supports (Cassius Dio, LV, 8, 3; Pliny, *N. H.*, XXXVI, 102). Very likely there were Hellenistic predecessors to these wooden forerunners and competitors of the glories of the Roman vaults, but, evidently, the Greeks of the Hellenic period did not yet mind the view in their halls being obstructed by columns. Thus no doubt in addition to the older Assembly hall of the "civic centre" on the South Hill (of which Robinson gives a new restoration, plate 246), the excavation of the residential quarters of Olynthus has afforded us a new specimen of a classical Greek council chamber.

Robinson is very detailed, sometimes perhaps even somewhat verbose, in presenting his vast material. Some slips and errors have been pointed out. Compared with the wealth of new knowledge in every volume of the Olynthus publication almost all of these criticisms seem to me to be of minor importance. There is only one point where I feel that criticism is unavoidable and can

be really constructive in a more fundamental way. It seems necessary to use greater philological care in comparing or identifying archaeological material, classical texts, and ancient terms. In that respect there are many loose suggestions and hasty conclusions to question in the Olynthus volumes. From one point of view it is of course quite justifiable to try to unite new facts and old words. On the other hand it would be very much deserving of blame, if we should allow this splendid new material to be followed by a wave of uncritical or at least not fully proved terms and identifications, thus causing confusion and unnecessary trouble. "The Stoa Type Assembly Hall" is oblong (about 19 x 9½ metres). To me it seems almost misleading, when Robinson comments on this simple fact by referring to Vitruvius' prescription for square (*quadratae*) and oblong (*oblongae*) *curiae* in Italy with their quite special traditions (V, 2). "The only ancient description"—Robinson continues (p. 88)—"of such a 'stoa type' Assembly Hall building agrees with this." He means Pausanias' description of the Phokikon (X, 5, 1-2), with its columns set along its length. But nobody can tell if the Phocian hall—as McDonald (*loc. cit.*, pl. XVII) alternatively suggests—like the Assembly hall of the "civic centre" on the South Hill at Olynthus had two rows of interior columns or only one row. To me the former alternative, and seats parallel with the columns (as in the Roman *curia*), seem more likely. In any case Pausanias' words about the Phokikon have very little of value to add to our understanding of the Olynthian "Stoa Type Assembly Hall" and may mislead us about the Phokikon. As I ventured to say in my review of *Excavations at Olynthus*, VIII (A. J. P., LXI [1940], p. 237) the various Greek house-types have so many common features that it is difficult as a rule (I would say) to see in short ancient descriptions which type is referred to. We should be very careful about hasty conclusions on this subject, knowing that houses of the Olynthus type, "Priene-houses," and peristyle houses can occur everywhere. In the Olynthus publication there is a tendency to claim for the Olynthian houses testimonies which as a matter of fact are, and probably will remain, ambiguous (or even clearly belong to other types). Very often only common features are mentioned. Very often, too, rooms had the same names in the different types of house. To quote George E. Mylonas in his *Excursus II to Olynthus*, XII, p. 384,

the word *oikos* for instance “in ancient Greece as in modern was used very loosely.” That is no doubt true of many Greek architectural terms, as was very well pointed out by G. Downey in his excellent study “On some post-classical Greek architectural terms” in *T. A. P. A.*, LXXVII (1946), especially pp. 26 ff. Therefore even if we can ascertain the name of a room in for instance a house in Olynthus, we should by no means be justified in assuming Olynthus type for all houses where in our sources that same name happens to be used, and force upon them an interpretation based on the evidence from Olynthus. If—in addition—we start to make lists of modern archaeologists’ hypothetical applications of Greek architectural terms and base our reasoning on them, a spider’s web of loose arguments and appearances will confuse the whole discussion. Mylonas has in his *Excursus*, just mentioned, added to Robinson’s publication a most useful and thorough examination of a common group of rooms in the houses of Olynthus, composed of three parts: of a large room, a narrower chamber, and a bath. He calls this “the oecus unit of the Olynthian house,” and explains its use very well, partly with convincing and amusing modern parallels. Very interesting is Mylonas’ reconstruction of the second stories and the flues. Mylonas shows (pp. 383 ff.) that the large room of the “oecus unit” was the most important work-room and living room of the house, the rooms *in quibus*, to quote Vitruvius’ description of the *gynaeconitis* of his Greek house (= the “Priene house”), VI, 7, 2, *matres familiarum cum lanificis habent sessionem*. In the *Odyssey*, VI and VII, obviously the same traditional type of Greek house, which Vitruvius (—as we know from Olynthus—inaccurately) designates as the only one, determines as an underlying and basic conception the fanciful description of the palace of Alcinous, in spite of all its added recollections of Oriental palaces of the 8th and following centuries, like the palace of Hama excavated by Danish scholars. There Odysseus—in Nausicaa’s words (VI, 305 ff.)—has to go through the *megaron* right up to the Queen:

ἢ δ' ἦσται ἐπ' ἐσχάρῃ ἐν πυρὸς αὐγῇ,
ἡλάκατα στροφῶσ' ἀλιπόρφυρα, θαῦμα ἰδεῖθαι,
κίονι κεκλιμένη· δύμωα δέ οἱ εἴατ' ὅπισθεν.

There is an obvious Homeric flavour in Vitruvius’ description of his *oecus magnus*, the late descendant of the *megaron*.

To return from the use to the type and name of the large living room of the Olynthian "oecus unit," it was very likely called *oikos*. We know from the description of Vitruvius, just quoted, that the main room of the "Priene houses" was styled so, and it seems only reasonable to think, with Robinson and Mylonas, that such was the case also in the Olynthian houses, though their general planning was different. In any case it is not possible to prove it. Mylonas tries all the same (p. 385) to throw doubt upon the prevailing interpretation of Vitruvius' Greek house (VI, 7, 1 ff.) as a "Priene house." On this point the present writer must join issue. Even if we could strictly prove that the main room of the "oecus unit" was called *oikos* (as it very likely was), that would not prove anything at all about the planning of Vitruvius' *gynaeconitis*, where the main room actually is styled the *oecus magnus*. Mylonas seems to hint at such a possibility—though emphasizing how loosely the Greeks used their architectural terms and of course knowing that the same name may easily be used in different types of houses. What most evidently connects Vitruvius' *gynaeconitis* with the "Priene house" is the unit of peristyle-court, *prostas* or *pastas* (*Hic locus apud nonnullos prostas, apud alios pastas nominatur*), and *oecus*. "Whether or not the 'oeci magni' were also connected with the 'prostas' is not specified," argues Mylonas after admitting that they were to be found "near the court" and "in the inner part of the house." By this remark Mylonas obviously tries to invalidate the identification of Vitruvius' Greek house (*gynaeconitis*) with megaron houses of the type described (in their archaic grandeur) in the *Odyssey* and to be seen in Priene, Colophon, Asea. This is indeed an effort (*in maiorem gloriam Olynthi?*), which only causes unnecessary trouble, and seems void of philological accuracy. Vitruvius' text is absolutely clear. He first describes the peristyle. At its upper north side (*quae spectat ad meridiem*) is the *pastas* or *prostas* (as I pointed out in my review of *Olynthus*, VIII, loc. cit., p. 237, we should remember that the words *pastas* and *prostas* were used promiscuously). Hereabouts (*in his locis*), towards the inner side, is a large hall (*oeci magni*, distributive sense of the plural!). Right and left of the *prostas*, Vitruvius resumes, returning to the peristyle, are the bedchambers, etc. That this very clear description cannot be combined with the "oecus units" and their

position in the Olynthian houses is evident. Equally evident is the fact that it fits in every detail with the houses of Priene type. It seems useful to add a reference to the strictly philological interpretation by E. Wistrand, a specialist on Vitruvius' language, and the graphical presentation of his results in a study of the houses of the Greeks and the Romans in *Eranos*, XXXVII (1939), pp. 21 ff.

To sum up, what we need and must demand is on the one hand a clear archaeological description without any preconceptions caused by hasty and premature glances at the sources. Mylonas' archaeological analysis of the "oecus unit" can in this respect serve as a model. On the other hand rigorous and thorough, strictly philological interpretation of the texts, like for instance Downey's study (*loc. cit.*), is necessary. After that free endeavours to identify are just as much wanted and necessary, but it seems indeed to be both wise and scholarly not to use hypothetical and uncertain results in our terminology. Many have sinned in this respect. Modern descriptive names are decidedly to be preferred to the use of ancient terms, if they suggest an identification which as a matter of fact is not fully established and arrived at. A general revision of our archaeological terminology according to these principles is in my opinion necessary, and the sooner it is done the better.

Anybody who takes up that task will at once feel the fundamental importance of Professor Robinson's work in Olynthus. The same is true of any other research work in the field of Greek town architecture. It is the main aim and scope of these observations to show what great consequences the excavations at Olynthus carry with them for the general history of ancient town architecture also. Even a hasty attempt to draw broad outlines and see the residential quarters and the South Hill of Olynthus in connection with them seems to elucidate in a most striking way the new situation created by the publications from Olynthus and thus, perhaps better than a survey of facts known from previous volumes and reviews or criticism of details, illustrate their weight and significance.

AXEL BOËTHIUS.

AENEAS AND THE TRADITION OF THE NATIONAL HERO.

Aeneas differs from Achilles and Odysseus, critics are agreed,¹ mainly in that he represents a specifically Roman ideal, disciplined and institutionalized in consonance with the spirit of the Augustan age, whereas the Homeric heroes represent poetic truth of more universal validity. Yet Aeneas possesses authentic heroic stature in infinitely greater degree than do the merely literary figures of Virgil's nearer predecessor in epic, Apollonius Rhodius, whose Jason exhibits neither national character nor individual prowess, except in the lists of love.² Aeneas is furthermore not only far more central but also far more dominant in his poem than are Jason, Odysseus, Achilles in theirs. Though his Greek predecessors are perhaps more admirable, from a literary point of view, because they are more nearly free agents and less under the constraint of manifest destiny, Aeneas, because he is a disciplined instrument of destiny, acquires the aspect of a symbol, which tends to separate him from ordinary humanity. Through Silvius he is the ancestor of the Alban kings and of Romulus; through Iulus of the Julian *gens*.³ Not only as the founder of these two great lines, but as the parent of the Roman people (who are sometimes called *Aeneadae*: cf. *Aeneid*, VIII, 648), Aeneas must have within him all the virtues which his descendants inherit. In a word, the *Aeneid* possesses the character of hagiographa which its rivals in epic do not. The story demands attention not only as literature but as patriotism raised to a religion. The contemporary history of Livy possesses something of the same character of hagiographa,⁴ but there seem to be no close analogues in earlier classical literature. Even

¹ The distinction is clearly made in W. Y. Sellar, *The Roman Poets of the Augustan Age: Virgil*³ (Oxford, 1897), chs. IX and X; its influence upon the character of the *Aeneid* is admirably treated in Mark Van Doren, *The Noble Voice* (New York, 1946), pp. 86-121. On Aeneas as the bearer of a mission see also T. Haeger, *Vergil* (Leipzig, 1931), pp. 80-89.

² Cf. my "The Tradition of a Feeble Jason," *C.P.*, XXXI (1936), pp. 166-168.

³ Discussed by H. T. Rowell in *A.J.P.*, LXII (1941), p. 273.

⁴ Cf. my "Livy as Scripture," *A.J.P.*, LXI (1940), pp. 445-456.

in the case of full divinities we must go back to certain of the *Homeric Hymns* and to Sappho's *Aphrodite* for genuine reverence for a central figure and its story; Callimachus has no more real respect for his deities than does Ovid. Patriotic appreciation of national values finds frequent expression, of course, especially when those values are being challenged, as in Greek speeches to Persians in Herodotus and in Pericles' Funeral Oration in Thucydides, in a play like Euripides' *Andromache*, in Isocrates and in Demosthenes. But nowhere, apparently, do we find a single character raised to a superhuman stature and in effect canonized as subsuming and symbolizing the national character and aspirations.

The nationalism of the *Aeneid* and the exaltation of Aeneas can be sufficiently explained on the basis of Roman mores and traditions and of the political atmosphere of the Augustan age. Seldom has a generation been so clearly aware of a transition in its own history. Rome had emerged from the terrible ordeal of continuous civil war which had threatened body and spirit, and release and enlargement issued in a surge of proud national consciousness. The impulse to examine and glorify the national heritage received official encouragement; the *Aeneid* itself is the product of this impulse, and we need look no further than the immediate situation and accumulated Roman tradition to explain its divergences from the Greek norm. But there are in fact curious parallels to Aeneas' position in the *Aeneid* in remoter literatures, and even if these parallels did not influence Virgil they are worth glancing at as illustrating Virgil's art and a recurrent human urge.

Men grow sensitive to the values of their national traditions and come to cherish them not only in periods of enlargement, like the Augustan or Elizabethan, but even more when the survival of those traditions is threatened, and most intensely when nationality itself is lost. The wistful loyalty evoked by threatened extinction tends to find expression in the examination and glorification of national traditions to an even greater degree than does the proud consciousness of national success. Expression of loyalty to national traditions is therefore to be sought at periods when a great imperial power tends to erase national distinctions and impose its own culture. In the articulate civilization of the Mediterranean such periods followed the conquests of Alexander

the Great and then of Rome itself. The classic response to the challenge of foreign domination may best be illustrated, I think, in the life and works of Plutarch, whose whole career was devoted to raising Hellenism to a cult which could survive under the rule of Rome.⁵ Though he might have enjoyed wealth and fame in Rome he returned to small Chaeronea "so that it might not become even smaller" (*Demosthenes*, 2, 2), he held a petty local magistracy for all his cosmopolitanism, and a priesthood of an obsolescent shrine for all his philosophy, he discoursed on philosophy, mathematics, and music to the provincial youth, because to do these things was to serve the cult of Hellenism. He wrote the *Lives* not to introduce Greeks to Romans or Romans to Greeks but to show Greeks that their own past could boast statesmen and warriors (there was no need to press the point for artists and philosophers) that were easily comparable to those of their Roman masters. But none of the heroes of the *Lives*, it must be noticed, not even Alexander, is endowed with the peculiar sanctity of an Aeneas. Individuals are not made the sole responsible bearers of Hellenism. The nearest approach to such a function in the *Lives* is Lycurgus, and in the opening sentences of his *Life* Plutarch is careful to cast doubts on Lycurgus' historicity. It was only in Rome that highly individualized portraiture was fashionable, and only in Virgil's day could an individual be endowed with augustness.

But the east had a different tradition. The enormously prolific Alexander legend is itself proof of the persistent tendency to glorify a personal hero and make him the focus and bearer of national ideals and aspirations. The history of that legend illustrates first the amalgamation of individual traditions, their transformation, and then their fragmentation into peculiar variations. The period immediately following the conquests of Alexander, before his legends were amalgamated, is most relevant to our inquiry. Culture reached an unparalleled degree of external uniformity in the Hellenistic *oikoumene* as result of those conquests, but pride in disparate national traditions persisted, and among peoples whose political independence had been suppressed there was felt a need, bound up with motives of religion, to assert the antiquity and dignity of individual na-

⁵ Cf. my "The Religion of Plutarch," *Review of Religion*, VI (1942), pp. 270-282.

tional traditions against competing traditions, chiefly, of course, the dominant Greek. Books embodying national traditions were written very early in the Hellenistic period; the Babylonian Berossus dedicated his *Babyloniaca* to Antiochus I Soter, and Manetho, high priest at Heliopolis, his *Aegyptiaca* to Ptolemy Philadelphus. It is to such works as these, apparently, that a passage in Plutarch's *Isis and Osiris* (360 B) alludes:⁶

However, mighty deeds of Semiramis are celebrated among the Assyrians, and mighty deeds of Sesostris in Egypt, and the Phrygians, even to this day, call brilliant and marvellous exploits "manic" because Manes, one of their very early kings, proved himself a good man and exercised a vast influence among them.

Extant remains of Berossus and Manetho⁷ do not exhibit (but do not prove impossible) the glorification of individual national heroes such as the Plutarch passage would suggest. Accounts of Sesostris are so varied, indeed, that they could hardly all derive from a single work; the interesting thing is that many works must have made Sesostris a hero. For our purposes the best specimen is the *Ninus Romance*, probably written in the last century B. C., whose two considerable fragments indicate that it is a love story of the famous Semiramis and Ninus, the founder of Nineveh.⁸ Here the affairs of a great national hero, highly idealized, are made the subject of fictional treatment. It may well be that the genus of Greek romances derives from such embellished treatment of historic national figures; Chariton's *Chaereas and Callirhoe*, the earliest of our extant romances (about 150 A. D. or earlier), starts by introducing the heroine as the daughter of "Hermocrates, general of Syracuse, the one who defeated the Athenians."⁹ In the earlier works individual heroes, apparently one for each people, out of a remote past

⁶ Martin Braun, *History and Romance in Graeco-Oriental Literature* (Oxford, 1938), p. 5, quotes this passage as "a suitable introduction, in which the hero-stories or hero-romances of several nations are enumerated." The translation is F. C. Babbitt's (Loeb).

⁷ There is now a good Loeb *Manetho*, by W. G. Waddell.

⁸ The fragments were first published by U. Wilcken in *Hermes*, XXVIII (1893), pp. 161-193; they are translated by S. Gaselee in an appendix to the Loeb *Daphnis and Chloe*.

⁹ The "historical" novel as the origin of Greek romance is discussed in R. M. Rattenbury, "Traces of Lost Greek Novels," in J. U. Powell, *New Chapters in the History of Greek Literature, Third Series* (Oxford, 1933), pp. 211-219.

(the figures named were all ancient to Herodotus) were glorified in fanciful tales with numerous accretions of the miraculous, and these tales became a focus for cultural survival and lent their readers a pride in their past which helped them bear the rebuffs of the present.

Of all the literary efforts calculated to ensure the cultural survival of depressed minorities in the Hellenistic world we have most extensive remains and are best informed concerning those produced by the Jews, and especially by the Jewish community of Alexandria.¹⁰ We may note that the final response of the Jews (to ignore chronology for the moment) was identical with that of Plutarch. When Jerusalem was under its final siege by the Romans Johanan ben Zakkai, Plutarch's contemporary, spirited himself out of the city, collected a band of students at Jamnia, and set about transforming Judaism from a nationality to a way of life guided by a peculiar body of traditions. But in Alexandria from the time of Ptolemy Philadelphus onwards Jews devoted themselves to producing a body of apologetic literature (of which the LXX itself may fairly be regarded as a specimen) calculated to demonstrate the antiquity and high merits of Jewish tradition. Most of this writing was in the category of "history," with a preponderant interest, significantly, in the career of Moses. In support of the claims of the historians certain works were falsely ascribed to well-known ancient names; of this class are Pseudo-Phccylides, Pseudo-Hecataeus, and the Jewish and Christian *Sibylline Oracles*. More germane to our present purpose are the frankly bellettristic works, such as the epic of the Elder Philo and the tragedy on the Exodus of Ezekielos. In these again the figure of Moses seems to have loomed very large. The absence of a central character in a work like III Maccabees, which can only be read as a romance,¹¹ may be explained by the circumstance that Moses could naturally not be used in that story.

It would appear, then, that in parts of the Hellenistic world the impulse to assert and glorify national traditions, when comparisons compelled such assertion, was expressed by elaborating the character and career of a central figure of the nation's

¹⁰ A full and succinct treatment of this literature is O. Stählin, "Hellenistische-Jüdische Litteratur," in Christ-Schmid, *Geschichte der Griechischen Litteratur*, II, 1 (Munich, 1920), pp. 535-656.

¹¹ I have treated of "III Maccabees and Greek Romance" in an article to appear in a forthcoming number of the *Review of Religion*.

remote history. But there is another factor which provides a curious parallel to the peculiar use which Virgil makes of Aeneas. A prime aim in the *Aeneid* is to communicate to its readers a sense that Rome's career is predestined and that its history in the years to come must take a certain direction. The reader is placed in the twelfth century, and prophecies from that vantage point which the reader knows to have been fulfilled create credit for other prophecies which refer to the actual future. I am myself regularly astonished at Dido's clairvoyance in the matter of the Punic wars (though my books tell me these wars were fought centuries before Virgil wrote), and so ready to believe that Virgil's other prophecies will be equally true. Now this technique, approximated in classical literature as far as I know only in Lycophron's *Alexandra* (and there only indifferently), is precisely the technique of the apocalypses. Daniel is a character of the Babylonian exile, but scholars can date the composition of Daniel in the Maccabean period to a month, at the point where "prophecies" left history—and proved wrong. Enoch, who is the hero of a whole group of apocalypses going back to the second century B. C., is a better example than Daniel, for "Enoch walked with God, and he was not; for God took him" (Genesis 5, 24). He could therefore receive and transmit special revelations. Neither is the death of Aeneas told, which sets him apart from Homer's other Trojans of the first rank; and Aeneas too was the protégé of a powerful divinity. Our *Sibylline Oracles* are of later date and hence not conclusive evidence for the character of the oracles of the Capitoline; but oracles of the extant type may have existed earlier, perhaps in the spurious collections which Augustus had burned. The *Sibyllines* also employ the apocalyptic technique; the author places himself at some remote point of time, such as the Exodus from Egypt, and after foretelling certain recorded events proceeds to the prediction of the actual future.

Did Virgil realize the significance of the rejuvenated Sesostris and Semiramis and Ninus? Did he know of Moses or of Enoch? Heinze's monumental work on the techniques of the *Aeneid* says nothing of the apocalyptic pattern, and Norden's full treatment of Virgil's eschatological and cognate ideas in his great edition of *Aeneid VI* attempts to demonstrate that Virgil learned only from classical, not from oriental, apocalyptic.¹² Most of the prodigious

¹² Eduard Norden, *P. Vergilius Maro, Aeneis Buch VI* (Leipzig, 1916), p. 6.

literature on the *Fourth Eclogue*, which Professor DeWitt¹³ has well called "the first draft of the *Aeneid*," is at pains to find some source other than Scripture for Virgil's messianic ideas. But DeWitt quite reasonably thinks "it is more than possible" that Virgil knew the Jewish Scriptures, shows that he had ample opportunity to become familiar with Jewish ideas, and speaks of him as "living in a Palestinian atmosphere" on the Campanian coast where he sojourned.¹⁴ There is no difficulty in assuming that enough of the complex of such ideas, especially in their more striking forms, was in the air to make it probable that a man alert to such ideas, as Virgil certainly was, could learn from them. If Horace assumes that Jewish credulity is a matter of common knowledge,¹⁵ Virgil is the type of mind which would investigate the objects of that credulity.

We find then that in the face of his meticulous regard for classical precedents Virgil has presented the story of a "canonized" national hero, in a manner which is virtually unexampled in classical literature but which shows certain parallels to Hellenized oriental literature. In the present context Virgil's regard for precedent may provide arguments for divergent views. We may maintain that what has no precedent in the traditional classics must be derived from some other available source; or we may argue that Virgil would not have included matter utterly alien to tradition, and hence that the exalted hero and the apocalyptic pattern are normal developments of main-line Greco-Roman tradition. Similar causes may indeed have produced similar results independently. I myself regard it as no derogation of Greco-Roman tradition or of Virgil's genius to suppose that both received stimulation from the east.

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¹³ Norman W. DeWitt, *Virgil's Biographia Litteraria*. (Toronto, 1923), p. 176. DeWitt's illuminating treatment of the subject of this paragraph, from which the quotations are drawn, is his ch. xvi, pp. 172-189.

¹⁴ Petronius could presume that his readers would recognize the locutions of Syrians and Jews on the Campanian coast: see my "Oriental Elements in Petronius," *A.J.P.*, L (1929), pp. 378-385.

¹⁵ *Credat Judaeus Apella, non ego: Serm.*, I, 5, 100. W. H. Alexander, "The Enigma of Horace's Mother," *C.P.*, XXXVII (1942), pp. 385-397, argues ingeniously that Horace's mother was a Jewess.

NOTES ON ATHENIAN INSCRIPTIONS OF THE
EMPIRE PERIOD.

I. TRIBAL AFFILIATIONS OF FOREIGNERS IN EPHEBE LISTS.

The ephebe lists of the Empire period differentiate citizens from foreigners through the following classification:

names with demotic <i>πολεῖται</i>	vs <i>ξένοι</i> vs <i>Μειλήσιοι</i>	<i>I. G.</i> , II ² , 1996 (84/5-92/3).
names with demotic <i>πρωτένγραφοι</i>	vs <i>ἐπένγραφοι</i>	<i>I. G.</i> , II ² , 2017 (shortly after 102 A. D.); 2044 (139/40).
		<i>I. G.</i> , II ² , 2046 (shortly after 140 A. D.); 2068 (155/6).
οἱ ὑπόλοιποι τῶν πολειτῶν	vs <i>ἐπένγραφοι</i>	<i>I. G.</i> , II ² , 2208 (212/3 or shortly after).

There are several lists in the first half of the second century A. D., however, which contain *ἐπένγραφοι* with demotics,¹ while we find instances in others where descendants of an *ἐπένγραφος* appear with a demotic.² While Augustus issued an edict forbidding the sale of Athenian citizenship,³ the ephebe inscriptions show that there was an opportunity extended to some foreigners to be listed under *τῶν πολειτῶν κατὰ φυλὴν ἔφηβοι* (*I. G.*, II², 2203). That this is a fact is evident from an analysis of two ephebe inscriptions, the conclusions to be drawn from which are applicable to the rest of the ephebe lists. A study of *I. G.*, II², 2097, dated in 169/70 brings out the following:

Tribe	<i>Ephebes in tribe listed with demotic</i>	<i>Ephebes in tribe listed without demotic</i>
Erechtheis	10	—
Aegeis	1	1
Pandionis	6	1
Leontis	9	—
Ptolemais	4	—
Akamantis	5	—
Hadrianis	5	—
Oeneis	5	1

¹ *I. G.*, II², 2033-5.

² Cf. *I. G.*, II², 2039 *vn.*

³ Dio Cassius, LIV, 7.

Kekropis	5	—
Hippothontis	8	1
Aiantis	7	—
Antiochis	5	1
Attalis	4	1
Total	74	6

*Ἐπέγγραφοι: 152.

In this inscription we have a phenomenon which is found in very many other lists of the Empire period. The question arises as to the status of those ephebes who are listed without a demotic. The absence of the demotic suggests that the epheboi in this category are not Athenian citizens. It is more likely that they are foreigners who through friendship or family connexions have been given the privilege of enrolling with the ephebes of the tribe during their stay in Athens. They are privileged foreigners who enjoy all the privileges of the tribe except citizenship.

That these are ἐπέγγραφοι enrolled κατὰ φυλάς is made evident from a study of *I. G.*, II², 2051, dated between 144/5-148/9. This inscription, which takes the form of a shield, contains the ephebes listed κατὰ φυλάς, some with and some without a demotic:

Tribe	<i>Ephebes in tribe with demotic</i>	<i>Ephebes in tribe without demotic</i>
Erechtheis	2	3
Aegeis	2	3
Pandionis	2	3
Leontis	6	3
Ptolemais	4	3
Akamantis	2	2
Hadrianis	3	3
Oeneis	6	3
Kekropis	3	4
Hippothontis	4	4
Aiantis	3	3
Antiochis	5	3
Attalis	2	3
Total	44	40

A very significant fact appears from the position of the epheboi without demotic. With the exception of one man (line 26) all of the ephebes without demotic are found listed at the end of their respective tribes. Since this inscription contains no ἐπέγ-

γραφοι it is apparent that the ἐπέγγραφοι are distributed κατὰ φυλάς, analogous to the Americans at Oxford who are distributed throughout the various colleges. This inscription not only corroborates the above suggestion, that the epheboi without demotic are ἐπέγγραφοι enrolled κατὰ φυλάς, but also shows that in the ephebe lists the foreigners are not limited to the category of Μιλήσιοι or ἐπέγγραφοι. They overflow into the tribes and the proportion of epheboi with demotic to epheboi without demotic in the tribe varies from inscription to inscription and period to period. In *I. G.*, II², 2097 (169/70), 92.5% of the epheboi are with demotic while 7.5% are without demotic, while in *I. G.*, II², 2245 (262/3 or 266/7) we have 10 epheboi with demotic while 305 without demotic are distributed κατὰ φυλάς and 50 are listed under the ἐπέγγραφοι. A study of the ephebe lists throughout the Empire period shows on the whole a greater proportion of foreigners to citizens with demotics, the proportion being particularly marked in the third century A. D.⁴

II. NAMES IN -ΙΟΣ AND -ΙΣ.

The reading of the stone of *I. G.*, II², 6503 (*I. G.*, III, 1762) is Γάιος Καρρείνας Διουμήδης Κολλυτεύς (cf. Γάιος, *I. G.*, II², 4815). In the publications of this inscription the name is restored as Γάιος. On line 60 of *Hesperia*, XI (1942), no. 37, p. 72, the stone reads ΗΛΙΣ, yet the name is restored as Ἡλιξ (see remarks, *loc. cit.*, p. 74). Both instances are examples of needless tampering. A study of names in -ΙΟΣ and -ΙΣ in inscriptions of the Empire period shows that many names that normally ended in -ΙΟΣ ended simply in -ΙΣ. Ἡλιος, which is the more frequent form of Ἡλιος (*I. G.*, II², 2160₁₈), appears also as Ἡλιος in *I. G.*, II², 2097₃₀₈; 2166₁₂; 2208_{12c}. Παράοις (*I. G.*, II², 2221₇₅) = Παρράοις (*I. G.*, II², 2223₃₃). Δίκαιοις (*I. G.*, II², 2199₁₂₇) = Δίκαιος (*I. G.*, II², 1811₄). Φάβιοις (*I. G.*, II², 2068₁₈₂) = Φάβιος and not Φαβιανός as suggested by Kirchner. Λήναιοις (*I. G.*, II², 2105₂₁₈) = Λήναιοις (*I. G.*, II², 2044₇₁). Λαβέριοις (*I. G.*, II²,

⁴ The proportion of foreigners to citizens is small in *I. G.*, II², 1996 (84/5-92/3), 2017 (shortly after 102 A. D.), 2065 (150/1), 2103 (172/3); it is somewhat in balance in *I. G.*, II², 2046 (shortly before 140 A. D.), 2049 (142/3), 2050 (143/4 or 144/5); it is larger in *I. G.*, II², 2024 (112/3), 2026 (116/7), 2058-9 (147/8), 2086 (163/4), 2239 (238/9-243/4), 2245 (262/3 or 266/7).

5881); *Λαβέριος* (*I. G.*, II², 593ε). We have another interesting example in the name *Παρθένις Σαρθενίου* (*I. G.*, II², 2068₁₅₃). *'Αθήναιος* (*I. G.*, II², 2111/2₁₀₂) appears as *'Αθήναιος* in *I. G.*, II², 1737₁₄; 1996₁₆₀; 2068_{154, 239}; 2097₈₄. *Τέρπτος* (*I. G.*, II², 2239₁₄₄) is found as *Τέρπτος* in *I. G.*, II², 1783₄₃; 2218₈. *Διονύσιος* (*passim*) is found as *Διονύσιος* in *I. G.*, II², 2097₂₃₉₋₉₀. The office of *καψάριος* in ephebe lists (*I. G.*, II², 2130₂₂₁, note; 2193₁₅₀; 2245₄₁) is also found as *καψάρις* (*I. G.*, II², 2276₃). Although these instances are not exhaustive they are sufficient to remind editors of Athenian inscriptions of the Empire period that names or words in -ιος, -ιωρ for -ιος, -ιων is a marked linguistic phenomenon noticed long ago,⁵ and that restorations to -ιος should be avoided.

III. THE ALPHABETICAL ORDER.

The principle which the Athenians used in their listing of names in catalogues, tribal order or otherwise, is an enigma. That the Athenians knew of the alphabetical order and used it on occasion is evident from two inscriptions. *I. G.*, II², 2208 (lines 133-167) and 2061 (lines 34 ff.) use the alphabetical order only in the listing of foreigners (*ἐπέγγραφοι*) in the *ἔφηβία*, and even this feature is an exception to the rule. The reason for the exclusion of the alphabet as a principle of classification is possibly to be found in the fact that the alphabetical order is associated in the Greek mind with cardinal numbers and in the first part of the alphabet with first, second, or third prizes in competition.⁶ It is perhaps this hierarchical association which led the democratic, lot-loving Athenians to disregard its use in cataloguing the citizens.

⁵ For a discussion of this linguistic phenomenon which does not appear in Greek before the third century B.C. and is attributed by Hatzidakis to Latin influence cf. G. N. Hatzidakis, *Einleitung in die neugriechische Grammatik* (Leipzig, 1892), pp. 314 ff.; *'Αθηνᾶ*, XI (1900), p. 288; K. D. Dieterich, *Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der griechischen Sprache von der hellenistischen Zeit bis zum 10. Jahr. n. Chr.* (Leipzig, 1898), pp. 63 ff.; A. Thumb, *Die griechische Sprache im Zeitalter des Hellenismus* (Strassburg, 1901), pp. 154 ff.; E. Schwyzer, *Griechische Grammatik*, I (Munich, 1939), p. 472 (*Handbuch der Altertumswissenschaft*); Stolz-Schmalz, *Lateinische Grammatik*, fifth edition by M. Leumann and J. B. Hofmann (Munich, 1928), p. 94 (*Handbuch der Altertumswissenschaft*).

⁶ Cf. *I. G.*, II², 2115.

IV. THE SIGNS OF CARDINAL NUMBERS.

Standard grammars list the signs of cardinal numbers after ten in the following order: first the sign of the decad followed by the sign of the cardinal number from one to nine, e. g. ω' , $\nu\beta'$, $\nu\gamma'$, etc. Although this is the standard usage in manuscripts and inscriptions, we find considerable deviation from this rule in inscriptions of the Empire period. For example we find η' (*I. G.*, II², 2245_{ss}) ; $\theta\iota'$ (*I. G.*, II², 2067_s) ; $\delta\iota'$ (*I. G.*, II², 2130_s). We even find in the same inscription (*I. G.*, II², 1367) both the usages of the signs of cardinal numbers. The reason for the deviation is to be found in the fact that when people wrote $\kappa\alpha'$ instead of the traditional and logical $\kappa\alpha$ they were literally transcribing the oral usage of the phrase $\epsilon\lambda s \ kai \ \epsilon\kappa\sigma\iota(\nu)$ rather than $\epsilon\kappa\sigma\iota \ kai \ \epsilon\lambda s$ or $\epsilon\kappa\sigma\iota \ \epsilon\lambda s$. The phenomenon needs to be noted in the revision of standard grammars.

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ECHOES OF EARLY ESCHATOLOGY IN THE *ILIADE*.

It is generally agreed¹ that Homer's recital of Trojan captives slain, along with horses and dogs, at the funeral pyre of Patroclus² is an unconscious echo of an obsolete eschatology. Nilsson³ puts the matter succinctly: "The burial of Patroklos is familiar as a relic of the extravagant funeral-cult of earlier times. Achilles slays twelve Trojan prisoners, four horses, two dogs, and oxen and sheep in large numbers, but the poet does not understand the custom, he does not know that such things were intended to serve the dead man in another world." Nilsson also cites Homer's use of the term *vékves* to denote the denizens of the other world as a linguistic relic of a related belief in the continued life of the actual corpse.⁴ Thus we find earlier strata of eschatological thought reflected in two ways. It is the purpose of this note to call attention to what seems to be a third. This time we are concerned neither with an element in the action of the poem nor with the poet's use of a particular word, but instead with the ideas expressed in two taunts⁵ which occur in

¹ Cf. E. Rohde, *Psyche*, I (4th ed., Tübingen, 1907), pp. 14-22; A. C. Pearson in J. Hastings and others, *Encycl. of Religion and Ethics*, VII (1914), p. 847; F. Schwenn, *Die Menschenopfer bei den Griechen und Römern* (= R. G. V. V., XV, Heft 3 [Giessen, 1915]), pp. 61 f.; P. Cauer, *Grundfragen der Homerkritik*, I (3rd ed., Leipzig, 1921), p. 356; M. P. Nilsson, *A History of Greek Religion*, trans. by F. J. Fielden (Oxford, 1925), p. 140; O. Kern, *Die Religion der Griechen*, I (Berlin, 1926), p. 32; U. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, *Der Glaube der Hellenen*, I (Berlin, 1931), pp. 306-8; F. Schwenn in R. E., XV (1932), cols. 950 f., § 4; H. Scholz, *Der Hund in der Gr.-Röm. Magie und Religion* (Berlin, 1937), p. 37; J. Wiesner, *Grab und Jenseits* (= R. G. V. V., XXVI [Berlin, 1938]), p. 161.

² Cf. *Iliad*, XXIII, 171-76; also XVIII, 336 f., XXI, 27 f., XXIII, 22 f.
³ *Loo. cit.*

⁴ *Ibid.* Cf. *Iliad*, XV, 251 f.: *καὶ δὴ ἐγώ γ' ἐφάμην νέκυας καὶ δῶμ' Αἴδαο / ἡματί τῷδ' ἔξεσθαι;*; R. J. Cunliffe, *Lex. of the Homeric Dialect* (London, 1924), s. v. *vékves* (2). On the belief in the "living corpse," cf. also E. Bickel, *Homerischer Seelenraube* (= *Schriften der Königsberger Gelehrten Gesellschaft*, I, Heft 7 [Berlin, 1926]), pp. 220-22; M. P. Nilsson, *Gött. Gel. Anz.*, CLXXXVIII (1926), pp. 440 f.; *id.*, *Revue d'Histoire et de Philosophie Religieuses*, X (1930), p. 117; Wiesner, *op. cit.*, pp. 164-67, 170, 179-85, 193 f., 210-12, 222.

⁵ On taunts in Homer, cf. A. L. Keith, *O.J.*, XIX (1923-24), pp. 556-58.

the battle-scenes of the thirteenth and fourteenth books of the *Iliad*.

The first passage is a brief speech uttered by Deiphobus, who has just slain Hypsenor in revenge for the killing of his friend Asius (*Iliad*, XIII, 414-16):

οὐ μὰν αὗτ' ἄπιτος κεῖτ' Ἀσιος, ἀλλά ἐ φημι
εἰς Ἄϊδος περὶ ιόντα τυλάρταο κρατεροῦ
γηθήσειν κατὰ θυμόν, ἐπει δάοι ὥπασα πομπόν.

In the second, Polydamas boasts that his spear has not been thrust at Prothoener in vain (*Iliad*, XIV, 454-57):

οὐ μὰν αὗτ' ὅτω μεγαθύμου Πανθοῖδαο
χειρὸς ἄπο στιβαρῆς ἄλιον πηδῆσαι ἀκοντα,
ἀλλά τις Ἀργείων κύμασε χροῖ, καὶ μιν ὅτω
αὐτῷ σκηπτόμενον κατίμεν δόμον Ἄϊδος εἴσω.

The dead Asius will rejoice *κατὰ θυμόν* as he travels the road to Hades' house, for Deiphobus has sent him the slain Hypsenor as a guide for the journey; along the same road the dead Prothoener will limp, using as a staff the spear which Polydamas has thrust through his shoulder. Now Homer elsewhere speaks of the *ψυχή* of the dead as flying like a winged creature or departing like smoke to Hades' abode.⁶ Here instead we have the dead thought of as actual wayfarers, needing, and taking pleasure in, the services of a guide, or trudging along with the aid of a staff. As divergent as this representation is from the usual Homeric concept, so similar is it to the beliefs which are unwittingly reflected in the recital of human sacrifice at Patroclus' funeral and in the use of the term *νέκτες* for the dead in the other world. If the two latter elements are rightly regarded as unconscious survivals of an earlier eschatology, so too, it is suggested, should we regard the ideas concerning the journey to the house of Hades which are expressed in the two passages here adduced.⁷

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⁶ Cf. *Iliad*, XVI, 856 (= XXII, 382): *ψυχὴ δὲ ἐκ ρεθέων πταμένη* 'Ἄϊδοσσδε βεβήκειν, XXIII, 100 f.: *ψυχὴ δὲ κατὰ χθονὸς ήντε καπνὸς / ὄχετο*.

⁷ W. Büchner, in *Hermes*, LXXII (1937), pp. 111-13, sees evidence in *Odyssey*, XI, 385-564 of a belief that the souls of Agamemnon and his warrior-companions lead a life comparable to that of men in our world, and unlike the empty existence of the rest of the shades.

AGAMEMNON, 469-470.

μένει δ' ἀκοῦσαι τί μου
μέριμνα νικτηρεφές
τῶν πολυκτόνων γὰρ οὐκ
ἄσκοποι θεοί. κελαιναὶ
δ' Ερινύες χρόγῳ
τυχηρὸν δοντ' ἄνευ δίκας
παλιντυχεῖ τριβῆ βίου
τιθεῖς ἀμαυρόν, ἐν δ' ἀλτοῖς
τελέθοντος οὔτις ἀλκά·
τὸ δ' ὑπερκόπως κλύειν εὖ
βαρύν· βάλλεται γὰρ δοσσοῖς
470. Διόθεν κερανός.

In anxious fear I wait to hear something shrouded still in gloom; for Heaven is not unmindful of men of blood. In the end the black Spirits of Vengeance bring to obscurity him who hath prospered in unrighteousness and wear down his fortunes by reverse; and once he hath passed among them that are brought to naught, there is no more help for him. Glory in excess is fraught with peril; for the thunderbolt from Zeus smites the eyes (of the guilty).¹

The meaning of these lines is immediately evident, with the seeming exception of 469-70, which have puzzled many scholars and caused attempts at emendation which alter the thought of the two verses.² A literal translation of the lines as given in the manuscripts (taking βάλλεται for ἐπιβάλλεται) may be rendered as “for the thunderbolt from Zeus is hurled against the eyes.” Thomson comments: “Even if the construction could pass, this is excluded, because Greeks never spoke of hurling a thunderbolt on a man’s eyes; it would convey no meaning”; for κερανός he substitutes κάρανα and translates “With a jealous eye the Lord Zeus in a flash shall smite him.”³ Verrall accepts the use of βάλλεται with the dative, but asserts “that ‘the bolt of Zeus strikes the eyes’ is neither true as a fact nor significant as

¹ Translated by H. W. Smyth, *Aeschylius* (London, 1936), p. 41, with the exception of lines 469-70.

² Cf. the emendations given in the editions of the *Agamemnon* by K. H. Keck (Leipzig, 1863) and F. H. M. Blaydes (Halle, 1898): “βάλλεται γ' δρόγκαις” and “βάλλεται γὰρ δύκοις.”

³ George Thomson, *The Oresteia of Aeschylus* (Cambridge, 1938), translation and commentary for lines 475-6. κάρανα is Tucker’s emendation.

a figure."⁴ Verrall does not emend, but instead resorts to the dubious practice of endowing a word with a meaning elsewhere unattested; in this instance he translates ὅσπεις as "mountain peaks."⁵ Both Thomson and Verrall are unjustified in assuming that the idea of striking a man's eyes with the thunderbolt was strange to the Greeks; Anchises, in the tradition followed by Theocritus, was blinded by the divine lightning for his presumption in boasting of his affair with Aphrodite.⁶

Apparently these scholars have not appreciated the significance of the lines with reference to the context. The connecting image of the passage is that of darkness and its personalized condition of blindness. First, the chorus fears it will learn of "something clothed in night" ($\tauί\ldots νυκτηρεφέται$), for the gods possess vision ($οὐκ\;\ddot{α}σκοποι$) to watch the deeds of men guilty of bloodshed. The Erinyes both move in darkness ($κελαιναι$) and shroud their quarry in darkness by making him both "shadowy" or "dim" and "sightless" ($\dot{\alpha}μαυρόν$), for there is no defense for him who comes into their unseen world ($\epsilon\nu\;\delta'\;\dot{\alpha}ίστροις$), or equally, there is no earthly help for him who has lost his vision by their action. Thus the disputed lines are observed to preserve consistently this extended image and to act as a summation of the whole passage; excessive fame is the source of grief, for the thunderbolt is hurled by Zeus against the eyes of the unjustly prosperous, through the agency of his servants of darkness, the Erinyes.⁷ The construction of the lines, while unusual, is closely paralleled by Euripides' *Phoenissae*, 1534 f., where the phrase $σκότον\;\ddot{\sigma}μασι\;σοῖσι\;\betaαλῶν$ permits only one interpretation.

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⁴ A. W. Verrall, *The 'Agamemnon' of Aeschylus* (London, 1904), line 475.

⁵ *Ibid.* H. W. Smyth (*op. cit.*, p. 41) follows Thomson in accepting $\kappaάρανα$ as correct, but translates, like Verrall, as "lofty peaks."

⁶ Servius, *ad Aen.*, II, 687: ". . . contra opinionem Theocriti, qui eum (Anchises) fulmine caecatum fuisse commemorat." Cf. also I, 617 and II, 35.

⁷ M. Untersteiner, *Eschilo, Le Tragedie* (Milan, 1946), translates lines 469-70, "viene scagliato il fulmine dagli occhi di Zeus." This interpretation, while grammatically admissible, concludes the central image much less forcefully and not so consistently.

REVIEWS.

ERNST HOWALD. *Der Dichter der Ilias.* Erlenbach-Zürich, Eugen Rentsch Verlag, 1946. Pp. 181.

The author, a man of great ability, attempts in this book to show just what in the *Iliad* is due to tradition, and what to the creative imagination of the poet. He believes that Homer was the first poet to unite various traditions into one majestic whole. He had before him the story of the wrath of Meleager and reproduced scenes of that poem in the ninth book of the *Iliad*, and the wrath of Meleager was a source as well as a pattern for the wrath of Achilles. He had also the epic of Memnon and that tale furnished him with the Lycians and their leaders, Glaucus and Sarpedon. Then he had smaller poems of many heroes, and by the device of having Achilles withdraw in his anger was able to show these other heroes in action. Homer was at the end of a great epoch and his genius was such that succeeding poets were eclipsed in advance. The quarrel between Achilles and Agamemnon, even if something similar may have existed, is in its present form a complete creation of Homer.

The genius of the poet is best shown in the books connected with Hector, especially in the sixth, the twenty-second, and the二十四. "Hector did not belong to tradition, but is a new creation, brought into being solely for the poem of the Wrath" (p. 118). "Hector and Polydamas were both the creations of the poet of the *Iliad*" (p. 137). It is in scenes connected with Hector that the creative genius of the poet is best revealed, and the author reaches the conclusion that the last book of the *Iliad* is not late and an addition, but the very heart of the poem and more than any other book shows the best in the poet's genius. This scholar in his treatment of the *Iliad* impresses me as a man of scurid judgment and possessed of a thorough knowledge of all parts of the poem, even if many of his assumptions depend on things unkown. Poetry is so much a matter of the imagination that it is generally impossible to guess what the facts were before touched by the genius of the poet.

His chapter on the *Odyssey* is far different from his treatment of the *Iliad*, as he sees great poetic power in the one poem, but little or none in the other. The poet of the *Odyssey* he regards as late, one who had before him the poems of the Cycle, the last poem of which dealt with Odysseus, a poem of about a third or at most a half the size of the present *Odyssey*. A late poet "ein Spätling," was fascinated with the *Iliad* and decided to expand the cyclic poem to something like the size of the *Iliad*, and this "Expander" had no ability, borrowed from many sources, and spoiled much that he took. For example he took the figure of Priam from the last book of the *Iliad* and introduced his parallel in the last book of the *Odyssey* as Laertes, the father of Odysseus. The Überarbeiter never caught the Homeric spirit, and he repeats without understanding many scenes from the *Iliad*. "Homer ist verschieden, grundverschieden" (p. 176). Then he illustrates the absurdity of the *Odyssey* by quoting the decription of the scene on the shore when Pisistratus and Telemachus

part after returning from the home of Menelaus, closing his book with these words: "In this manner the reviser of the *Odyssey* thought he was following Homer. True he saw the Homeric, but in his hands the best was lost, the real secret of Homer." It is also true that Vergil, Milton, and Tennyson never hinted that the *Odyssey* is not a great poem, and Horace, the best possible judge of real poetry, refers to Homer as the poet of perfect taste, *qui nil molitur inepte* (*A. P.*, 140), and this poet of "perfect taste" is the poet of the *Odyssey*, whose taste he illustrates by examples, not from the *Iliad*, but from the *Odyssey*. If this author will forget the vanities of Destructive Criticism, and will study the *Odyssey* with something like the zeal he has studied the *Iliad*, he will see that this poem is not composed of the absurdities of a stupid "Überarbeiter," but is the creation of a towering genius, a genius similar to the creator of the *Iliad*, and in no way inferior.

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G. Révész. Ursprung und Vorgeschichte der Sprache. Bern, A. Francke, 1946. Pp. 280. 19 Swiss fr.

The present book represents an attempt on the part of a psychologist to solve the problem of the origin and early history of Language. This is a problem which the modern school of linguists, interested chiefly in Indo-European philology with its horror at any kind of "glottogonic" reconstruction, has abandoned as insoluble, and lacking recourse to such a process, the problem must remain incapable of solution. But why exclude such a process in linguistic discussion? Hypothesis and theory have been and are still employed in man's attempt to understand and explain the phenomena of both natural and social science, and it would seem that there is no valid reason why they should not be made to serve the same purpose in our attempt to understand and explain that wonderful human activity that we call language. The author is to be congratulated on his temerity in attacking the problem once more.

After a preface, pp. 5-6, table of contents, pp. 7-8, and introduction, chap. 1, pp. 11-15, he states the problem before him in chap. 2, pp. 16-29.

This is followed in chap. 3, pp. 30-112, by an account of the various theories of the origin of language that have been proposed, which he divides into four groups.

1. Biological theories
 - a) derivation from expressive movements and expressive sounds
 - b) derivation from animal utterances
2. Anthropological theories
 - a) derivation through imitation of sounds in nature
 - b) ontogenetic theories
 - a') "Lalltheorie," derivation from "Lallwörter"
 - b') developed like the speech of children

- c') developed from musical sounds, singing
- d') theory that speech through the use of expressive sounds as symbols is a natural development of preceding wordless thought
- e') priority of gesture language (a theory concerning the original form, not the origin)
- f') origin to be sought in utterances of primitive peoples
- g') origin to be sought in the abnormal speech of the mentally ill.

3. Philosophical theories

- a) nativism—speech an innate function of man not derived from anything else
- b) empirical—man possesses an inborn tendency towards expressing himself in speech which is developed through the stimulus of experience and environment
- c) invention theory—speech a human invention produced to supply a felt need.

4. Theological theory—speech a gift of God like all characteristics of human nature.

Following this exposition he enumerates his ideas of the defects of these theories, and then outlines his own so-called "Kontakttheorie." His term "Kontakt" he defines as follows: "Das Wort Kontakt soll die abgeborene Grundtendenz gesellschaftsbildender Lebewesen zu gegenseitiger Annäherung, Fühlungsnahme, Zusammenarbeit und Verständigung bedeuten. Es geht hier um ein allgemeines Lebensprinzip der den sozialen Verbänden angehörenden Individuen." His theory differs from the various theories that trace language back to natural sounds (*Naturlaute*), he states, in that it argues that the beginning of language is rooted in those natural sounds only which are employed originally just as the sounds of language are now for the purpose of making oneself understood (*Verständigungsabsicht*).

On the problem of the *Ursprache*, chap. 4, pp. 113-15, he concludes that comparative linguistics can do little or nothing towards its solution beyond proving that the "evolution of language shows a progressive tendency from inseparable irregular conglomerations to freely and regularly combinable short elements" (Jespersen, *Progress in Language*, p. 27). He also believes, chap. 5, pp. 116-18, that as primitive man was *homo sapiens* as shown by the fact that he was *homo faber* (witness primitive artifacts) he must also have been *homo loquens* and that the language of perhaps a half million years ago did not differ essentially from the speech of historic times.

After a discussion, chap. 6, pp. 119-59, of the primary aim of Language (*Mitteilungsfunktion*) and its secondary aims in connection with *Denken*, *Wahrnehmen*, *Selbstbesinnen*, *Ausdruck des Inneren*, and an outline of his theory of the threefold function of primitive speech, viz., imperative, indicative, and interrogative, he concludes that the verb is "das adäquate sprachliche Ausdrucks-mittel" for the first two of these functions and therefore "die älteste grammatische Kategorie." This discussion leads to the fol-

lowing complicated definition of Language, p. 153, viz., "Unter Sprache ist das Mittel zu verstehen, durch welches zum Zwecke der gegenseitigen Verständigung, des geordneten Denkens, des sinnvollen Gestaltens der Wahrnehmungen, der Selbstbesinnung und des Ausdrucks des inneren Lebens—mit Hilfe einer Anzahl artikulierter und in verschiedenen Sinnverbindungen auftretenden symbolischer Zeichen—Forderungen und Wünsche zum Ausdruck gebracht, Tatbestände der inneren und äusseren Wahrnehmung angezeigt, Denkinhalte formalisiert und Fragen zur Veranlassung von Mitteilungen und der Selbstkontrolle gestellt werden" (in footnote, pp. 153-4, other definitions of speech are contrasted). In accordance with this definition, he says, "kann erst jene Kommunikationsform als Sprache im eigentlichen Sinne des Wortes gelten, die bereits mit imperativer, indikativer und interrogativer Funktion ausgestattet ist."

Having now laid the groundwork he proceeds, chap. 7, pp. 160-79, chap. 8, pp. 180-231, and chap. 9, pp. 232-236, to develop his "Kontakt" theory. He enumerates and describes the various forms of "Kontakt": 1) that which results simply from the mode of life of social creatures, from the desire for physical nearness for asexual and sexual reasons, the chief of which are food, reproduction, and protection (*der vitale Kontakt*); 2) a "Kontakt" which is characterized not only by a desire for physical nearness but by a feeling of mutual understanding, comradeship (*der seelische Kontakt*); 3) a "Kontakt" that implies a realization that the individual shares in the common mental and spiritual possessions not only of an individual but of a group (*der geistige Kontakt*). This last assumes the existence of Language.

He enumerates then the various forms of "Kontaktaut" which develop from expressive exclamatory sounds that are uttered without communicative purpose: 1) one directed to the group as a whole for the purpose of bringing about some desired reaction (a cry, *Zuruf*), 2) a cry directed to one or more individuals of the group (call, *Anruf*), 3) the word, not a signal like the *Anruf* but a symbol of something in nature, which develops during a period characterized by *geistiger Kontakt* or perhaps even during the preceding stage of *seelischer Kontakt*, as a result of the creative activity which is characteristic of man's nature, but just how, the author does not presume to say.

In some manner, therefore, words are developed out of these cries and calls and we have the beginnings of language. This most primitive form of speech he argues must have been of an imperative character, the words of this first form of language being used to convey orders or requests for action on the part of the person or persons addressed. Developments of the imperative are vocative and optative expressions, and this primitive imperative speech (*Frühform der Sprache*) develops later into a speech which can make statements and ask questions, in other words into a speech which has not only imperative but also indicative and interrogative function, a *Sprache mit drei Hauptfunktionen*. Out of this *Urform der Sprache* through the workings of that same creative power that transformed cries and calls into words gradually develops Language as we know it, with its tremendous vocabulary and its complicated morphological and syntactical apparatus.

In the following chapter 10, pp. 237-244, he discusses the logical structure of his theory, in which he seems to imply that there is something fundamental and essential in groups of three, as exemplified in *drei Kontaktbegriffe* (triebhafter, seelischer, geistiger), *drei Stufenbegriffe* (Zuruf, Anruf, Wort), *drei Funktionsbegriffe* (imperative, indicative und interrogative Funktion), *drei Phasenbegriffe* (Vor-, Früh-, und Vollphase der Sprache); p. 238 and note, pp. 238-9.

In chap. 11, pp. 245-54, he treats the bearing of his theory on *Sprachgeschichte, Entwicklungs-psychologie, und Urgeschichte*. In chap. 12, pp. 255-263 he gives a convenient résumé of the whole book.

His theory is illustrated by useful tables, pp. 235, 241, 242-3. A Bibliography of important works, pp. 267-71, a list of some of the author's works in the various fields of psychology, pp. 272-3, an index of names and topics pp. 274-9, and an announcement of the author's forthcoming work "Einleitung in die Musikpsychologie," p. 280, complete the work.

In this excellent, though somewhat wordy (the discussion of former theories comprises nearly a third of the book) and repetitious treatment of his subject the author has advanced an interesting theory. There are, however, a number of weak links in his chain of reasoning which tend to vitiate at least some of his results. His idea that the first words of primitive man must have been semantically of an imperative character, because the first speech of infants is exclusively of that type, is predicated on the supposition that the first speech of mature primitive men must have been of the same character as that of infants, a supposition which is certainly not an established fact and which is probably not true. Following the imperative language, a form of speech consisting entirely of commands or requests, he places the development of statements (indicative function) and questions (interrogative function), and as the imperative and indicative ideas are best expressed by what we call a verb, he argues that the first part of speech was the verb. Here the uncertainty of the premise (the priority of the imperative and the early development of the indicative) weakens of course the conclusion. Moreover it should be borne in mind, as the author himself states, that both functions can be very well expressed without recourse to real verbs.

In his discussion of the logical aspects of his theory, he seems to feel that there is something essential in the fact that his categories occur so frequently in groups of three, that three is a number which so often characterizes linguistic phenomena, that if such phenomena can be grouped in threes this may be regarded as proof of the correctness of the grouping. Such an argument seems the reverse of scientific.

He states that it is impossible to explain just how the *Anruf* which develops from *Zuruf* passes over into *Wort* except by saying that it is due to the creative power (*schöpferische Kraft*) of man. I think it is possible to give a more definite explanation. Granting that primitive man, like all the higher animals, has the power of ejaculating sounds to express his inner feelings and emotions or his response to external stimuli, it would be natural, even inevitable for him, using his power of thought *schöpferische Kraft* if you will, to identify his

ejaculations with the inner feeling or external stimulus, and thus develop what to him would be the symbol or name of such feeling or stimulus, i. e. a word. If such sounds, which are words to one individual, are understood and imitated by other individuals who are witnesses of the ejaculation and its cause, we have the beginnings of a medium of communication, the most primitive form of speech. This identification of the expressive sound (*Naturlaut*) with its stimulus is, I think, the beginning of language, and the author's failure to explain the development of *Wort* from *Anruf* puts his theory on a level with some of those he criticizes, such as the interjectional and imitative theories.

Zuruf and *Anruf*, which correspond apparently to animal speech, and the earliest form of words are interjectional in character, so we may say that the interjection is both the *Vorstufe* of speech and the first part of speech. These earliest words would certainly not be, as the author thinks, exclusively imperative in character, though undoubtedly some of them would be. Some would remain what they were originally, expressions of inner feeling; others would be employed to obtain the attention of one or more individuals (vocative function, which is not to be regarded as a derivative of the imperative function but as coordinate with it), still others in giving or asking for information (indicative and interrogative function); all of which functions might be expressed by the interjectional name of the stimulus, i. e. by a noun. Thus the interjectional name of an animal might be used in all four functions, e. g. deer (= it's a deer), deer (bring the deer), Deer! (calling a person of that name), deer? (is it a deer?). So it seems difficult to avoid the conclusion that the noun is the part of speech which emerges immediately after the interjection and not the verb.

The author does not attempt to trace the development of speech beyond his *Urform* with its three functions, but there are many indications in historic languages of the general course of this development. Assuming, as above, that the interjectional noun is the second oldest part of speech, the emergence of the other principal parts of speech may be conceived of briefly as follows. From nominal designations of place probably developed demonstrative particles, which were the basis of many pronouns and indefinite adverbs. I doubt if the verb in general grew out of the imperatively used noun; the verb, adjective, and many adverbs would seem to have been developed out of the noun by the fading out of the nominal idea and the strengthening of the subsidiary verbal, adjectival, or adverbial idea; for example the expression for a *running deer* might develop into a verb *run*, that for a *white deer* into an adjective *white*, that for a *fast running deer* into an adverb *fast*. It is possible also to suggest with a considerable degree of probability the sequence of the development of the other parts of speech and the course of the involution of the sentence from the simple interjectional sentence of one element to its most complex forms (cf. my "Origin and Development of Language and the Emergence of the Parts of Speech" (Abstract), *Proc. Amer. Phil. Assoc.*, LXVIII [1937], No. 1).

To resume, therefore, the author's theory, while emphasizing very properly the differences between natural expressive sounds uttered

without communicative intention (*Naturlaute*), *Zuruf*, *Anruf*, and *Wort*, does not explain satisfactorily the development of the last from the preceding two, which is the crux of the whole matter. His assumption of an exclusively imperative speech on the basis of the identity of the first speech efforts of infants with those of primitive mature man depends on the truth of this basis, which is at least doubtful and not susceptible of proof. His assumption that the verb comes first in the development of the parts of speech depending upon his assumed triple function of primitive speech, viz., imperative, indicative, interrogative; his development of the vocative function from the imperative; his ascription of a fundamental, essential character to the frequent occurrence of a triple division in the categorization of linguistic material; all these are unconvincing.

In common with such theories as the interjectional and imitative he finds the *Vorform* of speech in expressive ejaculations and like them again he makes no definite explanation of how these sound complexes became words. The elements which he has added to the older theories are of dubious value, and his failure to theorize on the further development of speech and the general course of the outcropping of grammatical categories would seem a distinct lack in any such treatment. In spite of these strictures, the work contains much useful material, many discussions of value, and presents many new points of view, and its perusal would seem essential to anyone who attacks again the problem of the origin and development of speech.

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CARLO MAZZANTINI. Heraclito: I frammenti e le testimonianze: Testo e traduzione. Introduzione e commento, con un'indice delle fonti, dei nomi, appendici critiche e bibliografia. Torino, Chiantore, 1945. Pp. 312.

The main substance of this work is contained in an introductory essay of 134 pages on "The philosophical thought of Heraclitus"; most of the fragments are here discussed in detail, under these chapter headings: Heraclitus and ourselves; The Logos; The opposites; The soul and the river; Metaphysics, ethics, epistemology; The position of man in the natural and human worlds; The theological culmination of the philosophy of Heraclitus; Biographical notes. Next follows a text, with translation and notes, of the fragments. This part of the book is based on the standard edition of the *Vorsokratiker* by Hermann Diels and Walther Kranz, and on an edition, with Italian translation, of Heraclitus alone by Richard Walzer (the latter was not available to me). In establishing his text, however, the author follows an independent path. The volume concludes with a useful "Bibliographical note" of ten pages, in which many previous studies are critically reviewed, and with indices.

The purpose of the work is clearly indicated by the author. From a philological examination of the texts he attempts to arrive at a philosophical explanation of Heraclitus' teachings, with emphasis on whatever elements in them are valid for all time. "The directive lines of my interpretation," says Mazzantini on p. 276, ". . . fit into a theoretical philosophical conception which, on the one hand, implies an interpretation of the historical course of philosophy and, on the other hand (in a continuous fruitful synergy), emerges from it, finding in it confirmation" (I quote from the work under review with rather literal translations, in order to preserve its style). Into the making of the book have gone learning and sagacity, enthusiasm and energy of thought; and yet it falls short of its goal, except for a limited area which is successfully covered.

As far as the more technical aspect of the author's task is concerned, the texts are not competently handled and explained. I give a few examples, the first of which have to do with determining what precisely in the references goes back to Heraclitus. According to Mazzantini, in fragment 71 (text below) Heraclitus imposes on the enlightened a responsibility for those that do not know their way; they are commanded to "remember" them, or, as the author puts it, to do their best to lead them back onto the right road and make them comply with the moral law (p. 101, n. 1; cf. also pp. 44, 95, and 100 f.). If this were true, it would give Heraclitus the complexion of a pre-Socratic Socrates, who makes it his business to minister to individuals and with loving care to attend to their moral welfare. The evidence for frag. 71 is the following passage from Marcus Antoninus (IV, 46): *'Αεὶ τοῦ Ἡρακλετέον μεμνῆσθαι ὅτι* (follows frag. 76). *μεμνῆσθαι δὲ καὶ τοῦ ἐπιλανθανομένου γῆ η ὁδὸς ἄγει* (= frag. 71). For anyone who reads the reference in its context (and Mazzantini published in 1940 a translation of the *Meditations*) it is evident that the words "remember also" are outside the quotation; they are, in fact, so printed in the *Vorschriften*. Marcus is reminding himself of a Heraclitean saying about a man "who forgets where the road leads him" (a man like the drunkard, *οὐκ ἐπαίνου ὅκη βάλνει*, of Heraclitus, frag. 117). Mazzantini makes much of this supposed fragment and of others from Marcus Antoninus who, in my opinion, rarely if ever quotes in full the actual text of Heraclitus; he rather tries to call back to his mind Stoic interpretations of Heraclitean words (for frag. 71 compare Seneca, *Epist.*, 98, 10: *obligi quo eant*, that is, forgetting that we are all on our way toward death). The author is especially emphatic about frag. 75. After asking a certain question which, as he says, "occurs spontaneously to Heraclitus and to ourselves, ourselves that read Heraclitus and converse with him without historicistic prejudices that hamper the colloquy" (p. 37), he asserts that "Fragment 75 answers in the most clear and explicit manner that one could wish for: . . . In the most clear and explicit manner, that is, unless one forces on the fragment interpretations, or rather prejudiced distortions which bring . . . 'prejudice' to bear on the genuine 'interpretation'" (p. 39). That sounds as if we were dealing with *ipsissima verba Heracliti*. And yet Mazzantini ignores, and fails to reprint, the difficult words with which the emperor himself introduces frag. 75: "I think that Heraclitus says

(or: means, λέγει) that" It was plausibly argued by Gerhard Breithaupt (Diss. Göttingen, 1913, pp. 21-23) that the so-called frag. 75 is no new fragment at all; Marcus is here (VI, 42) merely echoing and elaborating, from memory, one of his previous (IV, 46) [pseudo-]quotations from Heraclitus, namely, frag. 73. Mazzantini, however, writes: "Breithaupt maintains, and in my opinion rightly, that the two fragments [*scil.* 73 and 75] were united with one another in the book of Heraclitus" (p. 99, n. 2, duplicated p. 169, n. 3; the same thing had been said already on p. 45). Frag. 92 is taken from Plutarch's treatise *De Pyth. orac.*; in the middle of a sentence Plutarch inserts the words *καθ' Ἡράκλειτον*, and it is an open question how many, or how few, words of Plutarch's text are covered by this reference. Mazzantini writes on p. 251: "I keep the entire fragment [*sic*] as it stands in the MSS [*sic*]." Misinterpretation of Greek words is patent, for instance, on p. 268 where the author says: ". . . the 'glory' of which frag. 23 [read: 29] speaks is glory in God more than among men (although it also includes the latter)." But *κλέας δέναον* is unambiguously "fame (among men)," excluding such a Christian idea as "glory in God." With reference to frag. 85 (*θυμῷ μάχεσθαι χαλεπόν· ὁ γὰρ ἀν θέλη, ψυχῆς ὥνται*) we read on p. 250: "I maintain that the term *θυμός* . . . designates that summit of the soul which transcends the cosmic vicissitude and is able to affirm itself by saving itself through and beyond it, or else by shutting itself up within itself against it but also, by virtue of this same act, remaining submerged and imprisoned in it."

In his philosophical interpretation, Mazzantini moves within too narrow a circle. Three shortcomings seem mainly responsible for it.

The first is an insufficient familiarity with the non-philosophical literature of the age. The author sees in the teachings of Heraclitus, not so much a phase of Greek thought, but rather the spontaneous emergence of Philosophy which then and there had its first beginnings. The historical background is thus virtually lacking, with the consequence that Heraclitean philosophy becomes a thing with dim contours and pallid colors.

Secondly, the fragmentary nature of the evidence is hardly recognized, and we cannot but underrate the range of Heraclitean thought unless we realize that only a tiny fraction of his work has survived in one form or another. Mazzantini's book reads as if nothing were missing for our reconstruction of the Heraclitean system, and the obvious blanks are filled by means of unwarranted conjectures. These are all of the same stamp; whenever something needs to be supplied, the one set of notions is called upon which the author considers the core of Heraclitean doctrine. That Heraclitus, for instance, had definite ideas on after-life is shown by frag. 27 ('Αὐθώποντος μένει ἀποθανόντας ἄστρα οὐκ ἐλπονται οὐδὲ δοκέοντων), but we have no means of knowing what they were. Mazzantini declares (pp. 105 f.) that "The unexpected lot to which the fragment alludes is in the last analysis (mystically) 'salvation in God,' but this salvation consists in 'understanding the truth,' without the strains and deficiencies that vitiate this understanding (without, however, destroying it or jeopardizing those evident truths already reached) this side of death." The suggestion is not merely arbitrary; it is unlikely because an under-

standing for which one has already struggled with partial success during lifetime would hardly have been styled "unexpected and unopined."

The third, and gravest, reason is the radical Christianization which Heraclitus undergoes under the hands of a student who is convinced that it is "the classical and Catholic tradition which truly preserves and develops the genuine and profound nature of Hellenism" (pp. 242 f.). Since the points of contact between Heraclitean and Catholic doctrines are few, this particular perspective hides more things than it reveals, and it projects into the picture features that do not belong there. The author uses Clement of Alexandria as his guide and reads Christian concepts into the texts from the early fifth century B. C. In his discussion of frag. 52 (*aiōv ταῖς ἐστι παλέων*, etc.), he says this: "Here as elsewhere, the continuity, in actual experience, of Hellenism and Christianity (as against the barbarism of a Tertullian) is the reason why Clement discovers the most profound significance of the Heraclitean words. Even though he exaggerates when he sees in it, as it were, a theological comment on the Incarnation, he is entirely right in seeing in it the philosophical consciousness of such a rapport between God and world as to exclude the impossibility of the very Incarnation. If God can assume human infancy, this is possible because there is in Him an eternal divine Infancy" (p. 118). Mazzantini speaks of "the plan" (= benevolent design?) which the Logos has for the world (pp. 37, 38, 40); he ascribes to Heraclitus the view that "the obedient faithfulness of man experiences the divine presence as love, as law, and power of salvation" (p. 111); and in frag. 52 he also finds expressed the thought that "the divine transcendence, by sovereign condescension, permits the world to exist" (p. 119)—a thought which is incompatible with frag. 30. With tiresome repetitiousness, he insists on those elements in the Heraclitean system which may be looked upon as the rudiments of ideas that were much later fully deployed and technically elaborated in Christian philosophy. Especially in the last, summarizing, part of his essay (pp. 122 ff.) the author loses sight of the bulk of the fragments and their specific content with which he had dealt before, and indulges in restatements, time and again, of his principal points.

On the positive side, his Catholic beliefs helped the author to appreciate better than some other scholars have done the hierarchic structure of the Heraclitean universe, with man occupying an intermediate position between its bottom and summit (cf. my article, which Mazzantini has not seen, in this Journal, LIX [1938], pp. 309 ff.) and being able, by virtue of his participation in the Logos, to grasp the essence of the world. There is an analogy, though by no means identity, between the Christian concept of illumination and that awakening to a higher consciousness to which Heraclitus tries to arouse his readers, with the promise that then they will live their lives in plain sight of the transcending totality from which all things and events derive their being. Mazzantini's book contains a number of good remarks on those Heraclitean views that lent themselves to the approach which the author has chosen to take. Thus we read, for example, on pp. 33 f.: "This Logos is the soul of man, which is

here clearly thought of, not merely as the living and vivifying principle, but as the thinking principle, and thinking in a progressive fashion: reason incarnate, that becomes (can become) ever more and ever better reason: which increases itself, says frag. 115. Xenophanes had already insisted on the progressive character of human knowledge (frag. 18), but here the distinction-unity with the Divine Logos is more neatly designated." (Some reservations, however, are in order; for one thing, Heraclitus in frags. 115 and 45 says, not that the soul is, but that it has, logos.) There are also to be found in the work a few striking remarks on matters beyond the author's fixed program, e. g. on p. 65 with respect to the opposites Peace and War: ". . . the profound meaning of the Heraclitean 'war' is actually (but, precisely, in its profoundest meaning) 'peace.' . . . peace of affirmative living-together, in which each term affirms itself energetically, repelling the invasion (so to speak) of the others, but also finding itself repelled by the others (kept within its limit) . . . The exclusion is never total destruction (war unto death) but preservation within the limit, or reduction up to the limit . . ." Here, as throughout the book, one may take exception to the untidy phrasing, but the ideas themselves seem sound and worthwhile.

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EDMUND GROAG. Die römischen Reichsbeamten von Achaia bis auf Diokletian. Vienna and Leipzig, Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky A.-G., 1939. Coll. 198. (Akademie der Wissenschaften in Wien, *Schriften der Balkankommission, Antiquarische Abteilung*, IX.)

EDMUND GROAG. Die Reichsbeamten von Achaia in spätromischer Zeit. Budapest, Institut für Münzkunde und Archaeologie der P. Pázmány-Universität, 1946. Pp. 92. (*Dissertationes Pannonicæ*, Ser. I, No. 14.)

The two parts of the late Edmund Groag's masterly study of the Roman officials of Achaia will here be designated as *Achaia I* and *Achaia II*.

The author, who during the war was confined to his home in Vienna, died upon his liberation in 1945. Since it was impossible to publish *Achaia II* either in Germany or in Austria, the manuscript and a request from Groag for publication in the *Dissertationes Pannonicæ* had been secretly dispatched, it is said, to Professor Alföldi in Budapest, who edited the manuscript and "filled in the gaps that still existed." It is unfortunately not indicated which gaps were filled by Alföldi.

Achaia was organized in 27 B. C. as a senatorial province to be governed by a proconsul of praetorian rank. From 15 to 44 A. D.

the senate lost the province which came under the command of the legate of Moesia. Diocletian, who seems to have left the old arrangement in force for a while, later replaced the proconsul with an equestrian *vir perfectissimus*, who appears in the time of the tetrarchy as *praeses provincias Achaiae* under the vicarius of the dioecesis Moesiarum. Achaia, reduced by Diocletian to a province of the lowest rank, after 314 A. D. recovered its dignity and returned to government by a proconsul. The last known proconsul of Achaia belongs to the year 435 A. D.

For this study, a worthy last contribution from a scholar so eminent, the author has collected and utilized a mass of widely scattered pieces of evidence, chiefly from inscriptions. Despite the author's rare familiarity with epigraphical material and prosopography some problems are at the present stage incapable of solution, and others merely emerge as the result of the present sifting, systematizing, and consequent clarification, but the study makes a long step forward, has brought order into chaotic material, and, as a reference work, affords the greatest help.

The arrangement and presentation of the material are excellent. Tables and indices, moreover, make the work easy to consult. The continuity of the two parts is stressed by cross reference and by the presence of twelve pages of addenda and corrigenda to *Achaia I* at the beginning of *Achaia II*. The reviewer, satisfied with the aim and the general conclusions of the work, would submit the following notes on some of the details.

The proconsul honored in *I. G.*, II², 4103 is still called in *Achaia I* C. (Or?)conius. Groag disposes of the previous dating in the Ciceronian Period and places this proconsul early in the reign of Augustus. For reasons submitted in *A. J. P.*, LXVIII (1947), pp. 150-160, I should place the inscription certainly in the Julio-Claudian Period and restore the name as [Pa]conius or [As]conius, which are gentilicia of senatorial families.

For the proconsul L. Aquilius Florus Turcianus Gallus, Groag in *P. I. R.*², I, 993 preferred the date 52/3 A. D. proposed by A. B. West, but in *Achaia I* on the basis of the same evidence he leaned toward the old dating ca. 3 B. C. Not so v. Premerstein (*Abh. Bayer. Akad.*, phil.-hist. Kl., XV [1934], p. 217), to whom the phrase *prcqluaest(ore) Cypro* (a senatorial province) *ex auctoritate Aug(usti)* in the Corinthian inscription implied an interference more like Caligula, mentioned with deliberate vagueness, than like Augustus. Three extant inscriptions, including one published in *Hesperia*, X (1941), p. 238, were erected on the Acropolis at Athens, when Hipposthenis, a contemporary of Florus, was priestess of Athena. The date is still quite unsettled, but some day Hipposthenis may help.

In *I. G.*, II², 4511, a list of dedications to Asclepius from Philopappus and others, the names of Lupus and Proculus in line 10 are probably those of the proconsuls Cn. Acerronius Proculus and Gellius Rutilius Lupus. Both of these men, particularly the latter, were closely connected with Athens, where inscriptions in their honor have been found.

A decision by a certain Longinus is cited by the legate C. Avidius Nigrinus of the Trajanic Period in *S. I. G.*², 827. It is impossible to

say whether Longinus was a proconsul or legate and who he was. Groag, *Achaia*, I, col. 54, suggests the possibility of an identification with C. Julius Longinus cos. 107 A.D. A *iuris consultus*, cited merely as Longinus, rose in the first century from an equestrian origin to be a senator of praetorian rank (*P. I. R.*¹, II, 246); he too could be considered. The Roman lady, who in the first or early second century was honored at Rhamnus in *I. G.*, II², 4059 by the Areopagus, the Council of the Six Hundred, and the Demos, had a husband named Longinus. The reference should read Κεστίου Δούγγ[είνου] | γυναῖκα rather than Κεστίου Δόγγ[ει] . . . | γυναῖκα as in the *Corpus*. Cn. (or C.) Cestius Longinus must have been someone of consequence, but there is no evidence for or against an office in the provincial administration.

In the acephalous inscription *I. G.*, II², 3233, the photograph published in *Hesperia*, XVII (1948), Plate XIV, No. 30, shows enough for certain recognition of another Augustan legate to be added to those of *Achaia*, I, coll. 20-22: with the letters underlined which are now lost, — πρε[τ]ερ[βεντην] Αὐτοκρά[τορ]ς Καίσαρος Σεβαστοῦ καὶ Τιβερίου Καισ[α]ρ[α], a title which highlights the new position of Tiberius in 13-14 A.D., for it presumably implies common rule and raises the question elsewhere (*Epigraphica*, VIII, 33-36).

The Latin inscription at Corinth for Memmius Regulus, legate successively of Tiberius, Caligula, and Claudius, reads in the reviewer's opinion, *P. Memmi[us] P. f.* | *Regulo*, [VII] *viro* | *epul.*, *sodali* [*Augustali*] | *fratri Arvali*, [*leg.* *Gai*] |³ *Caesaris Augus[t]i* *G[ermanici]* | *pro* [*praetore*], etc. In *Achaia*, I, col. 25 Groag adds the abbreviation *cos* at the end of the restoration in line 2, but spatial considerations indicate that the title *cos* was indeed omitted as A. B. West, *Corinth*, VIII (2), p. 53 inferred. Groag's objection to West's identification of the emperor as Caligula, that the name would have been erased, is sufficiently met by restoring an erasure of the praenomen alone as in the above reworded and redistributed version of West's text. West, following Dean, restored the title as [*leg.* | *C.*] *Caesaris Augus[t]i* *G[er]*. | *pr. praet.*] *pro*[*v.* *Achaiae*. This cannot be right because the command included Moesia and Macedonia. Groag did not raise the question as to the exact title Memmius Regulus bore, but the question should be raised and the answer may lie in the hitherto unexplained three-letter abbreviation of *I. G.*, II², 4176, [πρε]ζβεντοῦ τῶν [Σε]β[αστῶν καὶ ἀντι]στρατήγον Μ(υτιλήνης) Μ(ακεδονίας) ΠΑ(χαλασσῆς).

On the proconsuls L. Livius and L. Rufinus and on the στρατηγός Mescinius (*Achaia*, I, col. 22) see now M. Grant, *From Imperium to Auctoritas* (Cambridge University Press, 1946), pp. 385-386.

The proconsul C. Sulpicius (Galba), honored at Samos, is, I believe, not the proconsul of Asia but the proconsul of Achaia, identical with the proconsul C. Sulpicius honored at Athens. The texts relating to this official have been brought together and discussed in *A. J. A.*, XLVI (1942), pp. 380-387 (the suggestion that he received divine honors was, however, mistaken). In the reviewer's opinion the proconsul is the same as the man honored at Delphi ca. 13 B.C. in an inscription which G. Daux (*B. C. H.*, LXVIII-LXIX [1944-1945], 107) has republished with a new fragment. The

proconsul, accordingly, would not be the consul of 22 A.D. (cf. *Achæia*, I, coll. 19-20) but rather his grandfather who never rose above praetorian rank.

In the article on Calpurnius Rufus, attested as a Hadrianic proconsul of Achæia by Ulpian, Groag (*Achæia*, I, coll. 61 f. and II, p. 6), who followed Mommsen's commentary to *C. I. L.*, III, 6072, seems to have conflated evidence concerning three generations of a family resident at Attaleia in Pamphylia. The proconsul has the same cognomen as M. Calpurnius M. f. Rufus who now appears as legate of the emperor Claudius—the name of the province is lost—in an inscription published by E. Bosch and S. Atlan, *Türk Tarih Kurumu Belleten*, XI (1947), p. 94, No. 10. With the evidence then at hand Groag, who pointed out difficulties and made reservations, was perhaps justified in his conflation. In view of the new evidence, however, it seems better to connect the references in *C. I. L.*, III, 6072 and *S. E. G.*, II, 696 with the imperial legate of the reign of Clandius; the proconsul of Achæia, Calpurnius Rufus, was probably the grandson of M. Calpurnius M. f. Col. Rufus. Bosch and Atlan have published *ibidem*, No. 11, a Greek inscription which names Calpurnius Longus as the son of M. Calpurnius Rufus, likewise a Greek inscription, No. 22, which gives the son's full name as L. Marcius Celer Calpurnius Longus, IIIvir viarum curandarum, triburus leg. I Italicae. Still another inscription from Attaleia published as No. 21 by Bosch and Atlan, *ibid.*, pp. 104-106, shows Longus as an official of Achæia. Bosch and Atlan restore the title as [ἀνθύπατον Ἀ]χαίας: On the basis of *S. E. G.*, VI, 650 (also from Attaleia), of which M. N. Tod, *Anatolian Studies Presented to William Hepburn Buckler* (Manchester, 1939), pp. 333-344, has pushed the date up into the first century after Christ, the reviewer prefers to restore the title as [πρεσβευτὴν | Ἀ]χαίας:

Belleten, XI, pp. 104-6, No. 21

S. E. G., VI, 650

<p>Λοικίου [Μ]άρκιον Καλ[πούργιον] Δόγγον, χιλία[ρχον πλατίση] μον λεγεῖ[νος πρώτης Ἰτα]</p> <p>5 λικῆς, πρεσβεί[ντην Πόντου] καὶ Βιθυνίας, [πρεσβευτὴν] ['Α]χαίας [-----] [...] καπαιδία [-----] [τ]ρεφόμενα [-----] 10 [...] νιον τροφ[-----] [πά]τρωνα καὶ ε[ὐεργέτην]</p>	<p>[-----] Πόντου καὶ Βειθυ νίας, δήμαρχον, στρατηγόν, πρεσβεύ την καὶ ἀντιστρά</p> <p>5 τηγον ἐπαρχεῶν 'Αχαίας καὶ 'Ασίας, Μᾶρκος Σεπτώνιος 'Αλβανὸς ἀρχιερεὺς καὶ ἀγωνοθέτης, 10 ἐπαρχος ἵππεων Ἰλης Σεβαστῆς Γερμανικο αῆς, τὸν ἔαυτοῦ φίλαν.</p>
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It is nowhere stated but probable that the proconsul Calpurnius Rufus was a son of Calpurnius Longus. If so, the genealogical table may be represented as in Figure 1.

<p>Caecilia Tertilla priestess of Livia and of Rome, gymnasiarch of the three gymnasia. <i>S. E. G.</i>, II, 696</p>	<p>M. Calpurnius [---] ca. 15 A. <i>C. I. L.</i>, III, 6072; <i>Belleten</i>, p. 94, No. 10.</p>
<p>M. Calpurnius M. f. Col(lina tribu) Rufus ca. 50 A.D. praef. frumenti ex s. c., legate in Cyprus, legate in Pontus and Bithynia, legate in Asia, leg. pro. pr. Tib. Claudi Caesaris Aug. Germanici [---]. <i>C. I. L.</i>, III, 6072, 7128; <i>Belleten</i>, XI, p. 94, Nos. 10 and 11; <i>S. E. G.</i>, II, 696.</p>	
<p>L. Marcius Celer Calpurnius Longus ca. 85 A.D. IIIvir viarum curandarum, tribunus laticlavius leg. I Italicae, praetor, legate in Pontus and Bithynia, legate in Achaia, legate in Asia. <i>Belleten</i>, XI, pp. 94 ff., Nos. 11, 21 and 22; <i>S. E. G.</i>, VI, 650.</p>	
<p>Calpurnius Rufus ca. 120 A.D. proconsul of Achaia under Hadrian <i>Dig.</i>, I, 16, 10 (Ulpian).</p>	

Figure 1. The Calpurnii of Attaleia in Pamphylia.

As to the proconsul Claudius Pro[] of *Achaia*, I, col. 62, B. D. Meritt *Hesperia*, XVI (1947), p. 175, has published a new fragment of *I. G.*, II², 4196, where the name now reads Κλ Πρό[κλον] Κυ[λ]υρον. Although Meritt is almost certain that the vertical hasta of a second cognomen can belong only to a nu, he has cautiously dotted the letter. Since the number of missing letters has been determined, for both lines, the name would seem to be Claudius Pro[culus Qui]ntus or Qui]jetus.

Both in *Achaia*, I, coll. 64-66, and in earlier discussions of L. Aemilius Juncus the would-be archaic inscription in the ancient Attic alphabet, *I. G.*, II², 3194 (= III, 70), has been a source of errors. Disregard of the uninscribed area between lines 3 and 4 has produced one of the chief of these errors, the failure to realize that a separate document of the same record begins in line 4. Hence the reference

to the Athenian archon Sylla, which occurs at the end of line 3, may date the inscription to the period 144-150 A. D., but it certainly does not date to the period 144-150 A. D. the document of lines 4-17 which concerns Juncus. Let us assume from the reference to Sylla that the inscription was erected by Athenian order—hence the Attic alphabet—in the Attic year 147/8 A. D. It contains in lines 4-17 as part of the record a judgment given by Juncus, for all we know, perhaps sixteen or seventeen years earlier, and in lines 18 ff. another document which mentions (that same judgment by) Juncus. For our purposes the two most important lines are 4 and 5:

'Ιοῦκ[ος] ^{5 or 6} μ[ετά] τὸν συνεδρεύντο[ν]
5 ἀνέγ[νω]ν [-----] vacat

In line 4, where the sigma had not yet been read, Kolbe's restoration δικαιοδότης and Dittenberger's restorations ἀθύπατος or *ho οὐταρτεὺς* were rejected for excessive length by Graindor, *Athènes sous Hadrien* (Cairo, 1934), pp. 21-25, who suggested ἀρχοντ (of the Parhellenion) or *ho πρόεδρος* (admittedly too long). Whereas Dittenberger had identified the συνεδρεύοντες with the *consilium* of the Roman magistrate, Graindor, without denying that it could be the *consilium*, sought to explain the synhedrion in other ways. He suggested *inter alia* that Juncus had become an Athenian citizen and appeared here as an Athenian official. In this misconception Groag has followed Graindor. However, Dittenberger was right at least about the *consilium*, for the sense becomes apparent from a comparison with headings to judgments of a Roman official in two papyri, *Ox. Pap.*, 1102 (ca. 146 A. D.), σκ[εψή]άμ[ενο]ς μετὰ τῶν παρόντων ὑπηγόρευσεν ἀπόφασιν ἢ καὶ ἀνε[γνώσ]θη κατ[ὰ] λέξιν οὐτῶς ἔχουσα, and *P. Tebt.*, 286 (121-138 A. D.), lines 15-18, as restored by A. S. Hunt, *The Oxyrhynchus Papyri*, VIII (1911), p. 171, ἀνασ-[τὰ]ς εἰς συμ[βούλιον κ]αὶ σκεψάμ[ενος με]τὰ [τὰ] ὥρα [π]α[ρό]ν[των] γ[νώση]ενσε[ν] ἀπόφα[σιν ἢ κ]αὶ ἀνεγνάσθ[η κα]τὰ λέξ[ι]ν φύ[τω]ν ἔχουσα. In all three cases the reference is to the procedure in a Roman trial. The Roman judge consults legal advisers; then on the basis of their advice he makes a decision, of which he dictates the essence; the decision is read out (ἀνεγνώσθη), and a copy is preserved for the record. Compare also *P. S. I.*, 1100, line 2, Φαῦστος σκεψάμενος μετὰ τῶν συνεδρεύντων. In line 4 we cannot restore σκεπσάμενος because of its excessive length; but the word ζετέσας would fit exactly. Transcribed into the Ionic alphabet, lines 4-5 might read Τοῦκ[ος ζητήσας] μ[ετά] τὸν συνεδρεύντων | ἀνέγ[νω]ν [ἀπόφασιν].

Thus at Athens, Aemilius Juncus appears as a special Roman judge. In *I. G.*, II², 4210, he has the title of an imperial legate of some sort. At Sparta he is called δικαιοδότης which usually means *iuridicus*. A *legatus iuridicus* is out of place in a senatorial province, but the title in the Spartan inscription certainly suggests the activity of a special judge. Juncus exercises a greater jurisdiction over the two *civitates liberae* Athens and Sparta than a proconsul. Groag leaves the question open whether Aemilius Juncus was a *legatus Aug. pro. pr. prov. Achiae* or a *legatus Aug. pro pr. ad corrigendum statum liberarum civitatum prov. Achiae*. Perhaps that is all one can do, but the official's contemporaneity with the Council of the Five

Hundred inclines the reviewer toward the opinion that Juncus, who was consul as early as 127 A. D., held the appointment in Achaea after the consulship. From probabilities J. A. Notopoulos, "The Date of the Creation of Hadrianis," *T. A. P. A.*, LXXVII (1946), pp. 53-56, argues plausibly that the Council of the Five Hundred, in Roman times, first appeared in 127/8 and that therefore the legate was of consular rank.

In his discussion of Paulinus (*Achaia*, I, coll. 84-86, and II, p. 7) Groag, who did not overlook A. Stein's article but to whose discussion L. L. Howe, *The Praetorian Prefect from Commodus to Diocletian* (Chicago, 1942), p. 91, had no access, defends successfully the view (combatted by Howe) that Paulinus was a praetorian prefect, not a vice praetorian prefect. On the other hand, Groag did not consider the bearing of the predicate ἐξοχώτατος on the question of the date. Howe, denying that there was any support for the dating of the Spartan inscription *A. E.*, 1913, 244, to about the time of Caracalla, lays special emphasis on the predicate ἐξοχώτατος, which is not attested as early as the reign of Caracalla. Howe dates this inscription "probably in the second half of the third century." Fixed translations of the Latin predicates of rank were only gradually adopted in the East, but since the predicate *eminentissimus*, first attested under Marcus Aurelius, was regularly employed from about 205 A. D., the use of the predicate ἐξοχώτατος is no real argument against dating the correctorship attested by *A. E.*, 1913, 244, to the first third of the third century (so Groag with a question mark). In fact Groag's date still seems to me preferable.

The name of the procurator Quadratus cited in *Achaia*, I, col. 150, is now known to be Caelius Quadratus. He is mentioned in an inscription of which an enlarged text has been published by the reviewer, *The Sacred Gerusia* (= *Hesperia*, Supplement VI [1941]), No. 24.

To *Achaia*, I, footnote 713, add Antiochus Caes(aris) n. s. verna from *Hesperia*, X (1941), p. 244.

To the footnote of *Achaia*, I, col. 171 f.: The reviewer doubts that L. Statius Aquila, cos. suff. 116 A. D., was an Athenian. Rather, as Graindor, *Athènes sous Hadrien* (Cairo, 1934), pp. 60 f., suggested, his son L. Statius Quadratus cos. 142 received the gift of Athenian citizenship after his consulship, and the family settled in Athens only at that time. There is no earlier trace of them at Athens.

Nor was the consular Ulpius Eubiotus Leurus, whose father bears no demotic in *I. G.*, II², 3695, necessarily a native Athenian. His family tree may be reconstructed as in Figure 2 on the following page. (Flavia Habroea's descent from the family of Hypata is nowhere explicitly stated, but it is indicated nevertheless by the names and by the Thessalian connections of her son.)

If the Democrats of *I. G.*, II², 11120 were a native Athenian (cf. *Achaia*, II, p. 12), there would be little point to the line [Δημοκρά]-την κατέχει Κέκροπος ηδε κόνις. Rather the land of Cecrops, which becomes his final resting place, is contrasted with the land of his origin.

Eubiotus (of Hypata)
S. I. G.^s, 822

T. Flavius Cyllus of Hypata, floruit 90-140 A.D.
epimelete of the Amphictyonic League
archon of the Attic Panhellenion
S. I. G.^s, 822; O. G. I., 504

T. Flavius Eubiotus of Hypata ————— Habroea
high priest and agonothete of the divi Augusti I. G., IX (2), 29 (cf. also 30, 32)
agorothete of the Pythia
epimelete of the Amphictyonic League
Helladarch
I. G., IX (2), 44 (S. E. G., III, 460)

Ulpian Leurus (of —————) ————— Flavia Habroea (of Hypata)
I. G., II^s, 3695 *femina consularis*
Oliver, *The Sacred Gerusia*, p. 132 ~

M. Ulpian Eubiotus Leurus, floruit 200-235 A.D.
consularis
eponymous archon of Athens
agonothete of the Panathenaea
Athenian citizen of the deme Gargettus
benefactor of the Thessalian League
Oliver, *The Sacred Gerusia*, pp. 125-142

M. Ulpius Flavius Tisamenus

M. Ulpius Pupenius Maximus

Figure 2. The family of the consular Ulpius Eubiotus Leurus.

It has been argued that a new text, published during the war, concerned the governor Lucilius Priscillianus, but to the reviewer it seems to concern a Roman knight who was the father of the governor rather than the governor himself (*A. J. A.*, L [1946], p. 247).

Officials who because of wartime conditions were not recorded even in the addenda of *Achaia* II are: a *quaestor pro praetore* of the first century after Christ, C. Vettius Sabinus Granianus, in an Athenian inscription published by H. R. Inmerwahr, *Hesperia*, XI (1942), p. 348; an imperial procurator of the Julio-Claudian Period, Q. Granus Q. f. Bassus, in a Corinthian inscription published by O. Broneer, *Hesperia*, X (1941), p. 388; an imperial procurator from the end of the second or the beginning of the third century after Christ, C. Publicius C. f. Cam(ilia tribu) Proculeianus of Ravenna, in a Delphian inscription published by G. Daux, *B. C. H.*, LXIII (1939), pp. 179-181.

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Symbolae ad Jus et Historiam Antiquitatis Pertinentes Julio Christiano Van Oven Dedicatae. Edd. M. DAVID, B. A. VAN GRONINGEN, E. M. MEIJERS. Leiden, E. J. Brill, 1946. Pp. viii + 410; 4 pls.; frontispiece.

Professor van Oven is the distinguished teacher of Roman law at Leyden. The editors, Professors David, Van Groningen, and Meijers (Meyers), do not follow the common practice of publishing a bibliography of the writings of the scholar honored. I have elsewhere found references to his text-book of Roman law—several times mentioned in this volume. This was published in 1945 and is evidently a substantial book, since it has 527 pages. There is also a briefer *Survey* now in its third edition, which was apparently intended as an introduction to his lectures; and a book or pamphlet on *Ancient Law in the Near East* (1939) [cited here, p. 61, n. 119]. Then there is what may be only a short paper on the importance of studying Roman legal history published in Zwolle in 1942. These writings are all in Dutch and no one of them was available to me even by way of inter-library loan. If we may infer that his publications are less numerous than is often the case with men in his position, we must equally infer that his chief accomplishment lies in the field of teaching. He may well derive satisfaction from a career that has inspired his pupils, friends, and associates to prepare in his honor a book containing so many valuable studies as this *Festschrift*.

Professor van Oven, like such Romanists as Cuq and Koschaker, included ancient Babylonia and Egypt among the communities with whose law he was conversant. The first paper is a fairly general study by A. de Buck of literature and politics in the twelfth Egyptian dynasty, that of the Amenemhets; and the following three are on special points of Babylonian law by van Proosdij, Leemans, and Böhl. All the other contributions are on Greek and Roman law with the exception of the last three which deal with the Middle Ages and the Renaissance.

Only three of the papers are in Dutch, but even these have an English summary at the end. The rest are in French or English, a fact for which most of us will be grateful even if those who know English and German might with an occasional glimpse into the dictionary, be able to follow the trend of a Dutch essay. Occasional lapses in English idiom, or the entertaining spelling of "by" as "bij"—an obvious interposition of the printer—, may well be ignored in the case of scholars who have put themselves to such pains in order to be understood by their foreign colleagues.

With the exception of Professor Fritz Schulz whose highly important *History of Roman Legal Science* was issued by the Oxford Press at just about the same time as this book was published, the contributors are Dutch, mostly, but not all, from Leyden. If only the names of Professors Fernand de Visseker and M. David were already familiar to me, that must be ascribed to the interruption which the Nazi *Umbruch* and the war have caused to communication between Romanists.

The general level of the papers is extremely high. This volume will be a reference book for the students of the administration of Ptolemaic Egypt in the second and first centuries, because of Perelman's paper, "Sur la Titulature Antique en Égypte au II^e et I^e

Siècle avant J.-C.," pp. 129-159; and for the manuscripts of the *Collatio* which are described and discussed by Fritz Schulz (pp. 313-332). Three Greek Papyri are edited by A. Burkhs, E. Visser, and A. Leeman-de Ridder and an important Oxyrhynchus Papyrus (II, 237), the edict of Valerius Eudaimon, is reedited and translated with Preisigke's corrections, together with an extended discussion, by A. Monkman (pp. 190-226).

Since a *Festschrift* is inevitably a miscellany, I shall confine myself to brief comments on a few of the papers, selected more or less arbitrarily because of personal interest in the points advanced.

Monkman's discussion of the edict of Valerius Eudaimon is principally concerned with refuting the thesis of Collinet that it gives us a clue to the origin of the *querela non numeratae pecuniae*. In that he seems to me to have succeeded, but it would hardly seem necessary to insist on a specialized or localized sense for περιγραφή or ῥάδιονυγία. The former is the exact equivalent of *circumscripțio* and may be a translation of it. Nor is the Latin term by any means confined to overreaching minors (p. 204). In later Byzantine law, περιγραφή is the usual translation of *circumscripțio* in the Latin texts. (Cf. Bas., XI, 20 = D., 2, 14, 7 and 9; and Theophilus, I, 6, 3 [ed. Ferrini, p. 29], I, 8, 2 [ed. Ferrini, p. 37]). As for ῥάδιονυγία, it seems to be meant with περιγραφή to cover every kind of fraudulent evasion short of direct forgery, but very near it. The term is used by Galen, 14, 27 for adulteration of drugs and by Irenaeus, *Patr. Graec.*, VII, col. 437A for distortion or falsification of sacred texts. Both Galen and Irenaeus were approximately contemporary with Valerius. I find myself much inclined to accept Monkman's suggestion (p. 207, n. 39)—although he withdraws it almost at once—that it is the equivalent of *stellionatus*, which was the subsidiary or reserve criminal charge when no other accusation would cover the case (D., 47, 20, 3, 1) just as *dolus* was, in the case of civil injuries. *Stellionatus* was frequently associated with forgery (cf. Pfaff's article, *s. v.*, in Pauly-Wissowa-Kroll, *R.-E.* (1929), Second Ser. 3A, col. 2329) as ῥάδιονυγία is in the edict. It would not require us to assume that Roman criminal law was applied. The need of such subsidiary accusations must have been felt in all systems. In that case we should be able to correct Pfaff's statement (*loc. cit.*, col. 2330): *Im griechischen Strafrecht findet sich nichts was dem Stellionatus an der Seite zu stellen wäre.*

The Basilica (60, 30) have as their version of *stellionatus*, ἀγωγὴ κατὰ περιέργων καὶ κατατρόπων and the Index Coislianus has in the margin, ἀγωγὴ κατὰ περιέργων καὶ ποιούντων ἐπιθέσεις ητοι στελλιονάτους. The text of the Basilica consistently uses περιέργα, and makes clear its connection with impostures which involve the presentation of spurious or counterfeit evidence, and which do not come quite clearly within either *dolus* or the *crimen falsi*. ῥάδιονυγία is combined with δόλος in Polybius, XII, 9, 5 and XIII, 6, 4 as it is in the Basilica passage. Περιέργα might, to the frivolous, appear as a contamination of the two words in the Edict, but it is good *koine* for "magical arts" in a distinctly pejorative sense. Cf. Acts, 19, 19.

Monkman is quite right in noting (p. 205, n. 35) that accusations are heaped up for the sake of completeness. It is an error to require of lawyers or administrators the precision of mathematicians. They are quite prone to sow their *termini technici* with the sack and not with the hand.

Another interesting paper is that of P. J. Verdam, "St. Paul et un Serf Fugitif" (pp. 211-230), which is a discussion on the point of law involved in Paul's Epistle to Philemon. As is well known, the slave of Philemon, Onesimus, is returned by the apostle to his master with this letter. There is nothing really strange in the fact that Paul returns the slave. Not to have done so would have been theft at Roman law—and Paul was a Roman citizen. It was probably theft at Athenian law or else a crime of its own as at Andania for which we have an inscription of 92 B. C. (*I. G.*, V, 1, 1390, 83) which imposes the penalty of twice the value of the slave on any man who receives or takes care of a fugitive.

The letter is, as has often been pointed out, something like a commentary on Paul's—and doubtless the early Christian—view of slavery, as expressed particularly in I Cor. 7, 21-22, which sets forth the doctrine that the status of freedom or slavery was irrelevant to a Christian. This was also the Stoic view, just as the famous passage of Galat. III, 28 is almost a verbatim transfer of Stoic doctrine.

The problem of the runaway slave was frequently in the mind of Greeks (Plato, *Prot.* 310 C; Xen., *Cyr.*, I, 4, 13; *Mem.*, II, 10, 1; Theophrastus, *Char.*, 18). The punishment was usually flogging or chains to prevent renewed flight. It was almost taken to be a duty so to punish him. Paul entreats forgiveness by Philemon, as Pliny does in the affecting letter to Sabinianus on behalf of the latter's freedman (*Ep.*, IX, 21, 24). The resemblance between the two was noticed long ago by Grotius (p. 212, n. 5), but it by no means follows that Philemon is based on the letter of Pliny.

Verdam refers (p. 228, n. 91) to Weiss' article on *Sklaven* in Páuly-Wissowa (1927), 3A, 1, but not to the much fuller article by Westermann in the Supplement on *Sklaverei* (cols. 893-1068). This has the dimensions of a treatise and is much the fullest and most recent treatment of the whole subject. A good deal can be found in the article *servi* in Daremberg-Saglio, *Dict. des Ant.*, by Victor Chapot. It is noteworthy that this excellent reference book is unduly neglected by non-French scholars.

The highly interesting discussion by David of the "Treaties between Rome and Carthage" (pp. 231-250) raises so many points which will help in understanding the development of the *ius gentium* that a full examination of them would exceed the compass of the article itself. I should like merely to point out that *commercium* (pp. 239-240) is not necessarily a technical term of law but means just what it seems to mean and may well be used to describe the passage quoted from Polybius (III, 24, 12-13). De Visscher's analysis of noxality under the *lex Aquilia* (pp. 307-312) and Hermendorf's examination of the *legis actio sacramento* (pp. 269-284) deserve careful study. Of particular interest to historians of the common law is the essay of E. M. Meyers on "La Réalité et La Personnalité dans le Droit du Nord de la France et dans le Droit Anglais" (pp. 379-400). It affords a valuable supplement to Pollock and Maitland's account of the development of the common law of property, and confirms the fact, so often ignored, that the common law is the custom of Normandy, developed and expanded by Norman administrators in England (p. 395). It might interest readers of Professor Meyer's article to note that the terms "realty" and "personality" in the sense which, as he correctly shows, was developed in

the feudal France of the eleventh and twelfth centuries, still give the fundamental—and legally important—division of property throughout Canada, the United States, Hawaii, New Zealand, and Australia, countries beyond the imagination of the feudal seigneurs who established the distinction.

I have a special interest in J. M. Polak's admirable essay on "The Roman Conception of the Inviolability of the House" (pp. 251-268) by reason of a brief discussion of the point in an article on the famous doctrine that an Englishman's house is his castle (*Law: A Century of Progress*, II, pp. 423 ff.), an article which Mr. Polak does me the honor to cite at several points. The Roman law is here fully and accurately presented. I may suggest for *obvagulatio* (p. 258) my article in Pauly-Wissowa-Kroll. The famous *quaestio lance et licio* which, of course, qualifies the inviolability of the house, certainly has a religious and sacral basis despite the objections of Weiss which Polak properly rejects (p. 254, n. 18). The whole procedure may be Greek. Cf. the scholiast on Aristophanes' *Clouds*, 489, and Plato's *Laws*, XII, 7, 954A. The scholiast gives the same rationalizing explanation of the searcher's nakedness that we find in Gaius, III, 193, for the *lance*, but in Plato, the searcher must swear by the νόμοι μοι θεοί that he has reasonable ground for believing the stolen article to be present. These νόμοι μοι θεοί can hardly be other than the gods whom the violation of the house would have offended. Isaeus, VI, 42, *De Philoctemi Her.*, speaks of a νόμος for house-searching, which may be no more than the εθος of the scholiast.

The Roman law on the subject and its qualification in practice are given in the book of F. G. Struve, *Pax Domestica* (1713, pp. 5-12, 33-56). Osenbrüggen's study, *Der Hausfrieden*, was unavailable to me. It seems to have discussed the later German practice rather than the Roman law.

We may wish the eminent scholar whose name is attached to these studies many more years of fruitful research. The *Symbolae* might serve to strengthen among scholars of all sorts the sense of the need of international coöperation.

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RUDI THOMSEN. *The Italic Regions from Augustus to the Lombard Invasion*. Copenhagen, Glyndendalske Boghandel, 1947. Pp. 339; 7 pls.; map; 6 pp. Danish résumé. (*Classica et Mediaevalia, Dissertationes*, IV.)

The invitation to prepare a notice of this stately volume was both gratifying and embarrassing: for it recalled to mind a shrewd saying, that, in order satisfactorily to review a scientific publication, the reviewer should know either far more or far less than his author. There need, however, have been no illusions as to which horn of the dilemma has here been grasped: for Dr. Thomsen's theme, as conceived and "monographically" interpreted by him, is fresh territory, and has been exploited by him with all that perfection of philological and historical method which the scholarly world is accustomed to expect and to find in the products of Nordic colleagues.

Such a book is destined to be used as a tool rather than read as literature; notwithstanding, both Dr. Thomsen and his English-speaking counsellors deserve grateful recognition for the care devoted to assuring a readable presentation of the subject-matter; even though among the cultured public devoted to this general field of history there may be some readers who are still under the spell of the sonorous cadences of Edward Gibbon and the easy yet dignified flow of Thomas Hodgkin: a distinguished tradition of literary historical prose. In the delicate matter of adjectival usage, not all will feel that the best results have been uniformly attained; at the beginning of the title, in fact, we ourselves should have preferred to see the expression "The Regions of Italy."

The division of the Italian mainland, for administrative purposes, into eleven regions (Sicily and Sardinia being constituted as provinces) formed an important element in Augustus' reorganisation of the Roman world. Its essential features are embodied, in varying degrees and fashions, in four remarkable documents: Strabo, V and VI; Pomponius Mela, II, 58-72; Pliny, *N. H.*, III, 38-138; and Ptolemy, III, i. The reliability of the respective text traditions—which as a general question might properly have received fuller treatment in the book—is not weakened but on the contrary strengthened by the multitude of place-names and indications of distance or relative position which must have puzzled many a mediaeval scribe; for it is a recognized psychological principle that such words stimulate and focus the attention of the copyist, thus to some extent safeguarding the text tradition. Even when the scribe was forced, to despair of understanding the words before him, and simply to copy mechanically an obscure or defective reading, he would do so to the best of his ability without succumbing to the temptation so frequent in the tradition of literary authors—in the interest of what is known as a "readable text" (!)—to emend according to his lights. Hence—apart from a certain inevitable amount of corruption in the tradition of Ptolemy, where the Greek copyists had their own difficulties, and of fundamental, deeply-rooted inaccuracy in the same geographer's topographical data—a considerable degree of confidence may be accorded these lists of place-names with distances, in the form in which they have been transmitted. The question, however, of the manner in which these lists were compiled, and their relation to the official tables prepared by Augustus and Agrippa, is engrossing and not altogether simple: the original lists of names appear to have been distinct from the regional divisions (it is thus that Pliny, *N. H.*, III, 46: *auctorem nos à vnum Augustum secuturos, discriptionemque ab eo factam*, is here interpreted); and then the use of a *periplus* in conjunction with the alphabetical lists of towns and tribes largely in the interior frequently resulted in an arrangement the reason for which must be sought in order that it may be fully understood. And on occasion the Augustan boundaries appear to fade and to make way for other groupings, some of them due to physical and social conditions, others suggestive of early tribal organisations; whereas again, many secondary boundaries are intelligible in the light of ecclesiastical and modern usage. Thus the chronological limitations embodied in the title should not be allowed to obscure the existence

of a vaster background of economically and socially ordered relations within this historic land, upon which the Augustan regions were imposed.

In the subsequent periods, other documents become available, notably the hitherto puzzling *Liber Coloniарum*, which now appears in a fresh light. *Pari passu* with the progressive encroachments of the central imperial administration, the privileged position of Italy changed to a status indistinguishable from that of the provinces, with which it was in fact eventually equated in nomenclature. Finally, in A.D. 568 and the following years, the Lombard invasion brought a millennial cycle of administration and culture to an end.

The first part of the volume, "The Augustan Regions," comprises three chapters devoted respectively to the Augustan Town-Lists according to Pliny; Ptolemy and the Italic Tribes; and Pliny's Regional Description and the Extent of the Individual Regions. The second part, covering the post-Augustan Administrative Districts, likewise has three chapters: The Period up to Italy's Final Provincialization; The Italic Provinces according to Inscriptions, Imperial Constitutions, Provincial Lists, etc.; The *Liber Coloniарum* and the Italic Provinces. The "Final Conclusion" puts in their proper setting the "*iuridicus* districts" introduced under Marcus Aurelius, the *urbica dioecesis*—with which question is involved the significance of the hundred-mile area about the Capital,—, and the *dioecesis Italicana* of Diocletian; and it closes with the following words:

... Augustus's regional frontiers coincided with so distinct (*sic!*) natural division lines that many of them remained political frontiers even after the Lombard invasion.

The boundaries fixed by Augustus mainly separated old Italic tribal territories. Thus the Italic tribes have put their stamp on the map of Italy for several centuries after they had lost their political importance, and accordingly the division into districts of ancient Italy represents a continuity not only through nearly six hundred, but through more than one thousand years. Actually that continuity is not yet extinct; this very day the frontiers of the ecclesiastical as well as of the political districts of Italy in many cases follow the division lines fixed by Augustus.

Regarding the related matter of the smaller administrative units and their boundaries, with the methods available for tracing these, mention may now be added of Dottoressa Luisa Banti's recent monographs on Luni (Florence, Istituto di Studi Etruschi, 1937), Pisae (*Memorie* of the Pontifical Roman Academy of Archaeology, VI, iv, 1943), and Perusia (*Studi Etruschi*, X [1936], pp. 97-127).

Many of these place-names of Italy are fraught with historical, literary, and cultural associations; some of them assumed a sudden and tragic import during the military operations of so short a time ago. The value of the present publication to all scholars concerned with ancient and also later Italy—and who is not?—will be clear. Here only a few of the offshoots from the general theme may be chosen for special notice. Pp. 120-3: The Younger Pliny's (*Ep.*, III, 4, 2; IV, 1, 3 f.; 6, 1; V, 6, 1 f., 45; 18, 2; IX, 15, 1; 36, 1; 40, 1) consistent mention of his villa near Tifernum Tiberinum as *Tusci* leads to the conclusion that it was only for its lower reaches that the

Tiber served as a regional boundary; in its upper course, the territory of certain towns extended across the full width of the valley; and ethnically Umbrian Tifernum, being one of these, was included not in Region VI but in VII. Pp. 151 f.: The country about Rome eventually received the name *Campagna* because of the spread of the term *Campania*, at the expense of *Latium*, to include the northern as well as the southern part of Region I; a somewhat similar destiny was in store for *Calabria*, which designation was transferred *in toto* from one side to the other of the peninsula.

P. 23: More attention, and perhaps a slightly different interpretation, might have been given to a secondary matter, showing the reverse process to that which we have observed in the case of Tifernum Tiberinum, and to the Elder Pliny's inclusion of Eburum, a town situated to the north of the river Silarus, normally the boundary between Reg. I, *Latium et Campania*, and Reg. III, *Lucania et Bruttii*, in the latter region: Pliny's account of the Salerno area started under difficulty owing to the circumstance that the *periplus* marked the division line,—quite properly from the navigator's angle,—at the *Promunturium Minervae*; and he was led to include in the territory of Salernum the sanctuary of Argive Juno, which is now known from excavations to have lain on the Lucanian side of the Silarus (see Jean Bérard, *Mélanges d'Archéol. et d'Hist.*, LVII [1940], pp. 7-31). The shrine lay within the boundaries of Posidonia, the colonists of which city imposed their sanctuary upon a primitive, indigenous cult center. But by Pliny's time, Paestum had sunk into insignificance and Salernum apparently was flourishing. There is a tendency for the strong to absorb the possessions of the weak. However, by the years A. D. 323-6 Salernum itself belonged to *Lucania et Bruttii* (pp. 203 f.).

Some will lay down this book with a strengthened respect for the achievement of the Elder Pliny, for it is no small matter to have transmitted to posterity the fullest account of Augustan Italy. Many who in their younger years adopted toward the old Admiral a patronizing or condescending attitude have ended by feeling genuine respect for his contribution to knowledge, and, in view of the law of nature that for every result there must be a corresponding cause, have been inclined to follow his nephew's judgment in attributing to him not only *instantia*, *vigilantia*, and *incredibile studium*, but *acre ingenium* as well. However that may be, the sympathetic figure of the stout-hearted servant of the Emperor and the State, who sacrificed his life in the interests of his friends and of science, will always be associated in honorable fashion with the administrative system which has been so well illumined by Dr. Thomsen.

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CARLO ANTI. Teatri Greci Arcaici da Minosse a Pericle. Padua, "Le Tre Venezie," 1947. Cinque ricostruzioni di I. Gismondi. Pp. 337; 81 figs.; 8 pls. 3000 Lire.

This book deals with theaters in the Greek sense, the room for the gathering of people for seeing (*θεᾶσθαι, θέατρον*) any kind of performance, be this religious, agonistic, political, or dramatic; thus with what the Romans and we, laying more emphasis on hearing (*audire*) than seeing, call auditoria. The main thesis of Anti is that Dörpfeld and all scholars following him are wrong when they believe that the Greek auditorium and the Greek orchestra, the area for dancing (*δρόχεῖσθαι*), were originally round. He asserts that the oldest theaters and all orchestras before the fourth century B. C. were either square or trapezoidal, and that there is a continuous tradition from the theatrical areas of Phaistos and Knossos (pp. 27 ff., Pl. I) with their straight steps for the audience to the archaic and early classical theaters of Athens (pp. 55 ff., Pl. II) and Syracuse (pp. 85 ff., Pls. III-IV, VII). Anti and Gismondi reconstruct also the Lenaion theater, in which comedy was originally performed and in which most of the plays of Aristophanes were given, as a square area with only one grandstand (*iκρωα*) for about 2000 persons (pp. 202 ff., Pl. V). One of the most interesting parts of his book is the chapter in which he shows how the situation of the Lenaion near the sanctuary of Dionysus in the marshes (*λιμναῖ*) on the slope of the Pnyx agrees with many allusions to the surroundings in most of the plays of Aristophanes (pp. 219 ff.). The *Frogs* for example are those which live in the marshes of the Sanctuary of Dionysus in Limnais.

Another interesting chapter is the one in which Anti shows that the model for the classical paraskenion theater was the palace of the tyrants of the VIth century, like those of the Peisistratides in Athens or the Kypselides of Corinth, who still lived in their anaktora in the period when the drama took shape. Unfortunately their residences are not preserved. But we know the anaktoron of Larissa on the Hermos, recently excavated and reconstructed by K. Schefold and Mayer Plath (pp. 259 ff., Fig. 67 and Pl. VI). It was built about 570-550 and has the form of the old oriental hilani, that is a broad house with a porticus in front between two towerlike side buildings. The center decorated by a colonnade could represent a temple or it could represent a palace or a house flanked by two more modest ones. For the *Frogs*, for example, the center could represent the palace of Pluto, the side buildings the house of Herakles and the house of the innkeeper. This practical form was built in stone in the time of Euripides, and it agrees with such pictures as the crater in Paris with the representation of the *Iphigenia in Tauris* and the Tarantine fragments in Würzburg (pp. 264-5, Figs. 68-69).

The reviewer agrees with most of the theories of Anti. The tradition of the Cretan-Mycenean auditorium adds one more proof to the fact that many elements of the pre-Greek civilization have come down in direct tradition to the Greeks and have helped to build up the archaic and classical civilization. The assumption that the auditorium in Athens was still straight in the fifth century is borne out by the fact that the water channel in the east was in a straight line,

which when continued and paralleled on the west side with a similar line gives a trapezoidal form to the border line between the auditorium and the orchestra. There are, furthermore, straight stones, later used to cover this channel, with inscriptions showing them to be for a proedrie. When the proedrie in stone was straight, it is certain that the wooden seats were also straight, as it is more difficult to build rounded grandstands in wood than one rounded row of seats in stone. That the Greek theater building of the Hellenistic period had some relation to the old Oriental hilani house I have already asserted in my *History of the Greek and Roman Theater*, quoted by Anti (p. 282). If indeed the paraskenion theater of the classical time was derived from the same form, then there is a welcome connection and continuity also between the classical and Hellenistic scene building.

There are, however, some points in which I disagree with Anti. He dates the rounded orchestra too late, in my opinion. The sustaining wall of the orchestra terrace in Athens forms even in the sixth century the segment of a large circle (Pl. II), and although we do not believe any longer with Dörpfeld that this was the orchestra itself but that the dancing area was smaller inside this terrace, the form is such a clear suggestion for a full circle that I do not think the Athenians waited until the time of Lycurgus to adopt it for the whole area. I do not see why it should be easier to arrange a round chorus in a square place than to arrange a square chorus in a round place (see p. 41). Madame Sikilianos certainly arranged beautiful square schemes when she produced the *Suppliants* of Aeschylus in the year 1930 in the round orchestra of Delphi. There is no reason to assume that the younger Polycleitus was the first to build a round orchestra in Epidaurus in about 360 B. C. and that Athens imitated it 20 to 30 years later.

On the other hand I believe that Anti dates the stone skene too early. Only the breccia foundations of the scene building in Athens were probably laid in the time of Euripides. On them was built a wooden temporary scaffolding with painted screens. There was not yet a stereotyped tragedy and comedy in the later fifth century. Aristophanes, who performed at least his fantastic plays *Clouds*, *Peace*, and *Birds* in the theater of Dionysus Eleuthereus, needed very different backgrounds for these comedies. Not before the followers of Euripides had given a stereotyped form to tragedy was the stone scene building erected, in the time of Alexander the Great. I refuse to believe with Anti that scene painting, invented by Agatharchus for Sophocles and the old Aeschylus, was already discarded in the time of Euripides to be replaced by a permanent stone background (p. 303). I believe that the painted screens were not discarded before the period of the Romans whose taste is reflected in Vitruvius' story (VII, 5, 5) of the mathematician Lycimnius: when he criticized the scenery painted by Apaturius as untrue, it was removed. The large canvasses were later replaced, in the east, by smaller paintings between the proskenion columns and inside the large thyromata, but in Athens not before the late Hellenistic period.

The book thus is full of interesting and challenging observations, and the main thesis is convincing and fruitful.

Small corrections for the bibliographies on pp. 82, 106, 139, 215, 282: All proper names and adjectives derived from them are capitalized in English, thus Greek, Aeschylean, Athenian, Argive, American, Roman. The first word of a title is capitalized in German and in English, thus: *Das griechische Theater in Syrakus. Athenische Mitteilungen. Antike Rathäuser. A topographical Dictionary.*

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Observations on ch. VII: "Theatral Structures of the Athenian Agora" and ch. IX: "Origin of the Skene with Paraskenia."

In chapter VII Anti deals with two theatrical establishments that have been intimately associated with the Agora of Athens: the Orchestra and an Odeion, distinct, according to Anti, from the Odeia of Pericles and of Herodes. His eventual conclusion is that neither Orchestra nor Odeion lay within the market square proper but that both are to be sought alongside the road that led from the southwest corner of the square around the west end of the Areopagus. The Odeion, therefore, according to Anti, is not to be identified with the covered theatre of the Augustan period brought to light by the American excavations in the middle of the square; of the real "Odeion of the Agora" he believes, indeed, that no remains exist. As a site for the Orchestra he would suggest tentatively an enclosure to the south of the Tholos hitherto designated on plans of the Agora simply as a building of the Greek period.

It should be pointed out, in the first place, that the area to the southwest of the Agora proper and to the west of the Areopagus has now been almost completely explored, yet no trace of an *odeion* has appeared nor is it likely that any such could longer escape detection in this region.

The author's choice of site for the Orchestra is no happier, for the enclosure to the south of the Tholos proves to contain a series of rooms around a small courtyard and could not possibly have served the purposes of the Orchestra.

Anti, in fact, is tilting at windmills. There need no longer be any doubt that the building of which ample remains have been found in the middle of the square is the "Odeion of the Agora," i. e., the Odeion mentioned by Pausanias (I, 8, 6), and there is good reason to believe that the Orchestra had been an open area near the middle of the square, part of which was probably overlaid by the Odeion in the time of Augustus (*Hesperia*, XVI [1947], pp. 200 ff.). The placing of the Odeion may, indeed, have been suggested by the memory of the existence of the old Orchestra at this spot.

The secure identification of these two monuments depends on the proper interpretation of Pausanias' account of his passage through the Agora. Such an interpretation is now possible, thanks to the evidence provided by the current excavations part of which was not yet available at the time of Anti's writing, part of which was dis-

regarded by Anti. (See the restored plan of the Agora in *Hesperia*, XVI [1947], pl. 49.)

The cardinal error in Anti's routeing of Pausanias lies in his belief that the periegete, after viewing the Tholos, left the square proper and followed the road around the west end of the Areopagus; whereas it is now abundantly clear that Pausanias, having completed his review of the buildings of the west side of the square from north to south, turned round and started north again, mentioning in succession the Eponymous Heroes, a series of outstanding statues (Amphiaraus, Eirene and Ploutos, Lycurgos, Kallias, Demosthenes), the temple of Ares and several statues in its neighbourhood. Then he swung south once more to note the Tyrannicides, to look into the Odeion, to pause by the Enneakrounos and the temples of the Eleusinian divinities above it. Soon thereafter he found himself at the Temple of Hephaistos, i. e., the so-called Theseum, on the top of Kolonos Agoraios and from there descended by the Sanctuary of Aphrodite Ourania to the northwest corner of the square once more. After covering the Stoa Poikile, which undoubtedly closed part of the north side of the square, he would seem to have resumed his progress on the Panathenaic Way, leaving the square at its southeast corner. He could scarcely have covered the site in a more logical way.

A key point in fixing the above itinerary is the altar of the Twelve Gods. The placing of the altar at a point near the northwest corner of the square was made probable by the discovery *in situ* in 1934 of a dedication to the Twelve Gods by Leagros (*Hesperia*, IV [1935], pp. 355 ff.), and was put beyond shadow of doubt when in 1946 fragments of an archaic altar of poros were found within the enclosure alongside which Leagros had placed his dedication (*Hesperia*, XVI [1947], pp. 198 f.). Thus we have two securely fixed points: the Tholos to the south, the altar to the north.

The identification of the Temple of Ares may now also be taken as securely established, inasmuch as Pausanias (I, 8, 4) mentions in the neighbourhood of that temple the statue of Demosthenes which by Plutarch in his *Life of Demosthenes*. (*Vit. X Orat.*, p. 847 A) is placed by reference to the altar of the Twelve Gods.

Between his mention of the Temple of Ares and of the Odeion, Pausanias noted the statues of the Tyrannicides, and in fact the current excavations have brought to light a fragment of the inscribed base of one of the two groups of statues between the buildings now labelled on Agora plans as the Temple of Ares and the Odeion (*Hesperia*, VI [1937], p. 352). It would, therefore, be flying in the face of all probability to doubt that the roofed theatre found in the middle of the square is other than the Odeion mentioned by Pausanias.

The statues of the Tyrannicides, which are known from the lexicographers to have stood by the Orchestra, are placed by Arrian (*Anabasis*, III, 1, 6, 8) "opposite the Metroon where we go up to the Acropolis." The place of finding of the inscribed fragment of the base, as also the Odeion, lie midway between the Metroon and the Panathenaic Way, the shortest route from Agora to Acropolis. Once more, therefore, the unprejudiced observer will scarcely doubt that the Orchestra lay in the area later occupied by the Odeion.

In chapter IX Anti includes among the progenitors of the skene with paraskenia the Stoa of Zeus in the Athenian Agora. In this connection he proposes a radical alteration in the restoration of the building; the fronts of the projecting wings, he suggests, were closed by walls, leaving an open colonnade only in the mid part of the front of the building (Fig. 73). There are, however, serious objections to such a restoration, only one of which need be mentioned here. The plan of the building in its actual state (*Hesperia*, VI [1937], pls. I and II) shows that in the course of centuries the space between the wings in front of the central part of the façade was completely filled with large monuments which must have rendered access to the building through the central colonnade both difficult and undignified. The space in front of the wings, on the other hand, was kept scrupulously clear of monuments, a fact which can be explained best on the assumption that the fronts of these wings were open colonnades.

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J. SVENNUNG. Compositions Lucenses. Studien zum Inhalt, zur Textkritik und Sprache. Uppsala, Lundequistska Bokhandeln; Leipzig, O. Harrassowitz, 1941. Pp. x + 204. 6 Kr. (*Uppsala Universitets Årsskrift*, 1941, No. 5.)

How long will Scandinavian scholars continue to write in German? Scholarship, it is said, overleaps tribe and nation; if so, a man's mother tongue is good enough; or, if he wants a wider public, then a language which has a poor claim to international use is not. No scholar is likely to resort to that final weakness of the fainthearted, a manufactured language. And there is always Latin itself.

This protest made—not for the first time—I turn to Svennung's workmanlike monograph. Svennung is a specialist in Latin writers on technical subjects. The fragmentary collection of recipes and rules contained in *Cod. Lucensis 490* (written ca. 800), fols. 217-231, to which Svennung adds a brief hitherto unidentified fragment on fol. 211v., is concerned chiefly with metal-working, dyeing, mineralogy, mosaics, and the like. It is, as Svennung says, without parallel in the older Latin authors, with the exception of items in *H. N.* (but a verb has dropped out of Svennung's German after Plinius, p. 1). There is in this monograph, besides the text of the new fragment (with translation—into German, as if scholars knew no Latin—and critical commentary), first the routine discussion of content and subject matter, date and provenance of the manuscript (the evidence is not really strong enough for North Italy, p. 16); an enquiry into sources (ultimately Greek, p. 10, but who taught the Greeks?); an enumeration of a few Keltic and Germanic words that have got into the text (how?); a description of the scripts, style (especially the blundering rubrics)—the entire manuscript appears to be the product of a sort of composite copy-book; of the state of the text,

and of its relationship to later compilations; and finally an account of previous editions and discussions. Then follow (ch. 3, pp. 29-99) "Bemerkungen zum Inhalt" and "Textkritik."

But the most valuable, and by far the most interesting chapters (4 and 5, pp. 100-174, 175-184) are those devoted to a thorough-going consideration of the linguistic peculiarities of this late Latin text and to the etymology of *mosaic*. Here again Svennung is an expert, who knows what he is talking about. It is the merit of the book to demonstrate once more—what ought not to be and would not be necessary, if "scholarship" did not lure so many incompetent botchers beneath its cotton-wool protection from a cold and hard world—that the prime (and final) requirement of a would-be editor, first, last, and all the time, is a complete and accurate knowledge of the language of his text and of the history of it at the date at which the text was compiled. Again and again there are forms here which ninety-nine editors out of a hundred would gaily "emend." Take *si rada uenerint* (p. 112) which appears in the "Mappae clauicula" text with *rara*. But *rada* (Svennung, p. 112) is right; Ital. *rado*, Sp. *rado*, *ralo* from L. *rarus*. Svennung calls this dissimilation (cf. Ital. *porfido*, *porfiro*). He is partly right. Svennung wrote in *Eranos*, XXXIII, p. 24, an account of *r* from *d*, and to Leumann's discussion of *crudus* (: *cruor*), which he cites, he should add Mezger's *K. Z.*, LXII, p. 22. But there is no dissimilation in *caduceus* from *καρύκευον*, or in Neapolitan *pere* "pedem," or, I warrant, Neap. *rurece* "duodecim." The alternation of *r*:*d*, and also *l*:*d*, is something that needs still further investigation, despite the attention already devoted to it, e. g., by Brück, *Z. f. R. Ph.*, LV (1935), pp. 125-154, by Rohlfis, *Germ.-Rom. Monatsschr.*, XVIII (1930), pp. 41-48, and by Bottiglioni, *Third Internat. Congr. of Phonetic Sciences*, 1938 [1939], pp. 288-289. The change appears to operate both ways, and while it is prominent in South Italian and Sicilian dialects, a related process there (Bov., Otr. *άρδο* *ἄλλος*) is comparable to the Umbr. *d* from intervocalic *r*, Vedic *l* from *d*, possibly even to O. L. *r* from *d* before *u* and *f*. The fundamental problem concerns the substitution of liquids for a voiced dental or post-dental stop or spirant and the reverse.

This example must suffice to show the importance of Svennung's work, which is, in short, something that no student of late Latin can afford to neglect. His explanation of *mosaic* is a gem. The word started (like *nymphæum*) as *musuem*, a natural grotto, the haunt of the muses. Next an artificial grotto took this name; then the multicolored decoration that ornaments—or disfigures—such places; and finally, as a technical term, *opus musivum* (later *mosaicum*) emerges. The guess of Gauckler (Daremberg-Saglio), Hebr. *maskith* (an Arabic word is propounded in Wachsmuth's *Lexikon der Baukunst*) was a mare's nest; like *Macedon* and *Monmouth* nothing more to it than the unprofitable fact that they all begin with *m* (so does mare's nest).

On vocalic assimilation (p. 106) cf. Bassett's Harvard dissertation (*H. S. C. P.*, LIII [1942], pp. 171-174). In *fumice*, *ibid.*, where Svennung quotes Logudor. *pedra fumiga*, popular etymology (*fumus*) may have been at work. The change *ur* to *gr* (p. 108) has a Keltic

(Brythonic) flavor; Welsh has *gwr-* from Indo-European *ur-*, but in spoken Welsh the *w* is apt to disappear (Pedersen-Lewis, *Concise Comparative Grammar*, p. 11). On p. 110 Svennung (quoting Sommer, p. 258) gives *susu* "schon 180 n. Chr.", but Sommer himself quotes *susouorsum* and *controuosius* from the Sent. Minuc. of 117 B. C. Hellenistic Greek *-is*, *-iv* for *-os*, *-ov* (p. 124) is, *pace* Svennung, inexplicable as a Greek change. Insomuch as it turns up in borrowed words (cf. Mod. *σπίτιν[η]* i. e. *hospitium*) and in proper names, *Αἰρῆλις* (four times in *I. G.*, XII, according to *T. L. L.*, II, 1482, 63), *Ιανονάρις*, one suspects that it is a dialectal (Oscan) or rustic Latin pronunciation that invaded the Greek of Magna Graecia and then spread into Hellenistic Greek at large. A really noteworthy form (p. 147) is *svventium* (from *subinde*), Fr. *souvent*, Ital. *sovente*.

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FRITZ WEHRLI. Die Schule des Aristoteles. Texte und Kommentar.
Basel, Benno Schwabe & Co. Heft I: Dikaiarchos, 1944. Pp. 80. Heft II: Aristoxenos, 1945. Pp. 88.

These are the first two fascicles of a series in which Professor Wehrli intends to collect and to publish with accompanying commentary the remains of the Peripatetic writings of the 4th, 3rd, and 2nd centuries B. C., the works of Aristotle himself and of Theophrastus not included. By "the remains of the Peripatetic writings" is apparently meant the fragmentary remains in the strictest sense, since in the fascicle devoted to Aristoxenus Wehrli does not print the extensive *Harmonica* or the *Rhythmic Fragments* but for these refers the reader to the publications of Marquard, Westphal, and Ruelle.¹ Furthermore Wehrli avowedly restricts his collection to passages that are guaranteed by explicit citation,² a properly conservative procedure to employ but one which might have been supplemented to the great advantage of further research by the addition of a list of those passages which, though not thus guaranteed, have nevertheless been ascribed by different scholars to the Peripatetic in question. It is still possible to make up this deficiency by compiling such lists for all the Peripatetics in an appendix to the series; and it is to be hoped that Wehrli will consider some such means of increasing the utility of his collection, just as it is to be hoped that he will repair the lack of the *index locorum* that might reasonably be expected in each fascicle, since each is represented as an independent publication,

¹ It is remarkable that Wehrli does not mention in this connection the later edition, translation, and commentary of the *Harmonics* by H. S. Macran (Oxford, 1902) or the book by C. F. A. Williams, *The Aristoxenian Theory of Musical Rhythm* (Cambridge, 1911).

² Some exceptions to this rule are allowed. For example, he prints as frag. 30 of Aristoxenus the story told of Archytas in Lamblichus, *De Vita Pythag.*, 197, in this agreeing with Wyttensbach as had Müller, *F. H. G.*, II, p. 273.

by a general *index locorum* and possibly an index of special terms or topics for the whole series.

The two fascicles already published contain fewer than a dozen fragments, more than half of which are mutilated sentences from the papyri of Herculaneum,³ that had not already been collected by Müller in volume II of his *Fragmenta Historicorum Graecorum*. Those fragments which Müller printed or to which he referred, however, Wehrli in many cases prints at greater length; and this is an improvement, even if at times Wehrli may be mistaken in claiming for Dicaearchus or Aristoxenus as much of the context of these passages as he does.⁴ His arrangement of the fragments is quite different from Müller's. Many of the fragments of Dicaearchus and Aristoxenus cannot with any degree of certainty be assigned to a definite writing; and Wehrli, frankly recognizing this, often employs a general rubric under which are grouped fragments that may have come from several different works of a similar nature. So in the case of Dicaearchus, for example, he does not presume to assign each biographical fragment to a separate "life" but collects them without distinction under the heading, "Ueber Lebensformen, Biographien," although he inclines to the belief that there were independent monographs on Pythagoras, the Seven Sages, Plato, and Socrates. He argues convincingly (I, pp. 75 f.) against the existence of an independent work, *καταμετρήσεις τῶν ἐν Πελοποννήσῳ ὁρῶν* (cf. Suidas, s. v. Δικαίαρχος); and in the case of Aristoxenus, although he collects under the rubric, "Seelenlehre," the references to Aristoxenus' remarks on the soul, he properly points out (II, pp. 84 f.) that there is no necessity for assuming that there was a separate book on this subject, since what evidence there is indicates rather that the comparison of soul with tone as the function of the lyre occurred in other, e. g. pedagogical, contexts.⁵

³ In Heft I: *Dikaiarchos*, p. 50 Wehrli properly rejects Mekler's arbitrary "restoration" in *Acad. Philos. Index Hercul.*, p. 22, col. V: [καθά Δικαίαρχος ἐν τῇ βίων φιλοσόφων ἡ] and with it the "evidence" for a "Life of Aristotle" by Dicaearchus.

⁴ For example, of Diogenes Laertius, III, 4 Wehrli prints *καὶ ἐπαιδεύθη μὲν γράμματα παρὰ Διονυσίῳ καὶ μημονεύει ἐν τοῖς Ἀντερασταῖς* as part of the fragment of Dicaearchus (frag. 40 = 24, Müller) and states (I, p. 54) that "Die Zusammengehörigkeit der bei Diogenes Laert. fr. 40 durch andere Zitate getrennten Stellen wird durch den Parallelbericht bei Apuleius *De Platone* I 2 bewiesen." If true, this would mean that Dicaearchus knew the *Anterastae* and took it to be authentic. The clause, *οὐ καὶ μημονεύει ἐν τοῖς Ἀντερασταῖς*, however, is not represented in Apuleius' version, the intermediate remarks concerning the origin of the name, Plato, which Diogenes Laertius ascribes to Alexander being absent also, and so probably does not come from Dicaearchus.

⁵ Wehrli takes *Schol. Platon. Phædo* 108 D (... ἐν τῷ περὶ τῆς μουσικῆς ἀκροάσεως ...) as evidence of a separate work of Aristoxenus entitled *Μουσικὴ Ἀκρόασις*, "eine für den Schulgebrauch bestimmte Schrift, die von Περὶ μουσικῆς zu unterscheiden ist" (II, p. 77 on frag. 90). Müller (frag. 77) also assumed that the reference is to a separate work, but he entitled it *περὶ τῆς μουσικῆς ἀκροάσεως*, which is strictly what the scholium says and which would have to mean not "Musical Lecture" but "On Listening to Music." The scholiast's phrase is highly suspicious, however; cf. Diels, *Doxographi Graeci*, p. 340 on Stobaeus, *Ecl.*, I, 23, 1, ἐν τοῖς περὶ τῆς φυσικῆς ἀκροάσεως: "περὶ ante φυσικῆς ἀκροάσεως otiosum

Such matters as the arrangement and ascription of the fragments are defended in the commentary which accounts for more than half of each fascicle and in which are discussed the implications of the fragments, the probable nature and scope of the works from which they were drawn or to which they refer, and the light which they cast upon the attitude and activity of Dicaearchus and Aristoxenus. This commentary is intelligently and soberly written and displays a healthy freedom from that tendency to which so many modern interpreters of ancient fragments are disposed, the tendency to erect for their authors extensive systems upon a few broken foundations filled out by elaborate but precarious hypotheses. The two fascicles under review are an auspicious beginning of a collection which will be of great service to scholarship and which all scholars of Greek and Roman thought will hope to see completed without undue delay.⁶

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Corpus Hermeticum, Traité I-XVIII. Texte établi par A. D. NOCK ; traduit par A.-J. FESTUGIÈRE. Paris, Société d'Édition "Les Belles Lettres," 1945. Pp. liv + 495.

Admired by Lactantius as well as by Julianus the Apostate, the revelations and doctrines ascribed to Hermes Thrice-Great have found, at long last, a perfect editor and an admirable translator. The *Hermetica* were edited twenty years ago, with English translation and copious notes, by the late W. Scott. Unfortunately, he profoundly altered the transmitted text, trying to improve upon it for the sake of common sense. But this rare commodity is conspicuously absent in the work of ancient theosophists. Our manuscripts of eighteen Greek treatises go back, as common *lacunae* show, to a Byzantine archetype, and the critical comparison of principal copies makes it possible to give a reliable text of the Hermetic corpus. A. D. Nock has established the text and furnished the introduction dealing with the textual criticism. He, too, prefaced the discourse *Asclepius*, a Latin translation of a lost Hermetic work. A.-J. Festugière gives us a French translation of the *Hermetica*, with notes and analyses which facilitate the understanding of this pagan theology. It is needless to say that the common work is marked by that comprehensive and yet neat and well ordered learning with which the names of Nock and Festugière are associated. Festugière even succeeds in making these rather abstruse writings

inferioris aetatis scriptori condonabis." It should be observed that in the text of the most recent edition of the scholium (*Scholia Platonica* . . . edidit W. C. Greene, American Philological Association, Haverford, 1938) there is no trace of *ἐν τῷ* before *τεπλ.* Certainly this is tenuous evidence for a "Lehrschrift" distinct from *Ηερμ. μονακής*.

⁶ I have observed scarcely any misprints that need cause a reader trouble. In fascicle I, p. 46, line 18 the reference 477 B 27 should be 407 B 27; and in fascicle II, p. 75, line 5 from the bottom of the page "Apelt" is presumably a *lapsus calami* for "Abert."

readable in French. It would be impertinent for one who is only a casual reader of *Hermetica* to plunge into discussion of the variants chosen by Nock throughout some twenty years of work. A cursory comparison of some portions of the text with the apparatus criticus has convinced me of the soundness of his critical judgment. But, as John Chrysostom says somewhere, *τελείου τὸ μὴ νομίζειν ἑαυτὸν τέλειον εἶναι*. In reading the new edition I became sometimes suspicious that the editor has not been, perhaps, sufficiently discriminating in regard to Christian interpolations. Since the Church Fathers and Byzantine scholars praised Trismegistus as precursor of the Christian doctrine, they could hardly fail to enrich his discourses with corrections consonant with the dogmas of faith. I quote but one passage (I, 6, p. 8), where my attention was arrested by a grammatical error: λόγος Κυρίου. In correct Greek, such as used by the Hermetic author (the so-called "Poimandres"), the article is wanted in the quoted clause. For brevity's sake, I now reproduce the text, marking Christian interpolations: τὸ φῶς ἐκεῖνο, ἔφη, ἐγὼ Νοῦς, ὁ σὸς θεός, ὁ πρὸ φύσεως ὑγρᾶς τῆς ἐκ σκότου φανείσης· ὁ δὲ ἐκ Νοῦς φωτεινὸς λόγος [ὑὸς θεοῦ]—τί οὖν; φημι.—Οὗτῳ γνῶθι· τὸ ἐν σοὶ βλέπον καὶ ἀκούν τὸν λόγον [Κυρίου, ὁ δὲ Νοῦς πατὴρ θεός], οὐ γὰρ δύσταται ἀπ' ἀλλήλων· ἔνωσις γὰρ τοιτῶν ἐστὶν η̄ ζωή. The elimination of this interpolation is of importance since that is the sole passage, I suppose, in the Greek pagan works, where the barbarism of the LXX translators, to wit the title *Kύρος* used without the article as a personal name, has been found. Cf. C. H. Dodd, *The Bible and the Greeks* (1935), p. 11.

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N. P. TOLL. The Excavations at Dura-Europos. Preliminary Report of the Ninth Season of Work, 1935-1936, Part II: The Necropolis. New Haven, Yale Univ. Press; London, Geoffrey Cumberlege, Oxford Univ. Press, 1946. Pp. viii + 150; 52 figs.; 65 pls. \$5.00.

The important excavations at Dura-Europos, the royal Seleucid colony, continue to be promptly published. This is the ninth volume since the excavation started in 1928. It is the second part of the report, the first part of which was reviewed in *A. J. P.*, LXVI (1945), pp. 430-433. It includes only the Necropolis and not the Palace of the Dux, as was previously announced. There is no index, no list of figures, which have no captions and are often printed far from the place of their description (for example, no. 3, p. 45 is figured on p. 107; no. 5, p. 45 on p. 108). Many of the plates (XXVI-XXXIII, LXII-LXV, etc.) lack any caption. Most have only the tomb number and not the number of the object illustrated. The chapters are labelled Introduction, Description of Tombs and Finds, Analytical Inventory, Chronology, Tower Tombs.

To the study of burial customs (300 B. C. to 256 A. D.) the book makes a real contribution. Single burials are common not only in the Necropolis but in the city. Cremation of the dead was little known

and probably came with the Roman legions. Only three jars containing cremated bones were found in all the excavated area. The predominant type of burial monument was the catacomb. Mr. Toll makes nine groups and on page 23 gives a table with relative chronology. The small subterranean chamber with *klinai* along its three walls, a type known in Phoenicia and Palestine as early as 1000 B. C., was adopted at Dura, perhaps because it was the nearest parallel to the Macedonian *kline* tomb. By 200 B. C. it was transformed into a loculus tomb.

The Macedonian and Olynthian influence is strong, as I pointed out in my previous review mentioned above. The high temperature and the rain water penetrating through the dromos have been unfavorable to the preservation of skeletons and furniture. As at Clythus, the skeletons had often disappeared or the bones turned to dust. The wood of the coffins had become a dark brown powder. Textiles had completely disappeared, bronze and silver had deteriorated through oxidation. It is possible, however, to say that the corpse was generally surrounded with objects of everyday life, as at Olynthus and elsewhere. Storage jars for water were placed in the corner of the central chamber to hold lustral water for purification of the soul, as at Olynthus. Green-glazed ware was predominant. In two cases glass and pottery were purposely broken. Delicate gold leaves forming a sort of burial crown were abundant. It is too bad that the burial customs of Dura have not been more compared with those of Olynthus and other places, and that the skeletons were not studied by an anthropologist. Compare such a study as Prof. Nock has made in his brilliant and scholarly review or article in *Classical Weekly*, XXXVII (1943), pp. 64-66 of *Excavations at Olynthus*, XI, *Necrolynthia, a Study of Greek Burial Customs and Anthropology*. Compare pp. 17, 119-120, 201-202 and also *Olynthus* X, no. 505 with many parallels and references, literary and archaeological, for such wreaths. The best wreath at Olynthus has gilded bronze leaves and not pure gold.

It is strange that silver coins were found near the pelvis, "probably placed in a purse attached to a vanished belt," and that the money provided for the last journey "was already out of use." At Olynthus, (cf. vol. XI, pp. 203-206) current coins were often found in the mouth. This was a common Greek custom, evidently not followed at Dura. Bronze bells, iron finger-rings, spatulae, fibulae, earrings, bracelets, etc. were found just as at Olynthus. The absence of lamps and of objects of religious significance is a great contrast to the abundance of terra cotta figurines at Olynthus. The absence of bronze strigils is perhaps due to Phoenician or Asia Minor customs. It reflects the non-athletic character of Durians as compared with Olynthians, Cerinthians, and other Greeks. At Olynthus a strigil, which had an even deeper meaning than a wreath, was generally placed over the breast or pelvis. Fifty-nine strigils were found in fifty burials, four sometimes in one grave (cf. *Olynthus*, XI, pp. 202-203; add to the references there a lecythus by the Vouni painter in New York: Richter, *Attic Red-Figured Vases* [1946], fig. 83). The absence of inscriptions, names, and dates is characteristic of Olynthus as well as of Dura. Perhaps there were wooden markers which have disap-

peared as seems to be the case at Olynthus. The finding of stamped amphora handles is interesting. On plate XLII, I seem to see more than the mask of Silenus. It certainly is not an eagle and fish. It resembles seated Sileni or Satyrs at Olynthus. I can see the face, body, arms, and two legs of such a seated Satyr (cf. *Olynthus*, VII, pls. 39-40, especially no. 328. In *Hesperia*, III [1934], p. 299 such an oval stamp has a standing satyr playing a double flute).

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N. BØGHOLM. The Layamon Texts: A Linguistical Investigation. Copenhagen, Einar Munksgaard, 1944. Pp. 85. (*Travaux du Cercle Linguistique de Copenhague*, III.)

For texts which, like Layamon's *Brut*, were edited a considerable time ago, a modern linguistic interpretation is clearly in order. Sir Frederick Madden's great edition of both the Layamon manuscripts (MSS Cotton Caligula A. IX and Cotton Otho C XIII), which appeared in 1847, has not been superseded by the new edition promised at one time by Kölbing, nor has Madden's full introduction in which are treated the basic textual and linguistic problems been displaced by any single modern work.

Professor Niels Bøgholm of the University of Copenhagen, the author of a number of studies on the English language, has endeavored to provide the badly needed modern commentary on the language as well as a short discussion, introductory in nature, on the relation of Layamon to Wace. His book falls into the following chapters: "Wace" (pp. 6-8), "The Layamon Chronology" (p. 9), "The Layamon Translation" (pp. 10-16), "Layamon's Vocabulary" (pp. 17-24), "Sounds and Orthography" (pp. 25-37), and "Grammar" (pp. 38-85). The book has neither a bibliography nor documentary footnotes, a fact that somewhat impairs its usefulness.

The first three chapters—"Wace," "The Layamon Chronology," and "The Layamon Translation"—set forth the standard inferences as to the lives and works of Wace and Layamon. But nowhere does Bøgholm make any allusion to the widely accepted current theory about the relationship of Layamon's work to *Le Roman de Brut*. This theory, advanced by Rudolf Imelmann in 1906 and supported by J. D. Bruce and others, maintains that the bulk of Layamon's additions to and deviations from Wace's story are due to the English poet's having translated an expanded version of Wace no longer known to exist. That is, it is no longer held, with Madden (Vol. I, p. xvi), that Layamon spun out his "additions" from his knowledge of "Welsh traditions not recorded in Geoffrey and Wace." Entirely ignoring this development, Bøgholm appears to assume that Layamon worked directly with the earlier and less corrupted Wace available to us in the editions of Le Rœx de Lincy and Arnold.

The discussion of French and Scandinavian loan words in "Layamon's Vocabulary" goes beyond the remarks on this subject to be found in Adolf Luhmann's "Die Überlieferung von Laȝamons *Brut*,"

(*Studien zur Englischen Philologie*, XXII [1906]) chiefly because Luhmann treated only one text whereas Bøgholm treats both. The material in this chapter could have been considerably expanded and enlivened had the author drawn upon the valuable work of Henry Cecil Wyld, "Studies in the Diction of Layamon's *Brut*," (*Language*, VI [1930], pp. 1-24; IX [1933], pp. 47-71, 171-91; and X [1934], pp. 149-201) wherein the vocabulary of text A (MS Cotton Caligula A IX) is compared to that of text B (MS Cotton Otho C XIII) and, further, Layamon's use of synonyms in the service of poetic expression is explored.

In "Sounds and Orthography," Bøgholm comments on the orthographical uncertainty of the Layamon texts, as did Madden (Vol. I, p. xxxii), and on nunnation or the intrusion of final inorganic *n*. Following Luhmann's study, which in this respect is the more elaborate of the two, he discusses the influence of Anglo-Norman on English spelling. Certain of the remarks on phonology are weakened by a failure to decide what sound-value or sound-values are to be given different vowels, such as *a*, *æ*, and *e*, used in variant spellings. In general, the aim of the phonological discussion appears to be descriptive rather than analytical. That is, the writer at no point summarizes the phonological features which bear on the dialect or date of the texts. It is true that, at the close of this chapter (p. 37), he states rather abruptly that "the dialect of the poem is South-eastern, as maintained by Luhmann . . ." "South-eastern" here is probably a slip of the pen for "South-western," because Luhmann distinctly assigns the A text to the South-west in the passage of his work (note 1, pp. 9-11) cited by Bøgholm.

It is disappointing that Bøgholm does not take cognizance of a most interesting paper by Professor Gustaf Stern of the University of Göteborg, Sweden. In his "Old English *Æ* in the Earlier Text of Layamon" (*Göteborgs Högskolas Årsskrift*, XLVII [1941], No. 24), appearing three years before the publication of Bøgholm's book, Stern casts doubt on the frequently expressed opinion that Layamon's dialect is Southern, in which view he was preceded by Mary Serjeantsor and one or two others. Stern considers the dialect to be Mercian on the basis of a statistical study of the rendering of OE *æ*¹ (i-umlaut of WGmc *ai*) and of OE *æ*² (WGmc *ā*). His principal argument arises out of the fact that many OE *æ*² words are spelled with the characteristic Midland *e*. A critical examination of Stern's argument would have been highly appropriate in Bøgholm's treatise.

The long chapter "Grammar" contains many illuminating observations grouped under the following heads: Cases, Pronouns, Possessives, Adjectives, Adverbs, Grammatical Number, Conjunctions, Prepositions, Articles, Verbs, and Sentence Construction. The writer is especially interested in noting the variations between the two texts, such as the substitution of the indicative in B for the subjunctive in the older A text and the shift of verbs from the strong to the weak conjugations. He is also interested in semasiology, pointing out that there are in Layamon earlier occurrences of words in certain senses (for example, special meanings of *shall* and *will*) than may be found in the *NED*.

The almost complete absence of documentation in this book is a source of some difficulty, as is the failure to explain the abbreviations and other conventions that are used throughout. One learns by trial and error that the line references to Wace are taken from the Arnold edition through line 9000 and thereafter from the old Le Roux de Lincy edition before he discovers an obscure acknowledgment of that fact on the last page. The significance of superscript 2 after many words and line numbers is left to the reader to determine. One gathers that superscript 2 is used when the forms assumed by a particular word in both text A and text B illustrate the point the writer wishes to make. The abbreviation AR appears to refer to the *Ancren Riwle*. Minor errors that may be worth pointing out are the omission of two lines from a passage quoted from Wace (p. 7) and the reading "Alfred" (p. 12) where "Arthur" is almost certainly intended.

It is clear that Professor Bøgholm does not utilize all the best and most recent scholarly opinion. Nevertheless, his readable description of Layamon's grammatical usage must be regarded as a contribution.

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LOUIS CHATELAIN. *Le Maroc des Romains. Étude sur les centres antiques de la Maurétanie occidentale*. Paris, E. de Boccard, 1944. Pp. viii + 317. (*Bibliothèque des Écoles Françaises d'Athènes et de Rome*, Fasc. 160.)

M. Chatelain intended his work to present both a general study of the history and culture of Roman Morocco and a résumé of the additions to our knowledge since the works of Tissot and Besnier on the topography and archaeology of the towns and posts of this remote western Roman province. The difficulties of our time have compelled him to postpone the printing of the first part, and, though the second justifies its appearance by reason of the information it includes, full and convenient use must wait for completion of the author's *Inscriptions latines du Maroc* and his *Atlas archéologique du Maroc*.

In the first section of the present work the *Antonine Itinerary* is used as a guide in summarizing our present information regarding sites, plans, monuments, and the smaller objects found in the forts, agricultural centers, and towns, with the exception of Volubilis. What emerges is an impression of the rather limited area of Roman occupation as shown by fragments of the Limes below Sala, the slow progress of exploration in Spanish Morocco, and the slightness in general of the remains, even where, as at Banasa since Thouvenot's publication and at Sala, they provide good indications of the progress that was achieved by military settlement and agricultural exploitation. The larger and necessarily more important section brings together the results of many years of excavation and study by the author at Volubilis, which is at once the Timgad and the Cherchel

of the western region. Here the inscriptions, town plan, monuments, and smaller objects together clearly present a well-known pattern: the assimilation with local mutations of the pervasive political and commercial and cultural forms of the Graeco-Roman world to the conditions of the country. Here the value of this work lies in the information it brings together from a large and scattered and often inaccessible group of smaller publications. But it is no longer complete, as M. Picard's recent notes in the *Revue Archéologique* (1947) on some new pieces of great interest clearly reveal; and the archaeological material in it would be more usable if it were accompanied by the 64 plates listed at the end and referred to in the text.

The author is inclined to place *Colonia Iulia Campestris Babba* at the probable site of *Oppidum Novum* (p. 111), the one an Augustan colony and the other a veteran settlement of Claudius, but besides the absence of the name and the disagreement in the distance from Lixus as given by Pliny it is to be noted that the author reports no coins of Babba from the site (on these, see Grant, *From Imperium to Auctoritas*, p. 222). In general, he reports discoveries of coins too summarily (see pp. 76, 101), when such analyses as that supplied by Thouvenot in his monograph on *Banasa* (Paris, 1941) would be very helpful. Discussion of the Augustan colonization in Morocco must now take account of the views to which Grant (*op. cit.*, pp. 174-178) has been led by his study of the coinages: Tingis became a Roman municipium in 38 under the patronage of Bocchus III; Lixus probably received the same status then or at the time of the colonial settlements in Mauretania Caesariensis; and the colony of Babba should be dated to 33-32 B. C. (p. 222). This date would determine that of *Banasa* also. In the famous inscription of M. Valerius Severus of Volubilis the author has rightly preserved the reading *inclusas* and rightly associates the imposts from which Claudius granted the Volubilitani immunity for ten years with the *onera remissa* mentioned in a contemporary inscription. To the reviewer Tiberius' grant to the cities of Asia (*Tac., Ann.*, II, 47) appears similar both in phrasing (*remisit*) and in motive.

The proof-reading is not always carefully done and other mistakes occur. Read *Chorographia* for *Chronographia* on p. 34, note 1; and von Rohden's fame rests rather on his share in the first edition of *P. I. R.* than his direction of Pauly-Wissowa (p. 183). A full and useful bibliography concludes a book which, though incomplete, deserves the thanks of students of the Roman period in Africa.

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S. A. HANDFORD. *The Latin Subjunctive, Its Usage and Development from Plautus to Tacitus.* London, Methuen and Co. Ltd., 1946. Pp. 184.

The history of the Latin subjunctive presents problems of a morphological and of a syntactical nature: on the one hand several types of primitive Indo-European modal forms have amalgamated

into the system of Latin forms known as subjunctive, and on the other the subjunctive mood, originally having functions more or less easily traceable to notions of will and potentiality, has increased its sphere of usage in subordinate clauses to such an extent as partly to crowd out the indicative from expressions of actual fact. The systematic treatment of these extensions of usage in Part II is a particularly important feature of the book under consideration, but actually the whole work has value as a careful analysis of one phase of Latin syntax. The plan is historical in the sense that the main basis of classification rests on independent uses of the subjunctive from which the various dependent uses are presumably derived, but the wealth of examples, together with the index of subject-matter, make the book suitable for reference purposes in so far as actual usage of the subjunctive is concerned. If the attention devoted to authors of the Augustan Age and the Silver Age is small by comparison with the abundant citations from authors of the Republic, it must be remembered that the greatest extension of subjunctive usages lay between the Plautine and Ciceronian periods. By the end of the Republic the subjunctive was already obligatory for consecutive clauses, indirect questions, and some other constructions which originally permitted the indicative; while the new subjunctive usages which appeared between Cicero and Tacitus (with *dum*, *quamquam*, iterative *cum*, etc.) are less significant, though important enough to win some notice.

The first chapter contains a brief discussion of the origin of the Latin subjunctive forms and a somewhat more extended treatment of the conflicting views of scholars as to the original functions of the IE subjunctive and optative. The author makes the correct observation (§ 6) that no exceptionally close association exists between optative meanings and those Latin subjunctives which are derived from optative forms. Thus he frees himself of the necessity of solving the problem of wherein the IE subjunctive and optative differed, and leaves the way open for distinction of the various subjunctive tenses on the basis of aspect and more especially of tense-sequence. In the last paragraph he expresses the belief that the Latin subjunctive started with a more or less composite set of meanings, but he does not at this point say what these meanings were; rather they are reserved for separate discussion in the body of the work. Since, however, the notions of will, futurity, wish, and potentiality are taken as fundamental uses of the Latin subjunctive in the body of the work, the author may be said to follow substantially the views of Delbrück, who assigned the first two of the above functions to the IE subjunctive and the last two to the optative.

The second chapter, dealing with parataxis and hypotaxis, shows borderline cases reflecting the intermediate stage in the transition from the former to the latter and lists the marks by which fully developed hypotaxis may be recognized. The examples arranged in parallel columns in §§ 14-15 foreshadow the method used throughout much of the book, whereby examples of independent usages are followed by closely related subordinate types derived from them (§§ 76, 87, 89, 90, 93, etc.).

On the subjunctive of will in general little need be said; as might

be expected, the hortatory, jussive, and other similar types, as well as many derived subordinate types, are included under it. From subjunctives of obligation cast in interrogative form in response to commands the "repudiating question" is derived, with a coloring of surprise or indignation. Handford has an exceptional interest in this type and, in fact, states plainly (§ 74) that it deserves more attention than it has hitherto received. He makes it the starting-point for several subordinate types, including subjunctive after negative expressions of possibility, propriety, and doubt, and in exclamations after *quasi* (§ 152), where he makes a good case for derivation from the repudiating question by calling attention to the regular use of present or perfect rather than imperfect or pluperfect subjunctive. §§ 95 and 111 present a certain type of question illustrated by the example *ut quisquam istuc credat tibi?*, "do you expect anyone to believe that?", where the potential idea is as strong as the jussive idea. Actually the above example could be traced to either source and suggests, I believe, that volitive and potential subjunctives, originally quite distinct in value, have so enlarged their sphere of usage that both have developed a repudiating type of question, according as the speaker expresses impatience that another person should expect something to be so, or incredulity that it possibly could be so. If potential subjunctives, then, are one source of repudiating questions, and if these are the source of a moderately large number of subordinate subjunctive uses, the potential subjunctive may have had a greater part in the development of subordinate clauses than the present work allows it.

Reference has already been made to Part II, dealing with the intrusion of the subjunctive into expressions of actual fact, where the indicative has been partly crowded out of use and where the specifically modal character of the subjunctive has been weakened or lost. The types concerned include consecutive clauses, indirect questions, certain *qui-* and *cum*-clauses, and also subjunctives resulting from attraction, together with the closely related subjunctives in subordinate clauses of indirect statements. Most of these types can be explained on the general principle that the subjunctive is extended from situations where it has modal force (clauses of willed result, deliberative subjunctive in indirect questions, natural attraction where the subordinate clause is an integral part of the superior clause, etc.) to situations in clauses of the same class where it has no modal force.

The foregoing remarks have been intended to summarize briefly the plan of Handford's book and the method by which he explains the development of the great variety of Latin subjunctive constructions from a few fundamental usages. A few matters of terminology and classification may raise objections in the minds of some readers. In § 27 and often subsequently (§§ 36, 48, 49, etc.) the term *perfective* is applied to that use of the perfect tense which signifies an achieved result, in contrast to *aoristic*, used of simple occurrences of action without regard to progress, repetition, or resulting state. This conflicts with the usual sense of the term *perfective*, as in connection with the Slavic aspects, where its sense is substantially the same as that of *aoristic* (or *punctual*), and cannot be justified by its association with *perfect* since the Latin perfect indicative has the aoristic sense fully as often as the other sense: *I did* is fully as common a

meaning as *I have done*, if not more so. The term *resultative* might perhaps be clearer than *perfective*. Between the *ut*-clauses after expressions of necessity, propriety, etc., represented in §§ 59 and 66, there is scarcely any real difference; they only emphasize the close connection between jussives and subjunctives of obligation. In § 45 the example Plaut. Rud. 1367, with *ne diuis*, should probably be classed with the (4) *ne facis* type rather than with the (5) *ne facias* type, unless the absence of aoristic *s* is considered more significant than the optative *i*. In § 134 *adeas* in Plaut. Poen. 330 is wrongly cited as an imperative. The bibliography fails to include Tenney Frank's *Attraction of Mood in Early Latin*, although the work is cited on p. 148 and elsewhere. But these defects are not serious enough to impair the real value of the book. There are many works dealing with the Latin subjunctive, but some treat only the early period, some treat only certain constructions, and others include the subjunctive as only one phase of the whole of Latin syntax. I know of no other work specifically devoted to the Latin subjunctive in all its uses, with a chronological range of more than three centuries and with such a great variety of examples.

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